D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) ORIGINAL plaintiff landlord has come in revision to this court. He failed in both the Courts below in obtaining a decree for eviction from the rented premises against the opposite party defendant on the ground of non-payment of rent for a period of more than six months prior to the service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (herein after referred to as the Act ). The rent was admittedly due from January 1 1961 and the monthly rent was Rs. 15. 00. The notice containing demand under sec. 12 (2) of the Act as well as terminating tenancy was given on August 4 1961 At that time the opposite party was in jail as an under trial prisoner as he was arrested on April 12 1961 It appears that even on the date of the suit before the trial Court that is on September 7 1961 he was in jail. It also appears that the said notice was sent back from the jail with an endorsement of refusal. However the brother of the opposite party sent a money order of Rs. 75/on August 9 1961 That was not sufficient to cover seven months rent as demanded by the notice quit. Therefore the landlord approached the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad for eviction of the tenant. After filing of the suit the defendant tenant came to be released from jail on October 26 1961 as can be found from the judgment of the trial Court. Apart from non-payment of rent ground namely non-user of the suit shop without reasonable cause for the purpose for which it was let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit was also urged. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Judge having found that the defendant was confined to prison from 13-4-1961 to 26-10-1961 came to the conclusion that the defendant was placed in such circumstances that he had to keep the shop closed for more than six months. On the question of neglect to make payment of arrears of rent for more than six months within one month of the service of the statutory notice under sec. On the question of neglect to make payment of arrears of rent for more than six months within one month of the service of the statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act the learned trial Judge held that the defendant had neglected to pay the amount of arrears of rent before the filing of the suit. The validity of this notice issued by the landlord was also challenged before the trial Court and on that ground the defendant succeeded as the learned trial Judge found on account of an error in the description of the month in the notice that the notice was invalid as in his opinion the error was fatal. notice. Therefore on the sole ground that the notice was bad the suit for possession came to be dismissed. Against that decree the landlord went in appeal to the Bench of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad. The earned Judges who constituted the appellate Bench agreed with the conclusion of the trial Court that the notice terminating the tenancy was not valid and they also relied upon the discrepancy in the description of the month in the notice regarding the termination of the tenancy. On the ground of neglect to pay the arrears of rent of more than six months within one month of the service of the notice the learned appellate Judges disagreed with the view of the trial Court. They having found that the defendant tenant was in jail during the aforesaid period and having also found from the evidence of the defendant that he had asked his brother who had gone to see him in the jail to pay up plaintiffs rent came to the conclusion that there was no neglect on the part of the defendant tenant in payment of the arrears of rent within one month of the statutory notice. For this purpose they construed the word neglects occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act as meaning omission to do a duty which the party is able to do or which the party has the power to do. . They came to the conclusion that during the period that the tenant was in jail that is from April 12 1961 to 31-8-1961 the tenant was neither able to pay nor was it within his power to pay all the arrears of rent to the plaintiff. . They came to the conclusion that during the period that the tenant was in jail that is from April 12 1961 to 31-8-1961 the tenant was neither able to pay nor was it within his power to pay all the arrears of rent to the plaintiff. Having found that there was no neglect established as contemplated under sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the suit for possession was bound to fail on this sole ground. It is against this decree in appeal that the original landlord plaintiff has come in revision to this Court. ( 3 ) MR. S. K. Zaveri the learned advocate for the petitioner urged that both the courts below were wrong in holding that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid. The only ground on which both the courts held the notice to be invalid was based on the discrepancy in the month while giving the date of termination of tenancy. The notice Exh. 31 was dated August 4 1961 and the relevant portion of this notice in connection with the termination of the tenancy may be translated as under:-AFTER expiry of 15 days from the receipt of this notice your month expires on August 1 1961 at that time or the date on which you consider that your tenancy month expires you should hand over vacant and actual possession of the rented shop and also pay up the arrears of rent to my client and obtain my clients receipt. . . . INSTEAD of stating the month in the date of termination of tenancy as 9 the month was stated by the figure of 8. This conveyed that on the expiry of 15 days after the notice the month of tenancy could not have been terminated three days before the notice that is on 1-8-1961. This error would be obvious to anybody and it is well settled that the notice terminating tenancy should not be construed on the splitting of a straw. A clerical error which is obvious and patent on the face of the notice in the circumstances of this case cannot render the notice invalid. But apart from that there was an alternative mode of termination of tenancy expressed in the notice which would hold good if the date of the termination of the tenancy is ignored. A clerical error which is obvious and patent on the face of the notice in the circumstances of this case cannot render the notice invalid. But apart from that there was an alternative mode of termination of tenancy expressed in the notice which would hold good if the date of the termination of the tenancy is ignored. The notice in question was sufficient to convey to the tenant that he was called upon to surrender vacant possession of the rented premises on September 1 1961 notwithstanding that the date mentioned was August 1 1961 Therefore the Lower appellate Court was wrong in its conclusion that the notice in the present case was invalid. ( 4 ) MR. Majmudar appearing for the defendant tenant relied upon the same reasons which were given by the lower appellate Court while discussing challenge to this notice. He added that if the notice called upon the defendant to hand over possession on 1-8-1961 that is three days prior to the giving of the notice it was still born notice and therefore it should be considered to be invalid. The argument is without any substance. This is a case of an error in mentioning the date of termination of the tenancy in the notice. Mr. Majmudar then pointed out that the same date was shown in paragraph 8 of the plaint. But that makes no difference. Another contention was advanced by Mr. Majmudar by way of challenge to the validity of this notice. He urged that emphasis in this notice was not on payment of rent in arrears but on termination of the tenancy. He urged that the notice should emphasize payment of arrears of rent and actually make a demand and given an opportunity to the tenant to stop the termination of the tenancy by payment of rent in arrears. For this purpose he relied upon a decision reported as Ram Krishna v. Mohd. Yahia A. I. R. 1960 Allahabad 482 wherein a learned Single Judge of that Court on construction of sec. 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 came to the conclusion that the notice given under that provision must give the tenant an. opportunity to save his tenancy from the consequences of default by paying the rent. 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 came to the conclusion that the notice given under that provision must give the tenant an. opportunity to save his tenancy from the consequences of default by paying the rent. The learned Judge further observed that the demand of rent may even be coupled with a conditional termination of tenancy such as If you fail to pay within one month of the receipt of the notice the tenancy will be at an end. The learned Judge then further stated that if the notice unconditionally terminates the tenancy and asks the tenant to vacate the accommodation irrespective of whether he pays the arrears or not it is not a notice of demand as required by sec. 3 (1) (a ). According to the view of the learned Judge if the demand for rent is coupled with a termination of tenancy then the landlord must terminate the tenancy conditionally. This view of the learned Judge has been expressly dissented from by my learned brother J. M. Sheth J. in Jenabai Mohmed v. Gulam Abbas XII Gujarat Law Reporter 819 The learned Judge has disagreeing with the view of Dhawan J. who decided Ramkrishna case (supra) has held that the landlord cannot give a conditional notice and that a clear cut notice determining the contractual tenancy as contemplated by sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has to be given. I respectfully agree with this view of my learned brother. ( 5 ) THEN the next question which requires to be considered in this case is whether in arriving at its decision on merits and basing it on the fact that there was no neglect to make payment of arrears of rent as contemplated by sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the lower appellate Court committed any error of law ? For this purpose we have got to accept the finding of the learned appellate Judges that on account of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case there was no neglect in payment of arrears of rent within one month of the statutory notice as contemplated by sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. The question of law raised in this court however is as regards interpretation of the word neglects occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. The question of law raised in this court however is as regards interpretation of the word neglects occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This provision now be reproduced;12 Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-sec. (2) the court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. ( 6 ) NOW it is well settled that four conditions have to be satisfied in order to attract the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. These conditions are:- (1) The rent is payable by the month (2) There is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases (3) The rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and (4) Neglect of the tenant to make payment thereof until the expiration of a period of one month after the statutory notice under sec. 12 (3 ). If all these four conditions are satisfied it is the duty of the court to pass a decree for eviction under sec. 12 (3) (a ). In such a case by tendering arrears of rent after the expiration of one month from the receipt of the notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act the tenant cannot claim before the court that he is protected by sec. 12 (1) of the Act. As held by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Manorama v. Mrs. Dhanlaxmi VII G. L. R. 1061 in a case falling within sub-sec. (3) (a) of sec. 12 of the Act the tenant must be dealt with under that sub-section. The learned Judges also stated in paragraph 4 with regard to the conditions of Sub-sec. (3) (a) as under:-IF the conditions of sub-sec. (3) (a) are satisfied the tenant cannot claim any protection from eviction under the Act. (3) (a) of sec. 12 of the Act the tenant must be dealt with under that sub-section. The learned Judges also stated in paragraph 4 with regard to the conditions of Sub-sec. (3) (a) as under:-IF the conditions of sub-sec. (3) (a) are satisfied the tenant cannot claim any protection from eviction under the Act. 99it was further observed in paragraph 5 The landlord is vested with the right to recover possession of the premises if the rent is in arrears for a period of six months or more the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-sec. (2) and the other conditions of sub-sec. (3) are satisfied This right cannot be defeated by showing that the tenant was ready and willing to pay the arrears of rent after the default but before the institution of the suit. Mr. Zaveri for the petitioner laid great stress on the aforesaid observation which in his submission go to show that a right to recover possession is vested in the landlord when the arrears for a period of more than six months are not paid within a period of one month of the receipt of the notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act. But then it is clear from the aforesaid observations that the satisfaction of other conditions also is contemplated before it can be said that the right is vested in the landlord and one of the conditions is the neglect of the tenant to make payment of rent in arrears until the expiration of the period of one month after the notice referred to under sec. 12 (2) of the Act. This decision is therefore not helpful to the petitioner. On the contrary it would show that all the conditions laid down by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 12 including the condition about the establishment of neglect to make payment should be satisfied before the court is called upon to pass a decree for eviction on the ground that it has no discretion left in the matter. ( 7 ) THE material question therefore is what is the meaning of the word neglects occurring in the aforesaid provision. According to Mr. ( 7 ) THE material question therefore is what is the meaning of the word neglects occurring in the aforesaid provision. According to Mr. Zaveris submission the said word should be construed to mean mere nonpayment or mere failure to make payment of the arrears of rent demanded by the notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act. ( 8 ) MR. Majmudar for the opposite party submitted that the word neglects should not be equated with a mere non-payment or a mere failure to pay the arrears because cases are conceivable in which it would be altogether beyond the power of the tenant who has received a notice to quit on the ground of arrears of more than six months to make payment thereof within a period of one month of the receipt of the notice. He gave an illustration. A tenant receives a notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act terminating tenancy and calling upon him to pay up arrears of rent which are for a period of more than six months. Within two or three days of the receipt of the notice the tenant meets with a serious accident which makes him unconscious and he is removed to the hospital. The tenant remains unconscious for more than a month or so and when he regains consciousness in the hospital the period of one month prescribed under sub-sec. (3) (a) of sec. 12 has already elapsed Mr. Majmudar urged that in such a case it can never be said that the tenant has neglected to make payment of the arrears within one month of the receipt of the notice because during this period of one month it was not within the power of the tenant to make payment on account of the fact that he had remained unconscious for a long time. This illustration is quite opposite. Of course other things being equal there would be a strong presumption of neglect from mere non-payment of the arrears within a period of one month from the receipt of the notice. In such a case it would be for a tenant to rebut this presumption by proving circumstances which convince the court that the tenant was not able to pay the arrears of rent. In such a case it would be for a tenant to rebut this presumption by proving circumstances which convince the court that the tenant was not able to pay the arrears of rent. It may be that poverty or want of funds may be pleaded as inability in a given case and that may not be held sufficient for coming to the conclusion that there is no neglect to make payment of the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice. But cases analogous to the illustration given by Mr. Majmudar are conceivable and it is not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Zaveri that in such cases also the Court must construe the word neglects as equivalent to mere non-payment or mere failure to make payment. There is one un reported decision of the Bombay High Court available to the Court which throws some light on the meaning and content of the word neglects occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. That decision is in the case of Himatlal Manilal v. Chhanalal Ambalal Civil Revision Application No. 1924 of 1957) decided by Chagla C. J. on December 18 1957 The learned Judge after referring to the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Act observes. It is significant to notice that the Legislature has not made the mere factum of non-payment of rent after the notice a ground for eviction. If that had been so then the language used would not have been the language which is actually used in this sub-section. The language is the tenant neglects to make payment The language is not the tenant does not make payment or does not pay. Mr. Kaji for the opponent suggests that the expression neglects means either actual payment or a tender or payment. I am not prepared to accept that contention because in the eye of the law proper tender is as good as actual payment and if all that the Legislature required was payment or proper tender then the expression used would not have been the tenant neglects to make payment. Therefore something more is necessary than mere non-payment of rent be the tenant. Therefore something more is necessary than mere non-payment of rent be the tenant. Or if I may put it in a different language there may be circumstances where actual non-payment may be established and yet the court may and can come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the non-payment the tenant has not neglected to make payment. These observations in a way meet the contention raised by Mr. Zaveri with regard to the interpretation to be given to the word neglects occurring in sub-sec. (3) (a) of sec. 12 of the Act. ( 9 ) MR. Zaveri urged that these observations were made in the context of the facts of that case and the facts were that in the year 1953 the tenant had sent two money orders of rent successively and the landlord had refused the same. Then the tenant did not pay rent and the landlord gave notice in 1955. The tenant replied to the notice drawing attention of the landlord to the fact that previous two money orders were not accepted and stating that he was prepared to pay up the rent provided proper receipt was passed by the landlord. The landlord had not replied to this letter of the tenant and filed a suit for eviction. Mr. Zaveri urged that it was the fault of the landlord in not accepting the offer made by the tenant and in that context the aforesaid observations were made. It is not possible to agree with this submission of Mr. Zaveri. The observations which have been reproduced in themselves show that they were made with a view to give proper meaning and content to the phrase neglects to make payment occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the aforesaid decision which show that something more is necessary to prove neglect than a mere non-payment of rent by the tenant. Of course as observed by me earlier a strong presumption of neglect might arise from the factum of non-payment of arrears of rent by the tenant within the prescribed period of one month and it would be on the tenant to rebut that presumption by leading evidence and proving conclusively the circumstances which may lead the court to hold that even though non-payment was established there was no neglect notwithstanding the non-payment. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary. Third edition one of the meaning of the word neglect is given as under:- (1) To neglect doing is the omission to do some duty which the party is able to do (per Patterson J. King v. Burrell 12 A. and B. 468) whether he gets a demand to do it or not (East London Water Works Co. v. Kyffin (1895) 1 Q. B 55 e. g. an arbitrator not making his award in due time (Willoughby v. Willoughby 9 Q. B. 923) The learned author has also given another citation showing the meaning of the word neglect as under:-A gas company does not neglect or refuse to supply gas (sec. 36 Gas Works Clauses Act 1871 (34 and 35 Vict. 41)) when prevented from doing so by viz. major e. g. an extraordinary frost (Re Richmond Gas Co. and Richmond 1893 1 Q. B. 55. ACCORDING to Blacks Law Dictionary (1951) 4th Edition neglect may mean a designed refusal or unwillingness to perform ones duty. In a case arising in England under Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894 (57 and; 58 Vict. 41) Lord Russell of Killowan said with regard to the word neglect as under:-NEGLECT is the want of reasonable care that is the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind (Vide The Queen v. Senior (1899) 1 Q. B. 283 at p. 291 ). THESE observations were made in the context of a provision of that Act which so far as relevant reads:- If any person. . . . . who has the custody charge or care of any child. . . . . . . . willfully. . . . . . neglects such child. . . . in a manner likely to cause such child. . . . . injury to its health. . . . . that person shall be guilty of mis demeanour. Thus neglect is not a mere omission to do a thing. ( 10 ) IF we look to the aforesaid meaning of the word neglect it appears that the word neglects has been advisably used by the Legislature in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This was done because by amending original sec. Thus neglect is not a mere omission to do a thing. ( 10 ) IF we look to the aforesaid meaning of the word neglect it appears that the word neglects has been advisably used by the Legislature in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This was done because by amending original sec. 12 (3) of the Act the Legislature wanted to take away the right of the tenant to pay up arrears of rent at the appellate stage and prevent passing of a decree for eviction which existed before and instead give an absolute right to the landlord to recover possession provided the contingency contemplated by sec. 12 (3) (a) was in existence. In order therefore to see that the tenants who by some misfortune became disabled from tendering the amount of rent in arrears to the landlord do not suffer these words have been used in contradistinction with non-payment. There was nothing easier for the Legislature if a mere non-payment of rent was considered sufficient to vest an absolute right in the landlord to recover possession under sec. 12 (3) (a) to make a provision by using a phrases like does not pay instead of neglects to make payment. The cases where tenants by some misfortune become disabled from tendering the amount of rent in arrears within a period of one month after the receipt of the notice under sec. 12 (2) can well be conceived and the illustration given by Mr. Majmudar which has been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment is one of those cases; and we will now turn to the present case. In the present case the defendant was in jail not only on the date the notice was tendered for service but also on the date of filing of the suit and for sometime thereafter. Still he did all that was within his power while in the jail by asking his brother who had come to see him in the jail to pay the rent in arrears to the landlord. The brother however sent a money order of five months rent only instead of seven months rent. This act of the brother was not within the control of the defendant. The brother however sent a money order of five months rent only instead of seven months rent. This act of the brother was not within the control of the defendant. In this state of facts can it be said that there was want of reasonable care or omission to take such steps as a reasonable man would take as contemplated by Lord Russell of Killowan C. J. in the Queen v. Senior (supra)? Or to put it differently can it be said that there was designed refusal or unwillingness. On the part of the defendant to perform this duty to pay up the arrears as mentioned in Blacks Law Dictionary ? ( 11 ) THESE different meanings of the word neglect have been referred to earlier with a view to emphasize only that in using the phrase neglects to make payment in sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the Legislature intended to convey something more than a mere non-payment of arrears of rent demanded by the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). If this is the position then the interpretation sought to be placed by Mr. Zaveri on the aforesaid phrase becomes unacceptable. ( 12 ) FROM certain decisions Mr. Zaveri tried to show that mere nonpayment of rent is sufficient to attract the provisions of sub-sec. (3) (a) of sec. 12. But in none of these decisions the phrase neglects to make payment has been interpreted. Mr. Zaveri firstly relied upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in Vasumati v. Naviram IV G. L. R. 969 at page 972; and these observations may be reproduced;what sec 12 (3) (a) requires is that in cases where there is no dispute between the landlord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if the landlord is able to show that the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months or more and the said arrears continued in spite of the fact that a notice was served on him before the institution of the suit and no payment was made within a month thereafter the landlord is entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the tenant. . . . . . . . . The respondents told the appellant by their notice that arrears were due from her and there is no doubt that the arrears were not paid up by the appellant until the expiration of one month next after the notice in writing was served on her in that behalf. . . . . . Therefore if the notice served by the respondents on the appellant prior to the institution of the present is in order and it is shown that the arrears have not been paid as required then sec. 12 (2) has been complied with and it is on that footing that the case between the parties has to be tried under sec. 12 (3) (a ). THE emphasis of Mr. Zaveri is that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid observations made use of the words no payment was made within a month were not paid up by the appellant and have not been paid as required. As observed earlier the question as regards the interpretation of the phrase neglects to make payment occurring in sec. 12 (3) (a) never arose in this decision. In fact neglect in making payment was implicit in that case. But the point raised before the Supreme Court was that on the date of the notice the old un-amended sec. 12 (3) of the Act was in force and under that sub-section as interpreted by the Bombay High Court in Dayaram Kashiram v. Bansilal 55 Bombay Law Reporter 30 the tenant could have made payment of all the arrears even at the date of the hearing of the appeal. The argument was that thereafter the amended sec. 12 (3) (a) came into force and the landlord taking advantage of the fact that the arrears were for more than six months filed the suit for eviction. It was contended that in view of the position of law obtaining before the date of the amendment sec. 12 (3) (a) should be so read as to require the landlord to issue a fresh notice after the amended section came into force because the notice given by the landlord prior to the date of the amendment did not convey to the tenant the knowledge that her failure to comply with it would necessarily lead to her ejectment. It was while dealing with this contention that the aforesaid observations were made by the Supreme Court. It was while dealing with this contention that the aforesaid observations were made by the Supreme Court. It was not a case in which the defendant tenant contended that he was not negligent in making payment and sought a finding on that question from the Courts of fact. ( 13 ) SAME observation will apply to another decision reported as Hirachand Sonu v. Mahadeo 64 Bombay Law Reporter 856 which was a case of part payment and not full payment of the arrears of rent as demanded by the statutory notice. Mr. Zaveri laid emphasis on the following observations at page 859:- The said observations have been reproduced in the aforesaid decision from the decision in Hurban Kussen v. Ratikant 59 Bom. L. R. 158 :-HAVING given adequate protection to tenants who are not in arrears for such a long period as six months Legislature appears to have taken the view that where tenants are in arrears for such a long period as six months if the tenants do not take steps to pay the rent within one month after receiving notice from the landlord they are not entitled to any further protection and the landlord would be entitled to obtain a decree as a matter of right. THESE observations also do not lay down that the meaning of the phrase neglects to make payment is mere non-payment. Another decision relied upon by Mr. Zaveri is Babulal v. Purshottam 65 Bom. L. R. 434 wherein the tenant paid a sum of Rs. 350/to the pleader for the purpose of being paid over to the landlord (who was the head tenant) and the lawyer neglected to make payment. It was held that the negligence of the lawyer was the negligence of the sub-tenant. This decision also has no bearing upon the question raised in the present case. ( 14 ) MR. Zaveri then pointed out a decision of this High Court reported as Nathubhai v. Bhakhibhai A. I. R. 1963 Gujarat 305 wherein the following observations were made at page 311 in paragraph 20:-IT is contended by the learned counsel for the opponent that mere failure to pay six months arrears would not amount to neglect within the meaning of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This contention cannot be accepted because even after the notice requiring the tenant to pay six ments arrears the tenant did not do so even for a period of one month. Such a conduct would naturally constitute neglect within the meaning of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. For the purpose of sub-sec. (3) (a) no distinction can be made between the word failure and the word neglect. THESE observations were made in the facts of that particular case where as observed earlier a presumption of neglect arising from the mere failure to make payment would prevail unless it is rebutted by the tenant. In that case mere failure amounted to neglect as there was nothing to rebut the presumption arising from non-payment. ( 15 ) IN the present case as observed earlier there is a finding of the lower appellate Court that the opposite party tenant had not neglected to make payment of the arrears of rent within the prescribed period. That finding was given in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case which led the court to hold that notwithstanding the fact of non-payment there would be no neglect. I therefore do not think that any error of law has been committed by the lower appellate court on this point. ( 16 ) MR. Zaveri in the end urged that if the Court is inclined to treat this case as falling under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act it should order the opposite party to deposit costs of the suit incurred by the plaintiff in the trial Court as contemplated by sec. 12 (3) (b ). There is no reason to exercise this discretion in favour of the plaintiff who in this case sought to exploit helpless condition of the tenant being in jail as an under trial prisoner. Besides no such order was sought during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court. ( 17 ) NO other point was urged. ( 18 ) IN the result the revision application will fail and is dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. .