T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) AN important question which is involved in this Writ Petition is whether the directions given by the State Government in form of a Resolution to the State Housing Board (which is hereinafter referred to as the Board) for the disposal of some residential flats built for low income group persons are infringing the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they resort to a Classification which has no nexus with the proclaimed object of regulations framed for disposal of such flats. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is a resident of Ahmedabad and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are Government servants at present occupying houses allotted to them in Housing Colonies built by the Board at Ahmedabad within the limits of Paldi area. These colonies are known as H and L colonies and this writ petition is with regard to the flats of these colonies. Respondent No. 1 is the State of Gujarat respondent No. 2 is the Gujarat Housing Board through its Chairman respondent No. 3 is the Housing Commissioner of the Board respondent No. 4 is the Union of India while respondents Nos. 5 to 14 are the persons who are interested in the petition and who are joined as parties as such. ( 3 ) AT this stage without going into the factual aspect of the matter it can be said that the petitioners make a grievance that the Government have by giving directions to the Board through their resolution No. LCS1058 dated 22nd June 1972 as regards the disposal of these flats on hire purchase scheme infringed the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution because by these directions they have arbitrarily proposed to dispose of these flats even to those who do not fall within the low income group category of people for whose benefit they are constructed. According to the petitioners these directions of the Government are purely arbitrary in fixing a date for the purpose of deciding the income eligibility of an applicant for allotment and also in resorting to classifications for eligibility and sub-classifications for preferences for allotment on hire purchase basis. According to the petitioners these directions of the Government are purely arbitrary in fixing a date for the purpose of deciding the income eligibility of an applicant for allotment and also in resorting to classifications for eligibility and sub-classifications for preferences for allotment on hire purchase basis. The petitioners have therefore prayed for a declaration that the above referred Resolution which is the impugned resolution and which is annexed with the petition as Annexure B is illegal ultra vires and of no effect as it is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. They have also prayed the Court to direct the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to dispose of the flats in question in accordance with the provisions of Act read together with Rules and Regulations framed thereunder and to issue injunction restraining the respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 and their servants from implementing the directions contained in the impugned resolution. ( 4 ) THE matter is governed by the Act known as Gujarat Housing Board Act 1961 (Gujarat Act 23 of 1961) (which is hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the rules and regulations framed thereunder and therefore a brief reference to the relevant provisions thereof at this stage would be necessary to understand properly the contentions raised by the parties. ( 5 ) SEC. 3 of the Act contemplates the establishment of a Board by the name of Gujarat Housing Board. By virtue of this section this Board is constituted as a body corporate competent to acquire and hold property both moveable and immoveable as well as to construct and to do all things necessary for the purpose of the Act. The Board is deemed to be a local authority for the purpose of the Act and well as the relevant Land Acquisition Law. Here it should be mentioned that before the Act came into force there were other Acts in force called The Bombay Housing Board Act 1948 and Saurashtra Housing Board Act 1954 Both these Acts have been repealed and replaced by the Act. As a consequence the Boards functioning under the repealed Acts were dissolved and on such dissolution all properties moveable and immoveable rights liabilities and obligations of the dissolved Boards became vested in the Board established under sec. 3 of the Act as per sec. 86 thereof. As a consequence the Boards functioning under the repealed Acts were dissolved and on such dissolution all properties moveable and immoveable rights liabilities and obligations of the dissolved Boards became vested in the Board established under sec. 3 of the Act as per sec. 86 thereof. Sec. 20 of the Act empowers the Board to enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act. Sec. 21 provides that every contract shall be made on behalf of the Board by the Chairman but this power is limited by the proviso which is attached to it. For the present we are not concerned with this proviso and therefore we shall proceed to consider the provisions of Chapter III which relates to Housing Schemes. This Chapter begins with sec. 24 which provides for the duties of the Board to undertake housing Schemes subject to the control of the State Government. Sec. 25 speaks of the matters to be provided for by the housing Schemes. Clause (g) thereof seek to make provision for the sale letting or exchange of any property comprised in the scheme and clause (1) speaks about the providing for the accommodation for any class of inhabitants. Then secs. 27 to 30 speak about the annual housing programme the manner in which the said programme is required to be sanctioned the sanction which is required to be obtained for the programme and final publication of the sanctioned programme. Those four sections therefore show that the Act envisages not only the publication of the programme for housing schemes but also the invitation of suggestions and objections from the members of the public as regards the various schemes undertaken by the Board. After the programme is sanctioned the execution thereof is contemplated by sec. 33 of the Act. Sec. 34 stipulates the publication of the housing schemes in the Official Gazette. These are the only relevant provisions of Chapter III for the purpose of determining this writ petition and therefore it is not necessary to refer to other sections of this Chapter. The relevant Chapter which we thereafter find is Chapter IV which is with regard to Acquisition and Disposal of Land belonging to the Board. These are the only relevant provisions of Chapter III for the purpose of determining this writ petition and therefore it is not necessary to refer to other sections of this Chapter. The relevant Chapter which we thereafter find is Chapter IV which is with regard to Acquisition and Disposal of Land belonging to the Board. Sec. 49 of that Chapter says that the Board may retain lease sell exchange or otherwise dispose of any land building or other property vesting in it and situate in the area comprised in any housing scheme sanctioned under the Act. This is the only relevant provision in Chapter IV. Chapter V is with regard to constitution of Tribunal under the Act with which we are not concerned. Chapter VI empowers the Board to evict persons from Board premises. Chapter VII is relating to Finance Accounts and Audit while Chapter VIII provides for Miscellaneous things. There are a few sections of this Chapter which are relevant for the purpose of this petition. I will therefore presently make reference to these sections. Sec. 73 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and particularly for the subjects which are mentioned therein. Sec. 74 empowers the Board to make regulations consistent with the Act and with the rules framed by the State Government with the previous sanction of the State Government. These regulations are contemplated under four heads namely:- (a) for the management and use of buildings constructed under any housing scheme; (b) for the principles to be followed in allotment of tenements and premises; (c) for the remuneration and conditions of service of the Secretary Housing Commissioner and other officers and servants of the Board; and (d) for regulating its own procedure and the disposal of its own business. So far as we are concerned in this writ petition the relevant power is the power contained in clause (b) which authorises the Board to make regulations prescribing the principles to be followed in allotment of tenements and premises. Then follows sec. 75 which empowers the Board to make bye-laws which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act but which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out Boards duties and functions under the Act. Sec. 76 provides for penalty for contravention of byelaws. Then follows sec. 75 which empowers the Board to make bye-laws which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act but which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out Boards duties and functions under the Act. Sec. 76 provides for penalty for contravention of byelaws. At this stage the pertinent point to be noted is that though with regard to bye-laws there is a penalty clause as provided in sec. 76 there is no such corresponding provision for the regulations framed by the Board under sec. 74. I shall advert to this point at a subsequent stage but for the present I will proceed to the consideration of further provisions contained in Chapter VIII. ( 6 ) SEC. 82 which finds its place in Chapter VIII refers to the State Governments powers to give directions to the Board. It says that the State Government may give the Board such directions as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act after giving opportunity to the Board to state its objections if any to such directions and after considering said objections. The section further directs that it shall be the duty of the Board to comply with such directions issued by the State Government. Sec. 84 empowers the State Government to dissolve a particular Board under certain circumstances and the consequences which would follow from such a dissolution. This provision is important only for the purpose of showing the control which the State Government exercises over the Boards established under the provisions of the Act. ( 7 ) THESE are the relevant provisions of the Act which directly or indirectly have some bearing on the questions involved in this petition. So far as the rules which are framed by the State Government by virtue of the power under sec. 73 of the Act are concerned we find that there is only one rule which is relevant and this rule is rule 10a which is with regard to disposal of property. This rule 10a is sub-divided into three sub-rules. Sub-rules (1) and (2) are not relevant for our purpose because they refer to the property which is required to be transferred by the Board in favour of the State Government. This rule 10a is sub-divided into three sub-rules. Sub-rules (1) and (2) are not relevant for our purpose because they refer to the property which is required to be transferred by the Board in favour of the State Government. But sub-rule (3) has some bearing on the facts of the present case and therefore it would be proper to quote it as under:-SUBJECT to the provisions of sub-rules (1) and (2) the Board shall not lease sell exchange or otherwise dispose of any immoveable property vesting in it and situate in the area comprised in any housing scheme sanctioned under the Act without the prior approval of Government. Such transfer shall be subject to such terms and conditions as Government may determine in each case in that behalf:-PROVIDED that in the case of a lease the Board shall communicate to Government the terms and conditions of the proposed agreement and if no approval is received by the Board from Government within thirty days from the date of receipt of such communication by Government the Board may proceed to settle the proposed agreement as if Government has approved of the proposal:-PROVIDED further that no such approval shall be required:- (a) for allotment of tenements of and premises according to the regulations made by the Board in that behalf; and (B) for leasing any vacant land for period not exceeding two years at a time; and (C) for sale or demolition of any building or structure which is in a dangerous condition or beyond repair. IT will thus be seen that by virtue of the proviso (a) the approval of the State Government is not required for allotment of tenements and premises according to the regulations made by the Board in that behalf. This particular proviso is relevant for the purpose of this petition. ( 8 ) HAVING thus seen the provisions of the Act and the rules I shall now proceed to the relevant provisions contained in the regulations which are framed by the Board by virtue of the power which it has got under sec. 74 of the Act. These regulations have been approved by the State Government on 2nd January 1964 The regulations bear the title Disposal of Property. Regulation No. 2 is important. It is in the following terms:- (2 ). 74 of the Act. These regulations have been approved by the State Government on 2nd January 1964 The regulations bear the title Disposal of Property. Regulation No. 2 is important. It is in the following terms:- (2 ). These regulations shall apply generally to those schemes in which properties created thereunder are to be disposed of by way of sale or hire purchase and in particular to the following schemes:- (A) Low Income Group Housing Scheme and (b) Middle Income Group Housing Scheme. THE regulation thus makes it clear that the other regulations apply in particular to the two types of schemes which are mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) thereof. ( 9 ) REGULATION No. 5 gives certain definitions. Out of these definitions two definitions contained in clauses (43) and (44) are important. They are as under:- (43 ). Low Income Group Person means a person whose annual aggregate income does not exceed Rs. 6 0 (44 ). Middle Income Group Person means a person whose annual aggregate income is above Rs. 6 0 but does not exceed Rs. 15 0i am told that both these definitions haveundergone amendments in the year 1968 with the result that. instead of the figure of Rs. 6 0 the figure of Rs. 7 200 should be read in both the clauses and instead the figure of Rs. 15 0 the figure of Rs. 18 0 should be read in clause No. (44 ). ( 10 ) REGULATION No. 7 is with regard to the disposal of Boards properties and provides that disposal of property shall be effected by either hire purchase or sale as decided by the Board which shall also decide other criteria for disposal as found necessary or desirable including the criteria of eligibility provided that such criteria shall be in consonance with the schemes. ( 11 ) AFTER a particular property of the Board is found ready for disposal the Board has by regulation No. 27 onwards to regulation No. 56 made provisions as to the manner in which a particular property should be disposed of. Regulation No. 27 says that the Housing Commissioner shall cause a public announcement to be made regarding the Property being ready for disposal. Regulation No. 27 says that the Housing Commissioner shall cause a public announcement to be made regarding the Property being ready for disposal. Such announcement shall be sufficiently in advance so that procedural part between the application and the handing over of the property to the allottee is completed not much later than the completion of the construction of the property and also so as to enable the property to be given in possession to the allottee without any undue delay. Regulation No. 28 further provides that such public announcement shall be made in the local papers and it shall state The criteria including that of eligibility as fixed by the Board as provided herein above the place and the time for the prospective applicants to get the relevant information and the form of application. The announcement shall also state the starting date and the closing date for receiving applications from intending purchasers. The other relevant regulation which is very important so far as the facts of this case are concerned is regulation No. 33. The announcement shall also state the starting date and the closing date for receiving applications from intending purchasers. The other relevant regulation which is very important so far as the facts of this case are concerned is regulation No. 33. It is in the following terms:- ( 12 ) PROPERTIES created under a Low Income Group Housing Scheme shall be allotted only to Low Income Group Persons and those under a Middle Income Group Housing Scheme only to Middle Income Group persons provided that the benefit of such schemes shall be available to only that person who does not already own a house or a that or a plot for the construction of residential building and who shall be eligible for such allotment as a Low Income Group or Middle Income group person as the case may be at the time of his application; provided further that the Board or the Property allotment Committee as the case may be may consider the case of any person even if he owns a house or a flat or a plot already if the Board or the Committee as the case may be is satisfied that the additional house or flat is needed for his bona fide residential purpose; provided further that such consideration shall not be given for any applicant who owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or minor children a house or a flat for residential purpose within the radius of 5 miles of the city or town where houses or flats are to be given on hire purchases stem;these are the relevant regulations with which we are concerned in this writ application. I shall refer to them as and when necessity arises during the discussion which follows. [ After stating the facts His Honour further proceeded :- ] ( 13 ) NOW the contention of the petitioners is that the directions given by the Government through the impugned resolution are quite contrary to the Regulations framed by the Board for the disposal of these properties. Shri Hathi who appeared on behalf of the petitioners drew my special attention to regulation No. 33 which is already quoted above and contended that according to the regulation the income eligibility of a particular applicant for allotment is to be determined with reference to the date of his application for allotment and not to any other date. Shri Hathi who appeared on behalf of the petitioners drew my special attention to regulation No. 33 which is already quoted above and contended that according to the regulation the income eligibility of a particular applicant for allotment is to be determined with reference to the date of his application for allotment and not to any other date. But the directions given by the Government are in total infringement of this regulation inasmuch as they provide a date which is about 12 years old for determining income eligibility of any applicant. It is further pointed out that even other directions given by the Government through the impugned Resolution are quite quite to the other regulations framed by the Board for the disposal of these properties. It was contended by Shri Hathi that the regulations framed by the Board are by virtue of the statutory power which it has got under sec. 74 of the Act and therefore they amount to a subordinate legislation made by a delegated authority under the statute and if that be so all these regulations should be read as if they are in the Act itself. According to Shri Hathi therefore it is not open to the State Government to give any direction to the Board which would result in infringement of a statute the regulations having a statutory binding force. Another contention raised by Shri Hathi was that the main classification which is envisaged by the impugned resolution is discriminatory inasmuch as it fixes a retrospective date in Contravention of the directions given by the Central Government in the above referred circular. According to Shri Hathi the choice of the date of 1st May 1960 is purely arbitrary and the classification which it seeks to make has absolutely no nexus with the object of the Housing Scheme because a person having the income below Rs. 6 0 per year in the month of May 1960 would be having much more income to-day which would not entitle him under the regulations to make any application for allotment of the flats which have admittedly been constructed for the people belonging to Low Income group scheme. 6 0 per year in the month of May 1960 would be having much more income to-day which would not entitle him under the regulations to make any application for allotment of the flats which have admittedly been constructed for the people belonging to Low Income group scheme. ( 14 ) HIS further contention was that the Government have no power to fix priority for the purpose of giving preference from amongst the eligible allottees and even if it is believed that the Government could fix such priority the sub-classifications which are made for the purpose of these priorities are infringing the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they have no nexus with the object of the scheme. It was contended that these classifications and particularly the classification which seeks to give priority to those occupants who are transferred to Gandhinagar are made with a view to favour some of the officer of the Government and therefore all these classifications should be struck down as made for ulterior purposes. ( 15 ) AS against these contentions of Shri Hathi the respondents have contended that the regulations which are framed by the Board in exercise of power conferred on it by section 74 of the Act have no statutory force and either therefore not binding either on the Government or on the Board. According to the learned advocates of the respondents these regulations are either contractual or managerial in their nature and since they are found to have been made purely for the purpose of internal administration of the affairs of the Board they cannot have any force of a statute. ( 16 ) IT was further contended that these regulations do not apply to the Housing Schemes which have come into existence before they were framed i. e. before the month of January 1964 because on proper interpretation of regulation No. 27 onwards it is found that they are meant only for those schemes which have come into existence after the regulations were brought into force. ( 17 ) THE respondents have pointed out that sec. ( 17 ) THE respondents have pointed out that sec. 86 and other sections of the Act invest the Government with all the necessary powers to issue directions and to control the affairs of the Board and therefore it is open to the Government to give necessary directions for the disposal of the flats constructed by the Board as also to fix criteria as regards eligibility of the persons in whose favour the flats should be allotted. According to the respondents the date of 1st May 1960 is preferred primarily because the State of Gujarat came into existence on that date and it was from that date onwards that the flats were allotted for the residence of the Government servants as and when they became ready for occupation. ( 18 ) THE respondents have further contended that it is always open to the State Government to fix the priorities for the purpose of alloting the flats to the persons found eligible for the said allotment and for that purpose even sub-classifications can be made. It was pointed out that the sub-classifications made by the Government are quite reasonable and bear a direct relation to the object of the scheme as well as the Act. In this connection it would be necessary to note a special plea which is raised on behalf of the respondents Nos. 5 to 14 in their counter affidavit. According to these respondents the rent of the disputed fiats which have been allotted to the Gujarat Government servants for residence after they were ready for occupation it is not fixed in the manner in which generally the rent of the Government premises is fixed. They say that the formula adopted by the Housing Board was that the capital cost of construction with interest should be repaid within 30 years and therefore calculating this amount of repayment rent of different flats was fixed not strictly on the basis of the return of the capital invested but on the formula that at the end of 30 years the whole capital invested together with interest would be paid back to the Board. It is contended that under these circumstances though the flats were given on rental basis to the Government servants who occupied them the arrangement in fact amounted to the levy of monthly instalments as if the flats were given on hire purchase basis. It is contended that under these circumstances though the flats were given on rental basis to the Government servants who occupied them the arrangement in fact amounted to the levy of monthly instalments as if the flats were given on hire purchase basis. According to these respondents therefore the Government N 2s quite justified to make the choice of 1st May 1960 as the date for determining income eligibility because it was from that date that the occupants were charged rent which for all practical purposes amounted to a hire purchase instalment. I will advert to this plea of the respondents Nos. 5 to 14 at a proper stage in this judgment. ( 19 ) IN my opinion all the contentions which are raised by both the sides can be covered by two main points which arise for consideration. These points are as under:- (1) Whether the regulations framed by the Board pursuant to the authority delegated to it under sec. 74 of the Act have statutory force and if so whether it would be open to the State Government to give directions to the Board which are contrary to these regulations. (2) Whether any of the directions issued by the State Government through the impugned resolution are in violation of the equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 20 ) SO far as the first question is concerned we have already noted above that the Board with the previous sanction of the State Government is authorised by sec. 74 (b) of the Act to make regulations consistent with the Act and rules framed there under prescribing the principles to be followed in allotment of tenements and premises. This is obviously a power delegated by the State Legislature to the Board. Initially before the repealed Act of 1948 was passed a Board was set up to meet with acute shortage of housing accommodation but that Board was working as a department of Government. Statutory status was conferred on this Board by the Act of 1948 and thereafter by the Act of 1961. The Act makes general provisions about the duties and functions of the Board the matters to be provided for by the Board and other incidental problems which the Board has to encounter with in implementing the housing schemes. The State Government is under sec. The Act makes general provisions about the duties and functions of the Board the matters to be provided for by the Board and other incidental problems which the Board has to encounter with in implementing the housing schemes. The State Government is under sec. 73 of the Act authorised to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act. But the supervisions do not exhaust all the powers which are required to be exercised in implementation of the schemes undertaken by the Board. The Board is therefore invested with two types of powers namely (1) the power to make regulations and (2) the power to make bye laws. The power to make regulations as already noted above is with regard to 4 subjects namely (1) management of buildings (2) principles to be followed in allotment conditions of services of its staff and (4) regulating its procedure and disposal of business Power to make bye-laws is distinct from the power to make regulations because that power is to be exercised only when it is found necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out Boards duties and functions under the Act. This power is given to the Board by sec 75 of she Act Thus it is apparent that the power to make regulations and the power to make bye-laws represent two forms of delegated legislation and in order to understand the exact scope and extent of these two powers it would not be out of place to dwell a little on their comparison. A bare perusal of the provisions contained in secs. 74 and 75 bears out the conspicuous difference between the two because while regulations contemplated by sec. 74 refer merely to internal management of the affairs concerning the Board itself the bye-laws contemplated by sec. 75 refer to the provisions which may be found necessary expedient for the purpose of carrying out Boards duties and functions under the Act. In this connection it would be of some interest to not that according to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 75 of the Act a bye-law made under that section provides that the contravention thereof shall be an offence. If we make reference to sec. 76 it would be clear that the statute itself provides that whoever contravenes bye-law made under sec. 75 shall on conviction be punished for a particular term of imprisonment as provided therein or with fine. 75 of the Act a bye-law made under that section provides that the contravention thereof shall be an offence. If we make reference to sec. 76 it would be clear that the statute itself provides that whoever contravenes bye-law made under sec. 75 shall on conviction be punished for a particular term of imprisonment as provided therein or with fine. Thus the comparison of these two sections makes it clear that unlike the bye-laws framed under sec. 75 the breach of regulations is not visited with a punishment. This aspect emphasises the fact that while bye-laws create statutory obligations regulations do not. The reason is that the regulations concern themselves only with the internal management of the affairs of the Board while bye-laws concern themselves with those subjects which affect the members of the public and impose some legal obligations on them. The distinction thus provided by the Legislature in investing the Board with these two distinct powers is in my opinion eloquent enough to suggest that power to make regulations under sec. 74 is merely for the internal management concerning only the affairs of the Board. Sir John Salmond calls this form of subordinate legislation Autonomous and observes that though the great bulk of enacted law is promulgated by the State itself in certain cases it has been found desirable and expedient to entrust the power of legislation to private hands. Accordingly says Sir Salmond the power has been given to specific groups of individuals to legislate to a limited extent on matters concerning themselves. For instance a university may make regulations for the control of its members; a railway company is empowered to make by-laws for the regulation of its undertaking. The legislation so effected by private persons and the law so created may be styled autonomic. Under these circumstances the Act itself furnishes sufficient evidence to show that the autonomic regulations which the Board is supposed to frame in exercise of its powers under sec. 74 of the Act are mainly for the purpose of its internal management. . ( 21 ) HOWEVER merely because a regulation is made for internal management of a statutory body it would not be non-statutory in character if it possesses other characteristics which make it statutory. 74 of the Act are mainly for the purpose of its internal management. . ( 21 ) HOWEVER merely because a regulation is made for internal management of a statutory body it would not be non-statutory in character if it possesses other characteristics which make it statutory. Even the learned Advocate General who appeared for the State did not subscribe to the view that every regulation made under a delegated legislative power should necessarily be non-statutory in character. It is therefore necessary to consider the criteria which would invest regulation with a statutory character. ( 22 ) THE contention of Shri Hathi the learned advocate for the petitioners was that since these regulations are framed by the Board in exercise of its delegated legislative powers and since they directly affect the interest of a well defined group of members of public (which is here a low income group people having yearly income of Rs. 6 0 they should be read as if they were in the Act itself and should therefore be enforced accordingly. ( 23 ) AS against this it was contended by the learned Advocate General that those regulations possess merely a contractual character because they are framed to formulate some principles which would govern the disposal of Boards properties in favour of others. The learned Advocate General invited my attention to secs. 20 and 21 of the Act which provide for the making of a contract by or on behalf of the Board. In support of his contention he also relied upon the decision given by the Supreme Court in Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1828 wherein service regulations framed by Indian Airlines Corporation were held by the Supreme Court as not constituting a statutory restriction even though they were made under the power conferred by a statute According to the learned Advocate General therefore even these regulations should be construed as contractual in nature. ( 24 ) SHRI Daru who appeared on behalf of the respondents Nos. 5 to 14 however contended that the regulations are purely managerial in character and are framed for the internal management of the affairs of the Board and therefore they have no statutory force. ( 24 ) SHRI Daru who appeared on behalf of the respondents Nos. 5 to 14 however contended that the regulations are purely managerial in character and are framed for the internal management of the affairs of the Board and therefore they have no statutory force. ( 25 ) IN my opinion apart from the question whether these regulations possess statutory character or not it is not possible to agree with the learned Advocate Generals contention that they are contractual in character. The regulations framed by the Board for disposal of its property are obviously unilateral in their impact inasmuch as their valid or binding nature does not depend upon the contractual volition of those applicants who want to procure them on hire purchase basis. The very fact that according to regulation No 33 the tenements constructed by the Board for a particular income group are required to be allotted only to the persons of that group emphasises the aspect that these regulations are not the outcome of any contractual relations between the Board and the members of general public. It need not be said that no member of the general public who does not fall within the category of the income group for which tenements are constructed can claim any allotment in his favour. These regulations derive their authority from the exercise of a subordinate legislative power. As observed by Shah J. (as then he was) in Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and others A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1857 power to make rules regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board. If that be so exercise of a sovereign power cannot be said to be a result of an agreement. Therefore merely because the disposal of Boards property pursuant to these regulations results in an eventual contract between the two parties it cannot be said that the true charater of the regulations is contractual. Under these circumstances I do not find it possible to agree with the learned Advocate General that these regulations are contractual in character. ( 26 ) BUT then the question is whether the regulations framed under clause (b) of sec. 74 of the Act assume statutory character simply because they affect the interest of a well defined section of public. Under these circumstances I do not find it possible to agree with the learned Advocate General that these regulations are contractual in character. ( 26 ) BUT then the question is whether the regulations framed under clause (b) of sec. 74 of the Act assume statutory character simply because they affect the interest of a well defined section of public. It cannot be gain said that the regulations framed by the Board for disposal of its property only in a particular manner do create a sort of interest in a well defined albeit uncertain group of people who are covered by the definitions of expressions low income group persons and middle income group persons. But does it therefore mean that these regulations would assume the character of a statute? These regulations obviously do not create any enforceable legal right in favour of any person belonging to the above referred two groups because the interest which the persons of these two groups possess is too inchoate and indefinite to be treated as a tangible legal right. Moreover even the group of persons whose interest is created is not a legal entity and is of uncertain and varying proportion depending largely upon the changing socioeconomic conditions of the society. Thus if these regulations create no legal rights they also create no legal obligations which can be enforced under a Statute. It follows therefore that their efficacy is merely to provide guide lines to those who administer them. If these guidelines are abitrarily disregarded the said arbitrariness can be set right by this court in exercise of its extraordinary powers vested in it under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India but there is no remedy which can be availed of through ordinary process of law. Therefore in my opinion it is not possible to accept Shri Hathis contention that these regulations have a force of law as they affect the interest of two well defined sections of people. ( 27 ) IT is undoubtedly true that the regulations are framed in exercise of a delegated legislative authoritybut it is not possible to subscribe to a proposition that exercise of every delegated legislative authority results in a statute. ( 27 ) IT is undoubtedly true that the regulations are framed in exercise of a delegated legislative authoritybut it is not possible to subscribe to a proposition that exercise of every delegated legislative authority results in a statute. It is evident that on account of increasing complexities of modern legislation the legislature is often obliged to delegate very extensive legislative powers over matters of details not only to the executive organs of the Government but also to local bodies and statutory corporations. But when it does so it provides the fundamental principles and a sound framework of the statute under which the details are required to be worked. Therefore. the details of day to day working and administration are generally left by the Legislature to the statutory body. These details are to be filed in either inform of bye-laws or in form of regulations but whenever these bye-laws or regulations relate to internal management and organisational problems in which out siders have no vested interest or whenever these by-laws or regulations do not impose any obligations on the outsiders they generally don’t possess any statutory authority though they may possess a very potent binding force on the behaviourial pattern of the statutory body or those who control the statutory body. Reported decisions do not furnish any exhaustive guidelines on the question but a Division Bench of this Court has furnished workable guidelines on this point in Chhabildas Mehta M. L. A. and ors. v. The Legislative Assembly Gujarat Stave and ors. (197u) 11 G. L. R. 729. In that case this court considered the binding nature of Gujarat Legislative Assembly Rules. Bhagwati C. J. speaking for the court has observed in that case that it is not an inviolable canon of construction that rules and regulations made in exercise of statutory power must always be construed as enacting a statutory obligation. (197u) 11 G. L. R. 729. In that case this court considered the binding nature of Gujarat Legislative Assembly Rules. Bhagwati C. J. speaking for the court has observed in that case that it is not an inviolable canon of construction that rules and regulations made in exercise of statutory power must always be construed as enacting a statutory obligation. After illustrating on this point the decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee U. P. Warehousing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi 1969 (2) S. C. C. 838 the learned Chief Justice has made the following pertinent observations which clinch the point in issue He says:-OF course where rules or regulations are in the nature of subordinate legislation intended to lay down binding rules of conduct for third parties they would be held to be invested with legislative force and for all purposes of construction or obligation they would be treated exactly as if they were in the statute and they would have the same effect as is contained in the statute. But where it appears clearly that the intention or the Legislature in conferring rule making power on an authority was not to enable the authority to make binding rules of conduct rules made by such authority would not have the effect of creating statutory rights and obligations enforceable at law. THEN discussing the factors which can be taken into account in deciding whether a particular rule or regulation has a binding force of a statute he observes as under:-WHETHER they have statutory force and effect or not would be a matter of construction and that again would depend on a number of relevant factors such as the scheme of the Act the nature of the rule making power the authority on which power is conferred the purpose for which the power is given and the subject matter of the rules and regulations. THUS the four factors which can be taken into account in deciding this question are:- (1) Nature of rule making power (2) The authority on which the power is conferred. (3) The purpose for which the power is given and (4) The subject-matter of rules and regulations. TAKING these four factors into consideration we can safely formulate the following guide lines to decide whether a particular regulation of bye-law is enforceable as a statute. (3) The purpose for which the power is given and (4) The subject-matter of rules and regulations. TAKING these four factors into consideration we can safely formulate the following guide lines to decide whether a particular regulation of bye-law is enforceable as a statute. (1) If the regulation or by law in question imposes a legal obligation breach of which is punishable at law or which can be enforced through an ordinary process of law then it possesses a statutory character. AS an illustration the following observations of Lord Russel C. J. in Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 Q. B. 91 at 96 should be notedbut first its seems necessary to consider what is a bye-law. A bye-law of the class we are here considering I take to be an ordinance affecting the public or some portion or the public imposed by same authority clothed with statutory powers ordering something to be done or not to he done and accompanied by some sanction or penalty for its non observance (2) A corollary to the above proposition is that if a regulation or a bye-law creates a vested right in arty individual or an ascertained body of persons then also that regulation or bye-law may possess a statutory character. (3) But if the said regulation or bye-law has merely a contractual character its statutory force is lost as was held by the Supreme Court in Indian Airlines v. Sukhdeo Rai and U P. Warehouse Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi (both supra ). (4) If the regulation of bye-law does nothing more than regulation the internal affairs of the statutory body it merely possesses the character of an article of association of a company and does not possess any statutory authority. (vide Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Indus Tribunal A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 245) ( 28 ) IN my opinion these are the four guiding principles applying which we can safely conclude whether a particular bye-law or regulation has statutory force or not. The instant case is obviously not covered by any of the first three categories mentioned above but squarely falls within the fourth category and hence the regulations in question cannot be construed as possessing any statutory authority which would restrict the State Government in giving any directions which are not in complete harmony with them. The instant case is obviously not covered by any of the first three categories mentioned above but squarely falls within the fourth category and hence the regulations in question cannot be construed as possessing any statutory authority which would restrict the State Government in giving any directions which are not in complete harmony with them. ( 29 ) IN view of this discussions I find that the regulations framed by the Board for the disposal of its properties do not have any statutory force. However the date fixed by the State Government for determining the income eligibility of the applicants for allotment is found to be quite arbitrary and totally sub-verts the original object of the scheme under which the disputed flats have been constructed. It therefore infringes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The rest of the contentions raised by the petitioners with reference to Art. 14 of the Constitution are not found to be proper and acceptable. In the result therefore this petition is allowed. [rest of the judgment not material for reports. ] .