JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - On a difference of opinion between Satish Chandra and K.N. Srivastava, JJ. the following question has been referred to me for opinion by the Chief Justice: Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the subject-matter of the lease was an 'accommodation' within the meaning of U.P. Rent Control Act? 2. In order to answer the above question it is necessary to determine as to what exactly was the subject-matter of the lease and whether it fell within the definition of the word 'accommodation' as contemplated by U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 3. The word 'accommodation' as commonly understood merely means a lodging, a quarter or space in a building. But the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act has given the following special meaning to the word in Section 2(a), as amended by Act XVII of 1954. 4. Accommodation' 'means residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes: (i) gardens, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) Any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building, but does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. 5. The last clause further amending the definition of the word 'accommodation' was added by Amending Act XVII of 1954. Although the first lease in favour of the Defendants was created in 1953, yet in this case we are essentially concerned with the last lease dated 26th May, 1959 which was determined by the Plaintiff by means of a notice dated 30th December, 1966, followed by a suit for eviction of the Defendants in the year 1967. Therefore, we have here to deal with the definition of 'accommodation' as amended by Act XVII of 1954. 6. The word 'business' as used in the last part of the definition has not itself been defined in the Act. It would, therefore, carry the common meaning of being a trade or commercial activity. Business being a trade or commercial activity, it must be in actual operation at the relevant time. 6. The word 'business' as used in the last part of the definition has not itself been defined in the Act. It would, therefore, carry the common meaning of being a trade or commercial activity. Business being a trade or commercial activity, it must be in actual operation at the relevant time. The context in which the word 'business' has been used in the last part of the definition also shows that it refers to a running business, which has to be leased out along with the factory or industrial establishment, as part and parcel of the same transaction, in order to exclude it from the definition of the word 'accommodation'. In other words, the leased out industrial establishment in a building would continue to be an 'accommodation' within the meaning of the Act, except where the business carried on, in or upon the building is also simultaneously leased out by the same transaction. It has been conceded by the learned Counsel for the parties that exhibition of cinema films is a business or industry. 7. Applying the aforementioned test to the present case, it is quite apparent that though the cinema hall in question along with all its furniture, fittings and cinema machinery was leased out by the Plaintiff to the Defendants, yet if a running cinema business operated therein was not simultaneously leased out to the Defendants by the same transaction, then the subject-matter of the lease would continue to remain an 'accommodation' as defined by the Act. Nevertheless, before the Plaintiff was in a position to lease out his cinema business, if any, along with the rest of the accommodation, two things were obviously necessary, viz., (1) that there was a running cinema business at the time of the creation of the first lease and (2) that the said business belonged to the Plaintiff, for without it he could not have leased out the same. The two crucial questions which, therefore, present themselves for determination in this case are (1) whether there was a running cinema business belonging to the Plaintiff at the time of the creation of the first lease in favour of the Defendants; if so, (2) whether he actually leased out the same to the Defendants along with the rest of the subject-matter of the lease. It may be that the last lease is the one which was determined by the Plaintiff by means of a notice followed by a suit for eviction from the demised property, but if the Plaintiff had not a running business of his own at the time of the creation of the first lease of 1953, he could not have evidently transferred the same to the Defendants at the time of granting subsequent leases, ending with the last lease of 1959, even though at that time the cinema business belonging to the Defendants might have well been running, because that running cinema business did not belong to the Plaintiff. 8. Most of the facts, giving rise to the question quoted at the outset, have already been set out in the judgments of the two learned Judges. The same need not, therefore, be repeated here in detail. However, there is some difference of opinion or uncertainty about some of the facts which have to be determined by me, inasmuch as I have to give my opinion "on the facts and circumstances of the case" that is on proved or established facts. There was some controversy between the parties whether there were two separate transactions of the demised properties-one relating to the lease of the cinema hall and the other relating to furniture, fans, fittings and cinema machinery, etc. affixed therein, inasmuch as the first lease of 1953 as well as most of the subsequent leases were evidenced by two separate documents. However, Mr. K.L. Misra, learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellants, has conceded before me that for the purposes of this case, inspite of there being separate documents of leases in respect of the demised properties, as referred to above, these sets of contracts may be treated as a single transaction each time. 9. It may also be mentioned that though the demised properties had already been delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendants, the agreement was that the tenancy shall commence from the date the business of exhibiting pictures starts in the cinema hall in question, which turned out to be 25-3-1953, when the first picture 'Jaggoo' was exhibited therein. 10. Although it does not appear to have been seriously pressed before the Division Bench, Mr. 10. Although it does not appear to have been seriously pressed before the Division Bench, Mr. S.P. Sinha, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent, has strenuously argued before me that the Plaintiff had actually carried on cinema business in the premises in question from 19 U to 1938 and that in 1948 he had leased out the cinema to one Bhagwan Das, who ran it only for two or four days, as he could not obtain the requisite licence. The Plaintiff, Dwarka Prasad, also deposed to these matters in his statement before the trial judge. However, in his cross-examination Dwarka Prasad had to concede that he did not recollect whether or not he had taken a licence in 1931 to run the cinema. At any rate, none has been produced by the Plaintiff. He admitted that he maintained account books and that there must be entries therein about his cinema business which he carried on from 1931 to 1938. Strangely enough, he did not produce the account books before the Court and admitted that he had no proof in writing to show that his cinema ran from 1931 to 1933. We have already seen that in 1948 the first lessee Bhagwan Das, could not run the cinema, as he failed to secure the requisite licence. The Plaintiff candidly conceded that he took no rent from Bhagwan Das aforesaid as he could not run the cinema. In answer to a Court question, Dwarka Prasad admitted that when he started negotiations with the Defendants in 1952, the cinema was not working, nor did he exhibit any film in 1952. In fact, Dwarka Prasad (PW 3) had to concede that he did not exhibit any film in this cinema till 25-3-1953, on which date he let it out to the Defendants. He further accepted that the agreement of the film 'Jaggoo', which commenced running from 23-3-1953, was not in his favour. He even could not deny that its agreement was made with the Defendants. Under the circumstances, the two learned Judges of the Division Bench had rightly observed that there was no proof of any cinema business having been conducted in the premises in question till the Defendants started it on 25-3-1953. He even could not deny that its agreement was made with the Defendants. Under the circumstances, the two learned Judges of the Division Bench had rightly observed that there was no proof of any cinema business having been conducted in the premises in question till the Defendants started it on 25-3-1953. In any case, even the business allegedly started by Bhagwan Das in 1948 had come to an end after two or four days and since 1948 till March 25, 1953 there was admittedly no cinema business of the Plaintiff or anybody else running in the instant premises. The letter of the senior Entertainment Tax Inspector, Agra (Ex. A-II) clearly shows that according to the official records maintained in his office the first licence under the Cinematograph Act and Rules for the premises in question was issued in the name of Shri D.D. Sarraf (Defendant) for the exhibition of cinematograph films on and from March 25, 1953 under the name and style of Mahabir Talkies, Agra. When there was no running cinema business of the Plaintiff in existence at the time of the grant of the first lease of 1953, there was no question of his leasing out the same to the Defendants along with other demised properties. The mere fact that the lease in favour of the Defendants was to commence from the date they started exhibiting pictures cannot be considered to be a lease of the running business in as much as the business did not belong to the Plaintiff but to the Defendants. Evidently enough, the Plaintiff could not possibly have leased out a business which never belonged to him. The mere fact that the lease was to commence from the date the Defendants started their business of exhibiting cinematograph films cannot mean that the Plaintiff had granted a lease of the cinema business as well to the Defendants, as it never belonged to him, but belonged to the Defendants alone. This is further established by the fact that there is no mention of the transfer of a running cinema business in any of the leases granted by the Plaintiff to the Defendants. As indicated earlier, annexed to the last lease deed of 1959 were two Schedules A and B, containing the lists of the demised properties. None of them mentioned the transfer of a cinema business to the Defendants. As indicated earlier, annexed to the last lease deed of 1959 were two Schedules A and B, containing the lists of the demised properties. None of them mentioned the transfer of a cinema business to the Defendants. Similarly, along with the plaint the Plaintiff filed two schedules of properties A and B over which he prayed for recovery of possession. These schedules again do not mention cinema business as one of the properties sought to be retransferred to the Plaintiff from the Defendants. 11. It is true that some of the lease deeds speak of the lease of the cinema, known as Mahabir Talkies. Ordinarily, the word 'cinema' means the cinema building or the place where cinematograph films are exhibited. The word 'cinema' has been defined in Rule 2(iii) of the U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951, thus: "Cinema means the entire place licensed for cinematograph exhibit ion and includes all appurtenances, plant and apparatus located therein." Therefore, when some of the lease deeds speak of the lease of the 'cinema', they obviously refer to the tenancy of cinema hall or the entire place for cinematograph exhibition, including all appurtenances, plant and apparatus located therein and not to the cinema business. 12. Before dealing with the next point urged on behalf of the Plaintiff, it may be mentioned that there are two types of licences which have to be obtained, in connection with cinema business. u/s 3 of the (Central) Cinematograph Act, 1918 as well as u/s 3 of the U.P. Cinemas (Regulations) Act, 1955, no person could give an exhibition by means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under the Act. Therefore, first of all, the place of exhibition of cinema films has to be licensed. Then there has to be a second licence, in the prescribed form, for giving cinematograph exhibitions, granted by the licensing authority as provided by the U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951. 13. Mr. S.P. Sinha has urged next that it was the Plaintiff, who owned the cinema hall, equipped with necessary furniture, fittings and even the paraphernalia for exhibiting cinematograph films and further in view of the fact that it was he who in 1952 and early 1953 had arranged the water connection and electric supply to the premises in question and had also taken a licence for the cinema house, known as Mahabir Talkies, in order to enable the exhibition of films. All these things must be taken to be a part and parcel of the cinema business, as they imparted their character, impress and seal on the business itself, without which it could not have been carried on. In other words, they are said to be a part of the cinema business and when they were let out to the Defendants, the cinema business should be deemed to have been let out to them. The argument appears quite attractive but does not have much substance. It is true that by doing the aforesaid things the Plaintiff set the stage ready for starting cinema business, which principally consists of exhibiting cinematograph films against sale of tickets to the public. It may be that without the aforesaid prerequisites arranged by the Plaintiff, the business of exhibiting pictures was inconceivable; but they did not constitute the business itself, which commercial activity was commenced by the Defendants alone. It is significant that the licence for running the business, i.e. for exhibiting cinematograph films, was never taken by the Plaintiff. The duly equipped building and premises admittedly belonged to the Plaintiff and there was nothing surprising that he took steps to get the water and electricity connections as well as the requisite licence for the hall under the U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1961, once he had decided to lease out the same to the Defendants. 14. In this connection, reference may also be made to the invitation letter dated 23-3-1953 issued to important citizens of the town to attend the opening ceremony of the first picture 'Jaggoo' on 25-3-1953 at 4 p.m. The one received by the Plaintiff has been filed by him, which is Ex. 20 on record. It shows that the name of the proprietor of the Mahabir Talkies was Dwarka Das Sarraf (Defendant) and not the Plaintiff. It was the management of Mahabir Talkies which had issued the invitation under the names of its General Manager and Manager. The invitee in question was the Plaintiff-Har Narayan Saligram, which is the name of the Plaintiff's firm. If the cinema business, on the first day of its commencement in 1953, was owned by the Plaintiff, then it is difficult to understand why the Plaintiff issued an invitation to himself to witness the first show. The invitee in question was the Plaintiff-Har Narayan Saligram, which is the name of the Plaintiff's firm. If the cinema business, on the first day of its commencement in 1953, was owned by the Plaintiff, then it is difficult to understand why the Plaintiff issued an invitation to himself to witness the first show. As stated above, it was the General Manager and the Manager of Mahabir Talkies (of which the Defendant, Dwarka Das Sarraf, was shown to be the proprietor), who had issued the invitations in their names. It is true that under the heading 'R.S.V.P.', the name of the second Defendant Vishwa Nath (father of the first Defendant Dwarka Das Sarraf) has irst been mentioned and at No. 2 appears the name of Kanhaiya Lal, father of the present Plaintiff. But 'R.S.V.P.' is only an abbreviation of the French phrase 'reponder S'il vous plait', which translated into English, only means reply, if you please'. The evidence on record shows that in 1953 Dwarka Das Sarraf, Defendant, used to live at the Plaintiff's house in Agra, which proves that at that time their relations were quite good and cordial. It was in keeping with Indian civilisation and tradition that the names of the fathers of Dwarka Das (Defendant) and Dwarka Prasad (Plaintiff) should have found place under 'R.S.V.P.' This certainly does not mean that the Plaintiff was one of the persons who had issued invitations for the opening ceremony of the cinema. The use of the words "opening ceremony of their cinema" clearly indicates that there was no pre-existing cinema business running in Dwarka Theatre Hall at that time, which could have been leased out by the Plaintiff to the Defendants and that the cinema business was being started on the premises by the Defendants alone. 15. Coming to the case law cited at the Bar, reference may first be made to Israrul Haq v. Seth Sridhar Lal 1952 ALJ 106. It is noteworthy that the decision aforesaid was given before the definition of the word 'accommodation' was modified by U.P. (Amending) Act XVII of 1954. In fact, it appears that Israrul Haq's case was responsible for bringing about the amendment of Section 2 relating to the definition of 'accommodation'. In that case the Plaintiff was already carrying on a cinema business under the name and style "Shri Vijay Talkies". In fact, it appears that Israrul Haq's case was responsible for bringing about the amendment of Section 2 relating to the definition of 'accommodation'. In that case the Plaintiff was already carrying on a cinema business under the name and style "Shri Vijay Talkies". It was that running business along with machinery and other articles appertaining thereto, which was leased out by Sridhar Lal to Israrul Haq. In the beginning it was merely a touring cinema but at the time of the creation of the lease it was lodged in a temporary building erected in the ginning factory of the grantor, which was not fit for carrying on cinema business permanently without material alterations therein. Later on, the lessor got a new building constructed for the purpose of the said cinema. On its completion, the lessee continued his cinema business in the new building. It was under these special circumstances, where a running cinema business was the real subject-matter of the lease, that the Division Bench held that the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (as it stood even before the amendment of 1954) did not envisage such a lease and that the demised property did not fall within the definition of 'accommodation' as contemplated by Section 2. If anything, Israrul Haq's case support the contention of the Defendants rather than of the Plaintiff, because in the instant case the Plaintiff did not and could not lease out his running business, as there was none in existence at the time of the grant. 16. Mr. Sinha has placed considerable reliance on Uttamchand Vs. S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 . It was a case under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 in which Section 3(a) defined 'accommodation' as under: Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (a)Accommodation" means- (x)......... (y) any building or part of a building and it includes- (1) garden, open land and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building, (2) Any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building, (3) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Thus it would be seen that the definition of 'accommodation' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is not in as wide terms as the all inclusive and exhaustive definition of 'accommodation' in the U.P. Act, embracing in its fold all types of "residential and non-residential accommodation", including "accommodation used as a factory or for industrial purpose" such as for running cinema business; nor is there any exclusion clause in the Madhya Pradesh Act, corresponding to the curtailment of the meaning of the term 'Accommodation' introduced by the U.P. Act of 1954. The last clause so introduced takes out from its ambit a factory or an industrial establishment, like a cinema house, only when the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction". To put it differently, where the running business of an industrial establishment in a building, like a cinema house, is not simultaneously let out, it would continue to remain an 'accommodation'. 17. It is true that Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act also provides for exemption of certain accommodations from the provisions of that Act. Clause (d) of Section 2 thereof specifically exempts "places of entertainment generally used as such". The Explanation added to the aforesaid sub-clause underlines the fact that the word 'entertainment' shall include "exhibition of cinematograph films,...and all other shows and plays meant for the amusement of public". Therefore, under the Madhya Pradesh Act all places of entertainment, including cinema houses, have been specifically excluded from the definition of 'accommodation'. On the other hand, in the U.P. Act, as noticed above, a nonresidential accommodation used for an industrial purpose, such as for cinema business, falls within the definition of 'accommodation', except where the business carried on in or upon the building is also simultaneously leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. Thus we find that the concept of 'accommodation' in Madhya Pradesh Act is materially different from that in the U.P. Act. It is in this perspective and background that we have to view and interpret the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court made in Uttamohand's case, which did not relate to a place of entertainment, such as a cinema house, but to a Dal Mill, where its building along with the fixed machinery in sound working order was leased out to the lessee on an annual rent. The intention of the lessee in accepting the lease was also to use it as Dal Mill, the possession whereof was given over to him in a sound working condition. At the end of the lease, the lessee was to return the machinery and other accessories thereof to the lessor in working order. All this shows that what was leased out in Uttamohand's case was a Dal Mill building along with its fitted machinery in working order as well as a running business carried on therein. It was in these special circumstances that their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the subject-matter of the lease in Uttamohand's case was not an 'Accommodation' as contemplated by the Madhya Pradesh Act. It was further pointed out that in order to determine the real character of the tease, it was necessary to find out the dominant intention of the parties in executing the document. In Uttamohand's case it was found that the dominant part of the lease consisted of the plant and machinery of the Dal Mill which happened to be fitted and fixed in the building, so that the building incidentally came in the lease as a secondary thing. In the words of their lordships of the Supreme Court: The fixtures are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. That is why we think the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the rent which the Appellant had agreed to pay to the Respondent under the document in question cannot be said to be rent payable for any accommodation to which the Act applies.... There can be no doubt that the fittings of the machinery in the present case cannot be said to be fittings which had been fixed for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The fittings to which Section 3(a)(y)(3) refers are obviously fittings made in the building to afford incidental amenities for the person occupying the building. That being so, it is clear that the fittings in question do not fall u/s 3(a)(y)(3). 18. The fittings to which Section 3(a)(y)(3) refers are obviously fittings made in the building to afford incidental amenities for the person occupying the building. That being so, it is clear that the fittings in question do not fall u/s 3(a)(y)(3). 18. It is noteworthy that in the Madhya Pradesh Act, a factory or industrial complex does not fall within the definition of 'accommodation'; while in the U.P. Act, after its amendment in 1954, a factory or an industrial complex comprising of its plant, machinery, fittings and fixtures, has specifically been included in the definition of the expression 'accommodation', except where the business carried on therein is also leased out simultaneously along with the lease of the rest of the premises. Therefore, the high authority of the Supreme Court, which was dealing with a materially different interpretation of the expression 'accommodation' as given in the Madhya Pradesh Act and the special circumstances of Uttamohand's case, is clearly distinguishable and would not, if I may say so with great respect, be an authority for the facts and circumstances of the present case, which is governed by the U.P. Act, wherein the definition of 'accommodation' is altogether in different terms, as indicated above. The present case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances, in the light of the special meaning given to the word accommodation by the U.P. Act and lot by what has been said in altogether different setting, circumstances and facts, interpreting the term 'accommodation' is understood by the Madhya Pradesh Act. 19. Mr. K.L. Misra, appearing for the lessees, has placed reliance on the Full Bench decision in K. Kungu Govindan and Others Vs. Parakkat Kunhilekshmi Amma and Others, AIR 1966 Ker 244 wherein the subject-matter of the leases in question were two cinema theatres, involving the interpretation of the expression 'building' as used in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, as amended by Act XXIX of 1961 in Govindan's case (supra) the preamble and object of the amendment was to include cinema theatres also within the ambit of the Act. Relying on certain authorities of the Supreme Court it was jointed out by the Full Bench that "if two constructions are possible of particular words occurring in a statute, the Court should prefer the construction, which would help the furtherance of the object of the Act." It was under these circumstances that cinema theatres together with furniture, fittings, machinery etc. supplied by the landlord amounted to lease of the 'building' within the meaning of Section 2(1) thereof. Hence the authority of Govindan's case does not very muoh help the contention of Mr. Misra inasmuch as in the instant case we have to construe the connotation of the expression 'accommodation' as defined in the U.P. Act. 20. About half a dozen other authorities have been cited at the Bar but again none of them deals with the scope and ambit of the expression 'accommodation' as contemplated by the U.P. Act in question. Some of them to consider the parallel expressions used in local enactments obtaining in various States, such as the interpretation of the term 'building' or 'premises', etc. But in none of those enactments have these words been defined in the manner in which the term 'accommodation' has been given a special meaning by the U.P. Act. Under these circumstances no useful purpose would be served by referring to other authorities in detail. 21. For the foregoing reasons, my answer to the question referred to me for opinion is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the subject-matter of the lease in question was an 'accommodation' within the meaning of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 22. Let this opinion be placed at an early date before the Division Bench concerned for decision of the appeal according to law. Satish Chandra, J. 23. This is a Defendants' appeal. It arises out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. 24. The Plaintiff-Respondent alleged that he was the owner of the property in dispute known as Mahabir Cinema situated at Roshan Mohalla, Agra. The Defendant was its tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,400/-. By a notice dated 30th December, 1966, the Plaintiff had terminated the Defendant's tenancy and demanded possession. The Defendant, however, refused to deliver possession. Hence the suit. The Plaintiff claimed Rs. The Defendant was its tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,400/-. By a notice dated 30th December, 1966, the Plaintiff had terminated the Defendant's tenancy and demanded possession. The Defendant, however, refused to deliver possession. Hence the suit. The Plaintiff claimed Rs. 4,800/- as arrears of rent and prayed for a decree for mesne profits, pendente lite and future, at the rate of Rs. 200/-per day. The principal plea in defence was that the property in dispute was an 'accommodation' within the meaning of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the suit was barred by Section 3 thereof. 25. The learned Civil Judge, Agra, held that the property in dispute was not an accommodation as defined by the Rent Control Act and so the suit was not barred by the provisions of that Act. The Plaintiff had terminated the tenancy and was entitled to possession. The mesne profits were assessed at Rs. 100/- per day. The suit was accordingly decreed for possession after the Defendants ejectment and for mesne profits. Aggrieved, the Defendants has come to this Court in appeal. 26. The principal question is whether the subject-matter of tenancy between the parties was an 'accommodation' as defined by the Rent Control Act. 27. The Plaintiff's case was that this building was constructed in 1928 and that cinema business was carried on in it from 1931 to 1938 in the name of Mahabir Cinema. The cinema business was again continued in it in 1948 for a few days. The Defendant approached the Plaintiff on or about 4th January, 1952, with a proposal to take the cinema business on rent. On 18th January, 1952, the Defendant addressed a letter to the Plaintiff stating that a theatre hall along with electric fittings, furniture and operating machine is agreed to be taken on hire for five years on a monthly rent of Rs. 1, 300/-. The tenancy shall commence from the day the business starts after the grant of licence. On 25th March, 1953, the cinema shows commenced. The tenancy started from that day. The Defendant executed a formal deed of lease on 19th April, 1953 and also executed a receipt for having received from the Plaintiff the various fittings, fixtures, machines, etc. necessary for running the cinema business. In that lease the agreed rent was Rs. 1,300/- per month. It was split up into Rs. The tenancy started from that day. The Defendant executed a formal deed of lease on 19th April, 1953 and also executed a receipt for having received from the Plaintiff the various fittings, fixtures, machines, etc. necessary for running the cinema business. In that lease the agreed rent was Rs. 1,300/- per month. It was split up into Rs. 1, 100/- per month being the rent of the machines, fixtures, etc. and Rs. 200/- for the building. On 1st February, 1954, the Defendant executed a fresh deed of lease. This time the rent was reduced to Rs. 1, 000/- per month of which Rs. 200/- was for the building and Rs. 800/- for the machineries, etc. On 10th January, 1956, the Defendant addressed a letter to the Plaintiff confirming the increase of rent to Rs. 1,200/- per month in consideration of the Plaintiff fitting new furniture and effecting repairs to the floor and ceiling of the cinema hall and also agreeing to spend one month's rent towards repairs. On 26th May, 1959, the Defendant executed a fresh lease for 11 months commencing from 1-4-1959 and a rent of Rs. 1,400/- per month of which Rs. 400/- was for the building and Rs. 1,000/- for the machinery, etc. The Defendant was continuing in possession under the lease dated 26th May, 1959, when the tenancy was terminated by the Plaintiff by notice dated 30th December, 1966. 28. The Plaintiff made a half-hearted attempt to establish his case that a cinema business was being carried on in this building from 1931 to 1938. Barring his oral testimony, there is no other evidence. If the case was true, the Plaintiff could have easily produced the licence for running the cinema as well as his accounts thereof. But no documentary evidence was produced. Similar is the case with the allegation that in 1948 cinema business was run for a few days in it. It appears that the Plaintiff had entered into an agreement with one Bhagwan Das to run the cinema business but, since no licence could be obtained, the venture did not fructify. Since the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff-Respondent did not seriously contest the Appellants' case that no cinema business was run at all in this building either from 1931 to 1938 or in 1948, we need not go into this aspect in detail. Since the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff-Respondent did not seriously contest the Appellants' case that no cinema business was run at all in this building either from 1931 to 1938 or in 1948, we need not go into this aspect in detail. Suffice it to say that the Plaintiff has failed to establish this part of the case. 29. The parties agreed about the lease of the cinema in January, 1952. Soon after the Plaintiff applied to the Municipal Board for opening the water pipe connection to the building, vide Ex. 38. He made an application to the authorities for the grant of a cinematograph lincence. On 4-10-1952 the DM, Agra, asked the Plaintiff to make structural changes in the building so as to comply with the Cinematograph Rules. The Plaintiff did the needful and ultimately the requisite licence was granted in the name of the Defendants. He also made efforts to get the electric connection from the Electric Supply Company. The requisite agreement was entered into on 19th February, 1953 (Ex. 51). On 7th February, 1953, the Plaintiff informed the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board that house tax and water tax will be paid with effect from the date the cinema starts functioning. Admittedly, the first show of the film commenced on 25th March, 1953. The same day the Defendant executed a receipt of the various machines, fans, fixtures and other things like Remington typewriter, fire-extinguishing pumps black cloth fitted all round the screen and at each exit door and other furniture, etc. Thereafter the formal deed of lease was executed by the Defendants on 19th April, 1953. 30. It is clear that the parties did not intend to lease out the building simpliciter. The building had to be made serviceable for conducting the cinema business. It was one of the terms of agreement between the parties that the lease would commence on the date the cinema show starts running. On 25th March, 1953, the first cinema show was held. The invitation cards issued to prominent people to witness the show indicate that both the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant were the hosts. The lease deeds executed by the Defendant show that the substantial part of the rent was reserved for the business paraphernalia of running cinema shows and a very minor portion was allocable to the building. The invitation cards issued to prominent people to witness the show indicate that both the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant were the hosts. The lease deeds executed by the Defendant show that the substantial part of the rent was reserved for the business paraphernalia of running cinema shows and a very minor portion was allocable to the building. After the commencement of the cinema business the lease commenced to run. It is quite evident that at the commencement of the lease, cinema business was being conducted in the building and that the entire apparatus and paraphernalia for running that business was leased out to the Defendant-Appellants. 31. The question is whether the subject-matter of this lease was an 'accommodation' as defined by the Rent Control Act. Section 2(a) of the Act states: * * * It will be seen that an accommodation is a building which may be used for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The gardens, grounds and out-houses appurtenant to such a building are included and so are the furniture that may be supplied by the landlord for use in the building and fittings that may be affixed to such building for the purpose of more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The Rent Control Act was enacted to control the letting of accommodations and their rents. In the context of the object of the Act, the definition of the term 'accommodation' lays emphasis on the subject-matter of the lease being primarily a building or a portion thereof along with the furniture and fittings if any supplied or affixed in it. This provision came up for consideration before a Division Bench in Israrul Haq v. Seth Sridhar Lal (supra). In that case the lease stated: The first party has temporarily got a building erected in his ginning (factory) situate in Mohalla Agra Darwaza, qasba Firozabad and started a cinema styled as Vijay Talkies. As a matter of fact the present building is not such that the said cinema business can be carried on in it for ever, without incurring expenses. It is for this reason that the first party is getting a new building constructed for the purposes of the said cinema and the building will be completed very shortly. As a matter of fact the present building is not such that the said cinema business can be carried on in it for ever, without incurring expenses. It is for this reason that the first party is getting a new building constructed for the purposes of the said cinema and the building will be completed very shortly. It is the desire of the second party that the said Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema along with all the articles appertaining thereto and the new building, may be let out to him on rent, so that he may run the same under his own management and continue the work. The first party remains busy in the affairs of his other business, hence the letting out on rent of the said Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema, along with all the articles appertaining thereto, such as, the building, machinery, furniture, electric fittings, fans, etc., i.e., calculated to benefit both the parties, accordingly the following conditions for this deed of rent have been agreed upon between the parties. The Bench held: The words used show that the lessees wanted that the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema along with all the articles appertaining thereto and the new building may be let out to them and the lessor stated that, since he remained busy in the affairs of other business, he wanted to let out on rent the said Shri Vijay Talkies along with all the articles appertaining thereto, such as the building, machinery, furniture, electric fitting, fans, etc. At both the places in this clause of the lease it is clearly mentioned that what is to be leased out is the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema. In using the words 'Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema' reference was not made to any building which was housing the cinema, but it is clear that the reference was to the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema as a running concerns or business.... The new building was thus treated as being a part of the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema. In the latter part of this clause, the position is made still clearer. Here, when stating that the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema is to be let out along with all the articles appertaining thereto, instances are given of such articles and the first and the foremost instance in the building. Thereafter come the machinery, furniture, electric fittings, fans, etc. In the latter part of this clause, the position is made still clearer. Here, when stating that the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema is to be let out along with all the articles appertaining thereto, instances are given of such articles and the first and the foremost instance in the building. Thereafter come the machinery, furniture, electric fittings, fans, etc. This language used in the lease makes it perfectly clear that this lease did operate as a lease of the Shri Vijay Talkies as a business with all the right going with the business including the right to occupy the building in which the cinema was shown at that time and the new building in which the cinema was to be shown after it became ready...the paragraph reproduced by us can only be interpreted to show that what was leased was not the building as such but the building was treated as appurtenant to Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema. The Bench then construed the Act and observed: This is therefore not a type of lease which would be covered by the provisions of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. That Act applies to the leases in respect of accommodation which has been defined as meaning 'residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building' and includes gardens, furniture and other things and appurtenances to such building or part of the building. The Act further defines 'landlord' as a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and 'tenant' is defined as a person by whom rent is or but for a contract, express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation. In this case, since the building was only a part of the whole property leased, it cannot be said that there was any rent payable to the lessor in respect of any accommodation. Nor can it be said that the rent was payable by the tenant of any accommodation. The rent for the building forms an inseparable portion of the rent for the whole property and it cannot, therefore, be held to be a case where the landlord or tenant comes within the meaning of these words as defined in the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (III of 1947). The rent for the building forms an inseparable portion of the rent for the whole property and it cannot, therefore, be held to be a case where the landlord or tenant comes within the meaning of these words as defined in the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (III of 1947). It is also not possible to say that the present suit for possession over the Cinema Property by the lessor is a suit for eviction of the lessees from any accommodation. The eviction from the building in which the cinema is housed is only incidental to the plea of possession of the Vijay Talkies Cinema so that it cannot be said that this is a suit for eviction from accommodation. 33. The facts of this case would show that the landlord was intending to construct a new building. The agreement was for letting out the cinema business which was proposed to be run in the new building. It is true that at the time of the lease the landlord was running a cinema in another building. But the subject-matter of the lease was the proposed new building along with its cinema business. The paraphernalia of this cinema business, namely the machines, fans, fixtures, fittings, etc. were let out along with the building. The Bench held that the subject-matter of the lease was the business of which the building was only an appurtenance. The lease did not relate to the new building simpliciter and so want in respect of an "accommodation." 34. In my opinion, this decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. The deed of Agreement dated 19th April, 1953, states: We have taken a Cinema hall known as Dwarka Prasad Theatre Hall...for running a cinema...on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- commencing from March 25, 1953. The same day the Defendants executed another lease deed stating that they had taken the Dwarka Theatre Hall on a rent of Rs. 200/- per month and that in this building there is new furniture fitted for about 500 seats with ceiling and fittings of electric light and fans, complete machinery, ceiling fans and operating machine together with all articles present in the hall of the theatre a list whereof has been duly signed by the executant and that they had taken this also on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,100/- besides rent of the building. 1,100/- besides rent of the building. The lease deed dated 1-4-1954 executed by the Defendants stated that whereas besides the cinema house popularly known as Dwarka Theatre Hall which has been taken on hire of Rs. 200/- per month, the Defendants had also taken on rent of Rs. 800/- per month the new furniture with tapestry, about 500 seats and ceiling and complete electric fitting machine together with the entire paraphernalia present in the theatre hall. The Defendants in this lease deed stated that they had taken the building on rent to continue running a cinema. The lease deed of 10th January, 1956, was a confirmation of the same subject-matter of the lease. It appears that by now the landlord was fitting new furniture in the hall and for that reason the rent was increased to Rs. 1,200/- per month. Similarly, in the lease deed dated 26th May, 1959, the Defendants stated that they have taken a cinema hall known as Dwarka Theatre Hall on a monthly rent of Rs. 400/- and the furniture of about 500 seats, ceiling, electric fittings, with fans, complete machine, ceiling fans, operating machine and other articles present in the theatre hall, a list whereof was attached, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1000/-. It will thus be seen that the transaction of lease between the parties was a composite one relating to the entire business apparatus of running a cinema in the building known as Dwarka Theatre. It appears that the popular name of this building was initially Mahabir Cinema but by 1953 it had become known as Dwarka Theatre, by the name of the present Plaintiff. 35. The Defendants did not take the building as it was in January, 1952. They took it not only when it was ready for running the cinema business but when actually the cinema shows had started. The original agreement was executed on 18th January, 1952, but the lease commenced on 25th March, 1953. More than a year was taken by the Plaintiff to make the building fit for running the cinema business and when the business had commenced to run the lease started to operate. The original agreement was executed on 18th January, 1952, but the lease commenced on 25th March, 1953. More than a year was taken by the Plaintiff to make the building fit for running the cinema business and when the business had commenced to run the lease started to operate. In my opinion, the course of conduct of the parties as well as the terms of the lease clearly show that the parties intended that the subject-matter of the lease would be the cinema business that was being be conducted in the Dwarka Theatre. The building itself was only one constituent of the subject-matter of the lease just as the cinematograph machine, the electrical fittings, the furniture, the screens and other paraphernalia, were. It is difficult to hold that the transaction between the parties related principally to the building so that it could be said that the lease was in relation to an 'accommodation' within the meaning of the Rent Control Act. In my opinion, the ratio of Israrul Haq's case (supra) applies to the present case and it cannot be said that the present suit for possession over the cinema property is a suit for eviction from any accommodation so as to attract the provisions of the Rent Control Act. 36. By the Amending Act No. 17 of 1954 another clause was added to the definition of the term 'accommodation' in the Rent Control Act. The newly added clause stated: but does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. This clause was not there in the definition of the term 'accommodation' when Israrul Haq's case was decided or when the lease commenced on 25-3-53. The ratio of that case would still apply to the construction of the definition of the term 'accommodation' because the newly added clause seeks to take out some thing from within the ambit of 'accommodation' it does not enlarge the significance of the definition. So, even if the present case is not covered by this new clause, the subject-matter of the lease would not for that reason become an accommodation. 37. But, in my opinion, the provisions of this new clause are satisfied in the present case. So, even if the present case is not covered by this new clause, the subject-matter of the lease would not for that reason become an accommodation. 37. But, in my opinion, the provisions of this new clause are satisfied in the present case. The learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellants did not dispute that running a cinema business did constitute an industrial purpose, so that the accommodation was used for an industrial purpose. As seen above, cinema business was carried on in this building on 25th March, 1953, when the lease commenced and this business was leased out to the Defendants along with the building by the same transaction. Even if it be held that no cinema business was actually being carried on in the building at the time of the lease in 1953, the same argument would not prevail in relation to the lease deed dated 26th May, 1959. At that time cinema business was being run in this building for several years. The entire apparatus for running that business was owned by the Plaintiff-Respondent and not by the tenant. Without that apparatus the Defendants could not have conducted the business. So, in 1959, it could safely be said that the cinema business which was being carried on in the building was also leased out to the lessees by the same transaction. 38. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, urged that the furniture and fittings, etc. whieh were the subject-matter of the lease would be covered by Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the definition of the term 'accommodation'. It was urged that Clause (ii) which provided that 'accommodation' includes any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building and Clause (iii) which provided that the 'accommodation' includes any fittings affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, were attracted to the present case and so the entire subject-matter of tenancy was an accommodation. I find it difficult to accept this submission. 39. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in Uttamchand Vs. S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 . The Court interpreted the definition of the term 'accommodation' as appearing in Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. That Act was passed in order to provide for control of letting and rent of residential and non-residential accommodation. 39. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in Uttamchand Vs. S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 . The Court interpreted the definition of the term 'accommodation' as appearing in Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. That Act was passed in order to provide for control of letting and rent of residential and non-residential accommodation. Section 3(a) of that Act defined 'accommodation' as meaning: (x) any land which is not being used for cultivation; (y) any building or part of a building and it includes- (1) garden, open land and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (2) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (3) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. It will be seen that Clause (y) of the definition is identical to the definition of the term 'accommodation' in the U.P. Rent Control Act. In that case the lease related to a Dal Mill building which had fixed machinery and other accessories described in the schedule to the lease. The lessee undertook to return the machines and other accessories of the Dal Mill in working order and sound condition, subject to usual wear and tear. It may be stated that the Defendant-Appellants had similarly undertaken to return the machineries, etc. in the present case. It was held by the Supreme Court that though the document purported to be a lease in respect of the Dal Mill building, the said description was not decisive of the matter because even if the intention of the parties was to (sic) building would still have to be described as the Dal Mill building. It is not a case where the subject-matter of the lease is the building and along with the lease building incidentally passed the fixture and the machinery in regard to the mill. In truth, it was the mill which was the subject-matter of the lease and it was because the mill was intended to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with the mill. The lease was for the purpose of letting the Appellant run the Dal Mill which was located in the building. It was argued that the machinery, etc. The lease was for the purpose of letting the Appellant run the Dal Mill which was located in the building. It was argued that the machinery, etc. which were fixed in the building were fixtures within the meaning of Clause (3) of the definition of 'accommodation'. The argument was repelled. Gajendragadkar, C.J. observed: It is obvious that a Mill of this kind will have to be located in some building or another and so, the mere fact that the lease purports to be in respect of the building will not make it a lease in respect of an accommodation as defined by Section 3(a)(y)(3). It was then held: The fixtures described in the schedule to the lease are in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The fixtures are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. 40. In the present case, the machineries, electrical fittings, fans and other paraphernalia which were the principal subject-matter of the lease were not intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. They were the primary object of the lease, the building coming in only incidentally. The operating machineries and fittings, etc. were the essential requisites for running the cinema business. They had to be located in a building; that is why the building was also let out. The machines, etc., carried a rent of Rs. 1,000/- while the building was on a rent of Rs. 400/- only. These machines, etc. could not hence be held included in the "fittings" contemplated by Clause (iii) of the definition of 'accommodation'. The various clauses of the definition of 'accommodation' relating to furniture and fittings contemplate such things only as are let out as appurtenances or incidentals of the building. The subject-matter of the lease between the parties was not an 'accommodation' as defined by the U.P. Rent Control Act. The provisions of this Act do not bar the present suit. The lease having been validly terminated, the suit for possession was rightly decreed. 41. The next point relates to mesne profits. Learned Counsel for the Appellants invited our attention to Dwarka Prasad Vs. Central Talkies, Collectorganj, Kanpur, AIR 1956 All 187 . There the subject-matter of the lease was held to be governed by the U.P. Rent Control Act. The lease having been validly terminated, the suit for possession was rightly decreed. 41. The next point relates to mesne profits. Learned Counsel for the Appellants invited our attention to Dwarka Prasad Vs. Central Talkies, Collectorganj, Kanpur, AIR 1956 All 187 . There the subject-matter of the lease was held to be governed by the U.P. Rent Control Act. In that context it was held that the Plaintiff was not free to let the premises to any one with whom he could strike a bargain. If he had been free in that respect, the amount of damages could be fixed on the probable amount which he could have obtained from the person desirous to rent the premises. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act controls the amount of rent which a landlord can get for any accommodation and so the proper measure for determination if mesne profits could be the maximum rent prescribed by the Rent Control Act. This case is distinguishable because in the present case the subject-matter of the lease is not governed by the Rent Control Act. The Plaintiff is free to let out the premises to any one with whom he can strike a good bargain. The maximum rent permissible under the Rent Control Act would hence not furnish a proper measure of mesne profits in the present case. 42. In Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan Das, AIR 1963 SC 1405 it was held that the normal measure of mesne profits is the value of user of the land to the person in wrongful possession. A person in wrongful possession of immovable property has to pay compensation computed on the basis of profits he actually received or with ordinary diligence might have received. Bhagwan Swarup (PW 1) stated that the cinema in dispute can be let out on a weekly hire of Rs. 2,800/- to Rs. 3000/- and that he was himself prepared to take it on rent of Rs. 4,500/- per month. Ramesh Chand Jain (PW 2) stated that he carries on film distribution business and that the Defendant-Appellant himself had let out the cinema in dispute to him on a rent of Rs. 3,000/- per week. He further stated that he was prepared to take the cinema from the landlord on a rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month. The Plaintiff Dwarka Prasad (PW 3) stated that he had received offers of Rs. 3,000/- per week. He further stated that he was prepared to take the cinema from the landlord on a rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month. The Plaintiff Dwarka Prasad (PW 3) stated that he had received offers of Rs. 3,500/- per week and also Rs. 6,000/- per month. These witnesses clarified that in weekly hire system the theatre is let out to the distributor for a week and the lessor has to bear the expenses for the upkeep of the hall, pay of the gatekeeper and electricity, etc. In the present case all such expenses were to be borne by the Defendants. According to the Plaintiff's evidence the Defendants could with diligence earn Rs. 3,000/- to Rs. 4,000/- per month. The Defendant-Appellant stated that his net earning was Rs. 2,000/- per month. He stated that the expenses he had to incur were Rs. 1,400/- rent payable to the Plaintiff, Rs. 500/-electricity charges, Rs. 1,300/-staff salary, Rs. 900/- cinema repairs, maintenance and carbons, Rs. 450/- travelling and telephone, Rs. 350/- insurance subscription, licence fee, municipal taxes, Rs. 350/- car expenses, Rs. 600/- show taxes, Rs. 1,100/- miscellaneous expenses and Rs. 900/- average expenses on advertisement and publicity. The Court below held that the expenses appeared to be exaggerated. The Defendant admitted that he maintained accounts of his business but they were not filed. Obviously, they would not have established this state of the expenses. On a consideration of the evidence the Court below came to the conclusion that the mesne profits could reasonably be assessed at Rs. 3,000/- per month, i.e. Rs. 100/- per day. In my opinion, the assessment of mesne profits by the Court below was reasonable and proper. The Plaintiff-Respondent has filed a cross-objection in which he claimed that the mesne profits ought to have been assessed at Rs. 200/- per day. In my opinion, the Plaintiff-Respondent has failed to establish this. 43. In the result, the appeal and cross-objection both fail and are dismissed with costs. K.N. Srivastava, J. 44. This is an appeal by the Defendant-Appellants against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Agra, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for eviction of the Defendants from the premises in suit and for Rs. 2,600/- as mesne profits, as well as for pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. This is an appeal by the Defendant-Appellants against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Agra, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for eviction of the Defendants from the premises in suit and for Rs. 2,600/- as mesne profits, as well as for pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. The Plaintiff-Respondent has preferred a Cross Objection for enhancement of the mesne profits as well as for the enhanced rate of pendente lite and future mesne profits. 45. Dwarka Prasad, Plaintiff-Respondent, is the owner of Mahabir Talkies situated in Roshan Mohalla, Agra. This cinema consists of building, stalls, open space, projector machines, electric fittings, fixtures and furniture etc. detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint. The aforesaid cinema building was rented on 1-4-1959 to Dwarka Das Sarraf on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,400/- Rs. 400/- was the rent of the building and Rs. 1000/- was the rent for furniture, projector machine and other fittings and fixtures. The first agreement was entered into between the parties on 19-4-1953. After the termination of the aforesaid lease, other leases were executed for different periods with some variations in the terms and the last deed of agreement was dated 19-4-1959. The last tenancy was to commence from first day of every calendar month and the tenancy was from month to month. The principal terms of the tenancy were that the Defendant-Appellants were to pay Municipal Taxes and other taxes for the building they were to maintain the furniture and fittings etc. in good condition at their expense and were to restore the same to the Plaintiff-Respondent in good condition on the termination of the tenancy; the white washing and repairs were to be carried out by the Defendant-Appellants at their own expense; and the Defendants were to get furniture etc. insured and to keep them in good working order at their own costs. 46. Some time later, the Plaintiff wanted to terminate the tenancy of the Defendant-Appellants as he wanted to run the cinema business himself. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants agreed to give up the possession of the machinery and paraphernalia to the Plaintiff on 1st April, 1967. insured and to keep them in good working order at their own costs. 46. Some time later, the Plaintiff wanted to terminate the tenancy of the Defendant-Appellants as he wanted to run the cinema business himself. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants agreed to give up the possession of the machinery and paraphernalia to the Plaintiff on 1st April, 1967. Even though this oral request amounted to a notice, the Plaintiff in order to avoid other technical objections, served a notice on the Defendant-Appellants on 30th December, 1966, terminating the tenancy, but inspite of the notice the Defendants did not deliver possession of the building, machinery, fittings and furniture to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, therefore, sued for possession of the premises with the properties detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint and for a decree of Rs. 4800/-with pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs 200/- per day. 47. The Defendants contested the suit and pleaded that the tenancy was with regard to the building which was covered by the term 'accommodation' as laid down u/s 2 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and therefore, the Defendant-Appellants were not liable to eviction unless the conditions laid down in Section 3 of the Act were fulfilled. They also contended that the notice was waived by the Plaintiff for the reasons given in paragraphs 22 and 24 of the written statement. It was further contended that there was no breach of the term of tenancy by the Defendants. The other plea taken by the Defendants was that the tenancy of the building was separate from the tenancy of the machinery, fittings and furniture etc. 48. The learned Civil Judge held that the proviso referred to above applied to the facts of the case as the business was carried on in or upon the building at the time of the execution of the lease and: therefore, the cinema hall did not come within the definition of the term 'accommodation', as laid down u/s 2 of the Act. The Plaintiff's suit for eviction of the Defendants was decreed. Rs. 2600/- were awarded as mesne profits up to the date of the suit and pendente lite and future mesne profit was awarded at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. The Plaintiff's suit for eviction of the Defendants was decreed. Rs. 2600/- were awarded as mesne profits up to the date of the suit and pendente lite and future mesne profit was awarded at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. The Defendant-Appellants were allowed time till 1st August, 1968, to hand over possession of the property to the Plaintiff. 49. Being dissatisfied, the Defendant-Appellants have filed this appeal. The Plaintiff has filed a Cross-objection for enhancement of the mesne profits. 50. Vishwanath, Defendant No. 2, died and therefore in this appeal his widow Smt. Chando Devi was arrayed as Appellant No. 2. 51. The main question which arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether the accommodation was used for industrial purpose where the business was carried on in or upon the building which was also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction by which the building was leased out. In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to reproduce Section 2 of the Act here, which reads as below: * * * 52. A perusal of Section 2 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that only accommodations used as factories for an industrial purpose were excluded from the definition of the word "accommodation", provided a business was carried on in or upon the building and provided the business was also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. In this connection, the intention of the legislature has to be looked into. If the legislature intended to exempt other accommodations from this definition, the proviso could have been worded in a different language. But, a perusal of the proviso leaves no room for doubt that only a factory for industrial purpose was exempted in cases where the business was also leased out by the same transaction by which the building was leased out. 53. In order to find out the intention of the legislature, the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the bill has to be looked into, though for a limited purpose. As shown above, this proviso was added by the UP Act No. XVII of 1954. The Plaintiff based his claim on this proviso alone. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to see as to low far this proviso helps the Plaintiff. 54. This proviso lays down three conditions. As shown above, this proviso was added by the UP Act No. XVII of 1954. The Plaintiff based his claim on this proviso alone. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to see as to low far this proviso helps the Plaintiff. 54. This proviso lays down three conditions. The first condition is that the accommodation is used as a factory for industrial purpose. Secondly, that the business is carried in or upon the building and thirdly, that the business is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. 55. In the Industrial Disputes Act, the word 'industry' has been defined as below: "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. 56. In law Lexicon, compiled and edited by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 'industry' has been defined as below: 'industry' defined by lexicorgrapeers to be habitual diligence in any employment, either bodily or mental and is as applicable to the sale of goods, which is the chief business of a merchant, as to the transportation of goods, which is the chief business of an express carrier. 57. Therefore, the word 'industrial purpose' used in the proviso means a business in the general sense of the word. The term "accommodation", therefore, does not include a factory where business is carried on. Furthermore, it has to be seen as to whether the business was also leased out by the same lease by which the building was leased out. 58. It cannot be denied that when the first lease was executed in 1953, no cinema business or any other business was carried out in this building. Therefore, there could not have been any intention of the parties to lease out any business because no such business was then carried out. There were no electric connections and water connection in the building. Though machinery and other electric fittings were there yet the building was not in a condition fit enough for exhibiting cinema films. It was the Defendant-Appellant who started the cinema business in this building in the year 1953 after taking electric connection and water connection etc. It is true that some time earlier exhibition of films had been started in this Cinema House, but that was for a short interval. It was the Defendant-Appellant who started the cinema business in this building in the year 1953 after taking electric connection and water connection etc. It is true that some time earlier exhibition of films had been started in this Cinema House, but that was for a short interval. The Plaintiff admitted that due to Hindu Muslim riot in Agra in 1947 the cinema business in this Cinema Hall had to be stopped because it was situated in a locality which was predominantly inhabited by Mohammedans. Bhagwan Das could not run the cinema business as he could not get a licence. The Plaintiff further admitted in his evidence that no business was in existence when the building was first leased out and therefore, there was no question of letting out a business. Ex. A 11 is a letter by the Senior Entertainment Tax Inspector, Agra, that there was no licence to exhibit films in this Cinema Hall prior to 1953. The licence was taken for the first time in the name of the Defendant-Appellant. Ex. 42 is a letter dated 18-1-1962 by the Defendants to the Plaintiff wherein it was mentioned that the tenancy would start from the date of commencement of work on getting a licence. The application Ex. 53 dated 8-8-1952 made on behalf of Mahabir Talkies to the U.P. Government would show that the Cinema Hall was not fit enough for exhibiting films. In this application it was clearly mentioned that major structural alteration in the building had been carried out and by the alteration substantial compliance of the Cinematograph Act had been made. Ex. 36 is another letter dated 7-2-1953 by the Plaintiff to the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Agra, informing him that efforts were being made to start a cinema and water tax and house tax would be paid as soon as the cinema started. There are other documents to the same effect, such as Ex. 51 and Ex. 37. A perusal of the statement of the Plaintiff coupled with the above referred documents leaves no room for doubt that no cinema business was being carried out when the building was leased out for the first time to the Defendant in the year 1953. 59. The lease which was executed in 1953 was renewed in 1955, 1956 and 1959. The last lease is of the year 1959. 59. The lease which was executed in 1953 was renewed in 1955, 1956 and 1959. The last lease is of the year 1959. There can be no doubt that after the termination of one lease, another lease was executed and each lease was an independent transaction in itself. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether in the year 1959, when the lease was renewed, was any business being carried out and if so, whether it was leased out by the same transaction. Certainly, in 1959 a cinema business was being carried out in this building by the Defendant-Appellant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that a business was being carried out when this lease was executed. But, this would not be enough for holding that the aforesaid proviso of the Act applied to the present case because it has further to be proved that the business was also leased out by the same transaction. 60. Admittedly, the business was being carried out by the Defendant-Appellant. The lease was executed by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendants. The business which was carried out by the Defendant at the time of execution of the lease, therefore, could not have been leased out by the Plaintiff. Before the Plaintiff could lease out the business, as the proviso lays down, he should have the right of demise over the business. The Plaintiff had certainly nothing to do with the cinema business. He was only getting certain rent for the Hall and the other paraphernalia, such as machines, fans, exhausts and other electric fittings. He was having no share in profit or loss of the cinema business. This business exclusively belonged to the Defendants. Therefore, in view of this, the third condition of the proviso was not fulfilled in the instant case because though the business was being carried out, that was not capable of being leased out by the same transaction. The lessor had no control over the business and the lersee, who was running the business, would not lease out the same in the his own favour. Therefore, the business that was being carried out was not leased out by the same transaction in order to attract the aforesaid proviso of the Act. 61. The lessor had no control over the business and the lersee, who was running the business, would not lease out the same in the his own favour. Therefore, the business that was being carried out was not leased out by the same transaction in order to attract the aforesaid proviso of the Act. 61. From the above discussion, it is quite evident that even when the first lease was executed, there could not have been any intention either of the lessor or the lessee to lease out the business because no business was then being carried out in the Cinema Hall. Even in the subsequent years, when the leases were renewed, though business was being carried out by the Defendants, it was not capable of being leased out by the same transaction and therefore, all the conditions of the proviso were not fulfilled in the instant case. 62. In the light of the facts found above, different decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts cited at the Bar will have to be looked into to see as to how far they are of help in the instant case. 63. A Division Bench of this Court in Israrul Haq v. Seth Srjdhar Lal (supra) observed as below: Here, when stating that the Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema is to be let out along with all the articles appertaining thereto, instances are given of such articles and the first and the foremost instance is the building. Thereafter come the machinery, furniture, electric fittings, fans, etc. This language used in the lease makes it perfectly clear that this lease did operate as a lease of the Shri Vijai Talkies as a business with all the right going with the business including the right to occupy the building in which the cinema was shown at that time and the new building in which the cinema was to be shown after it became ready...the paragraph reproduced by us can only be interpreted to show that what was leased was not the building as such but the building was treated as appurtenant to Shri Vijay Talkies Cinema. Further on, it was held that the lease in this case was not a lease which was covered by the provisions of the Act. 64. Further on, it was held that the lease in this case was not a lease which was covered by the provisions of the Act. 64. The decision in Israrul Haq's case was given in 1952, when the proviso had not been added to Section 2 by the Amending Act No. XVII of 1954. Therefore, this decision will not help us because as the Act then stood it applied to all residential and non residential accommodations without any proviso being attached to Section 2. By this proviso only particular types of buildings used for particular purposes were exempted from the definition of the term 'accommodation'. In my opinion, what was observed in this case by the Division Bench would not be of much help because the instant case has to be decided on the interpretation of the proviso, referred to above. 65. The other case referred to was Uttamchand v. S.M. Lalwani (supra). In this case a Dal Mill had been leased out with all the machinery, electric fittings and other paraphernalia. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with the interpretation of Section 3(a)(y)(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. It is true that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act applied to residential as well as non-residential accommodations, but the definition of the term 'accommodations', in the Madhya Pradesh Act was not similar to the definition of the term 'accommodation' in our Act. There was no proviso in the Madhya Pradesh Act as the one which is there in the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In the Supreme Court case, the emphasis was that "in truth, it is the Mill which is the subject matter of the lease and it was because the Mill was intended to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with the Mill." This is clear from the following observation of Gajendragadkar, C.J.: The fixtures are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. 66. In this Supreme Court case, the intention of the parties was to lease out the Mill and the building was only an accessory. The building in which the fixtures were located came in "incidentally". 66. In this Supreme Court case, the intention of the parties was to lease out the Mill and the building was only an accessory. The building in which the fixtures were located came in "incidentally". In this view of the matter, Uttamchand's case decided by the Supreme Court is also of not much help in deciding the instant case. 67. In K. Kungu Govindan v. Parabhat Kunbilekshmi Amma (supra), a similar question came up for decision before a Full Bench. In this Full Bench case, a Cinema House along with machinery, furniture, electrical appliances and other fittings were leased out under a lease deed. The lessor terminated the lease and filed a suit for ejectment. The suit was ultimately compromised and by this compromise the lessee agreed to surrender possession of the leased property on 1-11-1961 and also agreed to pay enhanced rent. Meanwhile, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1961, came into force. The lessee then took the plea that in view of this Act he was not liable to be evicted. The learned Civil Judge accepted the contention of the lessee. The matter ultimately came up before the High Court. The lessee also filed a Writ challenging the constitutional validity of the Act. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court decided in favour of the lessor. The matter came up before the Full Bench and the Full Bench held that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1961, applied to the facts of the case and the building along with the machinery, electric fittings and other paraphernalia was an 'accommodation', as defined in the aforesaid Act. In this case the Full Bench relied on three Division Bench cases of the Calcutta High Court and also considered the Supreme Court case, referred to above. The Full Bench observed as below: But by virtue of the compromise decree passed on 31-1-1961, there is a provision to the effect that the lessee will pay a consolidated rent for the properties described in Schedules A, B and C. But, in our opinion, that by itself does not make any difference because both the transactions, namely, under Ex. A-l and under Ex. A-l and under Ex. B-l which has now become a decree of court in the compromise decree dated 31-1-1961 must be considered to be leases of buildings let for non-residential purposes including the furniture supplied and fittings affixed by the landlord for use in such buildings. The Full Bench further observed as below: In the absence of any such provision used by our legislature in the enactment in question, in our opinion, we must have due regard to the clear wording of the statute and the natural interpretation that has to be put upon the words that have been used by the legislatures. If we go by that normal rule of interpretation, having due regard to the various recitals made in the lease deeds in question, they must be considered to be leases of buildings, let for non-residential purposes, including any furniture supplied or any fittings affixed by the landlord for use in such buildings. The requirement of Clause (b) of Section 2(1) of the Act will be satisfied if the furniture supplied or the fittings affixed by the landlord are only for use in such buildings. 68. In this case also a separate rents for the building and the machines, furniture, electric fittings and other paraphernalia were fixed, as in the instant case. It was interpreted that the fittings and other paraphernalia were to be used only in such building. In this connection, it was observed by the Full Bench as below: We have already stated that no controversy is raised by the landlords to the effect that the furniture supplied and the fittings affixed by them are for use in the buildings in question. In fact, it will be seen, by a reference to Clause 10 of Ext. A-1, to which we have already adverted, that there is a prohibition against the lessee removing the articles of furniture, equipment, fittings, machinery and fixtures described in Schedules B and C, outside the premises, without the permission of the landlord. Therefore, that will clearly show that the furniture supplied and fittings affixed are for use in the buildings and the requirement of Section 2(1) of the Act read with Clause (b) thereof, is perfectly satisfied. 69. In the Kerala case there was a condition in the lease that the lessee would not have the right to sublet the building. Therefore, that will clearly show that the furniture supplied and fittings affixed are for use in the buildings and the requirement of Section 2(1) of the Act read with Clause (b) thereof, is perfectly satisfied. 69. In the Kerala case there was a condition in the lease that the lessee would not have the right to sublet the building. In the present case, there is a clear recital in the agreement Ex. 25, which was executed on 19-4-1953 that the lessee shall not have the right to sublet or let out the building aforesaid and its articles on rent to any other person. In the last agreement Ex. 33, which is dated 25-5-1959, there is a condition that the owner of the building or his employees shall have the right all the time to enter into the cinema building and supervise the building and furniture etc. There is another condition in this agreement that at no time and in no circumstances the lessee shall have any right to sublet the building or to let out the aforesaid building together with all its paraphernalia. 70. The evidence on record leaves no room for doubt that the lessee had to use the machinery, electric fittings, fans, exhausts, furniture and other paraphernalia in the building itself and he had no right to take them out or to sublet the same or to let out the same on rent to anyone else. 71. Although in the Kerala case there was no provision as given in the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, even then the Full Bench, after considering most of the decisions, came to the conclusion that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, applied to the aforesaid lease. The instant case is much more stronger than the Kerala case because the only condition where an accommodation is exempted from the provisions of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is an accommodation used as a factory for industrial purposes where business is carried out and the same is also leased out by the same transaction. With the exception of such an accommodation, in my view, all other accommodations were covered within the provisions of the Act because had the Legislature intended to exclude other accommodations than those mentioned in the Act, a clear mention thereof could have been made. With the exception of such an accommodation, in my view, all other accommodations were covered within the provisions of the Act because had the Legislature intended to exclude other accommodations than those mentioned in the Act, a clear mention thereof could have been made. This omission clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend to exclude buildings other than those mentioned in the proviso from the operation of the Act. 72. It is true that there were some variations in the different lease deeds executed by the Plaintiff-Respondent in favour of the Defendant-Appellant between 1953 and 1959, but that would not go to make any difference and would in no way materially affect the case. In this view of the matter, I, therefore, hold that the lease in question refers to an 'accommodation', as defined in Section 2 of the Act and consequently, the Appellants are not liable to ejectment, without compliance of the other provisions of the Act. 73. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that the appeal must succeed. The Respondent is not entitled to any mesne profits. The Cross Objection, therefore, also fails. 74. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court are set aside and the Plaintiff's suit stands dismissed with costs throughout. The Gross Objection is dismissed. Satish Chandra and K.N. Srivastava, JJ. 75. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs in both the Courts. The cross-objection is also dismissed with costs.