S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 58 of 1968 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad against the defendant claiming possession of the suit premises under sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 ( 2 ) THE defendant resisted the plaintiffs claim. It was inter alia contended that suit was not within time as contemplated by sub-sec. (8) of sec. 6 and that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit by virtue of the provisions of sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 3 ) BOTH these contentions were negatived by the learned Trial Judge. On merits he held that the plaintiff was entitled to possession and he therefore passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for possession. ( 4 ) IT is that decree which is challenged in this Civil Revision Application by the defendant. ( 5 ) MR. Jhaveri appearing for the defendant has raised before me the following three contentions. 1 The suit was barred by time under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 19632 The City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit by virtue of sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. 3 On merits the plaintiff has not established his claim. 6 Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 provides as under. (1) if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law he or any person claiming through him may be suit recover possession thereof notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-SECS. (3) and (4) are not relevant for the purpose of the present case. Under sub-sec. (2) the suit must be brought before a period of six months from the date of dispossession has expired. Indisputably the plaintiff was dispossessed on 28th June 1967. He could have therefore brought the present suit on or before 28tb December 1907. . . SUB-SECS. (3) and (4) are not relevant for the purpose of the present case. Under sub-sec. (2) the suit must be brought before a period of six months from the date of dispossession has expired. Indisputably the plaintiff was dispossessed on 28th June 1967. He could have therefore brought the present suit on or before 28tb December 1907. But he filed the suit on 9 January 1968 because from 28th December 1967 to 8th January 1968 the City Civil Court was closed. The question which has therefore been raised is whether sec. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963 applies to such a suit. Sec. 4 provides thus:where the prescribed period for any suit appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed the suit appeal or application may be instituted preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. EXPLANATION. A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. ( 6 ) SEC. 4 comes into play where there is a prescribed period for a suit. Sec. 2 (j) defines the expression prescribed period as follows. PRESCRIBED period means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. THE expression period of limitation used in the definition of the expression prescribed period has been defined as follows by the said clause itself. PERIOD of limitation means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by the Schedule. SCHEDULE means Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 The period of six months laid down in clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6 is not the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule. Therefore sec. 4 will not proprio vigore apply to such cases. Now sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 provides as follows:where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule the provisions of sec. 6 is not the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule. Therefore sec. 4 will not proprio vigore apply to such cases. Now sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 provides as follows:where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule the provisions of sec. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. ( 7 ) THIS sub-section is in two parts. The first part attracts the applicability of sec. 3 where a special or a local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from one prescribed by the Schedule. I am not concerned with it in the instant case. The second part attracts the applicability of secs. 4 to 24 (inclusive) for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by any special or local law. Specific Relief Act 1963 is a special law within the meaning of that expression used in sec. 29 (2) of Limitation Act 1963 in as much as sec. 6 thereof prescribes its own period of limitation for suits to be filed thereunder. Secondly there Is nothing in that Act which expressly excludes the applicability of sec. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963 Therefore sec. 4 read with sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 applied to the present suit. The suit was therefore instituted within time. ( 8 ) MR. Zaveri has argued that whereas Article 3 in the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act 1908 prescribed special period of limitation for suits under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 there is no corresponding Article in Limitation Act 1963 This is a correct submission. But this legislative change has not altered the situation for the following reasons. Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 as originally enacted contained the expression instituted within six months from the date of dispossession. It was deleted by the Amending Act XII of 1891. But this legislative change has not altered the situation for the following reasons. Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 as originally enacted contained the expression instituted within six months from the date of dispossession. It was deleted by the Amending Act XII of 1891. In Article 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1877 it found its expression and Article 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 was enacted exactly in the same terms as Article 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1877 In Limitation Act 1963 Article 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 has not been enacted and the concept of period of limitation has been taken back to and incorporated in sec. 6 of Specific Relief Act 1963 as was the case in corresponding sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 prior to its amendment in 1891. In addition sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 has been recast and the corresponding sec. 29 (2) in the Limitation Act 1963 has been enacted in broader and wider terms. So far as the applicability of sec. 4 to period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law is concerned it has remained the same under the Act of 1908 and the Act of 1963 except for the insertion of Explanation to sec. 4 in the Act of 1963. Nothing turns on the Explanation in this case. ( 9 ) MR. Zaveri has next argued that whereas sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 opens with the expression No suit under this section shall be brought. . . . . . in the context of Article 3 of Indian Limitation Act 1908 sec. 3 thereof used the expression every suit instituted. . . . . after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule shall be dismissed. . . . . . . According to him the difference in the language used in sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 and sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 shows or suggests that the period of limita- tion prescribed by sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is not the period of limitation properly so called but is the condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit. If it is so viewed sec. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963 read with sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is not the period of limitation properly so called but is the condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit. If it is so viewed sec. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963 read with sec. 29 (2) thereof will have no applicability to the suits instituted under sec. 6 I am unable to accede to this argument for two reasons. Firstly I am unable to discover any real difference between the aforesaid two expressionsone used in sec. 6 of Specific Relief Act 1963 and another used in sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 In one case no such suit can be brought after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of dispossession. If therefore such a suit has been brought it shall have to be dismissed. In another case any suit instituted after the expiry of the said period of limitation shall have to be dismissed. When analysed in these terms the effect of both the expressions is the same. Different expressions are certainly used to convey different meanings. But it is not unknown that different expressions are used in different contexts in order to produce the same result. Therefore I am unable to read so much in sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 as Mr. Zaveri wants me to read. Secondly I cannot exclude the application of sec. 4 unless it is expressly excluded within the meaning of sub- sec. (2) of sec. 29. Specific Relief Act 1963 contains no such express provision. To accede to Mr. Zaveris argument is to attempt to draw a highly sophisticated and minute implication from the difference in language used in sec. 6 of Specific Relief Act 1963 and sec. 3 of Limitation Act 1963 Sec. 29 (2) does not permit any such implication to be drawn. Mr. Zaveris argument ignores the clear and unambiguous language of sec. 29 (2) and its acceptance will lead to the violation of the section. ( 10 ) THE next argument of Mr. Zaveri is that in the context of sec. 5 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 sec. 6 provides a special remedy which is fettered by a special condition. This analysis made by Mr. 29 (2) and its acceptance will lead to the violation of the section. ( 10 ) THE next argument of Mr. Zaveri is that in the context of sec. 5 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 sec. 6 provides a special remedy which is fettered by a special condition. This analysis made by Mr. Zaveri is eminently correct but he forgets that the rigour of the special condition is not as oppressive as he thinks it to be because of the moderation introduced by sec. 29 (2 ). ( 11 ) HE has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. R. C. Alexander and others A. I. R. (1968) Supreme Court 1165. It explains the different between secs. 8and 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 broadly to secs. 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 the different between Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act 1963 It has no bearing on the impact of sec. 4 read with sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 upon suits filed under sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 Mr. Zaveris arguments do not help the defendant in contending that the present suit was barred by the provisions of sec. 6 itself. In my opinion it was instituted within time. The first contention raised by Mr. Zaveri fails and is rejected. ( 12 ) THE second contention which Mr. Zaveri has raised is that by virtue of the provisions of sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit under sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 Where sec. 28applies the Court specified therein has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and no other Court has any such jurisdiction. Mr. Zaveri has invited my attention to the averment made by the plaintiff in his plaint to the effect that he is the lawful sub-tenant who was wrongfully dispossessed from his premises by the defendant landlady. The averment made by the plaintiff that he is the lawful sub- tenant and therefore entitled to retain his possession attracts submits Mr. Zaveri the provisions of sec. 28. ( 13 ) A similar question arose before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Shiavax C. Cambata v. Sunderdas Ebji 52 Bombay Law Reporter 381. The averment made by the plaintiff that he is the lawful sub- tenant and therefore entitled to retain his possession attracts submits Mr. Zaveri the provisions of sec. 28. ( 13 ) A similar question arose before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Shiavax C. Cambata v. Sunderdas Ebji 52 Bombay Law Reporter 381. In that case a suit for possession was filed under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 In that suit the defendants had let out a shop in their building to one R. S. Dalaya. In course of time Dalaya transferred the tenancy to Sunderdas the plaintiff and put him in possession of the premises. The defendants with the help of their watchmen took forcible possession of the shop and the contents thereof from the plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore filed on the Original Side of the High Court of Bombay a suit for possession under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 It was contended that by virtue of sec. 28 read with sec. 50 of the Bombay Rent Act the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit should be transferred to the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. The contention was upheld by the learned Trial Judge who ordered the suit to be transferred to the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. An appeal from that order was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Chief Justice M. C. Chagla and Mr. Justice Coyajee. It was contended that sec. 9 was intended to protect possession without any regard to the title or the origin of possession and that therefore its operation was not excluded even in cases where parties happened to be landlords and tenants. Upholding that contention it has been laid down that it is not every suit for possession to which the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act are attracted. The provisions of the Bombay Rent Act are attracted only to those suits for possession between a landlord and a tenant where they have been filed by a landlord as a landlord or by a tenant as a tenant and in his capacity as a landlord or a tenant and relying on his title as a landlord or as a tenant. It has been further laid down in that decision that though the plaintiff may set out his title in the plaint those averments are entirely unnecessary and irrelevant because the defendants cannot raise in a suit under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 an issue as to the plaintiffs title in the suit. He cannot contest the position that the plaintiff is not entitled to possession because he is not a tenant. He can contest the plaintiffs claim only on one simple and short ground viz. that the plaintiff was not in possession within six months of the filing of the suit. The issue as to the relationship of landlord and tenant can never arise in such a suit. Therefore in the opinion of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay the suit for possession filed by a dispossessed tenant or sub- tenant against his landlord under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 does not attract the provisions of sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act because no issue as to title arises in such a suit. ( 14 ) MR. Jhaveri has relied upon a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Dattatraya Krishna Jangam v. Jairam Ganesh Gore 66 Bombay Law Reporter 645. The Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay has in that decision considered the aforesaid decision in the case of Shiavax C. Cambata (supra) and has observed as under:-IN Shiavax Cambatas case it was held that a suit by a tenant to recover possession of demised premises from his landlord brought under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not fall within the purview of sec. 28 of the Rent Act. Chagla C. J. pointed out in his judgment that the object of sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is to protect possession without regard to the title or origin of possession that although the plaintiff might have set out his title in the plaint those averments were entirely unnecessary and irrelevant that the defendants could not have contested the position that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession because he was not a tenant that they could only have contested the plaintiffs claim on the one simple and short ground viz. that the plaintiff was not in possession within six months of the filing of the suit that therefore the issue as to landlord and tenant could never have arisen in the suit. and that consequently the suit was outside the scope of sec. 28. The learned Chief Justice also observed (p. 385 ). . . . In our opinion it is only when a landlord or a tenant files a suit for posses sion as a landlord or a tenant and in his capacity as a landlord or a tenant and relying on his title as a landlord or a tenant that it becomes a suit of the description mentioned in sec. 50 and sec. 28 of the Act. With respect we agree with this observation ( 15 ) THE Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay has therefore approved the decision in Shiavax Cambatas case (supra ). The principle laid down by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Dattatrayas case (supra) has no application to the facts of this case because in that case a suit for possession was filed by the plaintiff on his title as a landlord against the defendant whom he described as a trespasser. No such suit can be filed under sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 The High Court of Bombay in the aforesaid case was considering the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in a case where the plaintiff had sued on his title. Obviously that decision cannot apply to the instant case. Relying upon the principle laid down by the High Court of Bombay in Shiavax cambatas case (supra) I am of the opinion that the operation of sec. 6 is not excluded in cases between landlords and tenants where there is no question of title involved The second contention raised by Mr. Zaveri therefore fails and is rejected. ( 16 ) ON merits Mr. Zaveri has contended that the defendant has not shown that he had been in possession of the suit premises. He has emphasised the distinction between legal possession and mere occupation. On facts Mr. Zaveris contention cannot be upheld. Zaveri therefore fails and is rejected. ( 16 ) ON merits Mr. Zaveri has contended that the defendant has not shown that he had been in possession of the suit premises. He has emphasised the distinction between legal possession and mere occupation. On facts Mr. Zaveris contention cannot be upheld. The learned Trial Judge has taken into account the averment made by the defendant in her reply which she filed in Standard Rent Application No. 1265 of 1966 between the parties in which she stated that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit premises as a sub-tenant. That reply is at Ex. 21. The finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge is based upon this evidence and other evidence on record. It is a pure finding of fact. It suffers from no legal infirmity because what a sub-tenant enjoys is possession in the legal sense of the term and not mere occupation or permissive use. This finding therefore holds good for the purpose of the present suit. ( 17 ) THE decree passed by the Trial Court is therefore unassailable and must be upheld. The Trial Court has unnecessarily stated in answer to issue No. 1 that it was not necessary to decide it. In fact it has decided it but has curiously enough not recorded its short answer to the issue No. 1. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons stated above I find no substance in this Revision Application Revision Application therefore fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .