JUDGMENT : Bhargava J. ( 1. ) The respondents, who are six in number, were tried in the Court of the Magistrate First Class, Chhindwara, for an offence under section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh (C. P.) Public Gambling Act (hereinafter called the Act). They were convicted by the trial Court on their supposed plea of guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100 each and in default of payment of fine to suffer seven days simple imprisonment. It was also directed by the trial Court that the total amount of Rs. 368 seized from the person of five of the respondents should be forfeited to the State. ( 2. ) Feeling aggrieved from that decision, which was reached in a summary trial of the accused the respondents appealed and the learned Sessions Judge in appeal held that the trial Court was in error in reaching the conclusion that the plea of the accused amounted to their pleading guilty. In that view, the appeal was allowed and the learned Sessions Judge also reached the conclusion that it was not a fit case for remand as the respondents were not gaming in a public street or thoroughfare or at any place to which public had an access. Feeling aggrieved from the decision of acquittal, the State has filed this appeal. ( 3. ) The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the State is that the appeal was erroneously entertained by the Sessions Court. It is urged that no appeal was maintainable in the lower appellate Court as the sentence awarded to each one of the accused which amounted To punishment was a sentence of fine only and as that amount was less than Rs. 200, under section 414 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the order was not appealable. It is urged that the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 368 was no part of the sentence and, therefore, could not be taken into account for entertaining the appeal. ( 4. ) Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, we have formed the opinion that this appeal has no substance and should be dismissed. It is urged that the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 368 was no part of the sentence and, therefore, could not be taken into account for entertaining the appeal. ( 4. ) Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, we have formed the opinion that this appeal has no substance and should be dismissed. Section 13 of the Act expressly provides that any person who falls within the mischief of clauses (a;, (b) or (c) of the said section shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees, or to imprisonment, either simple or rigorous, for any term not exceeding four calendar months on his being held to be guilty of the offence by the trying Magistrate. It has further been provided in the last clause of the section "and such police officer may seize all moneys and all instruments of gaming found in such public place or on the person of those whom he shall so arrest, and the Magistrate may on conviction of the offender order such moneys to be forfeited and such instruments to be forthwith destroyed". ( 5. ) The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the State is that the forfeiture part of the provision does not prescribe the infliction of any punishment within the meaning of section 53 of the Indian Penal Code as that section only relates to such punishments as are imposed when somebody is found to have contravened the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel referred to us the decision of their Lordships reported in The State of West Bengal v. S. K. Ghosh ( AIR 1963 SC 255 ) He particularly referred to the observations made in paragraph 15 of the judgment. In our opinion, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the State is of no avail for holding that the impugned order of the trying Magistrate was not appealable in the lower appellate Court. In paragragh 15 their Lordships observed as follows : "The argument for the respondent is apparently based on the use of the word "forfeited" in section 13 (3) and also on the use of the word "forfeiture" in section 53 of the Indian Penal Code. In paragragh 15 their Lordships observed as follows : "The argument for the respondent is apparently based on the use of the word "forfeited" in section 13 (3) and also on the use of the word "forfeiture" in section 53 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no doubt that forfeiture in section 53 of the Indian Penal Code is a penalty but when section 13 (3) speaks of forfeiting to His Majesty the amount of money or value of the other property procured by the accused by means of the offence, it in effect provides for recovery by the Government of the property belonging to it, which the accused might have procured by embezzlement etc. The mere use of the word "forfeited" would not necessarily make it a penalty. The word "forfeiture" has been used in other laws without importing the idea of penalty or punishment within the meaning of Article 20 (1) Reference in this connection may be made to section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act (No. 4 of 1882) which talks of determination of a lease by forfeiture. We are, therefore, of opinion that forfeiture provided in section 13 (3) in case of offences which involve the embezzlement etc. of Government money or property is really a speedier method of realising Government money or property as compared to a suit which it is not disputed the Government could bring for realising the money or property and is not punishment or penalty within the meaning of Article 20 (1). Such a suit could ordinarily be brought without in any way affecting the right to realise the fine that may have been imposed by a criminal Court in connection with the offence." ( 6. ) It is plain from the observations made by their Lordships that the forfeiture which may be contemplated in a given case may amount to a penalty or may not amount to a penalty. ) It is plain from the observations made by their Lordships that the forfeiture which may be contemplated in a given case may amount to a penalty or may not amount to a penalty. If the property seized and forfeited belongs to the party in whose favour the order of forfeiture is to be made, then it is not an infliction of forfeiture penalty but the order will be more in the nature of the recovery by the owner of his own property though the process by which it is restored is termed forfeiture On the other hand, if the owner himself is required to be deprived of his property in view of the fact that he has been guilty of an offence, we do not see as to how in this case the forfeiture would not amount to a penalty. As section 13 of the Act, in our opinion clearly envisages the infliction of penalty by forfeiture, it is a punishment which is awarded to the accused on his having been found guilty by the Court. This conclusion is irresistible from the fact that the admitted position in the case is that the amount which has been ordered to be forfeited originally belonged to the various persons from whose person it was seized at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. Thus, we are clearly of the view that in this case there is a combination of sentences, one part being the amount of fine imposed and the other part being the forfeiture of the amount seized. We are, therefore, of the view that the matter is clearly covered by the provisions of section 415 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes for an appeal in the case of combination of sentences. Section 415 provides that an appeal may be brought against any sentence referred to in section 413 or section 414 by which any punishment therein mentioned is combined with any other punishment but no sentence which would not otherwise be liable to appeal shall be appealable merely on the ground that the person convicted is ordered to find security to keep the peace. As the forfeiture has been combined with the imposition of fine, in our view the appeal was clearly competent and has rightly been entertained by the lower appellate Court. The second. As the forfeiture has been combined with the imposition of fine, in our view the appeal was clearly competent and has rightly been entertained by the lower appellate Court. The second. contention raised by the learned counsel for the State is that the lower appellate Court reached a wrong conclusion in holding that the accused has not pleaded guilty. Each one of the accused when questioned about the following charge In our opinion, the lower appellate Court correctly came to the conclusion that the facts mentioned in the charge did not constitute the offence of gambling and, therefore, the mere plea which did not contain any admission of the accused constituting all the ingredients of the offence cannot render them liable to be convicted on their plea of guilty. We may point out that it was not mentioned in the charge as to what was the game of the cards in which the accused indulged. It has also not been established as to whether the game in which the accused were participating was a game of chance and thus amounted to gambling. It is also worthy of note that the lower appellate Court has held that the accused were playing the game of cards in the verandah of the house. The verandah of a house, as has rightly been held by the learned Sessions Judge, could not be held to be a public place. ( 7. ) For all these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.RAJESH