JUDGMENT A.K. Kirty, J. - The respondent Nar Bahadur was appointed as a rakshak by the Manager, Partali Workshop Chatgaon in 1946. It was then a workshop of the Assam Bengal Railway. Subsequently on the partition of India, he opted for India and worked as a Rakshak, firstly in East India Railway and thereafter in the Northern Railway. He was removed from the service by way of punishment by the order of Assistant Security Officer, Railway Protection Force, Allahabad dated 30-9-1969. He filed a suit questioning the validity of the said order and praying that order be declared to be null and void and that it be further declared that he continued to remain in the lawful employment of Government of India. The suit was contested by the defendants. 2. In the trial court two points arose. One was whether the enquiry proceedings were vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, and the other was whether the impugned order was made in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. On both the points the trial court recorded findings against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. In appeal the trial court's judgment and decree have been reversed and the suit has been decreed. 3. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the Assistant Security Officer was a person competent to pass an order of removal in view of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. 4. The manager of the workshop who had originally appointed the respondent belonged to a Railway which was not a Railway of Union of India. There is no finding nor even material from which it can be definitely and satisfactorily concluded that the Assistant Security Officer holds a rank which is equal to the rank of the manager of Partali workshop. No finding against the respondent on this point can be given merely on the solitary statement of the witness examined by the defendant. 5. The Railway Protection Force Act, 1937 (23 of 1957) is an Act by which the members of the Railway Protection Force are governed. Sec. 6 of this Act provides as follows:- "The appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer who shall exercise that power in accordance with rules made under this Act. 5. The Railway Protection Force Act, 1937 (23 of 1957) is an Act by which the members of the Railway Protection Force are governed. Sec. 6 of this Act provides as follows:- "The appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer who shall exercise that power in accordance with rules made under this Act. Provided that the power of appointment under this section may also he exercised by such other superior Officer as the Chief Security Officer concerned may by order specify in this behalf." 6. Under Sec. 6, therefore, it is clear that the appointing authority is the Chief Security Officer concerned. The power of appointment can be exercised by the Chief Security Officer only, or by some other superior officer to whom the power has been specifically delegated by the order of the Chief Security Officer. An Assistant Security Officer would be a "superior Officer" as defined in Sec. 2(f) of the Act. The expression "Chief Security Officer, "however, has not been defined so as to include, for purposes of Sec. 6 or otherwise, an Assistant Security Officer. The mere fact that an Assistant Security Officer is "a superior officer" will not be sufficient to establish that an Assistant Security Officer is also an appointing authority under Sec. 6. This section requires an express delegation made in that behalf by the Chief Security Officer by order. Admittedly there is no such order on the record. 7. Sec. 4(1) of the Act provides: "The Central Government may appoint a person to be the Inspector General of the Force and may appoint other persons to be Chief Security Officer, Security Officers or Assistant Security Officers of the Force." There is no provision in the Act itself from which it can be legitimately inferred that an Assistant Security Officer is not subordinate to the appointing authority, namely, the Chief Security Officer. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to the rules framed under the Act known as Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 made by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 21 of the Act. His contention is that Sec. 6 itself provides that in making appointments Chief Security Officer shall exercise that power in accordance with the rules made under the Act. His contention is that Sec. 6 itself provides that in making appointments Chief Security Officer shall exercise that power in accordance with the rules made under the Act. The said provision, however, only relates to the manner of exercise of the power and it has nothing to do with the power of delegation which has been given to him exclusively and to no other officer or authority. Therefore if the Chief Security Officer concerned has not, by order, delegated his power of appointment in accordance with the proviso to Sec. 6, no provision in the aforesaid rules can be accepted as a valid substitute for such delegation. 9. Rule 20 provides that the power of superior Officers to appoint members of the (Force) shall be as specified in Schedule 1. Schedule 1 mentions the powers of superior officers to make appointments to the Force. Assistant Security Officer is the superior officer mentioned in the schedule having power to appoint in the service rakshak or rakshaks. Learned counsel, in support of the appeal, urged that thus an Assistant Security Officer also is an appointing authority and, therefore. entitled to remove a rakshak. As the rule goes, it does support the learned counsel, but this rule is clearly inconsistent with the specific provision of Sec. 6 of the Act itself. It is settled law that statutory rules framed under an Act cannot over-ride or run counter to any specific and mandatory provision of the statute itself. In case of such inconsistency or anomaly, the provisions of statute must prevail over the provisions of the particular rule or rules. It is therefore not possible to hold on the strength of rule 20 that the Assistant Security Officer was the appointing authority. 10. The learned counsel then referred to rule 43 which provides that the disciplinary authority in respect of a member of the Force for the purpose of imposing any particular penalty or the passing of any disciplinary order shall be the authority specified in this behalf in Schedule II in whose administrative control, the member is serving and shall include any authority superior to such authority. Schedule II does mention Assistant Security Officer. But rule 43 again cannot override the Constitutional provision of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. This rule, therefore, could be held to be applicable only when disciplinary action or the penalty awarded does not contravene Article 311(1). Schedule II does mention Assistant Security Officer. But rule 43 again cannot override the Constitutional provision of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. This rule, therefore, could be held to be applicable only when disciplinary action or the penalty awarded does not contravene Article 311(1). Thus, unless it was established that the Assistant Security Officer for purposes of Article 311(1) was not subordinate to the appointing authority, the validity of the impugned order could not be upheld. The learned counsel in support of his submission that the impugned order was valid relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Chief Commercial Superintendent v. Gorakh Nath Upadhaya, 1971 ALJ 1103. In that case, however, the question was whether the General Manager of a Railway was competent to pass an order removing Gorakh Nath Upadhaya from service. It was held that the General Manager of the Railway was not subordinate in rank to the Agent or General Manager of the Railway company who had appointed G. N. Upadhaya. The decision in that case is not applicable to the instant ease at all. Here it has not been shown that the Assistant Security Officer is not subordinate to the Chief Security Officer nor it has been shown that his rank is the same or could be equated with that of the manager of the workshop who had appointed the respondent. 11. For the reasons stated above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.