J. A. Trivedi Bros v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M. P. , Indore
1972-09-04
BISHAMBHAR DAYAL, S.M.N.RAINA
body1972
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT BISHAMBHAR DAYAL, C.J. This judgment shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Civil Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 128, all of 1965 and No. 88 of 1968. These six references under section 44 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act arise out of sale transactions by the same party, M/s J. A. Trivedi Brothers, who are the owners of some collieries and manganese mines. Misc. Civil Case No. 127 of 1965 relates to sales during the period 1st April 1951 to 31st March 1952. Six questions were referred. But learned counsel appearing for the applicant has not pressed questions Nos. 3 to 6. Only questions 1 and 2 have to be answered. They are as follows: 1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the declarations furnished by the applicant in respect of the sales amounting to Rs.1,78,346 were valid for the purpose of deduction under section 2 (j) (a) (ii) of the old Act ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to M/s Sepulchre Brothers amounting to Rs.8,23,298-1-6 and to F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 59,709-5-6 were in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution and, therefore, not liable to tax under the old Act ? Misc. Civil Case No. 128 of 1965 relates to sales during the period 1st April 1952 to 31st December 1952. In this case four questions have been referred. But questions Nos. 3 and 4 have not been pressed by learned counsel for the assessee and only questions Nos. I and 2 have to be answered which are as follows: 1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the declarations furnished by the applicant in respect of the sales amounting to Rs.58,820-15-2 were valid for the purpose of section 2 (j) (a) (ii) of the old Act ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to M/s Sepulchre Brothers amounting to Rs. 20,86,929-5-6, to M/s F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 4,22,709-4-6, to M/s Pacific Minerals amounting to Rs. 62,867-3-0 and to M/s Natwarlal Shamaldas amounting to Rs. 81,995-0-6 were in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and, therefore, not liable to tax under the old Act ? Misc.
20,86,929-5-6, to M/s F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 4,22,709-4-6, to M/s Pacific Minerals amounting to Rs. 62,867-3-0 and to M/s Natwarlal Shamaldas amounting to Rs. 81,995-0-6 were in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and, therefore, not liable to tax under the old Act ? Misc. Civil Case No. 39 of 1965 relates to sales during the calendar year 1953. In this case six questions have been referred but only questions Nos. 3 and 4 have been pressed by learned counsel for the assessee. Questions Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 have not been pressed. Questions Nos. 3 and 4 are as follows: 3. Whether the sales of manganese to these four parties were in the course of export outside India and, therefore, came under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and were consequently, not liable to tax under the old Act ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 1,04,788-9-0 were intra-State sales or were outside sales as contemplated under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto of sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce coming under Article 286(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, exempt from the tax under the old Act ? Misc. Civil Case No. 40 of 1965 relates to the transactions during the calendar year 1954. Six questions were referred in this case also. Only questions Nos. 4 and 5 have been pressed. Other questions have not been pressed. Questions Nos. 4 and 5 are as follows: 4 Whether the sales of manganese to these four parties were in the course of export outside India and, therefore, came under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and were consequently, not liable to tax under the old Act ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 95,899-6-10 were intra-State sales or were outside sales as contemplated under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto or sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce coming under Article 286(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, exempt from tax under the old Act ? Misc. Civil Case No 38 of 1965 relates to the transactions during the calendar year 1955. In this case seven questions have been referred, but only questions Nos. 4, 6 and 7 have been pressed.
Misc. Civil Case No 38 of 1965 relates to the transactions during the calendar year 1955. In this case seven questions have been referred, but only questions Nos. 4, 6 and 7 have been pressed. The other questions have not been pressed. Questions Nos. 4, 6 and 7 are as follows: 4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to the 5th party were sales in the course of inter-State trade and, therefore, such of these sales amounting to Rs. 68,385-15-0 as took place after 6-9-1955 were exempt from tax under Article 286(2) of the Constitution as well as in view of section 27-A (1) (b) of the old Act (at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax) ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the disputed sales of manganese were in the course of export out of India and came under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution (at the instance of the applicant) ? Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 32,709-3-0 were intra-State sales or were either outside sales as contemplated under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto or sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce as contemplated under Article 286(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, exempt from tax under the old Act in view of section 27 A of the old Act ?. (at the instance of the applicant). Misc. Civil Case No. 88 of 1968 relates to the transactions during the calendar years 1956, 1957 and 1959. Transactions during the year 1957 also relate to Central Sales Tax. There are also questions which have been referred on behalf of the assessee in this reference which has been made at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Question No. 1 is a mixed question which has been referred on behalf of the department with regard to transactions after 1st November 1956 when Gondia ceased to be a part of this State and was included within the State of Maharashtra and on behalf of the assessee for transactions before that date. With regard to question No. 2 learned counsel for the assessee also pressed that the question has not been properly framed.
With regard to question No. 2 learned counsel for the assessee also pressed that the question has not been properly framed. But he had throughout contended in the alternative that the transactions referred to in that question were exempt from sales tax either as being in the course of export out of India or in the course of inter-State trade. He contended that he was entitled to argue both the aspects of the matter. With regard to question No. 3 learned counsel appearing for the assessee has not pressed this question and he requested us not to answer this question because, according to him, the full facts were not on record on the basis of which he could press for an answer. He contended that he would keep this matter open to be raised in a case where all the relevant facts were brought on the record. We, therefore, need not reproduce question No. 3 and only questions Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have to be answered which are as follows: 1. Whether the transactions covered by the contracts marked in Annexures V to IX and their subsidiary Annexures are sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and whether the contracts were executed before or after 1-11-1956 ? Whether the sales of manganese ore to Sepulchre Brothers, Ltd. marked in Annexures IV and IV-A to IV-N are sales in the course of export out of India ? Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the refusal to permit withdrawal of the Appeal No. 94-IV/1964 was not justified ? From the questions stated above it will be seen that many of the points are common in one or two or more of the references and it will, therefore, be unnecessary to deal with them separately in each reference. We have, therefore, decided to deal with all the references together and dispose of all the questions to be answered and then to note our answers to the questions referred according to our findings on each of the points as given below. The first point we would like to dispose of is about the validity of the declarations filed by the assessee under section 2 (j) (a) (ii) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act. This section as it stood at the relevant time provided (omitting the irrelevant parts)-- 2(j).......
The first point we would like to dispose of is about the validity of the declarations filed by the assessee under section 2 (j) (a) (ii) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act. This section as it stood at the relevant time provided (omitting the irrelevant parts)-- 2(j)....... .....'taxable turnover' means that part of a dealer's turnover during such period which remains after deducting therefrom-- (a) his turnover during that period on-- (i) . (ii) Sales to a registered dealer of goods declared by him in the prescribed form as being intended for resale by him.......... The prescribed form in the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Rules is given under rule 26 and the relevant part of the declaration was as follows: I.........bearing Registration Certificate No... ........hereby declare that I have purchased the goods herein mentioned from Shri...............Registration Certificate No--......for the purpose of resale... ..... Thus all that the rule required was that if a declaration in this language was given by a dealer, then that sale was not to be included within taxable turnover. The contention on behalf of the department was that although the language merely states that a declaration has to be given by the purchasing dealer to the effect that the purchase has been made for resale by him, the real intention of the section was that exemption could be granted if the purchasing dealer had purchased the goods for resale by him in this State of Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in this State. The contention raised by the department is obviously not supported by the language either of the section or of the declaration prescribed. The assessee was given an assurance in clear terms that if a declaration in those terms was given, he would be exempt from tax. If on the faith of that assurance the assessee does not collect sales tax from his purchaser, he cannot afterwards be asked to pay sales tax on some supposed intention of the Legislature which was not clear from the words of the statute. Taxing statutes have to be strictly construed in favour of the assessee. We are, therefore, of opinion that the department was wrong in refusing exemption in the case of those transactions in which the declaration in the prescribed form had been given by the purchaser and had been filed by the assessee before the assessing officer.
Taxing statutes have to be strictly construed in favour of the assessee. We are, therefore, of opinion that the department was wrong in refusing exemption in the case of those transactions in which the declaration in the prescribed form had been given by the purchaser and had been filed by the assessee before the assessing officer. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the department relied upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in Netrananda v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1961 (12) S T C 169. In that case section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act was almost in similar terms. It was held that although no declarations prescribed were filed, the declaration was only a proof of the purpose for which the goods were purchased and the intention of the Legislature was to exempt only those sales which were effected for the purpose of resale in the same State for consumption. With due respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken in the Orissa case. It was also contended by learned counsel for the department that the section was amended from 1st December 1953 and after that it was made clear that only those sales would be exempt which had taken place for the purpose of resale within the State of Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption. The contention was that this amendment made it clear that the previous intention of the law was also the same. We do not agree that the subsequent amendment which brings in a drastic change can be read by implication into the language as it previously stood. We are, therefore, of opinion that the assessee is entitled to exemption. This question is relevant in Misc. Civil Cases Nos. 127 and 128 of 1965. The next point relates to the sale of coal. This is relevant in Misc. Civil Cases Nos. 39, 40 and 38 of 1965. The sale of coal was throughout the relevant period under control and was according to the directions in the Colliery Control Order, 1945. The coal was sold F. O. R. loading station by the assessee. The mode of operating was exactly the same as was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Singareni Collieries Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes AIR 1966 S C 563 : 1966 (17) STC 197.
The coal was sold F. O. R. loading station by the assessee. The mode of operating was exactly the same as was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Singareni Collieries Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes AIR 1966 S C 563 : 1966 (17) STC 197. After discussing all aspects of the case their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the transactions of coal were not taxable. We need not discuss the matter in detail, the case being concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships. We, therefore, hold that the turnover of the transactions of coal involved in these cases is not liable to sales tax under the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act. Regarding the sale of manganese ore, the first contention of learned counsel for the assessee was that these transactions were exempt from sales tax under Article 286(2) of the Constitution. But in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Hargovind Das v. State of M. P. 1967 MPLJ 60 (SC) : 1967 (19) STC 263 learned counsel did not press this point as it has been held in that case that during the period from 1951 to 1955 these assessments had been validated and could not be challenged on the ground of Article 286(2) of the Constitution. With regard to the contention of learned counsel relating to these sales being exempt under the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is enough to state that the sale of manganese was neither alleged nor shown to be for the purpose of consumption in any State in India and consequently this contention was also not pressed. It was, however, contended by learned counsel for the assessee that in view of the circumstances of the case it must be held that these transactions were in the course of export within the meaning of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. For this contention learned counsel relied upon the terms of the contract between the assessee and the purchasers and particularly referred to the following facts: (i) The purchasers were exporters who were exporting goods outside India.
For this contention learned counsel relied upon the terms of the contract between the assessee and the purchasers and particularly referred to the following facts: (i) The purchasers were exporters who were exporting goods outside India. Although delivery under the contract was to be given on rail within the State of Madhya Pradesh, yet it was a stipulation that if the ore, even though it had been examined by the agent of the buyers before loading, was found not to be according to the contract, the purchasers were at liberty to refuse delivery of such ore. (ii) It was stipulated that the seller was bound to load the wagons under the control of the buyer or his agent. The seller was entitled to a price which included the price of loading into the wagons. It was the purchaser who undertook to pay all taxes including sales tax. (iii) Affidavits were filed on behalf of the assessee which stated that the goods had been purchased for the purpose of export outside the territory of India. It was also stated: The sellers of the aforesaid ore were bound under the contract to load it into wagons and they have actually done so. The ore so loaded have been taken to ports......from where it was exported out of the territories of India through Shipping and Clearing Agents........ The purchases of the aforesaid ore have thus resulted in its export outside the territories of India. On these facts the contention of learned counsel for the assessee was that since the goods were being loaded by the seller on railway wagons, the course of transport had started and the purchasers having purchased the goods for the purpose of export, these transactions started the movement of the goods in the course of export and hence the assessee was exempt from sales tax under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. We are unable to agree with this contention. In order to apply the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for bringing a sale within the term "in the course of export", it is necessary that it must be under the contract that the goods started moving so that the terms of the contract would not be fulfilled if the goods were not exported. We do not find any such condition under the terms in the present cases.
We do not find any such condition under the terms in the present cases. It may be a fact that the purchasers had purchased the goods for the purpose of export and had actually exported the goods but that was the volition of the purchasers and not in fulfillment of the contract. We are, therefore, of opinion that the assessee has not made out a case for exemption under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Coming to the questions arising in Misc. Civil Case No. 88 of 1968 the first point that has to be considered is regarding the sales which contained a stipulation of paying the price according to the weight taken at the weighbridge of Gondia Station which went into the Maharashtra State from 1st November 1956. The Tribunal has allowed exemption on transactions after that date but has held that transactions before that date would not be entitled to exemption as at that time Gondia was within the State of Madhya Pradesh and the mere fact that weight was to be taken at the weigh-bridge of Gondia within the State would not amount to a contract under which the goods have to move out of the boundaries of the State. The contention of learned counsel for the assessee with regard to these transactions before that date was that it was indicative of the fact that goods were to start moving from the point of loading towards the destination and although at that time Gondia was within the State of Madhya Pradesh, yet the principle of the case Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Allwyn Cooper 1970 M P L J 506 (S C) : 1970 (25) S T C 26 would be applicable. We are unable to agree with this contention. Their Lordships have in that case clearly laid down as follows: So far as these two contracts of sales are concerned, it is manifest that the first weigh-ment at the Gondia weigh bridge was the basis of fixation of price and the parties therefore necessarily contemplated the movement of the goods to the Gondia weighbridge and the weigh-ment of the goods at Gondia in fulfilment of the terms of the contract.
In our opinion, this is a very important feature of the two contracts and in order to fulfil the requirement of the clause, the seller had necessarily to move the goods by rail across the frontier of Madhya Pradesh. Thus, the emphasis of their Lordships was on the fact that the seller in order to get the price fixed had to move the goods across the frontier. The ratio decidendi of the case was "across the frontier" and not mere "movement". We, therefore, hold that transactions before 1st November 1956 in which there was a term that the weight taken at the Gondia weigh-bridge would determine the price would not on account of this term alone be exempt from sales tax but the transactions after that date would be exempt from sales tax. The contention of learned counsel for the department that even sales after 1st November 1956 would not be exempt is concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court cited above. Learned counsel for the department also contended that some of the transactions which were F. O. R., Bombay, were liable to sales tax as delivery was not necessarily contemplated to the purchaser at Bombay but only the price was to include the costs of carrying the goods upto Bombay. Consequently he contended that the sales had been completed within Madhya Pradesh. We are unable to agree with this contention. Since the price was to be determined after adding the costs of taking the goods upto Bombay, contract could not be fulfilled until the goods had been carried there. It must, therefore, be held that under those transactions the goods had to be moved out of the State and those transactions were rightly held by the Tribunal exempt from sales tax. The question as to how many transactions actually contained such a condition has to be determined by the assessing officer. Learned counsel for the department pointed out that the statement by the Tribunal in the statement of the case that all the contracts of Devidayal were of that nature is not correct on a scrutiny of the contracts with that firm. But that is a matter which has to be determined by the assessing officer. It was also contended that these very transactions are also exempt as being in the course of export.
But that is a matter which has to be determined by the assessing officer. It was also contended that these very transactions are also exempt as being in the course of export. The facts of these transactions are similar to those which have been considered earlier. Learned counsel for the assessee particularly pressed the following points: (i) According to his interpretation, there was an obligation to export. We have seen no such term in the agreement itself. (ii) The goods were loaded in the wagons and the buyers actually received the goods at the ports from where they directly exported the same. The contract being F. O. R. loading station, actual delivery was irrelevant. As we have stated above, export was according to the volition of the purchasers; and (iii) On the whole, the export is inextricably connected with the contract. We are unable to agree with this either. It was the will of the purchaser whether to export, when to export or not to export. If the purchaser had not exported, the seller had no say in the matter. The last question to be considered is whether the Tribunal was bound to permit the assessee to withdraw its appeal in the case of Central Sales Tax assessment which was nil. The contention of learned counsel for the assessee was that the assessment being nil, the assessee was not bound to appeal and its appeal was really infructuous, and the Tribunal should have permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal and should not have utilized the appeal for the purpose of remand and reassessment by a refusal to withdraw the same. The contention on behalf of the department is that under the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act it cannot be said that no appeal lay. Since it had been held by the assessing officer in the same order which exempted the assessee from sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act that it was liable to pay sales tax under the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, the assessee was entitled to appeal against this part of the order. Under section 22 of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act an appeal lay by--any dealer aggrieved by an original order under this Act.........
Under section 22 of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act an appeal lay by--any dealer aggrieved by an original order under this Act......... The contention was that every order could be appealed against and since in the order there were observations which were against the assessee he was entitled to appeal against that order. The appeal was, therefore, not infructuous and the Tribunal was not bound to grant withdrawal of the appeal when the Tribunal, after hearing the appeal and the connected appeals, came to the conclusion that some of the transactions were liable to Central sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. We are satisfied that this contention on behalf of the department is correct. The assessee must have felt bound to appeal against the nil assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act also because in any case there was a finding in the order about its being liable to pay tax under the State Act and if it had not appealed against that order, this might have been pleaded as a bar of res judicata against its appeals under the State Act under which the transactions had been assessed. As the words of the section quoted above are wide enough to enable an assessee to appeal against such an order, we think that the appeal could not be said to be infructuous or incompetent and in the case of such an appeal the Tribunal was not bound to allow its withdrawal. There was no provision of law under which the Appellate Tribunal would be bound to allow withdrawal of any appeal which an assessee wished to withdraw. We are of opinion that the contention on behalf of the assessee is not well founded. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 127 of 1965 are as follows: Q.1-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the declarations furnished by the applicant in respect of the sales amounting to Rs. 1,78,346 were valid for the purpose of deduction under section 2 (j) (a) (ii) of the old Act. Q. 2-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to M/s Sepulchre Brothers amounting to Rs. 8,23,298-1-6 and to F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 59,709-5-6 were not in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Questions Nos. 3 to 6 not pressed.
Q. 2-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to M/s Sepulchre Brothers amounting to Rs. 8,23,298-1-6 and to F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 59,709-5-6 were not in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Questions Nos. 3 to 6 not pressed. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 128 of 1965 are as follows: Q.1-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the declarations furnished by the applicant in respect of the sales amounting to Rs. 58,820-15-2 were valid for the purpose of section 2(j)(a)(ii) of the old Act. Q.2-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to M/s Sepulchre Brothers amounting to Rs. 20,86,929-5-6, to F. Dupre Ltd. amounting to Rs. 4,22,709 4-6, to M/s Pacific Minerals amounting to Rs. 62,867-3-0, and to M/s Natwarlal Shamaldas amounting to Rs. 81,995-0-6 were not in the course of export for the purpose of Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Questions Nos. 3 and 4 were not pressed. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 39 of 1965 are as follows: Questions Nos. 1 and 2--not pressed. Q.3-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of manganese to the first, second, third and fourth parties were not in the course of export outside India and were, therefore, not exempt under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Q.4-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 1,04,788-9-0 were in the course of inter-State trade or were outside sales and were exempt from sales tax either under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution or under Article 286(2) of the Constitution. Questions Nos. 5 and 6-Not pressed. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 40 of 1965 are as follows: Questions Nos. 1 to 3-Not pressed. Q. 4-The sales of manganese to the four parties were not in the course of export outside India and, therefore, did not come under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Q.5-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 95,899-6-10 were inter-State sales or were outside sales and were exempt from sales tax either under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution or under Article 286(2) of the Constitution. Question No. 6-Not pressed. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc.
Q.5-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 95,899-6-10 were inter-State sales or were outside sales and were exempt from sales tax either under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution or under Article 286(2) of the Constitution. Question No. 6-Not pressed. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 38 of 1965 are as follows: Questions Nos. 1 to 3-Not pressed. Q. 4-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the transactions of sales of manganese to the 5th party in which there was a condition that the price would be settled F. O. R. Bombay were exempt from sales tax as being in the course of inter-State trade. The other transactions which took place after 6th September 1955 were not so exempt. Question No. 5-Not pressed. Q. 6-The disputed sales of manganese were not in the course of export outside India and, therefore, did not come under Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Q. 7-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of coal amounting to Rs. 32,709-3-0 were inter-State sales or were either outside sales as contemplated under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto or sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce as contemplated under Article 285(2) of the Constitution and were therefore, exempt from tax under the old Act. Our answers to the questions referred in Misc. Civil Case No. 88 of 1968 are as under: Q.1-The transactions covered by the contracts marked Annexures V to IX and their subsidiary Annexures were sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce if executed after 1st November 1956, but not if executed before that date. Q.2-The sales of manganese ore to Sepulchre Brothers, India, Ltd. marked Annexures IV and IV-A to IV-N are not sales in the course of export outside India. Q.3 -Not pressed. Q.4-The refusal to permit withdrawal of Appeal No. 94-IV/1964 was justified. Parties shall bear their own costs in all these references.