D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE next contention relates to the interpretation of clause (1 ). It was urged relying upon the word residence in clause (1) that the landlord in order to succeed in a suit falling under clause (1) should establish that the vacant possession of another house was acquired by the tenant with the intention of having his permanent abode in that house. If this intention was not there. clause (1) would not be applicable. It was pointed out that the words residence is used in clause (1) and not the words residential premises. According to the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioners if the latter words were used then mere act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable premises would entitle the landlord to a decree for ejectment irrespective of the question of intention with which vacant possession was acquired by the tenant. It was pointed out by way of an illustration that a tenant may be doing business of purchasing and selling residential premises-vacant or otherwise In such a case he has no intention to go and reside in the vacant premises purchased by him. His intention in the act of purchase and in the act of acquiring vacant possession of the premises is to sell the same and earn profit. It is urged to such a case the provisions of clause (1) would not be made applicable because to do so would virtually prevent a tenant from carrying on that business. On the question of intention it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that there is no finding by the court below to the effect that the intention of defendant No 1 in purchasing the two galas was to go and reside there with his family and to make the same his place of permanent abode. The next contention on the construction of clause (I) was that the relevant date with regard to the operation of clause (1) must be the date of filing of the suit and the passing of the decree. In this connection the words has. . . . . acquired vacant possessions of. ; occurring in clause (1) were relied upon. The next contention on the construction of clause (I) was that the relevant date with regard to the operation of clause (1) must be the date of filing of the suit and the passing of the decree. In this connection the words has. . . . . acquired vacant possessions of. ; occurring in clause (1) were relied upon. According to the learned advocate for the petitioners the present perfect tense of the verb acquire would show that the act of acquisition of vacant possession must continue upto the date of the filing of the suit in any case. These are the only contentions as regards interpretation of clause (I) and we will first deal with the contention as regards the intention of the tenant in purchasing and acquiring vacant possession of the suit premises. Sec. 13 (1) (1) for this purpose may be reproduced:-13 Nothwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied:- (1) that the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has got built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. ( 2 ) NOW the scheme of the Act and in particular the scheme underlying the provisions of secs. 12 and 13 of the Act has been made clear on more than one occassion by the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this court. Under the general law of landlord and tenant a landlord on validly terminating the tenancy of a tenant or on termination thereof in accordance with other modes described in the Transfer of Property Act becomes immediately entitled to possession of the rented premises. Sec. 12 of the Act places an embargo upon this right of the landlord. It confers protection on the tenant from being evicted from rented premises notwithstanding the fact that the contractual tenancy between him and the landlord has been terminated. But the Legislature in enacting the provisions relating to protection conferred on the tenants under the Act also wanted to balance the interest of the landlords so thai they may not virtually be deprived of the enjoyment of their property Therefore sec. 13 was enacted and the opening portion of sub-sec. But the Legislature in enacting the provisions relating to protection conferred on the tenants under the Act also wanted to balance the interest of the landlords so thai they may not virtually be deprived of the enjoyment of their property Therefore sec. 13 was enacted and the opening portion of sub-sec. (1) of that section which has been reproduced above itself shows that once to the court is satisfied that any of the events mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) had happened the embargo imposed by sec. 12 is lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession of the rented premises. Therefore it is the decision of the court as regards the happening of one of the events contemplated in clause (1) which is determinative of the matter and not the intention of the tenant in bringing about the happening of that event. If the court is satisfied that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence as in this case the question of intention of the tenant in acquiring such vacant possession is not relevant. To import intention of the tenant as a necessary ingredient in clause (1) would virtually leave the landlord (and as a necessary consequence others who need rented premises) to the vagaries of a tenant who having acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence would say that he had no intention to go to reside there nor did he entertain that intention at the date of institution of the suit. The intention of the Legislature in enacting clause (1) is to see that residential premises are made available to those who are in greater need of them than those who acquire vacant possession of suitable residential premises. The tenant who acquires such vacant possession of a suitable residence has to hand over possession of the rented premises to the landlord so that others who need the rented premises from which he is sought to be evicted may get them. Therefore it is the act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence which infer alia is determinative of the operation of clause (1 ). The other acts which are determinative of this question are the act of building a suitable residence or the act of a third party or agency of allotting suitable residence to the tenant. Therefore it is the act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence which infer alia is determinative of the operation of clause (1 ). The other acts which are determinative of this question are the act of building a suitable residence or the act of a third party or agency of allotting suitable residence to the tenant. The illustration given by the learned advocate for the petitioners of a person doing business of purchasing and selling residential houses would not be a governing factor on the construction of clause (1) looking to the object underlying the said clause stated earlier. Such a person would be better placed financially as compared to others in need of rented residential accommodation. There is no reason why such a person should not vacate the rented premises and shift to the residential premises which he has built or which has been allotted to him or of which he has acquired vacant possession It is obvious that under the provision relating to restriction of rent the landlord even after obtaining possession of this residential premises cannot charge higher rent from other tenants. The very fact that sec. 13 provides for recovery of possession of rented premises from the tenant by the landlord on grounds other than present need of the landlord to occupy those premises personally is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature to make rented premises available from time to time to other needy persons as and when the events specified in clauses (a) to (f) and (hh) to (1) occur. In this view of the matter the contention based on intention of the tenant in acquiring vacant possession is not a relevant consideration for the purpose of clause (1 ). As observed earlier it is the act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence which forfeits the protection given to the tenant under sec. 12 of the Act and entitles the landlord to obtain possession of the rented premises from such a tenant. In growing cities and towns most of which are now covered by the Act more and more persons would be in need of residential premises. The Legislature by lifting the embargo on the landlords right to recover possession under sec. 12 of the Act and entitles the landlord to obtain possession of the rented premises from such a tenant. In growing cities and towns most of which are now covered by the Act more and more persons would be in need of residential premises. The Legislature by lifting the embargo on the landlords right to recover possession under sec. 12 on grounds other than the need of the premises by the landlord himself for his occupations has tried to provide for these helpless persons who come to growing cities and towns. .