S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff is the trustee of Ramji Mandir at Baroda. The suit lands are the properties of the trust of Ramji Mandir. These lands are situated in the Panchmahals District. On April 26 1958 the plaintiff obtained an exemption certificate in respect of the suit lands under sec. 88b of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act ). Thereafter he served upon the defendant a notice terminating his tenancy in respect of the suit lands. It was alleged in that notice that the defendant was an annual tenant thereof. This notice was served under sec84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the termination of the tenancy became effective from March 31 1961 On 31st December 1960 the defendant sent to the plaintiff reply to the notice by which he denied the claim made by the plaintiff. On August 9 1961 the plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of possession of suit lands and for the recovery of rents. ( 2 ) IN defence the defendant contended that he was a protected tenant in respect of the suit lands and that therefore sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act operated against the termination of his tenancy. The trial Court passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for possession and rent. The defendant appealed to the District Court. The learned Appellate Judge after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff had filed cross-objections before the District Court claiming future mesne profits which the trial Court had denied to him. They were dismissed. ( 3 ) THAT appellate decree is challenged by the defendant in this second appeal. The plaintiff has filed cross-objections in this second appeal claiming future mesne profits in respect of the suit lands. ( 4 ) MR. Patel appearing for the original defendant has raised before me the following four contentions (1) On the basis of the plaintiffs case in the plaint the defendant is the annual tenant and his tenancy cannot be terminated in view of the provisions of sec. 4s of the Tenancy Act. (2) In view of the fact that the defendant is a protected tenant his tenancy cannot be terminated on account of the provisions of sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act. (3) The notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant is illegal. 4s of the Tenancy Act. (2) In view of the fact that the defendant is a protected tenant his tenancy cannot be terminated on account of the provisions of sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act. (3) The notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant is illegal. (4) Sec. 88e of the Tenancy Act as inserted by sec. 31 of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 read with the Schedule to the said Act bars the present suit. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff Mr. Karlekar has raised the contention that the Courts below were in error in rejecting the plaintiffs claim for future mesne profits in respect of the suit lands. ( 6 ) SO far as the first contention raised by Mr. Patel is concerned the plaintiff himself has stated in the plaint that the defendant was an annual tenant in respect of the suit lands. Ex. 30 is the exemption certificate granted to the plaintiff in respect of the suit lands under sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act. It is dated April 20 1958 Now sec. 88b so far as it is relevant for the purpose of the present case provides as under:-NOTHING in the foregoing provisions except secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 and the provisions of Chapters VI and VII in so far as the provisions of the said Chapters are applicable to any of the matters referred to in the sections mentioned above shall apply (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . (b) to lands which are the property of a trust. . . . . . . . . . . . or an institution for public religious worship; (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . Provided that (i) such trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and (ii) the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. (2) For the purposes of this section a certificate granted by the Collector after holding an inquiry that the conditions in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) are satisfied by any trust shall be conclusive evidence in that behalf. It has not been disputed before me that the two requirements of the proviso to sub-sec. (i) of sec. (2) For the purposes of this section a certificate granted by the Collector after holding an inquiry that the conditions in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) are satisfied by any trust shall be conclusive evidence in that behalf. It has not been disputed before me that the two requirements of the proviso to sub-sec. (i) of sec. 88b are satisfied in as much as the Ramji Mandir trust has been registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and the entire income of the said lands is appropriated for the purposes of that trust. The certificate of registration issued under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 has been produced at Ex. 31. The certificate of exemption Ex. 30 in its turn states. hat these two requirements of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88b are satisfied. Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 80b the certificate of exemption Ex. 30 is the conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. I therefore hold that so far as the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88b is concerned its requirements are fully satisfied in the instant case. If that is so what is the effect of the certificate of exemption granted under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88b on the suit lands? The effect is that only the provisions of sec. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 and such of the provisions contained in Chapters VI and VIII of the Tenancy Act as are applicable to matters specified in the aforesaid sections apply to the suit lands. the remaining provisions of the Tenancy Act do not apply. Mr. Patel has relied upon secs. 3 and 4b of the Tenancy Act in support of his contention. These are some of the sections which are applicable to the suit lands. Now sec. 3 of the Tenancy Act provides as under : The provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act apply to the tenancies and leases of land to which this Act applies. Basing his arguments on this section he has urged that sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (which is in Chapter V) governs the termination of the tenancy in respect of the suit lands. Basing his arguments on this section he has urged that sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (which is in Chapter V) governs the termination of the tenancy in respect of the suit lands. In other words his contention is that the plaintiff ought to have served upon the defendant six months notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy for the purpose of termination of his tenancy. He has overlooked the provisions of sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that none of the provisions of Chapter V shall apply to leases for agricultural purposes except in so far as the State Government may be notification published in the Official Gazette declare all or any of such provisions to be so applicable in the case of all or any of such leases together with or subject to those of the local law if any for the time being in force. Sec. 3 of the Tenancy Act has inter alia brought both these sections into force If both are in force then sec. 106 cannot apply to the instant case unless there is a notification issued by the State Government under sec. 117. He has not been able to show me any such notification. Therefore sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the lease in respect of the suit lands. If sec 106 has no application to the instant case under the aforesaid circumstances it does not become applicable merely by virtue of the provisions of sec. 3 of the Tenancy Act By virtue of sec. 3 of the Tenancy Act such provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable as are otherwise applicable to agricultural leases or are otherwise made applicable to such leases. The argument raised by Mr. Patel on the strength of sec. 3 of the Tenancy Act therefore fails and is rejected. ( 7 ) MR. Patel has next argued that sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act hits the present suit. It provides as under:-NO tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. Tenancy has been defined by sec. 2 (17) in the following terms : "tenancy means the relationship of landlord and tenant. " sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act hits the present suit. It provides as under:-NO tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. Tenancy has been defined by sec. 2 (17) in the following terms : "tenancy means the relationship of landlord and tenant. " sec. 4b militates against the termination of the tenancy only in so far as it is sought to be done on the ground that the period or duration for which the tenancy was granted has expired or the period during which the tenant could be in possession has expired. In the instant case the notice served by the plaintiff upon the defendant does not seek to terminate the tenancy on the ground of efflux of time. There are several other grounds which are stated in the notice. He has alleged that in Survey No. 583 which is one of the suit lands the defendant has constructed a permanent building and that he has been tethering cattle therein and that therefore he has been causing waste of the suit lands. According to the plaintiff the waste or damage to the suit land caused by the defendant has been permanent. The second ground which he has stated is that the trees which had been standing on the suit lands have been cut away by the defendant and that therefore he has caused permanent damage to the suit lands. He has next alleged that the defendant has not been personally cultivating the suit lands and that he has been giving them to others for cultivation and that therefore he has been causing waste of the suit lands. The next ground which he has urged is that the defendant has not paid rent for the years from 1956-57 to 1958-59. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff has terminated the tenancy of the defendant on grounds other than efflux of time. Sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act therefore does not come in the way) of the plaintiff. Mr. Patels argument based on sec. 4b therefore fails and is rejected. The first contention raised by Mr. Patel has therefore no substance whatsoever. ( 8 ) IN support of the second contention he has invited my attention to sec. Sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act therefore does not come in the way) of the plaintiff. Mr. Patels argument based on sec. 4b therefore fails and is rejected. The first contention raised by Mr. Patel has therefore no substance whatsoever. ( 8 ) IN support of the second contention he has invited my attention to sec. 89 of the Tenancy Act the material part of which is as follows: (1) The enactment specified in Schedule I is hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the fourth column thereof. (2) But nothing in this Act or any repeal effected thereby (a ). . . . . . . . . (b) shall save as expressly provided in the Act affect or be deemed to affect: (i)any right title interest obligation or liability already acquired accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act or (ii) any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right title interest obligation or liability or anything done or suffered before the commencement of this Act and any such proceedings shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act was not passed. He has not relied upon any other sub-section of sec. 89. So far as sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 89 are concerned he has placed reliance only upon the effect of repeal provided in sub-sec. (2) in so far as rights which accrued to the defendant under the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 are concerned. The question therefore which arises is this What were the rights which the defendant acquired under the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 and what are the rights which have been saved by sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 89 of the Tenancy Act ? Mr. Patel has not argued before me that the defendant had acquired more or higher rights under the Bombay tenancy Act 1939 than the rights which have been saved to him under secs. 3 3 and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 as modified and incorporated in Schedule I to the Tenancy Act of 1948. Therefore the question of comparing the rights which accrued to him under the Bombay tenancy Act of 1939 with those which the modified secs. 3 3 and 4 of that Act (vide Schedule I to the Tenancy Act of 1948) continue in force for him does not arise. Therefore the question of comparing the rights which accrued to him under the Bombay tenancy Act of 1939 with those which the modified secs. 3 3 and 4 of that Act (vide Schedule I to the Tenancy Act of 1948) continue in force for him does not arise. So also the question of considering the effect of repeal in so far as this aspect of the case is concerned does not arise. He has proceeded on the basis that the defendant had only those rights which the aforesaid three modified sections continued in force for him. Mr. Patel has placed reliance upon the said secs. 3 and 3a of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 Sec. 4 of the said Act has indisputably no application to the instant case. Sec. 3 provides as under :3 A tenant shall be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of any land if (a) he has held such land continuously for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding either (i) the first day of January 1938 or (ii) the first day of January 1945 and (b)he has cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid period. Explanation I. If the person who held such land on the first day of January 1938 or the first day of January 1945 as the case may be came to hold the same by inheritance or succession from another person or if he has held such land as a tenant and is an heir to such other person the period during which such other person held such land as a tenant shall be included in calculating the period of six years under this section. Explanation II-If the person who held such land on the first day of January 1938 or the first day of January 1945 as the case may be held as a tenant at any time within six years before the said date from the same landlord in the same village any other land which he cultivated personally the period during which he held such other land shall be included in calculating the period of six years under this section. Explanation III-Where any land is held by two or more persons jointly as tenants all such persons shall if any one of them cultivated and continues to cultivate such land personally and if the other conditions specified in this section are fulfilled be deemed to be protected tenants in respect of such land. SEC. 3a provides as under 3a. Every tenant shall from the eighth day of November 1947 be deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of this Act and his rights as such protected tenant shall be recorded in the Record of Rights unless his landlord has prior to the aforesaid date made an application to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the tenant is not a protected tenant. Explanation-A person shall not be deemed to be a protected tenant if such person has been on an application made by the owner of the land as provided in sec. 3-A of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 declared by a competent authority not to be a protected tenant. It is clear that before a tenant invokes the provisions of the said secs. 3 and 3a of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 it must be proved that he had held the land in question continuously for a period of not lees than six years immediately preceding either the first day of January 1938 of the first day of January 1945 and that he had cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid period; The learned Appellate Judge has dealt with this aspect of the case in the following terms :undoubtedly there is no controversy that the tenancy of the appellant had commenced prior to 1946 and consequently under the terms of the old Act of 1939 he was to be counted a protected tenant and therefore ordinarily the appellant would have enjoyed the status of a protected tenant but for the consideration that this sec. 4a was excepted from the body of sec. 88b (i) of the Act and so far as sec. 88b (i) was concerned this sec. 4a was not included therein. Therefore according to the learned Appellate Judge the defendant was a protected tenant within the meaning of secs. 3 3 and 4 of the Bomb?. Tenancy Act 1939 (as modified and incorporated in Schedule I to the Tenancy Act 1948 In cases where sec. 88b (i) was concerned this sec. 4a was not included therein. Therefore according to the learned Appellate Judge the defendant was a protected tenant within the meaning of secs. 3 3 and 4 of the Bomb?. Tenancy Act 1939 (as modified and incorporated in Schedule I to the Tenancy Act 1948 In cases where sec. 4a applies and it applies in a very large number of cases the tenancies protected under Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 are recognised under the Tenancy Act 1948 and continue in force with all the protection which the latter Act accords to them However since sec. 4a of the Tenancy Act does not apply to cases in which exemption certificates have been granted under sec. 88b (vide sec. 88b it excludes the application of sec. 4a) the protected tenancy of the defendant cannot be recognised. While this is the position on one hand on the other hand his tenancy cannot be terminated on the ground of efflux of time because sec. 4b which applies to such cases bars such a termination. Excepting the ground of efflux of time the defendants tenancy can be terminated on any other ground not under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act because as stated above it has no application to agricultural leases but under sec. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Indeed it shall be a ground other than the ground of efflux of time which is barred by sec. 4b. The notice Ex. 36 served by the plaintiff upon the defendant states grounds which are not hit by sec. 4b. I have referred to them in the foregoing parts of this judgment. They are completely de hors the forbidden field and prohibited area carved out by sec. 4b. Therefore sec. 4b does not come in way of the plaintiff and does not hit the termination of the defendants tenancy by the plaintiff in any manner whatsoever. Out of abundant caution however let us see whether secs. 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 which in addition to secs. 3 and 4b govern cases of lands exempted under sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act grant any protection to the defendant in this behalf. Out of abundant caution however let us see whether secs. 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 which in addition to secs. 3 and 4b govern cases of lands exempted under sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act grant any protection to the defendant in this behalf. Sec. 8 provides for the maximum and the minimum of the rent payable by a tenant to his landlord notwithstanding any law custom usage agreement or the decree or order of a court. Sec. 9 deals with the rate of rent payable by a tenant to his landlord. Sec. 9a deals with the quantum of rent payable by a tenant to his landlord. Sec. 9b exempts landlord from any liability to make contribution to the cost of cultivation. Sec. 9c provides for payment of rent by a tenant to his landlord until the rent is fixed in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Sec. 10 provides for refund to a tenant of such rent as has been recovered by his landlord in contravention of the provisions of the Tenancy Act and for incidental matters. Sec. 10a provides for a tenants liability to pay land revenue and certain other cesses. Sec. 11 abolishes the payment of all cesses howsoever described by a tenant to his landlord except the rent and those cesses which have been specified in sec. 10a. Sec. 13 provides for suspension and remission of rent payable by a tenant to his landlord under the circumstances specified therein. Sec. 27 prohibits sub-division subletting or assignment of a land by a tenant. This brief reference to the said sections shows that they protect a tenant in matters relating to rent payable by him to his landlord and protect the land against sub-division subletting and assignment which in their turn protect the landlord who has a right to recover possession prevent fragmentation and development of absentee landlordism. If therefore a landlord has a right to terminate his tenants tenancy in order to recover its possession the said sections do not come in the way of the landlord. Chapters VI and VIII of the Tenancy Act apply only in so far as they or any part of them is applicable to any of the matters refereed to in the sections mentioned above. Chapters VI and VIII of the Tenancy Act apply only in so far as they or any part of them is applicable to any of the matters refereed to in the sections mentioned above. In this view of the matter it is clear that the defendant has no special protection at all against the termination of his tenancy and recovery of possession by his landlord. The second contention raised by Mr. Patel therefore fails and is rejected. ( 9 ) THE third contention raised by Mr. Patel relates to the validity of the notice. The plaintiff has terminated the defendants tenancy on the ground that the defendant has been his annual tenant. He therefore gave him three months notice under sec. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Mr. Patel has expressly stated to me that under sec. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code the notice will be valid if the defendant is an annual tenant of the Plaintiff. He has however contended that the defendant is a protected tenant and that therefore notice under sec. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is not sufficient. According to him six months notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy should have been served by the plaintiff upon the defendant. This argument raised by Mr. Patel cannot be accepted because it is based upon sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which does not apply to agricultural leases by virtue of sec. 117 of that Act. The third contention raised by Mr. Patel on the strength of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act therefore fails and is rejected. ( 10 ) THE last contention which Mr. Patel has raised is based upon sec. 88e of the Tenancy Act. This contention could not be taken up in the written statement nor could it be argued before the two Courts below because sec. 88e was inserted in the Tenancy Act with effect from November 15 1969 At that time the present second appeal was pending. I have permitted Mr. Patel to argue that point because if the subsequent amendment alters the rights of the parties its effect must be considered. I have heard Mr. Patel and Mr. Karlekar at length on this point. Sec. 88e was inserted in the Tenancy Act by sec. I have permitted Mr. Patel to argue that point because if the subsequent amendment alters the rights of the parties its effect must be considered. I have heard Mr. Patel and Mr. Karlekar at length on this point. Sec. 88e was inserted in the Tenancy Act by sec. 31 of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Devasthan Inams Act ). Sec. 31 thereof provides as follows; the enactments specified in column 1 of the Schedule shall be amended to the extent specified in column 2 thereof. The Schedule refers to two Acts with one of which I am concerned in this Second Appeal. It is the Tenancy Act. Firstly sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act has been amended and the expression an institution for public religious worship has been deleted. The effect of this amendment to sec. 88b (1) (b) is that no exemption certificate can be granted under sec. 88b in respect of lands which are the properties of such an institution. Having thus amended sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act sec. 31 of the Devasthan Inams Act has inserted a new section. It is sec. 88e. It is in the following terms :88e (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 88b with effect on and from the specified date lands which are the property of an institution for public religious worship shall cease to be exempted from those provisions of the Act except secs. 31 to 31d (both inclusive) from which they were exempted under sec. 88b and all certificates granted under that section in respect of such lands shall stand revoked. (2)WHERE any such land ceases to be so exempted then in the case of a tenancy subsisting immediately before the specified date the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date and the provisions of secs 32 to 32 (both inclusive) shall so far as may be applicable apply. Explanation-In this section specified date means the date of the commencement of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 the question which has been canvassed by Mr. Patel is whether sec. 88e is retrospective in character or prospective and whether it has the force of hitting a validly instituted action. It is not in dispute before me that on the date when the present suit was filed it was validly instituted. Patel is whether sec. 88e is retrospective in character or prospective and whether it has the force of hitting a validly instituted action. It is not in dispute before me that on the date when the present suit was filed it was validly instituted. It is also not disputed before me that the decree which the trial Court passed was validly passed. I have therefore to find out the actual force and capacity of sec. 88e. ( 11 ) SO far as the landlords to whom exemption certificates are granted under sec. 88b are concerned they can be classified into three categories for the purpose of considering the question. The first class consists of those landlords who obtained exemption certificates under sec. 88b instituted actions against their tenants for recovery of possession of the lands in their possession and obtained possession of their lands. The second class consists of those landlords who obtained exemption certificates under sec. 88b and did not institute any action to recover possession of the lands from their tenants or instituted such actions and finally failed in their attempts to recover possession of their lands. The third class consists of hose landlords who obtained exemption certificates under sec. 88b instituted actions against their tenants for recovery of possession of their lands and whose actions so instituted are pending either at the original stage or at the appellate stage. What is the effect of sec. 88e on these three classes of persons ? The plaintiff belongs to the third class of landlords. Under the scheme of the Tenancy Act as originally enacted the right of the landlord to recover possession of his and from his tenant was severely fettered by a number of restrictions. Sec. 88b enables certain specified classes of landlords to be free from the restrictions or fetters of the Tenancy Act if they succeed in obtaining exemption certificates under that section. The right to recover possession of an immovable property is a substantive right. It was that right which the landlords specified in sec. 88b enjoyed if they obtained exemption certificates. The amendment made to the Tenancy Act by sec. 31 of the Devasthan Inams Act clearly shows that a landlords right to recover possession of lands which are the properties of an institution for public religious worship is sought to be destroyed. Sub-sec. It was that right which the landlords specified in sec. 88b enjoyed if they obtained exemption certificates. The amendment made to the Tenancy Act by sec. 31 of the Devasthan Inams Act clearly shows that a landlords right to recover possession of lands which are the properties of an institution for public religious worship is sought to be destroyed. Sub-sec. (2) provides for statutory purchase of such lands by the tenants whose tenancies had been subsisting on the specified date that is November 15 1969 It is therefore very clear that what the amendment to the Tenancy Act has done is to take away the right of such a landlord to recover possession of his land from his tenant. In other words it is the substantive right of such a landlord which is adversely affected by this amendment. This amendment came into force during the pendency of the present suit at the second appellate stage. It is a well settled principle that when a substantive law is during the pendency of an action altered the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was instituted unless the new enactment shows a clear intention to vary such rights (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12 Edition P. 220 ). ( 12 ) IN Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lat Bahadur Chetri A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1511 it has been laid down that where vested rights are affected by any statutory provision the said provision should normally be construed to be prospective in operation and not retrospective unless the provision in question relates merely to a procedural matter. Retrospective operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even in cases where such retrospective operation appears to be clearly implicit in the provision construed in the context where it occurs. ( 13 ) IN Sukhram Singh v. Smt. Harbheji A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1114 it has been laid down that a law is undoubtedly retrospective if it says so expressly. However it is not always necessary to say so expressly in order to make the law retrospective. There may be occasions or circumstances which render a law retrospective in operation. A Court of law does not presume that a law is retrospective The initial presumption is otherwise. The remedial statutes are always regarded as prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. There may be occasions or circumstances which render a law retrospective in operation. A Court of law does not presume that a law is retrospective The initial presumption is otherwise. The remedial statutes are always regarded as prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly statutes are sometimes held to be retrospective when the declared intention is clearly and unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the particular law or in the context of connected provisions. In order to find out whether such an intention has been declared it is necessary to look at the general scope and purview of the Act and the remedy the Legislature has intended to apply in the former state of the law and then to determine what the Legislature has intended to do. ( 14 ) IN Ram Sarup v. Munshi A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 553 it has been laid down that if a statute is found retrospective it will not be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders it strictly necessary. ( 15 ) IN Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 655 it has been observed that where an amendment affects vested rights it operates prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication. ( 16 ) THE aforesaid decisions make it clear that a statute which alters the substantive law is ordinarily prospective in operation unless the Legislature has expressly given it retrospective operation or has given it such operation by necessary intendment. I have to apply these principles to sec. 88e and determine its character. ( 17 ) SUB-SEC. (1) of sec. 88e provides for cessation of exemption from those provisions of the Tenancy Act which have been specified in sec. 88b except secs. 31 to 31d (both inclusive ). The second consequence which it produces is that it revokes all certificates granted under sec. 88b. Subsec. (2) confers upon the tenants the right to statutory purchase of the lands in their possession and belonging to the institutions for public religious worship. Sub-sec. (1) uses the expression with effect on and from the specified date. The aforesaid expression clearly indicates that the cesser of exception comes into force on and from November 15 1969 which is the specified date. Sub-sec. (1) uses the expression with effect on and from the specified date. The aforesaid expression clearly indicates that the cesser of exception comes into force on and from November 15 1969 which is the specified date. It cannot therefore be said that the cesser of exception relates back to the date of the grant of exemption certificate rendering thereby the exemption certificate retrospectively ineffective from the date of its grant. ( 18 ) MR. Patel has argued that the expression with effect on and from the specified date governs only the cesser of exemption and does not govern the revocation of exemption certificates granted under sec. 88b. The clause which provides for cesser of exemption has been joined by a conjunctive with the other clause which provides for revocation of exemption certificate. It is difficult to read the expression with effect on and from the specified date in such an isolated manner as to govern the first part of sub-sec. (1) and not to govern the second part. In my opinion the expression with effect on and from the specified date governs both the parts of sub-sec. (1) Or reading the entire sub-sec. (1) I am unable to reach any other conclusion. If it is so what is the effect of prospective revocation of the exemption certificate? In my opinion the prospective revocation of the exemption certificate will not in any manner hit the first class of landlords referred to above because the rights of both the parties so far as that class of landlords is concerned have been finally settled. Sub-sec. (1) does not have the force of destroying the finally settled rights of such landlords who answer the description of an institution for public religious worship. So far as the second class of landlords is concerned the revocation of exemption certificates held by them will deprive them of their right to recover possession of their lands from their tenants because the right to recover possession of the lands where a certificate of exemption under sec. 88b has been granted is otherwise than under the provisions of the Tenancy Act and it is on the basis of that certificate that the ordinary machinery of law is set in motion. In other words it is the exemption certificate which forms the basis of or the foundation for civil action to recover possession of such lands. 88b has been granted is otherwise than under the provisions of the Tenancy Act and it is on the basis of that certificate that the ordinary machinery of law is set in motion. In other words it is the exemption certificate which forms the basis of or the foundation for civil action to recover possession of such lands. If that foundation has been disturbed or if that basis has been knocked down no suit in a civil Court can lie because the revocation of the exemption certificate brings into operation amongst others secs. 29 and 85 of the Tenancy Act. It is this class of landlords answering the description of 4san institution for public religious worship who are hit by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88e. So far as the third class of such landlords is concerned if the suits which they have instituted were validly instituted on account of the fact that their exemption certificates at the date of the suit were in operation can its subsequent revocation destroy the suits or non-suit the plaintiffs? The right to recover possession of land accrues according to the ordinary law of the land to the landlord when the tenancy of his tenant is determined. In the instant case the tenancy of the defendant was determined with effect from March 31 1961 It was on that date that the substantive right accrued to the plaintiff to recover possession of the suit lands. This substantive right cannot be disturbed unless the subsequent legislation is retrospective in operation. I find nothing in sub-sec. (1) which disturbs this right or hits a validly instituted action. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 88e lends support to the view which I find taking. It provides that where a land has ceased to be exempted under sub-sec. (1) a tenant can purchase the land under secs. 32 to 32r if his tenancy has been subsisting. The right to statutory purchase of land has not been conferred upon those tenants whose tenancies had not been subsisting on the specified date. In case their tenancies were terminated prior to the enactment of sec. 88e they did not subsist at the date of the enactment of that section. 32 to 32r if his tenancy has been subsisting. The right to statutory purchase of land has not been conferred upon those tenants whose tenancies had not been subsisting on the specified date. In case their tenancies were terminated prior to the enactment of sec. 88e they did not subsist at the date of the enactment of that section. The expression in the case of a tenancy subsisting immediately before the specified date clearly suggests that the Legislature did not want to deprive this class of landlords of their right to recover possession of the lands under the ordinary law of the land. The expression with effect on and from the specified date used in sub-sec. (1) and the expression shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date used in subsec. (2) in as much as they lay emphasis on the specified date clearly show prospective operation of sec. 88e when they are read in the context of the provisions contained in those two sub-sections. ( 19 ) MR. Patel has cited before me the decision of the Privy Council in K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer and others A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 49 It was a case under the Bengal Tenancy Act as amended by Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act 1934 In that cases the landlord brought the suit against his tenant for recovering possession of the land on the ground that a non-transferable occupancy was transferred by him without his consent. The amending legislation which came into force during the pendency of the appeal before the Privy Council provided that the consent of the landlord shall be deemed to have been given in the circumstances specified in the said amending legislation. This amending legislation was held to be retrospective in operation by the Privy Council and relief was granted on that basis. The principle laid down in that decision cannot be applied to the instant case because the language which the Legislature has used in sec. 88e is different from the language of the said amending legislation. The amending legislation which the Privy Council was construing in that case used the expression every person claiming an interest as landlord. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . shall be deemed to have given his consent to every transfer of such holding or portion. . The amending legislation which the Privy Council was construing in that case used the expression every person claiming an interest as landlord. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . shall be deemed to have given his consent to every transfer of such holding or portion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sec. 88e does not use such an emphatic and clear language nor does it use a deeming fiction which was used in the said Bihar Law. To hold that revocation of exemption certificates has been made effective from the dates of their grant is to read the section firstly in a manner totally isolated and disconnected from the expression with effect on and from the specified date and secondly to read it as if it means that all the certificates granted under sec. 88b shall be deemed to have always been revoked. In my opinion to place such a construction on sub-sec. (1) is to violate its clear and precise language. It cannot be done. It will also militate against the combined effect of the expressions with effect on and from the specified date and in the case of a tenancy subsisting immediately before the specified date the tenant will be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date. Both the sub-sections have got to be read together in order to give them a harmonious meaning. I therefore find nothing in sec. 88e or any other provisions of the Tenancy Act which will enable me to hold that sec. 88e is retrospective in operation hits the validly instituted actions and adversely affects the rights of the landlords which have already accrued to them. Sec. 88e therefore does not help the defendant in the instant case. It is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and therefore if a legislation has been enacted subsequent to the institution of the suit and during its pendency at the original or the appellate stage it can be looked at for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties as on the date of the suit. If it has a retrospective operation the rights of the parties as on the date of the suit shall have to be decided in the light of its provisions. If it is prospective in operation it will have to be ignored. Since I have found for the reasons stated above that sec. 88e is prospective in operation I have got to ignore it so far as the present suit is concerned. Therefore the revocation of the certificate of exemption in the instant case by sec. 88e with effect on and from 15th November 1969 does not in any manner hit the present suit. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to succeed on the merits of the case inspite of the enactment of sec. 88e. The last contention raised by Mr. Patel therefore fails and is rejected. ( 20 ) MR. Karlekar has in support of the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff contended that the Courts below were in error in holding that no direction as to future mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 Civil Procedure Code could be given in the absence of any prayer by the plaintiff in that behalf. If the plaintiff claims past mesne profits he has got to pray for them. If he has not done so he is not entitled to claim them. Direction as to future mesne profits is within the discretion of the Court. Therefore irrespective of whether the plaintiff has prayed for them or not if the Court thinks fit to give direction as to future mesne profits it can do so. In my opinion therefore the Courts below were in error in holding that in the absence of any prayer by the plaintiff they had no jurisdiction to give direction as to future mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 Civil Procedure Code. Support is lent to this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in R. S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1812 and also by the decision of the Madras High Court in Basavayya v. Guravayya A. I. R. 1951 Mad. 988. The finding as to jurisdiction recorded by the Courts below on this ground is erroneous and must be set aside. . 988. The finding as to jurisdiction recorded by the Courts below on this ground is erroneous and must be set aside. . ( 21 ) IT has been held by the lower Appellate Court that the defendant cannot be said to have been in wrongful possession after the termination of his tenancy by the plaintiff and that therefore direction for future mesne profits cannot be given. The expression mesne profits has been defined by sec. 2 (12) of the Civil Procedure Code. A person who is in possession of an agricultural land under a contract between him and his landlord and who is not protected by any other enactment is in wrongful possession of that land after the termination of his tenancy. There is therefore no reason to deprive on this ground the plaintiff of the future mesne profits. In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to them. ( 22 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objections are allowed and the decree passed by the Courts below is varied by inserting the direction that on the application of the plaintiff the trial Court shall determine future mesne profits of the suit lands from the date of the suit until delivery of possession and pass according to law an appropriate final decree in that behalf. There shall be no order as to costs in the cross-objections. ( 23 ) MR. Patel on behalf of the defendant applies for certificate of fitness under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Certificate is granted. Appeal dismissed. Cross objections allowed. .