JAGAT NARAYAN, C.J.—These applications under sec. 66(2) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, were filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajasthan, in this Court on 18-1-1966 and 30-3-66 respectively against his Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singh of Jaipur. During the pendency of the applications the respondent died on 24-6-70. Applications for substituting his son and successor His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Bhawani Singh of Jaipur were filed on 17-3-71. Notices were issued to the latter who has taken an objection that the applications have abated. The contention on behalf of Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Bhawani Singh is that an application filed to the High Court under sec. 66(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922 is an original civil proceeding within the meaning of sec. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Code including those contained in O. 22 are applicable. Sec. 141 runs as follows— "141. Miscellaneous proceedings.—The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction." 2. In Thakur Pershad vs. Sheikh Fakir-Ullah(i) their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows— "Their Lordships think that the proceedings spoken of in sec. 647 (of the Code of 1877 include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probate, guardianship, and so forth, and do not include executions." 3. O. 22 in terms applies to suits and appeals. Most of the High Courts took the view that sec. 141 C. P. C. only applies to such proceedings as are in pari meteria with suits and thus original in character. It was on this basis that it has been held that O. 22 is not applicable to revision applications under sec. 115 C. P. C. 4. Our attention has been drawn to an obiter observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra vs. State of U. P.(2) to the following effect— "Similarly recently this Court has held in Munshiram vs. Banwarilal, (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 903) that under sec. 41 of the Arbitration Act and also under sec. Our attention has been drawn to an obiter observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra vs. State of U. P.(2) to the following effect— "Similarly recently this Court has held in Munshiram vs. Banwarilal, (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 903) that under sec. 41 of the Arbitration Act and also under sec. 141 C. P. C. it was competent to the Court before which an award made by an arbitration tribunal is filed for passing a decree in terms thereof to permit parties to compromise their dispute under O. XXIII, R. 3, C, P. G. Though there is no discussion, this Court has acted upon the view that the expression civil proceeding in sec. 141 is not necessarily confined to an original proceeding like a suit or an application for appointment of a guardian etc., but that it applies also to a proceeding which is not an original proceeding." 5.There is abundant authority for the proposition that a pending reference under sec. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act does not abate. Reference may be made to the following decisions in this connection—Maharaja of Darbhanga vs. Commissioner of Income-tax(3, Commissioner of Income-tax vs. I. D. Varshani(4), Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gulam Hyder Khan(5), Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Gourishankarlal Singha(6). The above decisions proceed on the ground that O. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been made applicable to a reference under sec. 66 of the Indian Income tax Act. Sec. 37 of the Income-tax Act makes portions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. He has been given the right to enforce the attendance of any person and examine him on oath. He has also been given the right to compel the production of any document. He can also issue commissions for examination of witnesses etc The same powers have been granted also to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal How a reference is to be dealt with after it is made under sec. 66 is provided for in sec.66 (5) and 66 A(l) of the Income-tax Act and all that they provide is that a reference shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges. 66 is provided for in sec.66 (5) and 66 A(l) of the Income-tax Act and all that they provide is that a reference shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges. It may be said that since the sections provide for a hearing, it is expected that the Court would before passing final orders on the reference inform the parties interested and hear them if they so desire. O. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code not having been made applicable and there being nothing either in the Income-tax Act or the rules framed thereunder, it cannot be urged that the reference has abated by reason of the fact that the assessee has died. Arts 176 and 177 of the Limitation Act apply to the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, or the legal representatives of a deceased appellant or a deceased respondent. Even these two articles cannot be said to be specifically applicable to an income-tax reference under sec. 66 In the Calcutta case(6) referred to above it was also stated that with regard to references under the Indian Income-tax Act, the basic principle is that once a case has been stated to the High Court, the Court is bound to answer the question and the proceedings cannot be stopped simply because of the death or absence of one of the parties interested before it. The main reason to our mind why it has been held that a pending reference under sec.66(l) does not abate is that the High Court does not exercise either original or appellate jurisdiction, in this matter, but exercises advisory or consultative jurisdiction. 6. An application under sec. 66(2) asking the Court to direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer questions of law to it is also an application invoking the Court to exercise its advisory jurisdiction. In Seth Premchand Satramdas vs. The State of Bihar(7) an appeal was filed before the Federal Court against an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an application under sec. 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 for directing the Board of Revenue Bihar to state a case and refer it to the High Court. Sec. 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1944 is similar to sec. 66 of the Income-tax Act 1922. 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 for directing the Board of Revenue Bihar to state a case and refer it to the High Court. Sec. 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1944 is similar to sec. 66 of the Income-tax Act 1922. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the order of the Patna High Court was not an order passed by the High Court in the exercise of either its appellate or original jurisdiction, but that the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter was only consultative. 7. We are accordingly of the opinion that the present applications under sec. 66(2) of the Income-tax Act are not civil proceedings within the meaning of sec. 141 C.P.C Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is therefore not applicable and the applications have not abated. 8. Let the substitution prayed for be made.