JOSHI, J.—On the night intervening the 1st and 2nd July. 1968, at about 1 or 1.15 A.M., P.W. 1 Rudsingh, P.W. 2 Phoolchand and P.W. 3 Khangarsingh members of B.S.F. party Who had laid in ambush sighted a man coming from the side of the Pakistan border. On being challenged by Phoolchand P.W. 2, the man coming from the side of Pakistan border raised his hands and gave out his name as Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. Thereafter he was surrounded by the members of the B.S.F. including P.W. 1 Rudsingh, P.W. 2 Phoolchand and P.W. 3 Khangar Singh Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was taken by the members of the B.S.F. to the outpost Machiwada and on his search being taken before the Motbirs Hoturam P.W. 5, Darbara Singh P.W. 6 and Labhsingh, an index plan of Gang Canal Colony Ex 1, a letter in Urdu Ex, 2 and a few Pakistani coins were found in his possession along with other things in a plastic bag. The search memo Ex. P. 1 was prepared in pursuance of the search. The articles found from the bag were tied in the bundle. Thereafter Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was taken with the articles recovered from him to police station Karanpur which is at a distance of 14 miles from the police outpost Machiwada and first information report Ex. P-2 was filed by Phoolchand P.W. 2 at the police Station Karanpur on behalf of the Company Commander and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was handed over to Jogendra Singh P.W. 30 incharge police station Karanpur along with the articles recovered from him on 2-7 68 at about 7.30 P.M. On arrest, Ramchandra gave out that he was merely a courier of Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh and in that capacity had brought the plan Ex, 1 and the letter in Urdu Ex. 2 for him. On receipt of the first information report, P.W. 30 Jogendra Singh proceeded to the spot and prepared the site plan Ex. 5 on 3-7-68. Having come to know of the name of Lalchand from Ramchandra, P.W. 30 Jogendra Singh suspected Lalchand in the shady affair and therefore on 5-7-68 he took the search of the house of Lalchand situated at village Kohni and recovered a chit Ex. 3 containing the addresses of certain people whom he suspected to be Pakistanis. 5 on 3-7-68. Having come to know of the name of Lalchand from Ramchandra, P.W. 30 Jogendra Singh suspected Lalchand in the shady affair and therefore on 5-7-68 he took the search of the house of Lalchand situated at village Kohni and recovered a chit Ex. 3 containing the addresses of certain people whom he suspected to be Pakistanis. He prepared the search memo in respect of the search made at the house of Lalchand, which is Ex. P-22. Lal Chand was then arrested on 5-7-68. Jogendra Singh on his part challaned both Lalchand and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand under the Indian Passports Act and the Opium Act in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Karanpur. 2. From the investigation made by Jogendra Singh, some more facts came to light which aroused the suspicion of the authorities that Ramchandra son of Bhag-wan Singh, Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh, Gopalsingh son of Amarsingh and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand had entered into a conspiracy and engaged themselves in espionage activities by giving information to the enemy country namely Pakistan which information was directly or indirectly injurious to the safety and security of India. From the investigation, the Security Department came to the conclusion that the above named four persons had committed an offence under S. 120 B I.P.C. and also under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Official Secrets Act (here-inafter referred to as the Act). Sri U.N. Misra, the Superintendent Police, Security Department, Jaipur, therefore, filed a first information report Ex. P-35 before Mahi-manand P.W. 49 in-charge, Special Police Station, Ramganj at Jaipur on 19-7-68 for prosecuting the above named four persons udder S. 120-B LP G. and under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Act. On the first information report made by Shri U.N. Misra, a case No. 2 of 1968 was registered against the above-named four persons. Investigation was then handed over by Mahimanand P.W.49 to Sri Brij Gopal D.S.P. P.W. 47. Lalchand was formally arrested on 27th July, 1968, in case No. 2 of 1968 and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was arrested on 3-8-68, in case No 2 of 1968. On 5 8-68, Lalchands house at Bijaynagar was searched but nothing incriminating was found. The investigating agency took the search of Lalchands house at Ganganagar on 7-8-68. At the search, Exs. Lalchand was formally arrested on 27th July, 1968, in case No. 2 of 1968 and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was arrested on 3-8-68, in case No 2 of 1968. On 5 8-68, Lalchands house at Bijaynagar was searched but nothing incriminating was found. The investigating agency took the search of Lalchands house at Ganganagar on 7-8-68. At the search, Exs. P.10, P.ll, P12 and P.13 were recovered from the bag which was hanging on a wooden peg in the wall. The recovery memo is Ex. P. 9. Ex. P.10 was a letter in Urdu addressed to an unnamed person by simply stating "Pyare Dost". It transpired that Ex. 2 recovered from Ramchandra son of Nadarchand which was in Urdu was also in the hand of the same person who was the scribe of Ex. P-10. Ex. P.10 contained the name of Gopalsingh accused. Taking clue from Ex P-10, the investigating agency arrested Gopalsingh at Jaipur on 12.9.68. On 22-9 68 Gopalsinghs house at Gajsinghpura was searched. Ex P-17 a small diary and Ex. P-55 a deportation order and a copy of the newspaper Obdserve Ex.P-56 were recovered from Gopalsinghs house.The search memo in this regard is Ex. P-17. 3. During the course of investigation, the investigating agency got some clue of complicity of Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh in the espionage activities and the conspiracy. Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh was, therefore, arrested on 4-lt -68. After completion of investigation, the Security Department, Police, being satisfied that a case had been made out against all the four accused, obtained sanction of the Union Government for the prosecution of the above-named four persons. The sanction is dated 13-6-69 and is Ex. P-25. It related to the prosecution of all the accused under the Official Secrets Act and cognate offence namely S. 120-B I.P.C. Under the aforesaid sanction, Brij Gopal P.W. 47 was authorised to file complaint which was filed in the court of District Magistrate. The District Magistrate after inquiry committed all the four accused to the court of Sessions, Jaipur, on 22-12-69 under S. 120B IPC. and under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Act. 4. The prosecution examined in all 49 witnesses in support of its case. The accused in their statements under S. 342 Cr. P.C. denied their complicity in the offence. and under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Act. 4. The prosecution examined in all 49 witnesses in support of its case. The accused in their statements under S. 342 Cr. P.C. denied their complicity in the offence. The accused Gopalsingh while denying the charges against him stated that he never visited Pakistan nor was he in communication with any person there. His plea was that he had been falsely implicated on account of enmity with one Harbans Singh Police Inspector. The accused Lalchand and Ramchandra sons of Bhagwan Singh also denied charges levelled against them and inter alia pleaded that Sri Manphool, the then Deputy Minister in the Government of Rajasthan was behind their prosecution. Lalchand stated that Manphoolsingh who was then the Deputy Minister in Rajasthan wanted some illegal acts to be done for his benefit but Lalchand had refused to oblige Manphoolsingh. The plea of accused Ram Chandra son of Nadarchand is that he was not arrested near the border as alleged by the prosecution. His explanation was that although he was in the village Machi-wada in the evening of 1-7-68, but his visit was in connection with selling cloth. He further stated that two officers of the B.S.F. namely Phoolchand P.W. 2 and Khangarsingh P.W. 3 owed money to him and he had pressed them for making payment of the same. On demand for money being made, a quarrel ensued between him and the two above-mentioned members of the B.S.F who had falsely implicated him in this case. The accused examined in all 8 witnesses in defence. 5. The learned Sessions Judge after an elaborate inquiry found the accused Lalchand and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand guilty of an offence under S. 3 of the Act and the accused Gopalsingh and Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh guilty of the offence punishable under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge found all the accused guilty under the offence punishable under S. 120B l.P.C. holding that all the accused had entered into a conspiracy for a purpose which was prejudicial to the safety or security of the State, inasmuch as they either obtained, collected or communicated the persons in Pakistan the official secret and with that and in view the plan Ex. 1 was taken to Pakistan which was calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy country of Pakistan or which related to a matter the disclosure of which was likely to affect the safety or integrity of the State. In the result, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused Lalchand and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand under S. 3 of the Act and also under S. 120B I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months under each of the sections. Likewise the learned Judge convicted Gopalsingh and Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh under S. 3 read with S. 9 of the Act and also under S. 120B I P.C. and sentenced each of them to 18 months rigorous imprisonment under each of the above-referred two sections. He, however, directed the sentences incases of all the four accused to run concurrently by his judgment dated 121-72. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction dated 12-1-72, all the four accused have preferred this joint appeal which is S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1972. A revision has been preferred by the State for the enhancement of the sentences of all the four accused. A rule was issued by Mehta J. in the above criminal revision for enhancement of the sentences upon the four accused who have been convicted by the Sessions Judge. On account of the rule being issued for enhancement of the sentences both the criminal appeal No. 86 of 1972 and Criminal Revision No. 96 of 1972 have been laid before the Division Bench as per the High Court Rules. We propose to dispose of both the criminal appeal and the revision by a single judgment. 7. The appeal and the revision have been exhaustively argued in this Court and the questions of law and fact which arise therein have been discussed from every conceivable point of view. We have minutely scrutinised the record and we now proceed to record our decision. 8. We first of all propose to take up the appeal preferred by the accused persons challenging their convictions. Mr. Magraj Bhansali learned counsel for the appellants while dealing with the indictment of conspiracy in the first instance raised a grievance that the charge of conspiracy was absolutely vague as it did not contain sufficient particulars so as to enable the appellants to meet it. Mr. Magraj Bhansali learned counsel for the appellants while dealing with the indictment of conspiracy in the first instance raised a grievance that the charge of conspiracy was absolutely vague as it did not contain sufficient particulars so as to enable the appellants to meet it. His grievance was that the agreement to do illegal act or to do legal act by illegal means being the gist of the offence of conspiracy u/.s 120B, in order to establish such agreement, it was very essential that the prosecution should have given the date and the place where the agreement constituting the conspiracy had taken place. It was contended that the learned Judge should have specified the point of time of commencement of the conspiracy and further the last point of time till the conspiracy subsisted as in the absence of such crucial data in the charge, the learned counsel submitted, serious prejudice was caused to the accused. 9. We have carefully examined this argument but we regret that we cannot accept it. In considering the question of criminal conspiracy it is very difficult to specify the exact date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy and the last date till it subsisted. In fact it is not possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the conspiracy and so also the manner or object of conspiracy is to be carried out. Likewise it is also very difficult to specify the place of the agreement where the conspiracy was hatched. We are fortified in this view of ours by the authorities reported as State vs. Shankar(l) & Abdulkadar vs. State(2). We find from the charge that the approximate time of the commencement of the conspiracy and the time of the subsistence of the conspiracy have been already specified. No grievance was raised on behalf of the accused persons during the lengthy trial about the vagueness of the charge. Even the learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us as to what prejudice the accused appellants had suffered on account of the alleged vagueness of the charge. No grievance was raised on behalf of the accused persons during the lengthy trial about the vagueness of the charge. Even the learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us as to what prejudice the accused appellants had suffered on account of the alleged vagueness of the charge. Looking to the very nature of privacy and secrecy inherent in the offence of conspiracy, we are not at all convinced with the argument of the learned counsel that the accused have suffered in any manner on account of the alleged vagueness of the charge. On the other hand, from the perusal of the charge, we are satisfied that it cannot be termed as vague so as to prejudice the accused in any manner. The evidence brought on the record has clearly brought to the notice of the accused appellants and approximate time of the commencement of the conspiracy and so also the time till it lasted. The accused have been put necessary question as to the activities of various persons alleged to be involved in conspiracy with reference to the approximate time which gives a cule to the commencement of the period of conspiracy and also approximate time till the activities lasted with reference to furtherance of the conspiracy In this view of the matter, we over-rule the objection of the learned counsel to the effect that the charge of conspiracy is vague. 10. The next important question of fact which requires determination is whether the prosecution has proved the existence of conspiracy the purpose of which was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State by obtaining collecting or communicating the persons in Pakistan the official secret which was calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy country of Pakistan or which related to a matter the disclosure of which was likely to affect the safety and security of the State. 11. Before we take up the factual aspect of the case, we deem it necessary to set out the relevant section relating to conspiracy under which the accused have been convicted. 11. Before we take up the factual aspect of the case, we deem it necessary to set out the relevant section relating to conspiracy under which the accused have been convicted. Sec. 120A of the Indian Penal Code runs in these terms:— "When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act, which is not illegal, by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy; Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy, unless some act, besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation:—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object." Sec. 120-B provides the punishment for criminal conspiracy. 12. The first link in the transaction of conspiracy is sought to be traced to Gopalsingh accused appellant. Gopalsingh, according to the prosecution had contacts and connection with Pak intelligence officer and spies since 1967 or even prior to that. This Gopalsingh was an employee of the P. Deptt. Bhagwansingh P.W. 27 has deposed that in the year 1966 he had accompanied Gopalsingh to Pak. He has of course deposed that he had gone in connection with black-marketing business to Pak. He has further deposed that a month or so thereafter, Gopalsingh called him to his field and he saw one Gulam Rasul Ranjha with him Gulam Rasul Ranjha asked him to accompany to Pakistan. He has given the identity of Gulam Rusal Ranjha as the resident of 23 Chak Murad Pakistan. This Gulam Rasul Ranjha is not only a national of Pakistan but is also a spy of Pakistan for receiving the secret informations of India, which are injurious to the safety and security of India. Mahiman and P.W. 49 in-charge of special police station Jaipur has stated in categorical terms that the Government of India supplies the Security Department the names of Pakistani spies from time to time and in the names so supplied, there is the name of Gulam Rasul Ranjha, r/o 23 Murad, Pakistan. There is further corroboration of the associations and contacts of Gopalsingh with Pakistani Intellegence officers as brought out in the testimony of Pyarasingh P. W. 8, Isharsingh P. W. 10 and Makhansingh P.W. 26. There is further corroboration of the associations and contacts of Gopalsingh with Pakistani Intellegence officers as brought out in the testimony of Pyarasingh P. W. 8, Isharsingh P. W. 10 and Makhansingh P.W. 26. P.W. 8 Pyarasingh has stated that he was sent by the Dy. Suprintendent of Police Ganganagar to Pakistan for spying for India during the period from 1964 66. He was however arrested in Pakistan on 17-8-66. In Pakistan he had falsely assumed the name of Ramsingh son of Jaisingh to conceal his real identity. After his arrest he was taken to Shahi Kila, Lahore, for interrogation. Lt. Dogar who happened to be the Security Officer of Pakistan had interrogated him several times to find out the truth. Ultimately he was taken to police station Haruna Bagh. Lt. Dogar accompanied by Gopalsingh came there and passed nearby him and sat in a room. A minute or two thereafter Gopalsingh came to him and after seeing him again returned to the room. Again Lt. Dogar along with Gopalsingh came to him and Mr. Dogar inquired of Gopalsingh as to whether the person giving out his name as Ramsingh was really Pyarasingh. Thereupon Gopal Singh answered in the affirmative. After receiving this information Lt. Dogar took the witness (Pyarasingh) in a car to Lahore. The witness further stated: "When I was made to sit in the car, Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha were standing side by side." This witness has further deposed that Gulam Rasul Ranjha was a partner with Gopalsingh in a black-marketing business. This Pyarasingh after undergoing the sentence was repatriated to India which fact is duly proved by Amarnath P. W. 44. Amarnath P.W. 44 was in the office of the Dy Commissioner as an Asstt. He has stated that when Indian Nationals are repatriated from Pakistan, the Attache or the Secretary to the Indian High Commission comes to the Hussainiwala border to personally hand over the Indian Nationals to the Deputy Commissioner. He has stated that a letter was received from the Indian High Commission on 22-8-68 that a person in the name of Ramsingh son of Jaisingh, resident of Ganganagar, Rajasthan, is being repatriated along with 30 persons. The original letter is Ex. P-46 wherein the name of Ramsingh appears at serial No. 15. This witness has further deposed that on 27-6-69 another letter Ex. P47 was received repatriating some mote persons. The original letter is Ex. P-46 wherein the name of Ramsingh appears at serial No. 15. This witness has further deposed that on 27-6-69 another letter Ex. P47 was received repatriating some mote persons. The letter in this behalf is Ex. P-47 and the list of the persons forwarded along with this letter is Ex P-47/1. The names of Isharsingh (P.W. 10) and Makhansingh (PW 26) appear at the serial Nos. 21 and 27 respectively in that list, amongst the persons repatriated from Pakistan Isharsingh P. W. 10 has deposed to the association of Gopalsingh with Lt. Dogar, the Pakistani Intelligence Officer in Pakistan. This fact was witnessed by him when he was arrested for crossing the border of Pakistan. 13. The next witness to establish the association of Gopalsingh with Pakistani Intelligence Officer is Makhansingh P.W. 27. He has deposed that be was arrested for going to Pakistan by Pakistani authorities. He saw Gopalsingh with Lt. Dogar, Intelligence Officer of Pakistan. Both Lt. Dogar & Gopalsingh accused had rebuked him for spying for India. Besides this, there is documentary evidence in the form of Ex. P-17 recovered from his house. Ex. P.17 is a diary containing the names and addresses of Pakistani foreign agents, Intelligence Officers of Pakistan like Gulam Rasul Ranjha and Sardar Ali Dogar. The name of "Aafjal Manzil Bhawal Nagar" is also mentioned in the said diary. P.W. 49 Mahimanand has deposed that the address "Aafjal Manzil Bhawal Nagar" mentioned in the diary Ex. P-17 was an address of the office and residence of Pakistani Intelligence Officer. After about a month, accused Gopalsingh sent for the witness in his field where the witness saw the accused Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha. P. W. 9 Kartarsingh is another witness to prove Gopalsinghs connection and contacts with Pakistan. This witness has stated that he arranged crossing the border by the accused Gopalsingh at his request and once he too accompanied the accused Gopalsingh and went to Pakistan and stayed for one night at Gopalsinghs house. The younger brother of Gulam Rasul asked the witness to go inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the accused Gopalsingh, Gulam Rasul and one Harish were talking with Pakistani Police. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination of the above-referred to witnesses to discard their testimony. 14. The younger brother of Gulam Rasul asked the witness to go inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the accused Gopalsingh, Gulam Rasul and one Harish were talking with Pakistani Police. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination of the above-referred to witnesses to discard their testimony. 14. From the above analysis of the oral as well as documentary evidence, it is established beyond reasonable doubt that Gopalsingh had not only had contacts and association with Pakistan but was in close touch with the Pakistani Intelligence Officers and spies. At present we are only concerned with the consideration of the question as to Gopalsinghs complicity in the offence of conspiracy. It will appear from the testimony of the above witnesses that his illegal connections and contacts with the Pakistani spies and Intelligence Officers related back to the period since 1967 and it is on that account that the period of commencement of conspiracy has been specified to be the year 1967 in the charges framed against the accused appellants. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that once Gopalsinghs contacts with Pak nationals to do illegal act is established, he is liable to be convicted on the indictment of conspiracy. According to him conspiracy could be entered into between known or unknown person or even a foreigner. In this connection he relied upon Lennart vs. Director of Enforcement(3). We have carefully perused this authority. But it is distinguishable. In that case, a foreigner was found to have committed an illegal act in the territory of India. It is doubtful whether a foreigner residing in Pakistan and entering into conspiracy with an Indian national can be termed as doing illegal act, as doing acts for spying for his own country in our opinion cannot be held to be an illegal act in that country. We, therefore, are unable to hold that Gopalsingh was in conspiracy with unknown persons in Pakistan. 15. We have now to see whether the other accused appellants were in conspiracy with Gopalsingh to commit illegal activities of espionage for Pakistan so as to directly or indirectly harm the safety or security of India. 16. We, therefore, are unable to hold that Gopalsingh was in conspiracy with unknown persons in Pakistan. 15. We have now to see whether the other accused appellants were in conspiracy with Gopalsingh to commit illegal activities of espionage for Pakistan so as to directly or indirectly harm the safety or security of India. 16. We may here observe that the gist of the offence of conspiracy lies not in doing the act or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them nor in inciting others to do them but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough. In an indictment of conspiracy; it is sufficient if the combination exists and is unlawful because it is the combination itself which is mischievous. 17. Thus from the perusal of sec. 120-A I. P. C., it will appear that there should be a consensus or a meeting of the minds and each person alleged to be a party to the conspiracy must be proved to have shared the criminal intention. In the very nature of conspiracy, privacy and secrecy are more characteristic of a conspiracy than a loud discussion in an open place. Thus the conspiracy can seldom be proved by means of direct evidence and has almost invariably to be inferred from circumstantial evidence consisting generally of evidence as to the conduct of the parties on certain occasions and in relation to certain matters. To put it in a nutshell, secrecy and privacy being the special character of conspiracy, it is very difficult to prove by direct evidence and is generally inferred by conduct and circumstances vide N. M. M Y. Momin vs. State of Maharashtra(4). We may however observe here that as regards the standard of proof required to establish a charge of conspiracy, there is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence. The conspiracy may be established by direct evidence if any or by proof of circumstances from which a legitimate inference of the existence of an agreement between the parties to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means can be drawn. In a word, the conspiracy can be established by means of circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy may be established by direct evidence if any or by proof of circumstances from which a legitimate inference of the existence of an agreement between the parties to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means can be drawn. In a word, the conspiracy can be established by means of circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence should however be of such a nature as must necessarily lead to a finding of guilt, (vide Sailendra Nath Mitra vs. State(5) ). In Bhagwan Sarup vs. State of Maharashtra(6) while dealing with the mode of proof of conspiracy, Subba Rao J. has observed as under : "The essence of conspiracy is, therefore, that there should be an agreement between persons to do one or other of the acts described in the section. The said agreement may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from acts and conduct of the parties. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence; it can be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence." It is in the light of the above propositions that we have to consider whether any of the accused appellants had entered into a conspiracy with .Gopalsingh as stated in the charge. Ramchandra son of Bhagwan Singh—First of all we take up the case of Ramchandra son of Bhagwan Singh for determining whether he had entered into conspiracy with the other accused appellants. The learned Sessions Judge while dealing with the case of Ramchandra son of Bhagwan Singh has observed as follows— "Taking the case of Ramchandra s/o Bhagwan Singh, I find that the evidence against this accused is that he once asked for a plan of 4th Desert Division of the Rajasthan Canal from Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12, and at that time, accused Ramchandra s/o Nadarchand was with him. The letter Ex. P10 then makes a reference to a plan of the Rajasthan Canal having been sent to, presumably, Pakistan and was returned by the receiver. This is enough ground to presume that the plan which Ramchandra s/o Bhagwan Singh received was that plan which was returned through Ex. P-10 " While discussing the charge of conspiracy the learned Judge has merely observed : "All the accused are further guilty of the offence punishable under sec. This is enough ground to presume that the plan which Ramchandra s/o Bhagwan Singh received was that plan which was returned through Ex. P-10 " While discussing the charge of conspiracy the learned Judge has merely observed : "All the accused are further guilty of the offence punishable under sec. 120B of the Indian Penal Code, in that, conspiracy is inferred from the different parts played by them in connection with the main offence of having one purpose, which was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State." It will thus appear that the learned Judge has convicted Ramchandra son of Bhagwan Singh on the ground that he once along with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand approached P.W. 12 Madan Mohan Saini and asked for a plan of 4th Desert Division of the Rajasthan Canal from the witness. The further circumstance which has been pointed out by the learned Judge in this connection is that there is reference to the plan of the Rajasthan Canal in the letter Ex. P.10 alleged to have been recovered from Lalchands house in a plastic bag. The learned Judge has, therefore, raised a presumption that the reference to the plan of Rajasthan Canal in Ex. P-10 must be to the one which was obtained by Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh from P. W. 12 Madan Mohan Saini and he has further drawn a presumption that the plan obtained by Ramchandra s/o Bhagwansingh must have been sent to Pakistan and was returned by the receiver. We are not at all satisfied with this logic of the learned Sessions Judge purely based on unwarranted presumption for seeking to establish the case of conspiracy. We may emphasize that conspiracy has to be provide by independent evidence and the presumption as applied the learned Judge is not at all permissible to bring home the charge of conspiracy to this accused appellant. As already observed, conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstantial evidence must lead irresistibly to one and one conclusion that the accused was responsible for the act imputed to him. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the plan obtained by this accused from Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12 was ever sent to Pakistan. Nor is there scintilla of evidence to prove that the reference in [Ex. P-10 was to the very plan obtained by this accused appellant. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the plan obtained by this accused from Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12 was ever sent to Pakistan. Nor is there scintilla of evidence to prove that the reference in [Ex. P-10 was to the very plan obtained by this accused appellant. In the absence of any cogent evidence even of circumstantial nature, it is very difficult for us to agree with the line of reasoning of the learned Judge The presumption under sec. 3 and 4 of the Official Secrets Act which prescribe special rules of evidence for the purposes of that Act cannot, in our opinion, be availed of to prove the charge of conspiracy which has to be proved by independent evidence may that be of circumstantial nature or of conduct of the accused. The circumstantial evidence does not come up to that requisite standard so as to bring home the charge of conspiracy to this accused appellant. There is not even a suggestion that this accused appellant could be said to be in agreement with the rest of the accused persons to commit the illegal act imputed in the charge of conspiracy against him. It has been stated by Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12 that at the time of asking for the plan of 4th Desert Division of the Rajasthan Canal from him, Ramchandra son of Nadar Chand happened to accompany him. This witness has admitted that the plan was given to this accused appellant about 2i years prior to his date of deposition dated 26-8-70. He has admitted that no record is kept for giving such a plan in his office. He has further conceded that he does not remember the date of giving the plan to this accused appellant. He has also admitted that he did not know the name of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand at the time when he accompanied this accused appellant. He has also not referred to the name of Ramchandra son of Nadar Chand before the police. In this state of affairs, we are not prepared to believe this part of his statement that Ramchandra son of Nadarchand had accompanied Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh to P. W. 12. He has also not referred to the name of Ramchandra son of Nadar Chand before the police. In this state of affairs, we are not prepared to believe this part of his statement that Ramchandra son of Nadarchand had accompanied Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh to P. W. 12. There is not an iota of proof to prove Ramchandra son of Bhagwansinghs association of culpable nature warran-ting an agreement in the common design of doing an illegal act with Gopalsingh and the rest of the accused. This accused appellant of course happens to be the real brother of Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh, but nothing has been suggested by the prosecution to show his association being of a suspicious character either with Lal Chand or with Gopalsingh and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand in doing an illegal act as contemplated by sec. 120A I. P. C. The evidence of P. W. 12 Madan Mohan Saini is not at all sufficient to establish or provide a circumstance irresistibly giving rise to a conclusion of the complicity of this accused appellant in the crime of conspiracy. It is therefore very difficult for us to hold that Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh was a party to the conspiracy set up by the prosecution. Ramchandra son of Nadarchand—We next take up the case of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. He was apprehended by the party of Border Security Force namely Roodsingh P.W. 1, Phoolchand P.W. 2 and Khangarsingh P.W. 3 while he was coming from the side of Pakistan near the Pakistan border. This accused appellant was found to be possessed of site plan Ex.1 of the Gang Canal along with Ex 2 a letter in Urdu On the night intervening the 1st & 2nd July, 1968, Ex. 2 a latter in Urdu was scribed by the same author who is the author of Ex. P-10 alleged to have been recovered from Lalchands house. Both Ex. 2 and P-10 have not been signed by the scribe of those letters nor were they addressed to any person by them. 2 a latter in Urdu was scribed by the same author who is the author of Ex. P-10 alleged to have been recovered from Lalchands house. Both Ex. 2 and P-10 have not been signed by the scribe of those letters nor were they addressed to any person by them. They purport to be addressed to Pyare Dost The learned Additional Advocate General had urged that the scribe of Ex 2 and Ex P-10 being one and the same person and Ex P-10 having been recovered from the house of Lalchand, it should be held to be proved that this accused appellant was in conspiracy with Lalchand, son of Bhagwansingh, in espionage activities against India in favour of Pakistan. It has been further urged that as Ex P-10 makes a reference to Gopalsingh therefore, the liaison at least between these three persons namely this accused appellant, Lalchand and Gopalsingh is proved. On the other hand, Mr. Magraj on behalf of the appellants raised a serious controversy with regard to the use of Ex.P-10 against any of the appellants. In the first place, he submitted that it is not proved that Ex. P-10 was recovered from the exclusive possession of Lalchand; secondly he urged that unless the general prima facie reasonable proof of conspiracy is educed, the contents of Ex P. 10 cannot be looked into to spell out the proof of conspiracy therefrom; thirdly that there is no proof to trace Ex. P-10 to its author. We been it appropriate at this stage to determine the controversy raised at the bar. Having heard the arguments at the bar and after examining the evidence on the record, it cannot be said with certainty that Ex P. 10 was recovered from the exclusive possession of Lalchand The key of the house of Lalchand was with his father Bhagwan Singh who actually opened the lock at the time of the search of his house Bhagwan Singh had easy access to this house even though he was then residing in Abhor. He was brought from the Abhor by the police party and at that time he came with the key of the house therefrom Ex. P.10 is alleged to have been recovered. The possibility of the letter Ex. P-10 being addressed to Bhagwansingh cannot be ruled out in the facts and circumstances of the case. The letter Ex. He was brought from the Abhor by the police party and at that time he came with the key of the house therefrom Ex. P.10 is alleged to have been recovered. The possibility of the letter Ex. P-10 being addressed to Bhagwansingh cannot be ruled out in the facts and circumstances of the case. The letter Ex. P-10 is alleged to have been recovered from a bag which was hanging on the wooden peg of the wall of the house along with other papers. What these other papers were has not been disclosed by the prosecution. Even while making the list of the documents recovered from the bag, the investigating agency had failed to make a list of all the documents found in the bag. Reference may here be made to Prithvi Singhji vs. State of Bombay(7). In that case 76 bottles of foreign liquor were recovered by the authorities under the Prohibition Act from the trunks admittedly belonging to the accused Prithvisingh. The keys of the trunks however were with the servant. At Abu Road where the Prohibition Act was in force then, the 76 bottles of foreign liquor were recovered from the trunk belonging to the accused. In this state of facts, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that: — "It has been proved beyond any question that although the ownership of these trunks is in the appellant, the entire handling of these trunks, their packing and unpacking, was in the hands of his servant Gangaram Makarji who had in his possession their keys." In these circumstances their Lordships observed that: "The likelihood of Gangaram Makarji taking advantage of his control and possession of his masters luggage, to bring into Abu Road a large quantity of liquor for his own purpose and profit cannot altogether be excluded." Their Lordships further observed that : "The circumstantial evidence in the case is not of that kind from which the only inference that could reasonably be drawn was that the appellant had knowledge of the contents of his luggage and that he had accordingly possessed an intoxicant, incontravention of the provisions of the Act." Another case relevant to the point is Radha Kishan vs. State of U.P. (8). In that case the accused was|being prosecuted u/s. 52 of the Post Office Act 1898, for secreting certain registered postal articles. In that case the accused was|being prosecuted u/s. 52 of the Post Office Act 1898, for secreting certain registered postal articles. All that the prosecution had been able to prove was that those articles were found in an almirah of the house in which the accused lived jointly with his father and of which the key was furnished by the father. In this state of evidence it was observed by their Lordships that it would not be legitimate to infer that the almirah was even in the accuseds joint, much less in his exclusive possession. It was also observed that the circumstance that the almirah contained, apart from the registered articles in question, certain other articles belonging to the accused could not sustain an inference that the almirah was in the accuseds possession exclusively or even jointly with his father. On the other hand, if the almirah also contained a large number of articles belonging to the father, since he had the key with him, it must be he who must be deemed to be in possession of the almirah and consequently of its contents, including the registered articles in question. The fact that the accused had the opportunity to get at the articles was not sufficient to infer exclusive possession of the accused of those articles. Their Lordships therefore refused to draw any presumption against the accused that he had secreted the postal letters from the mere fact that they were found in the almirah which, at best might be regarded as being in the joint possession of himself and his father." 18. From the facts and circumstances brought on the record, it is very difficult for us to hold that Bhagwansingh had no access to the house specially when he was possessed of the key of the house which was only tendered by him at the time of the search for opening the lock of the house. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to throw light on the nature of papers which were laying along with Ex. P-10. The circumstance of recovery from the house belonging to Lalchand, in our opinion, cannot exclude the possibility of Bhagwansingh placing the same in the bag as it was he who was in possession of the key. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to throw light on the nature of papers which were laying along with Ex. P-10. The circumstance of recovery from the house belonging to Lalchand, in our opinion, cannot exclude the possibility of Bhagwansingh placing the same in the bag as it was he who was in possession of the key. We, therefore, do not feel inclined to accept the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the letter was recovered from the exclusive possession of Lalchand. 19. Taking up the second contention of Mr. Magraj that the contents of Ex. P-10 could not be looked into, we have been referred to the provisions of sec. 10 of the Indian Evidence Act The learned Additional Advocate General urged that the contents of Ex P-10 could be looked into for proving the charge of conspiracy. Mr. Magraj on the other hand urged that sec. 10 could not be availed of unless the condition precedent that is the prima facie proof of conspiracy is adduced. In this connection numerous authorities were cited at the bar, but in view of the settled position of law laid down by Mirza Akbar vs. Emperor(9) and Sardul Singh vs. State of Bombay(lO), we need not analyse the various authorities cited at the bar. Mirza Akbar vs. Emperor (supra) had enacted the limits of admissibility of evidence in conspiracy cases. It has been held that S. !0 must be construed in accordance with the principle that thing done, written or spoken was something done in carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a step in the proof of the conspiracy. Their Lordships further observed that the evidence receivable must be "in reference to their common intention* and the words "anything said, done or written by any of such persons" are not capable of being widely construed The same view has been taken in Sardul Singh vs. State of Bombay (supra). It will, therefore, appear that the application of the rule of law embodied in sec. 10 is strictly conditional upon there being reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons have engaged themselves in a joint enterprise, e. g., criminal conspiracy. The requirements of the section should be always borne in mind. It will, therefore, appear that the application of the rule of law embodied in sec. 10 is strictly conditional upon there being reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons have engaged themselves in a joint enterprise, e. g., criminal conspiracy. The requirements of the section should be always borne in mind. When the condition above is fulfilled, i. e., once reasonable grounds are made out for belief that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence, anything done or said by each conspirator in reference to the common design is admissible against each of the others. 20. In this case, to our mind, the prosecution has not been able to satisfy that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accused appellants were in conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution and consequently it is not possible for us to refer to the contents of Ex. P. 10 to spell out the proof of conspiracy. 21. The learned Additional Advocate General then urged that the contents of Ex. P. 10 could be looked into under sec. It or 32(3) of the Evidence Act, 22. We have examined the rival contentions of both the sides. S.l 1 makes facts not otherwise relevant, relevant if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. Mr. Magraj has urged that although the facts could be taken note of if they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable; but his contention is that the contents or recitals in the letter cannot be said to be a fact within the meaning of sec. 11. He has in this connection cited Thakurji vs. Parmeshwar Dayal(ll), Kalappa vs. Bhima(12) and Ravjappa vs. Nilakanta Rao(13). In these authorities it has been held that recitals in a document cannot be deemed to be a fact within the meaning of sec. 10, It may be pointed out that wider interpretation should not be given to the term "fact". There is a difference between the statement as to fact and to the fact itself. Sec. 11 speaks of the existence or non existence of any fact. Had the Legislature intended the term fact to embrace the statement within the fold of sec. 10, It may be pointed out that wider interpretation should not be given to the term "fact". There is a difference between the statement as to fact and to the fact itself. Sec. 11 speaks of the existence or non existence of any fact. Had the Legislature intended the term fact to embrace the statement within the fold of sec. 11, then it could have also referred to the term "statement" along with "fact" as has been done in sec. 32 of the Evidence Act. We, therefore, hold that the contents of letter Ex.P. 10 cannot be looked into under sec. 11 to prove the charge of conspiracy. We may, however, point out that our observations on this score should be taken to be limited to the ordinary charges under the Indian Penal Code, as we think that the contents of Ex. P. 10 can be used to look into the incriminating circumstances against the accused under the Act as in that Act as we will advert to later on, a lesser degree of proof is required and the conviction can be based on the conduct, circumstances and the proved character of the accused person. Sec. 32(3) in our opinion is also not of any assistance to enable the prosecution to refer the contents of the documents to bring home the charge of conspiracy against the accused person. The relevant portion of sec. 32 may be extracted as follows— "Statements, written or verbal of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable are themselves relevant facts in the following cases — (3) When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it would exposed him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages." Under sub-sec. (3), the statement of a person whose attendance could not be procured is made admissible if such a statement would expose the person making the statement to criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages. (3), the statement of a person whose attendance could not be procured is made admissible if such a statement would expose the person making the statement to criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages. A careful reading of this section gives a clear indication that at the time of making a statement that statement could have exposed the person to criminal prosecution. The alleged statement in Ex. P. 10 emanates from a person residing in a foreign place and the statement made in Pakistan by the scribe of Ex. P. 10 cannot be conceived to have exposed him to a criminal prosecution at the time and place when and where it was made. In.these circumstances we hold that the contents of Ex. P. 10 cannot be referred under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act for bringing home the charge of conspiracy. 23. If Ex. P. 10 is taken out of consideration, then it will not at all be safe to arrive at the conclusion that Ramchandra son of Nadarchand, Gopalsingh and Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh accused appellants had illegal common design with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. The prosecution has further relied upon association of this accused appellant with Lalchand on the ground that Lalchand was instrumental in arranging the marriage of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the testimony of Madanlal P. W. 21, who has deposed that it was Lalchand who arranged the marriage of his sister with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. Both Lalchand and Ramchandra son of Nadarchand have denied this fact. To our mind, even if this evidence is believed be to true, it is rather an innocuous circumstance which does not lead to the inference of culpability on the part of both these persons in the matter of conspiracy. The mere association of the accused person with the other is not sufficient to lead to an inference of conspiracy unless the association itself is of a suspicious nature. There is also no evidence of the association of the accused appellant with Gopalsingh. The evidence brought on the record against this accused appellant, in our opinion, is not at all sufficient to bring home the charge of conspiracy against him. Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh—We next take up the case of Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh in respect of the charge of conspiracy. The evidence brought on the record against this accused appellant, in our opinion, is not at all sufficient to bring home the charge of conspiracy against him. Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh—We next take up the case of Lalchand son of Bhagwansingh in respect of the charge of conspiracy. The circumstances brought against this accused appellant may be briefly summarised as below: (1) That he was a Patwari in the Irrigation Department and that the had access to the office of the Executive Engineer and removed the plan alleged to have been recovered from Ramchandra son of Nadarchand ; (2) that letter Ex. P. 10 was recovered from his house ; (3) that he had association with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand ; (4) that he had association with Gopalsingh inasmuch as he had been to his house as per the statement of P. W. 4; (5) letter Ex. P. 11 alleged to have been written by one Syamsunder Sastri. an astrologer, to Lalchand was recovered from the house of Lalchand. That letter clearly shows his complicity in the illegal activities of espionage for Pakistan against India. 24. From the circumstances outlined above, the alleged recovery of Ex. P. 10 where the name of Gopalsingh finds place is a relevant circumstance worthy of consideration, and his association with Gopalsingh as per the statement of P. W. 4 Ratansingh. As regards Ex.P. 10 we have given our finding above and it need not detain us any further to rule out Ex. P. 10 from consideration so far as this accused appellant is concerned. 25. We, at this stage, wish to consider the testimony of P. W. 4 Ratansingh. Ratansingh who is a taxi-driver deposed that some 2-1/2 years prior to the date of deposition namely 21-5 70 one Sardarilal had hired his jeep and taken it to Ganga-nagar at the house of the accused Lalchand. When he reached there with Sardarilal, two persons namely accused Gopalsingh and one Gupta were present there. In the evening the person named Gupta slaughtered a fowl. When he reached there with Sardarilal, two persons namely accused Gopalsingh and one Gupta were present there. In the evening the person named Gupta slaughtered a fowl. On his asking accused Lalchand replied that the name of Gupta was Gulam Rasul Ranjha and that he was a Muslim The witness further deposed that after about one month of this incident, accused Lalchand hired his jeep saying that two persons were ill and they were to be brought from Ramsinghpura and from that village the witness brought the accused Gopalsingh and one Gulam Ghosh. In the cross-examination the witness has admitted that he could not give the description (Hulia) of the person named as Gupta. He has pointed out that he was dark-skinned and middlesized. He has further admitted that he did not give the description (Hulia) of this person. He has been contradicted by Bhagwansingh P. W. 27 in the matter of colour of Gupta who had described that he was fair-skinned. After perusing the statement of this witness, we are not impressed with the truth in what he has said. In the first place, there could have been so occasion for Lalchand to have disclosed the identity of the person who had falsely assumed the name of Gupta. Ordinarily, it does not stand to reason that the identity of the person who is assuming a false name and is deputed to do the spying work would be disclosed to a taxi-driver who had no business to ask him much less to be informed of the identity of such a person. Looking to the contradictions as to the colour of Gulam Rasul deposed to by this witness, it appears that he is not a witness of truth and appears to have been invented to suit the convenience of the prosecution. There is no other evidence to connect Lalchand with Gopalsingh so as to justify an inference of agreement to do an illegal act as contemplated under sec. 120B I.P.C. 26. The learned Sessions Judge has very casually disposed of the charge under sec, 120B and his finding on this charge is perfunctory. Neither he has analysed the ingredients nor has he catalogued the circumstantial evidence to come to a conclusion that the accused were guilty under sec. 120B I. P. G. He is rest content to observe that— "All the accused are further guilty of the offence punishable under sec. Neither he has analysed the ingredients nor has he catalogued the circumstantial evidence to come to a conclusion that the accused were guilty under sec. 120B I. P. G. He is rest content to observe that— "All the accused are further guilty of the offence punishable under sec. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, in that, conspiracy is inferred from the different parts played by them in connection with the main offence of having one purpose, which was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State." He has neither taken care to refer to the gist of the evidence nor has he cared to find out what are the circumstances which sustain agreement between the parties to establish that they had a common mind to do an illegal act. We are constrained to observe that this finding cannot at all be said to be a judicial finding. 27. From the above narration of facts and discussion of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge of conspiracy to the accused persons and the accused appellants must be acquitted of this charge. 28. Having dealt with the indictment of conspiracy against all the accused, we now propose to take the cases of all the accused under the Official Secrets Act, 1923. Before we deal with the individual cases of all the accused persons, we deem it expedient to note the relevant salient features of the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act prescribes penalties for spying in any of the three following circumstances— (a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place; or (b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy; or (c) obtains, collects, records or publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article or note or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy or which relates to a matter the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States. The general object of the Act appears to prevent any foreign power from obtaining, in whole or in part, any information which is prejudicial to the safety or security of the State. The Act derogates from the ordinary principles of definitions of offences provided by the Penal Code. Under the present Act, the obligation of the prosecutor is lightened by exception because the facts which form the various offences defined under the Act are proved through presumption and by the transfer of the onus of proof from the State to the accused himself. The Act sets up two presumptions which, if not rebutted, prove these two elements of the offence. The Act also gives a wider definition to the term "foreign agent" so as to include any person who is or has been or in respect of whom it appears that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting him of being or having been employed by a foreign power, either directly or indirectly for the purpose of committing an act either within or without India, preju-dicial to the safety or interests of the State etc. A presumption has been permitted under sec. 4(2) of the Act to the effect that if a person has been in communication with foreign agent, his purpose shall be presumed to be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. The Act, therefore, being primarily meant for the safety and security of the State is to be interpreted with that object in view and consequently liberally. 29. The special features of the Act came to be considered by Chhangani J. in D B. Criminal Appeal No. 663 of 1968 (Kutubudeen vs. State of Rajasthan) decided on 14th August, 1969, where after noting the principles of construction of statutes with regard to the safety and security of the State, Chhangani J. observed as follows— "Broadly stated, the Act contains provisions prescribing certain standards of proofs for some matters and special rules of evidence for proving some facts and certain presumptions in favour of the prosecution. Sec. 3 of the Act inter alia states that in cases of offences punishable under sec. 3, to 14 years rigorous imprisonment, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove any particular act tending to show purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. Sec. 3 of the Act inter alia states that in cases of offences punishable under sec. 3, to 14 years rigorous imprisonment, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove any particular act tending to show purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. The accused may be convicted if from the circumstances of the case or his conduct or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. The use of the expression "if it appears" indicates that the standard of proof requiring a lesser degree of probability has been prescribed. Sec. 3 further provides that in respect of the above category of offences the Court shall draw a presumption about the information having been made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State if the purpose of the accused can be considered to be prejudicial to the safety on considerations mentioned earlier and if it is further shown that any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information relating to or used in any prohibited place, or relating to anything in such a place, or any secret official code or pass word is made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated by any person other than a person acting under lawful authority. Under sec. 4, the fact that a person has been in communication with, or attempted to communicate with, a foreing agent, whether within or without India, shall be relevant for the purpose of proving that he has for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or] interests of the State, obtained or attempted to obtain information which is calculated to be or might be, or is intended to be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy. Sec. 4(2) provides for presumptions in relation to communication with a foreign agent if : (i) he has, either within or without India, visited the address of a foreign agent or consorted or associated with a foreign agent, or (ii) either within or without India, the name and address of, or any other information regarding a foreign agent has been found in his possession, or has been obtained by him from any other person." Chhangani J. has further, after referring to the English authorities, been pleased to observe that— "the fundamental concepts of criminal law have to be borne in mind in considering cases under the emergency statutes but some difference in the manner of approach may have to be observed in the two kinds of cases. Under the administration of ordinary criminal law, Judges not very infrequently and per-haps not altogether without justification having regard to the nature and extent of State power, display great concern and solicitude for the life and liberty of the subjects and do not weigh in golden scales the conflicting testimony offered by each side but in taking their stand on the side of the accused, examine all facts and circumstances with care and circumspection so that it may not abuse the liberties of those who are placed under their protection. In considering cases under the statutes promulgated for the safety of the nations, we cannot ignore the important consideration that out of order comes liberty......" It is true that the word "appears" occurring in sec. 3 of the Act suggests a lesser degree of standard of proof required in the cases of this kind. Reference here may be made to Pyarelal vs. State of Rajasthan(14). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had observed that "the appropriate meaning of the word "appears" is seems. It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. The standard of a prudent man is not completely displaced but the stringent rule of proof is relaxed. Even so, the laxity of proof permitted does not warrant a courts opinion based on pure surmise. It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. The standard of a prudent man is not completely displaced but the stringent rule of proof is relaxed. Even so, the laxity of proof permitted does not warrant a courts opinion based on pure surmise. A prima facie opinion based on evidence and circumstances may be adopted as the standard laid down." In other words, the courts are to base the judgment not on pure surmise but if there are circumstances which prima facie lead to a conclusion of the guilt of the accused, then the Court will be justified in holding such evidence to be sufficient for the purposes of the Act. In the light of the above proposition, we propose to examine the case of each of the accused under the Act. 30. We first take up the case of Ramchandra son of Bhagwansingh. We have already pointed out while dealing with the charges of conspiracy against this accused that all that the learned Judge has pointed out is that he once approached Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12 and asked him for the map of the Rajasthan Canal. The prosecution seeks to connect the plan of the Rajasthan Canal obtained by this accused by placing reliance on Ex. P-10 where the reference to Rajasthan Canal map finds place. We have examined the suggestion put forth by the prosecution very carefully; but we are enable to find any reliable link between the plan obtained by this accused and the one the reference of which has been made in Ex. P-10. There is no evidence to show that the plan obtained by this accused was ever sent to Pakistan. Nor is there evidence to prove that the very plan obtained by this accused appellant was referred to in Ex. P-10. No act of sending the plan by the accused to Pakistan has been established. Nor there is any prima facie evidence of his conduct or circumstances or known character proved on the record to warrant the raising of a presumption under sec 4 of the Act In fact, the evidence against this accused appellant is wholly insufficient (even if we judge his case in the light of the standard of proof and rules of special evidence laid down in the Act). It was contended by the Additional Advocate General that at the time of obtaining the plan by this accused, Ramchandra son of Nadarchand happened to accompany him and that shows his connection with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand from whom the letter Ex. 1 in Urdu and the plan of the Rajasthan Canal were recovered. We have already shown our inability to rely upon this part of the statement of Madan Mohan Saini P. W. 12 while dealing with the charge of conspiracy against this accused and we need not encumber our judgment by repeating the reasons already stated in this connection. We are, therefore, of opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt to this accused and he must be acquitted of the charge under sec. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Act also. 31. We next take up the case of the accused appellant Gopalsingh Gopalsingh was an employee of the police department. He was appointed on 26-8-59 vide Ex. P-21. Thereafter he was suspended on 7-9 64 vide Ex. P-20 and was subsequently dismissed on 8-11-65 vide Ex. P-19. Exs. P-19, 20 and 21 have been proved by Madanlal P. W. 29, and his evidence has not been challenged on behalf of the appellants Gopalsinghs contact with Pakistani Intelligence Officers and his communication with them is proved by the overwhelming evidence on the record. We may first refer to Ex. P. 17 which is a small diary recovered from his house at the search. This diary contains the address of Sardar Ali Dogar and Gulam Rasul Ranjha. Gulam Rasul Ranjha has been proved to be a Pak spy as deposed to by P.W. 49 whose statement has been recorded at great length while dealing with the charge of conspiracy against him. The diary also contains the address of Afzal Manzil Bhawalnagar. This is the address of the Pakistani Intelligence Officer Sardar Ali Dogar which fact has been proved by Mahima Nand P.W. 49. His contacts with Gulam Resul Ranjha Pak stani spy are also deposed by P. W. 27 Bhagwansingh who has deposed that accused Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha had come to his field for enabling them to cross the border to go to Pakistan. His contacts with Gulam Resul Ranjha Pak stani spy are also deposed by P. W. 27 Bhagwansingh who has deposed that accused Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha had come to his field for enabling them to cross the border to go to Pakistan. P. W. 9 Kartarsingh has also deposed that he himself had accompanied accused Gopalsingh to Pakistan where they stayed for one night, and there he saw Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha who were talking in the company of police officers of Pakistan. Pyarasingh P. W. 8 and Iswarsingh P. W. 10 have deposed to the close association of Gopal Singh with the Pakistani Intelligence Officers and spies namely Lt. Sardar Ali Dogar and Gulam Rasul Ranjha. Pyarasingh P. W. 8 and Iswarsingh P.W. 10 and Makhansingh P. W. 26 who were doing the spying work for India had gone to Pakistan where they were arrested. Pyarasingh has even assumed false name of Ramsingh to conceal his identity, but he was arrested in Pakistan on 17-8 66. After his arrest he was interrogated by the Security Officers of Pakistan several times. Lt. Dogar accompanied by Gopalsingh happened to visit the place where he was arrested and the accused appellant bad passed on the information that gave out the real name of this witness and informed that he was an Indian spy. The witness was also taken for further interrogation in a car by Sardar Ali Dogar and Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha were also seen at that time with Sardar Ali Dogar. Iswarsingh P.W. 10 and Makhansingh P. W. 26 were also the persons who were doing spying work for India in Pakistan and they were arrested there. Both these witnesses had actually seen with their eyes Gopalsingh in the company of Lt. Dogar, Intelligence Officer of Pakistan. His Statement finds corroboration from the list of the persons repatriated from Pakistan. Amarnath P. W. 44 has deposed that a letter was received from the Indian High Commissioner on 22 8-68 wherein the name of Ramsingh (the assumed name of Pyarasingh) was at serial No. 15. The letter is Ex. P-46 which has been proved by this witness. There is another letter Ex P-47 where the names of Iswarsingh P.W. 10 and Makhansingh P. W. 26 find place amongst the list of persons repatriated from Pakistan. The letter is Ex. P-46 which has been proved by this witness. There is another letter Ex P-47 where the names of Iswarsingh P.W. 10 and Makhansingh P. W. 26 find place amongst the list of persons repatriated from Pakistan. The evidence of Amarnath along with Exs 46 and 47 lends assurance to the testimony of these witnesses. It is, therefore, clear that the above witnesses were admittedly in Pakistan and they had seen Gopalsingh in the company of the Pak Intelligence Officer and the Pak spy Gulam Rasul Ranjha. Bhagwansingh P. W. 27 has also deposed that he knew the accused Gopalsingh, that in 1966 he had gone along with the accused Gopalsingh to Pakistan. About a month thereafter accused Gopalsingh sent for this witness in his field where he saw the accused Gopalsingh and Gulam Rasul Ranjha together. The testimony of the above witnesses finds corroboration from the official record and deposed to by Amarnath P.W. 44 and Mahimanand P. W. 49. On the top of all this, there is the testimony of Thakurdas P.W. 41. Thakurdas is a Border Intelligence Inspector and used to report about the Pak spies and the persons who entered into acts of smuggling from India to Pakistan and vice versa. He had submitted a report Ex. P-27 on 25 3-68 to his superior officer namely the Superintendent of Police (C. I. D.) Jodhpur with a copy to the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D.) Jaipur and Deputy Superintendent of Police (G. I. D ) Ganganagar. In the report he had stated that Gopalsingh was in direct touch with Pakistani Intelligence Officers This report was submitted much prior to the date of the incident when Ramchandra son of Nadarchand was apprehended by the Border Security Force party. Nothing has been brought out in his cross-examination to either show his interestedness or to brand his testimony as unreliable. From the above analysis of the evidence, it is very well established that Gopalsingh was not only visiting Pakistan but had a direct and close contact with Pak spies and Pak Intelligence Officers. 32. Shri Magraj on behalf of the appellant urged that Gopalsingh was doing smuggling work and his presence in Pakistan can be very well reconciled with his smuggling activities, as there is no positive evidence of his doing any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. 32. Shri Magraj on behalf of the appellant urged that Gopalsingh was doing smuggling work and his presence in Pakistan can be very well reconciled with his smuggling activities, as there is no positive evidence of his doing any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. We may point out that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove doing of a particular act prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State, as we are satisfied from the circumstances of the case brought on the record and conduct of this accused appellant as well as also his proved character that he was a dismissed police constable. The very fact that Gopalsingh was in direct touch with the Pak spies and Pak Intelligence Officers goes a long way to make out his contact and communication with the foreign agents. Under sec. 4 of the Act, there is a presumption against the person charged with the offence under sec. 3 that the purpose for communication was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. His conduct in visiting Pakistan frequently in the company of Pak spies and Pak Intelligence Officers, coupled with the fact that he is a dismissed police hand are the circumstances which fully bring home the guilt to him beyond any reasonable doubt. We are, therefore, not inclined to disturb the order of conviction qua Gopal Singh u/s. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Act. 33. This brings us to the case of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. This accused appellant was apprehended by the party of the B. S. F. namely Roodsingh P. W. 1, Phoolchand P.W. 2 and Khangarsingh P. W. 3 while he was coming from the side of Pakistan. The site plan Ex. 1 of Gang Canal and a letter in Urdu were recovered from him. The contents of Ex. 2 fully lend assurance to the fact of Ramchandra son of Nadarchands communication with foreign agent inasmuch as it is he who had brought this letter from a person from Pakistan, The contents of the letter also reveal a circumstance to establish an involvement in the shady affair. This accused appellant has denied the recovery of the letter and the plan Ex. This accused appellant has denied the recovery of the letter and the plan Ex. 1 from his possession and has stated that he had gone to sell cloth in Machiwada village and was never found near the Pak border nor was he apprehended. On the other hand, his assertion was that as he had some money outstanding against Roodsingh P. W. 1, Phoolchand P. W. 2 and Khangarsingh P. W. 3 and he had pressed them for making payment that he had been falsely implicated by them in this case. 34. Mr. Magraj on behalf of the appellant urged that the recovery made by the B. S. F., party does not inspire confidence. The reason he advanced was that the B. S. F. party did not make mention of the contents of the letter while framing the list Ex. P-2 nor did they take the signatures of the Motbirs either over the Plan Ex. 1 or the letter Ex. 2. His further argument was that these two articles were neither sealed by the B.S.F. party and there is every reason to infer that the recovery was a faked one and these two documents Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 were planted by the B.S. F. party. It is true that the B. S. F. party had not taken the signatures of the Motbirs over Ex. 1 and Ex 2 nor they had sealed them. But we are not inclined to give undue importance to this conduct on the part of the B. S. F. party. The accused has rather taken a false plea that he had some dues outstanding against the members of the B.S.F. party which plea is not at all plausible nor is it proved on the record. 35. Another argument that there was every possibility of implanting of Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 falsely in the Thela of the appellant is, in our opinion, equally untenable. As already referred to above, the members of the B.S.F. party had no motive whatsoever to falsely implicate this accused appellant. In fact the accused appellant himself has admitted his presence at Machiwada village. The plea of going to Machiwada for purpose of selling the cloth being wholly unreliable, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of the members of the B.S.F. party that they apprehended the accused coming from the side of Pakistan border. In fact the accused appellant himself has admitted his presence at Machiwada village. The plea of going to Machiwada for purpose of selling the cloth being wholly unreliable, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of the members of the B.S.F. party that they apprehended the accused coming from the side of Pakistan border. The conduct of the members of the B. S. F. party cannot be said to be unnatural or abnormal so as to cast doubt on their testimony. 36. Mr. Magraj, the learned counsel for the appellants, tried to impeach the testimony of Roodsingh P. W. 1, Phoolchand P.W. 2 and Khangarsingh P. W. 3 on the ground that there is a serious discrepancy in their statements on the point when they left for lodging the report at police station Karanpur. He pointed out that whereas Roodsingh had stated that they had left for lodging the report in a jeep car at 7 A.M. in the next morning and reached within half an hour, Phoolchand and Khangar Singh have stated that they left Machiwada at about 3 P.M. on foot and then took over the jeep car in mid way and reached Karanpur at about 7 P. M. and lodged the report at 7-30 P.M. Both Phoolchand and Khangarsingh have explained that they prepared the list and necessary papers upto 11 A. M. and thereafter they took rest as it was very hot and they left at 3 P. M. on foot as the Company Commander had taken away the jeep to the Headquarters at Sri Ganganagar for collecting salary and the same was sent by him subsequently which crossed them in the mid-way and it was on that account that they reached Karanpur at 7 P. M. and lodged the report at 7.30 P.M. We have perused the statements of these two witnesses and we are of opinion that Roodsingh has not given a correct statement on account of lapse of memory. There was no reason for the members of the B.S.F. to have given this wrong explanation more specially when it is consistent with the time of filing the F.I.R. which is 7.30 P.M. We, therefore, do not agree with the suggestion of the learned counsel for the appellant that the delay was made merely to manoeuvre the implanting of the incriminating articles Exs. 1 and 2 with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. 37. Mr. 1 and 2 with Ramchandra son of Nadarchand. 37. Mr. Magraj next contended that even assuming that the incriminating articles were found in the possession of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand and that too near the Pakistan Border, they were not sufficient to establish the guilt against this accused appellant beyond any manner of doubt* His contention was that in the first place, the plan Ex. 1 cannot be taken to be Official Secret within the meaning of the Act as there was nothing secret in the document as it was even available on payment of price as deposed to by P.W. 20 Sri Bhupal. 38. We are unable to agree with this argument of the learned counsel.We may here make a reference to Sec. 3(l)(c) of the Act wherein it has been made culpable to obtain, collect, record or publish or communicate to any other person any plan, model or any information etc. which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. The term enemy has been used in a wider connotation. The enemy country does not necessarily imply that it should be actually at war with the other country. The term "enemy" in sec. 3 includes any unfriendly State. Under the Official Secrets Act 1911, of Great Britain on the pettern of which our Act of 1923 has been apparently drafted, the word "enemy" came to be interpreted in the case of George Charles Parrot (1913, 3 Cr. Ap. Reports 186) by Philimore J. The learned Judge interpreted the term enemy" as follows— "When the statute uses the word enemy* it does not mean necessarily some one with whom this country is at war, but potential enemy with whom we might some day be at war." In the above case, the facts were that one Parrot had collected and was going to collect information for Germany in 1912 when he was apprehended. His case was decided on 28th February, 1913, when there were no hostilities between Great Britain and Germany—the World War I having broken out on 4th August, 1914, and yet Parrots conviction was maintained on the ground that he obtained and was about to obtain information regarding defence for an enemy. The term "enemy" came to be interpreted by Beri J. in Kutbuddin vs. State(15). The term "enemy" came to be interpreted by Beri J. in Kutbuddin vs. State(15). Beri J. after perusing the provisions of the Official Secrets Act of the Great Britain as also of the Act was of the view that the Act was on the same pattern with that of the Great Britain Act. He also adopted the construction put on the term "enemy" occurring in the Act of Great Britain as interpreted by Philimore J. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretation put by Beri J. in Kutubuddins case (supra) on the term "enemy". 39. Pakistan is surely ill-disposed towards India and is rather unfriendly. In fact there had been a series of actual hestilities between India and Pakistan right from 1948 to 1965 and the relations between the two countries throughout the period from 1948 to the date of the occurrence were rather unfriendly. Therefore, there can be no controversy that the plan Ex. 1 which was taken to Pakistan was directly or at any rate indirectly useful to the enemy. We get it from the deposition of Capt. L. C. Tewatia P. W. 38 that the terrain of an area which is adjacent to the enemy territory and any information regarding terrain is important, specially canals, roads and railway lines, from military point of view Canals are important as they obstruct the passing of tanks and movement of B vehicles, which are normally transport vehicles. Roads are helpful to the enemy. Similarly, railway lines, which are obstacle to B vehicles are helpful in guiding the enemy by giving directions. A bare look at the plan Ex. 1 shows that it contains all the information deposed to by Capt. L. C. Tiwetia P. W. 38, and if such information goes into the hands of the enemy country, they are certainly prejudicial to the safety and security of the country. We are fully convinced that the plan Ex. 1 was directly or indirectly useful to an enemy country. 40. It was argued on behalf of the appellant Ramchandra s/o Nadarchand that there is no evidence to show that this appellant had taken the plan to Pakistan. We are fully convinced that the plan Ex. 1 was directly or indirectly useful to an enemy country. 40. It was argued on behalf of the appellant Ramchandra s/o Nadarchand that there is no evidence to show that this appellant had taken the plan to Pakistan. On the other hand, if it is held that it was directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, then the same was brought back to India and therefore bringing of such a map from Pakistan to India could not constitute an offence within the meaning of sec. 3 of the Act. We may point out that the plan was recovered from the possession of this accused appellant which he had brought from Pakistan. Admittedly he was returning from Pakistan and apprehended near the border He had not furnished any explanation how the plan came into his hands from Pakistan. On the other hand, he had even taken a false plea that the plan was not recovered from him. Taking all the circumstances together into consideration there is no room for doubt that plan must have been taken by the accused appellant to Pakistan to supply information and the topography of the area adjacent to the enemy territory which had great significance from the defence point of view. 41. Mr. Magraj next contended that the appellant had not done any act the purpose of which could be said to be prejudicial to the safety and sovereignty of the State. We are not at all impressed with this argument inasmuch as when such a plan which could be directly or indirectly helpful to the enemy is taken to Pakistan and when there is no satisfactory explanation on the side of the accused, a presumption has to be raised under sec. 3(2) of the Act that the purpose in carrying it was prejudicial to the safety and sovereignty of the State. Then there is letter Ex. 2 which was recovered from this accused appellant. The contents of the letter Ex. 2 clearly establish that this accused appellant was in touch with certain foreign agents in Pakistan whose identity was not disclosed obviously for the reason that in such matters the identity generally is concealed for not being detected. Then there is letter Ex. 2 which was recovered from this accused appellant. The contents of the letter Ex. 2 clearly establish that this accused appellant was in touch with certain foreign agents in Pakistan whose identity was not disclosed obviously for the reason that in such matters the identity generally is concealed for not being detected. Moreover, information has been sought with regard to Abhor which is a town in India and important from military point of view as deposed to by H. S. Aneja P. W. 36. The general tenor of this letter also goes to show that it has emanated from the foreign agent with a view to obtain information of the place important from the military point of view. It is not a simple letter written by a smuggler as was suggested by Shri Magraj, learned counsel for the appellant, inasmuch as the smugglers are hardly interested to carry such documents where the information is sought in respect of the towns of military importance. 42. It was however contended on behalf of the appellant that it is not proved that Ex. 2 was written by a foreign agent and therefore its contents cannot be looked into. This argument, in our opinion, has got no weight. The letter is an important circumstance to show the connection of the accused with Pak foreign agents and it can be peeped into to know the conduct of the accused person more specially when the Act prescribes special rule of evidence and a lesser degree of proof and also permits circumstances and conduct to be taken into consideration for the purposes of bringing home the charge against the accused person We are further convinced as to the culpable intention of the accused when we look into Ex. P.10 which is also scribed by the author of Ex. 2 as proved by the hand writing Expert Mr. Puri P. W. 37. The tenor of Ex. P-10 also clearly shows that information which has been sought is directly or indirectly helpful to the enemy. Taking an overall picture of the evidence against this accused appellant, we are fully satisfied that he took Ex. 1 to Pakistan for the purpose of supplying information to the enemy country which was directly or indirectly helpful to the enemy and was in communication with foreign agent. 43. Taking an overall picture of the evidence against this accused appellant, we are fully satisfied that he took Ex. 1 to Pakistan for the purpose of supplying information to the enemy country which was directly or indirectly helpful to the enemy and was in communication with foreign agent. 43. We have to examine in the next place the case of Lalchand son of Bhag-wansingh under the Act. The prosecution case in a nutshell, as already stated while dealing with the charge of conspiracy, is that Lalchand had surreptitiously removed Ex. 1 from the office of the Executive Engineer, that his connection with the foreign agents in the matter of supplying incriminating informations is established from the recovery of Ex. 3, Ex. P-10 and Ex. 11, and that he had association with Gopalsingh who had direct connections with Pak spies and intelligence officers. The prosecution has sought to prove the removal of the plan by Lalchand by the testimony of Bhupal P. W. 20 and Laxmansingh P. W. 7. It has been suggested that Lalchand being a Patwari in the Irrigation Department had occasion to visit the Executive Engineers office and that Laxmansingh peon had deposed that the had come to the office of the Executive Engineer during the relevant period when the plan had been missed from the office of the Executive Engineer. We have carefully looked into the testimony of these witnesses and we are not at all satisfied with their evidence to establish that Lalchand was the person who could be held to have removed the plan from the Executive Engineers office. Laxmansinghs testimony is quite vague. He had not seen Lalchand removing the map. Lalchands visit to Executive Engineers office cnnnot be said to be unnatural as he was a Patwari in the Irrigation Department. Bhupal has not deposed anything directly against Lalchand to establish that he was the person responsible for removing the map Ex.1. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold that Lalchand had removed the plan Ex, 1 from the Executive Engineers office. 44. Coming to the recovery of Ex. P-10, we have already recorded our finding with regard to Ex. Bhupal has not deposed anything directly against Lalchand to establish that he was the person responsible for removing the map Ex.1. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold that Lalchand had removed the plan Ex, 1 from the Executive Engineers office. 44. Coming to the recovery of Ex. P-10, we have already recorded our finding with regard to Ex. P. 10 while dealing with the indictment of conspiracy and have held that it was not recovered from the exclusive possession of this accused appellant as Bhagwansingh had the key of the house and access to the apartment from where Ex.P 10 was recovered. Ex.P.10 therefore cannot be made use of to establish an incriminating link in the chain of the circumstantial evidence against Lalchand. Much stress was laid by the Additional Advocate General on Ex.. P-ll alleged to have been recovered from Lalchands house. It is true that Ex. P-ll purports to be addressed to Lalchand and is alleged to have been recovered from his house. This Ex. P-ll is a letter scribed on an ordinary paper and is said to have been addressed by one Shyamsunder Shastri P. W. 19, astrologer, in reply to the letter of Lalchand. The contents of the letter of course appear to be incriminating as they throw light on his connections with the smuggling activities in Pakistan. But on a careful consideration of the statement of Shyam Sunder P. W. 19, we have our own doubts whether the letter was really addressed to Lalchand by this witness. This witness was asked about the letter of Lalchand in reply to which Ex. P-ll was given by him but he has failed to produce it. His explanation for non-production is that he had not preserved it, but on a careful reading of his evidence, we are not satisfied with the reliability of this witness. There is a mention of some names in the letter Ex. P-ll. The witness has failed to disclose the identity of the persons mentioned in this letter. We do not find it safe to rely on such testimony to arrive at an adverse conclusion against the accused appellant. As regards the conduct of this appellant, the circumstance of his association with Gopalsingh, we have been referred to the testimony of car-driver Ratansingh P. W. 4 and the reference to Gopalsingh in Ex. We do not find it safe to rely on such testimony to arrive at an adverse conclusion against the accused appellant. As regards the conduct of this appellant, the circumstance of his association with Gopalsingh, we have been referred to the testimony of car-driver Ratansingh P. W. 4 and the reference to Gopalsingh in Ex. P-10 alleged to have been recovered from the house of this accused appellant. As regards Ratansingh P. W. 4 we have wholly disbelieved this witness while dealing with the charge of conspiracy and we do not wish to reiterate our reasons in order to ovoid encumbering the judgment. His evidence, therefore, cannot be taken not of in this regard. As regards the reference to Gopalsingh in Ex. P-10 in our opinion, it cannot be made use of against this accused appellant as we have already held that the letter was not recovered from the exclusive custody of this accused appellant. It could equally be imputed to Bhagwansingh who was in charge of the key of the house. We may also mention that the house of Lalchand was searched after inordinate delay that is on 5-8-67, although the search of Lalchands house at Kohni was made on 5-7-67. The explanation for the delay given by Jogendra Singh P. W. 30 that they did not expect anything substantial from Lalchands house at Ganga-nagar is not very cogent. In these circumstances we do not think it safe to use the recovery of Ex. P-10 against this accused appellant. 45. The last link in the chain of circumstances which has been relied upon by the prosecution is the recovery of Ex. 3. It contains, among others, the addresses of two persons namely(l) Deshraj Lekhraj Behrani Fatehchand and (2) Mohammed Sharif s/o Mohammed Sardar Ali Dogar Ballerion-Wali, although Ex. 3 contains the jottings of certain articles, Saries, Garam Chaddar etc., but the emphasis of the prosecution while relying upon this document is on the fact that they contain addresses of the persons alleged to be foreign agents. In this connection, Kanwarsingh P. W. 15 has been examined to establish that the person in the name of Sardar Ali Dogar whose name appears in Ex. 3 belonged to Balleri and had shifted to Pakistan. In this connection, Kanwarsingh P. W. 15 has been examined to establish that the person in the name of Sardar Ali Dogar whose name appears in Ex. 3 belonged to Balleri and had shifted to Pakistan. The testimony of this witness is hardly reliable as he has admitted in his cross-examination that he did not see Sardar Ali Dogar but he had only heard that there was some person in the name of Sardar Ali Dogar residing in Balleri. He has further stated that he had read the name of Sardar Ali Dogar in the revenue record. The revenue record has not been filed. Nor is there any independent reliable evidence to establish that Sardar Ali Dogar Ballerion-wala is in Pakistan and the address contained in Ex. 3 relates to him. We do not give much importance to the address of Sardar Ali Dogar in Ex. 3. It is also not established by any reliable evidence that the address of Deshraj related to any foreign agent of the enemy country. The possibility of the addresses being written in an innocuous manner has not been eliminated nor there is proof to show that the addresses relate to any foreign agents of the enemy country. In the circumstances we cannot give any importance to Ex. 3 so as to arrive at an adverse inference against the accused Lalchand. The learned Sessions Judge has also not relied upon this document. 46. The learned Sessions Judge while dealing with the case of Lalchand under the Act has relied upon the recovery of Ex. P-10 from his possession. We have already held that it is not proved that Ex. P-10 was recovered from the exclusive possession of Lalchand. Ex. P-10, therefore, cannot be taken to connect Lalchand with any incriminating circumstances. If this Ex. P-10 is taken out of consideration against Lalchand, then its contents about the reference to the plan of canal area near about Ganganagar also loses significance as against this accused appellant. The learned Judge has further observed that "the accused Lalchand had access to the plan and since it was traced out with Ramchandra who was connected with Lalchand, it had to be presumed that Lalchand took it away from the office of the Executive Engineer, Ganganagar". In our opinion, such a presumption is not warranted under the provisions of the Act. In our opinion, such a presumption is not warranted under the provisions of the Act. There must be prima facie evidence to connect the removal of the plan by Lalchand and as already pointed out the evidence being wholly insufficient in this behalf, such a presumption on the part of the learned Judge is wholly unjustified. The connection of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand with this accused as brought on record and referred to above is hardly a circumstance justifying the presumption of Lalchands involvement in supplying the plan to Ram Chandra son of Nadarchand and sending the same to Pakistan. To our minds, the learned Sessions Judge had gone too far to raise a presumption which was never the intendment of sec. 3 of the Act. 47. Taking all the evidence, facts and circumstances into consideration and having carefully gone through the finding of the learned Sessions Judge, it is very difficult for us to agree with his finding holding Lalchand guilty under the Act, and consequently he must be acquitted. 48. Taking up the revision of the State for enhancement of the sentences, we may point out that so far as Ramchandra and Lalchand sons of Bhagwansingh are concerned, it has become infructuous inasmuch as they are being acquitted. So far as Ramchandra son of Nadarchand and Gopalsingh are concerned, they have been convicted under sec. 3 and sec. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Official Secrets Act respectively and sentenced to 18 months rigorous imprisonment The maximum sentence prescribed in the facts and circumstances of this case is three years and we do not think that the sentence already passed can be termed in any way to be grossly inadequate. We, therefore, are not inclined to enhance the sentences of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand and Gopalsingh. 49. In the result, we partly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction under sec. 120 B. I. P. C. and acquit all the accused appellants of the offence under sec. 120 B I. P. C. We also set aside the order of conviction as against Lalchand and Ramchandra sons of Bhagwansingh under sec. 3 and sec. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Official Secrets Act respectively and acquit them of these offences. They shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. 120 B I. P. C. We also set aside the order of conviction as against Lalchand and Ramchandra sons of Bhagwansingh under sec. 3 and sec. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Official Secrets Act respectively and acquit them of these offences. They shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. However, we maintain the convictions and sentences of Ramchandra son of Nadarchand and Gopalsingh under sec. 3 and sec. 3 read with sec. 9 of the Act respectively. The revision filed by the State is hereby dismissed.