JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This appeal is by defendants 1 and 2. It is from the reversing decision dated 24-8-1968 of Shri S. Mohapatra, Additional District judge, Puri passed in T.A. No. 16/24 of 1968/1965. 2. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and proforma defendants 4 and 5 were intermediaries in respect of touzi no. 464. Anabadi plot no. 596 of khata no. 191 of village Golapur appertains to the said touzi. Plaintiff no. 1 had -/5/- interest, plaintiff no. 2 had -/6/- interest and proforma defendants 4 and 5 had together -/5/- interest in the said touzi. Upon the abolition of the estate claims were preferred in respect of the plot no. 596 which has an area of 1.15 acres, under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. A0.79 out of it was settled with plaintiffs 1 and 2 and A0.30 was settled with proforma defendants 4 and 5 by the Estate Abolition Collector. These settlements were made in the year 1959. There is a banian tree standing on plot no. 596. Plaintiff's case is that defendants 1 and 2 claiming the said tree as standing on their plot no. 595 sold it to defendant 3, and all the three defendants out a branch thereof and removed 10 cart loads of wood valued at Rs. 100/- at the rate of Rs. 10/- per cart load of wood, despite protest by the plaintiffs. Hence this suit for recovery of damages of Rs. 200/- from the defendants. 3. Two sets of written statements were filed, one jointly by defendants 1 and 2 and the second by defendant 3. The defence adopted in the both the written statements is substantially the same. The defence was : (a) the banian tree on plot no. 595 belongs to defendants 1 and 2 and they were all along in possession of the said tree. Defendant 3 purchased the same and cut some brandies of it; (b) the plaintiffs have no title to the disputed banian tree as it does not appertain to plot no. 596; at any rate, the portions of plot no. 596 which have been settled with plaintiffs 1 and 2 under the provisions of Orissa Estates Abolition Act do not contain the banian tree ; (c) the portion of plot no. 596; at any rate, the portions of plot no. 596 which have been settled with plaintiffs 1 and 2 under the provisions of Orissa Estates Abolition Act do not contain the banian tree ; (c) the portion of plot no. 596 on which the banian tree stands not having been Settled with defendants 4 and 5, as they did not file application for settlement in time, vested with the State Government and, therefore, the plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5 cannot claim the said tree and, as such, are not entitled to any damages ; and (d) even if the banian tree appertains to plot no. 596 and the said plot is deemed to have been settled with plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 4 and 5 under Estates Abolition Act, the defendants. 1 and 2 being in possession of the said land for over 12 years adversely have acquired title over it in extinguishment of title of the plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5. 4. The trial Court held that the banian tree stood on plot no. 596 basing on the report of the Civil Court commissioner, who had been appointed to survey the land. He negatived the claim of defendants 1 and 2 to acquisition of title by adverse possession. He also found that the defendants have cut a branch of the banian tree and removed 10 cart loads of wood, the total valuation of which is Rs. 100/- as claimed by the plaintiffs. He, however, said that he was unable to find that any claim was filed by the defendants 4 and 5 with regard to plot no. 596 under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, and their claim to -/5/- annas interest in that plot must be treated as barred under sub-section 3 of section 8-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, and as there were no materials before him to come to the conclusion that the banian tree stood on that portion of the plot settled with the plaintiffs, the present suit must fail apparently for want of cause of action. 5. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court that the defendants have failed to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession, and that the banian tree stood on plot no. 596 and not on plot no. 595 of the defendants. 5. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court that the defendants have failed to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession, and that the banian tree stood on plot no. 596 and not on plot no. 595 of the defendants. The plaintiffs produced the order of the Estates Abolition Collector showing the settlement of a portion of plot no. 596 with defendants 4 and 5 and filed an application to take that order as a piece of additional evidence. The lower appellate Court after hearing objection felt that he should admit such evidence in order to remove the doubt and to do justice between the parties. After considering the additional evidence together with other evidence on record he came to the conclusion that the entire plot no. 596 has been settled with plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5. Thus the lacuna in title to the entire plot no. 596, as indicated by the trial Court, having been removed, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit. 6. The points that were urged before the lower appellate Court have been repeated here. The first point is that the lower appellate Court committed an error in receiving the order of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act as a piece of additional evidence. The order of the Orissa Estates Abolition Collector is dated 13-8-1959. The plaintiffs applied for a copy of it on 12-12-1964 and got it on 7-7-1965. Before the certified copy was obtained, the suit was disposed of on 23-12-1964. In the circumstances they were unable to produce the same before the trial Court despite opportunity having been granted to them. The petition for additional evidence was filed before the lower appellate Court on 28-10-1965. The question as to under what circumstances the additional evidence may be adduced and received under Order 41 rule 27, Civil Procedure Code has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivatava AIR 1957 S.C. 912 , and in the case of K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and others AIR 1963 S.C. 1526 . In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivatava AIR 1957 S.C. 912 , their Lordships held that though additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacuna in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps, the position would be different where the appellate Court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties. In K. Venlcataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and others AIR 1963 S.C. 1526 , their Lordships held that- "Under Rule 27(1), the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence "to enable, it to pronounce judgment" but also for "any other substantial cause". There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state.of record as it is, and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under Rule 17(1)(b) of the Code." The lower appellate Court has clearly stated that it required this piece of additional evidence to remove doubts and to enable it to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, in the interest of justice. As will appear from the certified copy of the order of the Estate's Abolition Act Collector, the plaintiffs in fact applied for the same before the trial Court pronounced its judgment and his inability to procure it before the Court was not on account of any laches on his part. For the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that the lower appellate Court was justified in accepting the additional evidence. 7. The next point that is urged is that the suit should fail for non joinder of the necessary party, namely, the son of Lachhman Nisanka. For the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that the lower appellate Court was justified in accepting the additional evidence. 7. The next point that is urged is that the suit should fail for non joinder of the necessary party, namely, the son of Lachhman Nisanka. I am in agreement with the lower appellate Court that non-implication of Lachhman Nisanka's son would not be a bar in passing an effective decree and that the estates of Lachhaman Nisanka was sufficiently represented, inasmuch as his widow was a party and the widow had no adverse interest against her minor son. In fact, in the present suit, the interests of both mother and son are identical. This point, therefore, has no substance, in the circumstances of the case. 8. Lastly, it was contended that the evidence regarding adverse possession has not been considered by the lower appellate Court. That point has no substance. The question of adverse possession was fully dealt with by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court did, in fact, take up that issue and held that the plea of adverse possession has not been established. Of course, he has not elaborately discussed the evidence, like the trial Court, but I have no manner of doubt that the lower appellate Court read the evidence on the point and also the discussion of such evidence by the trial Court before rendering his finding. 9. In the result, I am of opinion that there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed