JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The following two common questions have been referred in these three special appeals for decision to this Bench at the instance of a Division Bench: 1. Whether for purposes of fixing, u/s 4 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (U.P. Act I of 1961), the ceiling area in regard to land falling in areas described in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 337 of the UP ZA and LR Act (Act No. 1 of 1951), the same should be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 337 of the UP ZA and LR Act? 2. In case the answer to the above question be in the affirmative, whether the computation in the three appeals before us should be two acres for one acre as provided originally in Section 337 of the UP ZA and LR Act or it should be on the basis of one and a half acres for one acre as provided by the amendment of Section 337 by the U.P. Land (Amendment) Act (U.P. No. 4 of 1969)? 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Standing Counsel that these questions do not arise in any of the special appeals in which the references have been made and that we should decline to answer the questions. The principal contention raised by the Appellants is that, since the land in each one of these cases lies in Bundelkhand, each tenure-holder was entitled to retain 80 acres of Fair Quality Land as his ceiling area and not merely 40 acres as in other parts of the State. The learned Standing Counsel has pointed out that, in none of these cases, was this point raised either before the Prescribed authority or before the appellate authority, nor was this point raised before the learned Single Judges who heard the three writ petitions out of which the special appeals arise. Throughout the cases have proceeded on the footing that the ceiling area for the tenure-holders was 40 acres of Fair Quality Land. The question now is whether it is open to us and proper to say that the two questions referred do not arise in the special appeals and to decline to decide them on that ground. 3. Rule 6 of Ch. The question now is whether it is open to us and proper to say that the two questions referred do not arise in the special appeals and to decline to decide them on that ground. 3. Rule 6 of Ch. V of the Rules of Court provides: The Chief Justice may constitute a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing a case. In the latter event, the decision of such Bench on the question so formulated shall be returned to the Bench hearing the case and that Bench shall follow that decision on such question and dispose of the case after deciding the remaining questions, if any, arising therein. On the strength of this rule, it was urged by Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari, learned Counsel for the Appellants, that this Bench cannot go behind the order of reference and is bound to answer the questions referred. He has also relied upon the following observations of Desai, C.J. in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Firm Deo Dutt Lakhan Lal, AIR 1966 All 73 : Sri S.N. Kaoker, appearing in Sp. As. Nos. 918 and 931, contended that there is conflict between the two Full Bench decisions and that, in any case, referring the special appeals to a larger Bench was not correct or justified. The special appeals have been referred to this Bench by an administrative order of the Chief Justice and it has no jurisdiction to consider its merits. It derives its jurisdiction over the special appeals from the order of the Chief Justice passed under Rules of Court and it has not been alleged that it is against any provision of Rules of Court. The Chief Justice passed the order on a Judicial order passed by a Bench that to resolve the conflict between the two Full Bench decisions, they may be referred to a larger Bench, e.g., a Bench of at least five Judges. It is not open to any member of this Bench to question that order of the Division Bench and I can only express surprise at the suggestion made by counsel that he can do so and that this Bench can hold that the order passed by the Chief Justice referring the special appeals to a Bench of five Judges was not proper or legal. Jagdish Sahai, Broome, Manchanda and Pathak, JJ., the other learned Judges who constituted the Bench, observed: We are in agreement with the conclusions drawn by the learned Chief Justice. It was strenuously contended by Mr. Khare that the Full Bench has been wrongly constituted inasmuch as the judgment of B.D. Gupta, J has been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of V.G. Oak and Seth, JJ. but now that a Full Bench has been constituted, we do not think it is for us to enter into the question of the propriety of the constitution of this Bench. The learned Standing Counsel was unable to place any case before us in which a Full Bench has declined to answer a question of law referred to it for decision In these circumstances, we do not think that, we would be justified in declining to answer the questions referred to us for decision. It is for the Bench to see that the questions really arise in the case before it makes the reference. Once a question of law has been referred to a Full Bench, the Full Bench has to proceed on the assumption that the Bench was, at least, prima facie satisfied that it properly arises in the case. It goes without saying that, after it has received the answers given by the Full Bench and when it is disposing of the case finally, the Bench may still take the view that the question does not arise in the case or that it should not be allowed to be raised. It will avoid the making of an unnecessary reference if a decision in this regard is taken before making the reference. The learned Standing Counsel brought to our notice the following observations of a Full Bench of this Court in Durga Gita Vidyalaya Association v. State of U.P. 1962 AWR 243 : We may observe that the relief by way of writ is a proceeding of an exceptional type. The Court should not allow it to be utilised by a party for the purpose of obtaining its opinion on hypothetical and abstract questions, not directly arising in the case before it, nor for the purpose of seeking declarations that are futile and irrelevant so far as the matter in issue is concerned. The Court should not allow it to be utilised by a party for the purpose of obtaining its opinion on hypothetical and abstract questions, not directly arising in the case before it, nor for the purpose of seeking declarations that are futile and irrelevant so far as the matter in issue is concerned. While exercising writ jurisdiction Under Article 226, the High Courts in India do not act in an advisory capacity and however fascinating might appear to be the form in which a party is able to present a legal question before the Court, the latter should resist the temptation of entering into this alluring region unless the legal question posed before it can be shown to be directly related to the specific right sought to be asserted or enforced in the writ petition itself. These observations should be kept in mind by Judges and Benches making references to larger Benches. We accordingly reject the preliminary objection. 4. In order to appreciate the questions referred, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of law. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Ceilings Act) define ceiling area and Fair Quality Land thus: (a)-'Ceiling Area' means the area of land, not being land exempted under this Act, determined as such in accordance with the provisions of Section 4; (b)-'Fair Quality Land' means land the hereditary rate whereof is above rupees six per acre. Clause (n) of Section 3 provides: (n) The words and expressions not defined in this Act, but used in the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950, shall have the meanings assigned to them in that Act. Section 4, which lays down the ceiling area, reads thus: 4. Ceiling Area-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder shall be calculated after taking into account all the land in any holding in the State held by him, in his own right, whether in his own name or ostensibly in the name of any person. (2)(a)- The Ceiling area of a tenure-holder shall be forty acres of Fair Quality Land. (2)(a)- The Ceiling area of a tenure-holder shall be forty acres of Fair Quality Land. (b)-Where the tenure-holder has, or consists of, a family having more than five members, the ceiling area of such tenure-holder shall be the area mentioned in Clause (a) together with eight acres of Fair Quality Land for every additional member of the family, subject to a maximum of twenty-four such acres: Provided that, if at any time, the family comes to consist of not more than five members, all land held by the tenure holder in excess of the ceiling area Under Clause (a), shall become liable to be treated as surplus land. Explanation-In calculating the ceiling area under this sub-section in respect of land other than Fair Quality Land, one and one-half acre of such land, the hereditary rate whereof is above rupees four per acre, but does not exceed rupees six per acre and two acres of such land the hereditary rate whereof is rupees four or less per acre, will be deemed to be equal to one acre of Fair Quality Land. Section 33 confers the power to determine or modify sanctioned hereditary rates. Rule 61 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1961, lays down the method of determining the hereditary rates in areas where no hereditary rates have been sanctioned. Rule 62 provides the method of modification of sanctioned hereditary rates in areas where marked changes have taken place since the last settlement. Section 337 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act), upon which the entire argument of Sri Chaudhari is based, is in these terms: 337. Rule 62 provides the method of modification of sanctioned hereditary rates in areas where marked changes have taken place since the last settlement. Section 337 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act), upon which the entire argument of Sri Chaudhari is based, is in these terms: 337. Computation of the area fixed in certain districts-For the purposes of computing the area fixed under any of the provisions of this Act, 2 acres shall count as 1 acre in the following areas:> (a) Bundelkhand; (aa) the Tarai and Kashipur subdivisions of Naini Tal District; (b) trans-Jamuna portions of the Allahabad, Etawah, Agra and Mathura districts; (c) the portion of the Mirzapur district south of Kaimpur range; (d) Tappa Upraudh and Tappa Chaurasi (Balai Pahar) of tehsil Sadar in district Mirzapur; (e) portion of tehsil Robertsganj, district Mirzapur, which lies north of Kaimpur range; and (f) Pargana Sakteshgarh and the villages mentioned in lists 'A' and 'B' of Schedule VI in hilly pattis of parganas Ahraura and Bhagwat tahsil of Chunar of district of Mirzapur. By President's Act XVII of 1968 which came into force on June 28, 1968, the words 2 acres in Section 337 were changed to 1 1/2 acres'. The President's Act was later replaced by U.P. Act IV of 1969 which also replaced the words 2 Acres' with 11/2 acres'. 5. The argument of Sri Chaudhari is that, since, in the Abolition Act in every provision which fixes an area, the word 'acres' is to be read as 2 acres if the land is situate in the areas specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 337, in Section 4(2)(a) of the Ceilings Act, which also fixes a ceiling area, the word 'acres' must be read as 2 acres if the land is situate in the areas specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 337 of the Abolition Act. He supports the argument on the following three grounds: (i) Since the word 'acre' is not defined in the Ceilings Act, by virtue of Clause (n) of Section 3 of that Act it should be given the same meaning which is assigned to it in the Abolition Act; (ii) the provisions of the Abolition Act, which prescribe ceilings of areas, are in pari materia with the Ceilings Act and therefore, the two Acts should be read together and the words and expressions used in the Ceilings Act should be construed in the sense in which they have been used in the Abolition Act; and (iii) that, if the provisions of Section 337 of the Abolition Act or the principle thereof is not incorporated in the Ceilings Act, the Ceilings Act will become discriminatory for lack of classification. We will now examine these three grounds in the order in which they have been raised. 6. For the application of Clause (n) of Section 3 of the Ceilings Act, it is necessary that (i) the word or expression, should not be defined in the Ceilings Act; (ii) it should be used in the Abolition Act; and (iii) it should have a particular meaning assigned to it in the Abolition Act. If these three conditions are satisfied, then that words or expression shall have the same meaning in the Ceilings Act as is assigned to it in the Abolition Act. There is no doubt that the word 'acres' has not been defined in the Ceilings Act. In fact, 'acre' has a well-known and fixed meaning and a definition would have been necessary only if an artificial meaning was to be given to that word. There is also no doubt that the word 'acre' has been used in the Abolition Act. The question then is whether any meaning other than its ordinary and natural meaning has been assigned to the word 'acre' in the Abolition Act. We have been taken through a number of provisions of that Act in which the word 'acre' has been used. After an examination of all these provisions, we are of the view that the word 'acre' in the Abolition Act has been used in its ordinary and natural meaning. It is not correct to say that the word 'acre' has been assigned the meaning of 2 acres' in the Abolition Act. After an examination of all these provisions, we are of the view that the word 'acre' in the Abolition Act has been used in its ordinary and natural meaning. It is not correct to say that the word 'acre' has been assigned the meaning of 2 acres' in the Abolition Act. All that Section 337 of that Act provides is that, for purposes of computing areas fixed under the other provisions of that Act, if the land lies in the areas specified in that Section 2 acres shall count as 1 acre. This means that, for certain specified purposes, the words 1 acre' shall be read as 2 acres'. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari contended that, at least in respect of the areas specified in Section 337 and for the purposes mentioned in that section, the Abolition Act assigned the special meaning of 2 acres' to 'acre' and for those areas and for that purpose, the same meaning should be assigned to "acre" in the Ceilings Act. It is not correct to say that the word 'acre' has been given any special meaning by Section 337. This section merely lays down a rule of computation by which the limitation as to areas made by the provisions of that Act was to be computed at double the figure prescribed if the land was situated in the areas specified. In our opinion, no special meaning has been assigned to the word "acre" in the Abolition Act and therefore, the provisions of Clause (n) of Section 3 of the Ceilings Act have no application to this word. We are unable to accept Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari's contention based on Clause (n) of Section 3. 7. The second ground, on which the argument is founded, is very similar to the first ground. The only difference is that, in the first ground, reliance was placed on the statutory provision in Clause (n), whilst, under this ground, reliance is placed on a rule of interpretation by which the same meaning maybe assigned to words and expressions used in one statute as is assigned to them in another statute which is in pari materia with that statute. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the The State of Madras Vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61 . Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the The State of Madras Vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61 . In this case, the expressions 'shall presume' and 'may presume' used in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, were given the same meaning as has been given in the definitions of these expressions in the Indian Evidence Act on the ground that the two Acts were in pari materia. We are unable to see how the principle or the decision of the Supreme Court supports Sri Chaudhari's argument. We have already held while dealing with the first ground that the word 'acre' has neither been defined in the Abolition Act, nor has it been assigned any meaning other than its ordinary and natural meaning by the Abolition Act. Even if the Abolition Act and the Ceilings Act are held to be in pari materia, since the word 'acre' has not been assigned any special meaning in the Abolition Act, no question arises of reading that word in any sense other than the ordinary and natural meaning of that word. 8. The third ground, on which Sri Chaudhari has supported his argument, is that, if we do not import the provisions of Section 337 of the Abolition Act into the Ceilings Act, the Ceilings Act will become discriminatory inasmuch as it will subject good quality and poor quality lands to the same treatment. According to him., there would then be a lack of classification which would result in discrimination. There is no doubt that there are different qualities of land in different parts of the State and if one uniform ceiling area is fixed for all qualities of land, then it might legitimately be urged that the failure to make classification of different qualities of land would result in inequality; but, in our opinion, it is not necessary that the classification should, in all cases, be on geographical basis. Section 337 of the Abolition Act makes a geographical classification. Classification can also be made on the basis of the quality of land. This is the type of classification which the explanation to Section 4 makes in the Ceilings Act. The explanation classifies land according to hereditary rates payable therefor. Hereditary rates are related to the quality of the land. Section 337 of the Abolition Act makes a geographical classification. Classification can also be made on the basis of the quality of land. This is the type of classification which the explanation to Section 4 makes in the Ceilings Act. The explanation classifies land according to hereditary rates payable therefor. Hereditary rates are related to the quality of the land. The explanation divides land into three classes on the basis of quality and provides for a different ceiling area in respect of each class. Thus, while the inequality in the fixing of ceiling areas by the Abolition Act is removed by Section 337, the inequality of the ceiling areas fixed by Section 4(2)(a) of the Ceilings Act is removed by the explanation to Section 4(2). It is, therefore, not correct to say that, if we do not import the provisions of Section 337 of the Abolition Act into the Ceilings Act, it would result in inequality in the imposition of the ceilings. 9. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that, for purposes of fixing the ceiling area u/s 4 of the Ceilings Act, the provisions contained in Section 337 of the Abolition Act cannot be taken into account. We accordingly answer the first question in the negative. Since our answer to the first question is in the negative the second question does not arise for consideration. The appeals may now be listed before the Bench concerned.