A. A. DAVE, J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal was filed by original complainant Muktaben after obtaining special leave of the Court as required under sec. 417 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal passed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Junagadh at Porbandar in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1971. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were convicted in Criminal case No. 846 of 1969 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Porbandar. Respondent No. 1 was convicted of an offence punishable under sec. 494 of the Indian Penal Code and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were convicted of an offence punishable under sec. 494 read with sec. 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Respondent No. 1 was sentenced to suffer one months rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. 00 and in default of payment of fine to undergo one weeks further rigorous imprisonment. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were sentenced to suffer one days rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100. 00 and in default of payment of fine to undergo seven days further rigorous imprisonment. ( 2 ) THE admitted facts are that complainant Muktaben who has died during the pendency of this appeal was the legally married wife of respondent No. 1. Their marriage had taken place according to Hindu religious sites and caste customs. There was some difference of opinion between them which ultimately culminated in filing of Civil Suit No. 180 of 1965 by respondent No. 1 against Muktaben for restitution of conjugal rights. A consent decree for restitution of conjugal rights came to be passed against Muktaben. On 9-12-1967 respondent No. 1 filed Civil Suit No. 392 of 1967 for a decree of divorce on the ground that Muktaben had not complied with the decree for restitution for a period over two years. That suit was challenged. Ultimately a decree for divorce came to be passed on merits in favour of respondent No. 1 on 20-9-1968. Muktaben preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1968 on 26-11-68 against the trial Courts decree for divorce. That appeal came to be dismissed by the appellate Court on 10-4-1970. That suit was challenged. Ultimately a decree for divorce came to be passed on merits in favour of respondent No. 1 on 20-9-1968. Muktaben preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1968 on 26-11-68 against the trial Courts decree for divorce. That appeal came to be dismissed by the appellate Court on 10-4-1970. It was during the period of the pendency of that appeal between 26-11-1968 and 10-4-1970 it is alleged by complainant Muktaben that respondent No. 1 performed second marriage with respondent No. 2 and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who are the relations of respondent No. 2 abetted the commission of the aforesaid offence of bigamy punishable under sec. 494 of the Indian Penal Code. That marriage is alleged to have taken place on 13-5-1969 Admittedly the parties are Hindus. They are of Lohana caste. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge found that when marriage between complainant Muktaben and respondent No. 1 was subsisting second marriage was contracted knowing fully well that there was a valid subsisting marriage. He therefore passed the order of conviction and sentence as said earlier. ( 4 ) THE learned appellate Judge found that what was necessary to rove was not only a belief of the factum of the marriage. What was to be proved was that but for the provisions of sec. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 which declares such second marriage to be void there was a valid marriage between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. For the proof of such a marriage complainant must prove that the marriage was performed according to the Hindu rites and customs. Even if it was a case of second marriage i. e. Natra marriage it must be established that particular ceremonies were prescribed by the custom of the caste and there was such a long standing custom and as a matter of fact those ceremonies were performed and consequently a valid marriage had come into existence and that marriage would have been a valid marriage but for the provisions of sec. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 On scrutiny of the evidence he found that such evidence was lacking. Mere registration of the marriage by the parties i. e. respondents at the caste organisation where the practice was registration for such marriage of Lohana caste people would not be sufficient. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 On scrutiny of the evidence he found that such evidence was lacking. Mere registration of the marriage by the parties i. e. respondents at the caste organisation where the practice was registration for such marriage of Lohana caste people would not be sufficient. Even the admission made by one of these respondents viz respondent No. 2 Jasumati in her statement recorded under sec. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code that she married respondent No. 1 would not be sufficient. In support of his conclusion he has referred to a few decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) THE first question that was agitated before us on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 was that this appeal abates as the complainant who filed this appeal with special leave of the Court has died during the pendency of this appeal. In our opinion this submission is not well founded. Sec. 431 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads:every appeal under sec. 411a sub-sec. (2) or sec. 417 shall finally abate on the death of the accused and every other appeal under this Chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellant. A plain reading of this section indicates that in case of an appeal filed under sec. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code the appeal shall abate finally on the death of the accused. It does not State that such an appeal filed under sec. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code will abate on the death of the appellant i. e. the complainant. The conclusion reached by us is clearly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Khedu Mohton Y. State of Bihar AIR 1971 Supreme Court 66. At page 69 after referring to the provisions of sec. 431 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is observed:from this section it is clear that an appeal under sec. 417 can only abate on the death of the accused and not otherwise. Once an appeal against an acquittal is entertained by the High Court it becomes the duty of the High Court to decide the same irrespective of the fact the appellant either does not choose to prosecute it or is unable to prosecute it for one reason or the other. The argument that while introducing sub-sec. (3) to sec. Once an appeal against an acquittal is entertained by the High Court it becomes the duty of the High Court to decide the same irrespective of the fact the appellant either does not choose to prosecute it or is unable to prosecute it for one reason or the other. The argument that while introducing sub-sec. (3) to sec. 417 Criminal P. C. The Parliament overlooked the provisions contained in sec. 431 does not deserve consideration. The language of sec. 431 is plain and unambiguous. Therefore no question of interpretation of that provision arises. THE Supreme Court has in terms stated that the view taken by the Madras High Court in Thothan v. Murugan AIR 1958 Madras 624 wherein the contrary view was taken is clearly wrong. We therefore reject this sub- mission made on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 4. ( 6 ) COMING now to the merits of the appeal we find that the learned appellate Judge has rightly made the observations referred to by us earlier. In Bhaurao v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1564 the Supreme Court has made the following material observations:sec. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes the marriage between two Hindus void if two conditions are satisfied: (i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act and (ii) at the date of such marriage either party had a spouse living. The word solemnize means in connection with a marriage to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form. It follows therefore that unless the marriage is celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due forms it cannot be said to be solemnized. It is therefore essential for the purpose of sec. 17 of the Act that the marriage to which sec. 494 I. P. C. applies on account of the provisions of the Act should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties be taken to be married will not make the ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established custom. ( 7 ) IN a later decision of the Supreme Court in Kanwal Ram v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration AIR 1966 Supreme Court 614 the Supreme Court has observed:in a bigamy case the second marriage as a fact that is to say the essential ceremonies constituting it must be proved. ( 7 ) IN a later decision of the Supreme Court in Kanwal Ram v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration AIR 1966 Supreme Court 614 the Supreme Court has observed:in a bigamy case the second marriage as a fact that is to say the essential ceremonies constituting it must be proved. Admission of marriage by She accused is not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultery or bigamy casewhere therefore in prosecution for offences under secs. 494/109 I. P. C. the evidence of the witness called to prove the marriage ceremonies showed that the essential ceremonies had not been performed the conviction of the accused persons on the statement of the alleged bridegroom that he had sexual relationship with the alleged bride and on admission of the accused in a written statement that the parties married after the first marriage was dissolved was not justified. ( 8 ) IN Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Surerh Chandra Ghosh AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1153 the Supreme Court has observed:proof of solemnization of second marriage in accordance with essential religious rites applicable to parties is a must for conviction for bigamy. Mere admission by accused that he had contracted second marriage is not enough. ( 9 ) IN view of these latest decisions of the Supreme Court the appellate Court was quite justified in coming to the conclusion that mere proof of the fact that respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 4 a relation of respondent No. 2 who got this marriage registered at their caste organization by payment of necessary fees the receipt of which has been produced at Ex. 16 which indicates such registration is not sufficient to prove that such marriage was contracted between the parties which could be termed as a valid marriage but for the provisions of sec. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 It is significant to note that Gopaldas Bavaji Ex. 29 who is working with the said caste organisation does not depose in terms that such a registration of marriage is the only formality to be gone through for such marriage in the community to which the parties belong. Evidence of Popatlal Vasanji Ex. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 It is significant to note that Gopaldas Bavaji Ex. 29 who is working with the said caste organisation does not depose in terms that such a registration of marriage is the only formality to be gone through for such marriage in the community to which the parties belong. Evidence of Popatlal Vasanji Ex. 34 a relation of respondent No. 1 does not in terms state as to what are the ceremonies to be gone through for solemnizing such marriage in their community and also does not speak that Prabhudas Gor who had celebrated the marriage performed those ceremonies for solemnizing such marriage. It is thus evident that there is no evidence led by the complainant who had no personal knowledge about the marriage in question that certain ceremonies were the ceremonies prescribed in this community for solemnizing the marriage and those ceremonies were performed in solemnizing the marriage in question. Mere statement made by respondent No. 2 Jasumati in her statement Ex. 23 recorded under sec. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code in an answer to the question what she had to state about the evidence of Gopaldas Odhavji was that on 13-5-1969 accused No. 1 remarried with accused No. 2 and there is Nondh of the same in Luhana Mahajan Vadi and also there are signatures of accused Nos. 1 and 4 in the said Nondh Ex. 19 that it was true would not be sufficient for the proof of solemnization of the marriage in question as required under law. It will be only an admission about her belief. That would not be sufficient as has been held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. The learned appellate Judge has therefore rightly come to the conclusion that the complainant has not led sufficient evidence to prove that such a valid marriage had been solemnized. Consequently therefore he was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the offences in question are not established against any of respondents Nos. 1 to 4. The appeal therefore fails. ( 10 ) THE appeal is dismissed confirming the order of acquittal passed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 4. .