Judgment 1. This application under Sec. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed to quash the Magistrates order dated 2-7-1969 in Case No. 281-G/69 under which he has taken cognizance of the offence under Sec. 420/ 120-B of the Indian Penal Code against these petitioners and also its subsequent proceedings in the court of the transferee court. 2. As it appears, on 2-7-1969 Dr. M. P. Sinha, Deputy Superintendent, Sadar Hospital, Saharsa, (opposite party here) filed a written complaint, its copy has been annexed to this miscellaneous application, making allegations of cheating against these petitioners. Petitioner No. 1 R. K. Poddar is said to be the Chairman of the Board of Directors of M/s. Auto Distributors, Calcutta (in the complaint petition he has been described as Proprietor of this Company). Petitioner No. 2 R. K. Chaturvedy is the Branch Manager of its Patna Branch. Petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 (P. K. Sikdar and S. K. Ghoshwami) are said to be its Mechanic and Cashier at Patna. 3. There is no dispute that the Patna branch caters on behalf of the Company to the orders for sale and distribution of Fiat cars for this region. The cars are supplied to this Company including its Patna Branch in fixed number every quarter and they are sold to the registered applicants against cash payments of their scheduled price. Such sales through this Company, namely, M/s. Auto Distributors are done strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Cars (Distribution and Sale) Control Order, 1959, of the Central Government According to this Order an intending purchaser has to get his name registered in the Companys register maintained for this purpose under the order for which he has to make an application with fixed security deposit. These names are registered strictly in the order of the applications and as and when their turn comes they are informed and requested to take delivery of the car after paying the entire price and completing other formalities. When the registered applicant comes and takes delivery of the car within the time allowed his name is removed from the register. If for any reason he fails to take delivery of the car within time then his claim is by passed and the next on the list is allotted that car. 4. When the registered applicant comes and takes delivery of the car within the time allowed his name is removed from the register. If for any reason he fails to take delivery of the car within time then his claim is by passed and the next on the list is allotted that car. 4. In his above complaint petition the allegations made were to the effect : The complainant had got his name registered as a purchaser of Fiat car with this Company at Patna after making the necessary security deposit. After he had done so he received reports from some of his friends who owned new Fiat cars that the performance of a new Fiat car was not good and it always gave troubles and that its body was very delicate and it presented a very bad show only after a short while. On those informations the complainant dropped the idea of purchasing a new Fiat car. Thereafter, he informed accused Nos. 1 and 2 (petitioners 1 and 2) several times on telephone that he had dropped the idea of purchasing a new Fiat car and that his security deposit should be refunded. They (accused Nos. 1 and 2) however sent accused No. 3 (petitioner No. 3) to the complainant at Saharsa on 10-11-1968 who talked very high of the body and engine of a Fiat car and induced him to change his mind and purchase a Fiat car. On that inducement which was with mala fide intention to cheat him the complainant revised his idea of this car and agreed to go in for it. 5. On 17-5-1968 the complainant received a letter from M/s. Auto Distributors Ltd., Patna Branch under the signature of accused No. 2 to complete the formalities and take delivery of the car within a specified time which, on complainants petition,was extended by the Central Government of which he was informed under the Companys memo dated 20-11-1968 with a request to complete the taking of the delivery within that time. The accused persons in that way by deceiving the complainant fraudulently and dishonestly made him part with a huge sum and under that inducement he issued draft for Rs. The accused persons in that way by deceiving the complainant fraudulently and dishonestly made him part with a huge sum and under that inducement he issued draft for Rs. 18000.00 dated 8-11-1968(?) in favour of the Auto Distributors Ltd., to be drawn on the State Bank of India, Patna for which the latter granted him a receipt dated 30-11-1968 under the signature of their aforesaid Cashier (petitioner No. 4). They encashed that draft and thereafter a Fiat car was made over on 14-12-1968 to the complainant in process of its delivery at Saharsa on 14-12-1968. When that car was in process of delivery to the complainant at Saharsa it suddenly ceased functioning near Mansi though all necessaries like petrol, water and mobil oil were complete and within formal limits and there was nothing wrong on the part of the driver who was driving it to Saharsa. When it ceased functioning at that point of road the complainant immediately informed the accused and on that information accused No. 3 was sent by accused Nos. 1 and 2 with all necessary equipments to Mansi. On reaching there accused No. 3 checked the car in presence of the mechanic of the complainant and found everything (oil, mobil and water) intact. He, however, found that the engine had ceased to work because its main bearings had got burnt completely which was due to only mechanical defect. Accordingly, accused No. 3 granted a certificate to that effect to the complainant and took the car with him to his office at Patna. The complainants mechanic on return from Mansi reported to him that the car looked used up and there were apparent signs of mechanical defect which had resulted in its engine ceasing to work. 6. The complainant thereafter sent a letter dated 1-1-1969 to accused No. 2 informing him of all those facts with a request that he should replace that car with a new Fiat car. In reply thereto the accused, with a mala fide intention sent a letter to the complainant that all the damaged parts of the car would be replaced at his (complainants) cost and when those parts were repaired it would be open to the complainant to take its delivery after paying those charges. This made the complainant fully helpless as he had been deprived of a huge amount and had been harmed in body, mind and reputation. This made the complainant fully helpless as he had been deprived of a huge amount and had been harmed in body, mind and reputation. Hence the complainant gave a pleaders notice to the accused demanding the replacement of that car by a new Fiat car by them. Instead of doing so, the accused persons in order to make a wrongful gain sent a reply to the notice through their own lawyer making false allegations therein and also evading supply of a new car in place of the old one. The complainant thereafter sent another pleaders notice to the Company but that also went in vain. When all such efforts of the complainant failed he sent his man, Ganesh Prasad Singh, to the accused at Patna on 29-6-1969, who contacted them on 30-6-1969 but they flatly refused to change that car by a new one and asked him to take delivery of that repaired car after clearing the charges. They further told him that it was open to the complainant to do whatever he liked. 7. On receiving the above complaint petition the learned Subdivisional Magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and took cognizance in the case under Sec. 420/120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sent the case to another Magistrate for disposal, as already noted. It is against this order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate that the present application has been filed by accused persons. 8. Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that on the facts alleged in the complaint petition no case of cheating has at all been made out against his clients and as such the Subdivisional Magistrates cognizance of such an offence is wholly misconceived and illegal and must be set aside. According to him, if the accused persons are made to fight this case in the court below it will necessarily mean great harassment and torture to them though they are in no way liable for any criminal action much less cheating in the matter, and this would manifestly amount to abuse of the process of the court which this Court in exercise of its inherent power must prevent for the ends of justice. His submission further is that though most of the allegations that the complainant has chosen to make in his complaint petition he seriously refutes as they are all false and fabricated to anyhow bring the matter within the purview of cheating to harass the accused persons but on their mere examination the Court will get convinced that on their face they do not at all disclose any case of cheating at their hands and whatever actions they had taken in the matter from beginning to end were open and above board within the provisions of the above Government Control Order and if any flaw had subsequently been discovered in the car he may take to any other remedy to have the wrong, if any, to himself corrected or compensated, as the case may be, but certainly in no way he can make the accused undergo the prosecution for cheating him. 9. That this Court can intervene in appropriate cases and quash criminal proceedings at such an initial stage in the exercise of its inherent powers under Sec. 561-A if it is considered necessary to prevent abuse of the process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice cannot be disputed. In R. P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 it has been laid down that the inherent power of High Court under Sec. 561-A, Cr. P. C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code; the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. P. C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code; the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In that case while observing that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction their Lordships have by way of illustration categorised certain types of cases where this jurisdiction can and should be exercised, and one category of such cases, to which learned petitioners counsel has pointedly drawn my attention and relied upon, is where the allegations in the first information report the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged, as in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. 10. It is not disputed that the complainant in order to purchase a new Fiat car had got his name registered as per rules with this dealer on 24-4-1964 and when his turn reached in due course the dealers issued him the allotment order on 17-5-1968 with request that he should take its delivery in their shop at Patna by a fixed time. He, however, got that time extended till 31-12-1968 by the appropriate authority and actually took the delivery on 14-12-1968 after completing the necessary formalities which included payment of its full price for which they (dealers) granted him the necessary receipt. After taking its delivery at Patna in that way he drove it to Bhagalpur by road where it was duly registered. Thereafter it was being driven to his place at Saharsa but on the way it went out of order near Mansi. It is also not disputed that after the car had stopped near Mansi in that way he sent news to the dealers at Patna who sent their mechanic (accused No. 3) to attend to it and he went there and examined the defects. It is also not disputed that after the car had stopped near Mansi in that way he sent news to the dealers at Patna who sent their mechanic (accused No. 3) to attend to it and he went there and examined the defects. According to the accused persons in course of that examination the dealers mechanic noticed that the defects which had developed in the car were due to some accident which it had met while being driven to Saharsa from Bhagalpur. The complainants allegation, however, is that the dealers mechanic had found everything in the car water, mobil etc. within normal limits but the engine bearings were burnt causing its (engine) failure. Which of these stories is correct cannot however be investigated at this stage. The proper stage for its determination on merit will be during trial, if any, on the evidence of the parties. At the present moment what this Court has to find out is whether on the allegation made in the complaint petition any prima facie case of cheating was made out to justify its cognizance by the Subdivisional Magistrate. 11. The allegations of inducement from the side of these petitioners, as alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint petition even if accepted to be correct (though the petitioners refute them) do not, I think, make out a case of cheating against them. If the complainant had got adverse reports about the quality of a new Fiat car and on that basis had dropped the idea of going in for such a car even after having his name registered for its purchase, there was hardly anything wrong on the part of the dealers if they tried to remove that misunderstanding from his mind through their mechanic at Saharsa in the manner alleged. It was only natural for them to try to impress upon him its overall good quality so that he could clear his mind about the adverse reports that he had received about its quality and be its purchaser. If they did so how could any element of cheating be read into it. Such an approach from their side to the complainant as a customer was just a normal conduct of a commercial man to safeguard the interest of their business. 12. If they did so how could any element of cheating be read into it. Such an approach from their side to the complainant as a customer was just a normal conduct of a commercial man to safeguard the interest of their business. 12. It cannot be disputed that under the relevant rules before taking delivery of the car the complainant was to complete certain necessary formalities including payment of full price. As already observed, the complainant has himself admitted in the complaint petition that within the extended time he came to Patna and took delivery of the car from this dealer after paying its full price by means of bank draft and completing the remaining formalities. Those steps were, therefore, clearly to comply with the prescribed procedure. It is then not understood as to how the accused persons can be alleged to have practised any fraudulent deception on the complainant in getting them done. It is the admitted case of the complainant that after taking delivery of the car it was driven to Bhagalpur by road (a distance of about 200 miles) where it was registered and then it was being driven to Saharsa when on the way its engine stopped and ceased functioning. 13. An argument has been advanced on behalf of complainant here that these accused persons knew about this knowledge(?) they fraudulently induced him to purchase it and thus make him part with his large sum of money which he would have never done except for that deception and these facts clearly satisfied the ingredients of cheating and made them liable for being prosecuted as such. As it appears from his complaint petition, no such specific allegation was made in it against the accused persons. No case has been alleged therein that the accused persons either collectively or individually had actually canvassed him to buy this particular car even though they knew that it had such a defect and thus cheated him by making him part with his good money. No case has been alleged therein that the accused persons either collectively or individually had actually canvassed him to buy this particular car even though they knew that it had such a defect and thus cheated him by making him part with his good money. As the complaint petition stands, the alleged inducement and deception is said to be their approach through accused No. 3 to impress upon him that a Fiat car was not as bad as had been reported to him and that it was good enough in every respect worth going in, in which, as I have already observed, there was nothing wrong being a normal business deal to win a customer after removing his prejudices, if any. 14. On the facts stated in the complaint petition, they do not appear to disclose offence of cheating against these accused persons in this deal. The above defect noticed in the car which according to complainant was responsible for the non-functioning of its engine might be its manufacturing defect for which the responsibility cannot be fastened on these accused who had nothing to do with its manufacture. Moreover, as already pointed out, there is difference between the parties regarding the cause of this defect. According to the complainant it was the initial defect from which the engine suffered, though on behalf of the accused it has been alleged that the defect had developed due to some accident which the car met on the way while being driven by the complainants driver. However, this is a matter which cannot be held this way or that at this primary stage because decision, if any, about it will be dependent on the evidence produced by the parties. 15. At the present moment, on the allegations as they stand in the complaint petition, it is amply clear that even if they are accepted as they are they do not contain the necessary ingredients to constitute a prima facie case of cheating against these accused-petitioners. It has been rightly contended for the petitioners that the complainant may have any other remedy against the manufacturer of the car or these dealers in this matter but it cannot be of the present nature viz. cheating. It has been rightly contended for the petitioners that the complainant may have any other remedy against the manufacturer of the car or these dealers in this matter but it cannot be of the present nature viz. cheating. It does not seem necessary nor desirable to say anything what other remedy, if any, he has against these persons or the manufacturer because it is for him to decide about it and take such legal action, as he is advised. On the instant facts, however, I am quite convinced that they do not prima facie make out any case of cheating against these petitioners as to make them liable for prosecution under Sec. 420/120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In such a situation, Magistrates prosecution of them for such offence is manifestly wrong and cannot be sustained. To make them undergo the botheration of trial for these offences will, in my opinion, amount to abuse of the process of the court and would be against the interest of justice. 16. The authority of the Supreme Court in Bakhshish Singh Dhaliwal V/s. The State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 752 on which learned counsel for the complainant has relied in support of his stand that on the allegations made in the complaint petition a case of cheating against these petitioners is appropriately made out is, to my mind, not helpful to him. As a perusal of this ruling will show, its facts,which it does not seem necessary to recite in any detail, are entirely distinguishable from the present facts. The principles enunciated in it related to the facts as they obtained in that case. 17. On behalf of the petitioners objection has also been taken to the jurisdiction of the Subdivisional Magistrate, Saharsa for entertaining this complaint. According to their counsel, offence of cheating, if any, against them on the complainants allegations must be deemed to have taken place and completed at Patna. Accordingly, this complaint should have been filed in the Court of Patna who alone had jurisdiction to entertain it and its filing at Saharsa was obviously wrong and the Saharsa court was incompetent to entertain and take its cognizance. 18. According to Sec.177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. 18. According to Sec.177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. From the above discussions it will appear that the complainant had under rules got his name registered with the accused firm at Patna and when his turn came he was issued with the necessary allotment order at Patna. He also paid the price of the car by means of a bank draft and completed other formalities at Patna whereafter the car was physically delivered to him at Patna. In such circumstances, it has to be presumed that complainants alleged cheating, if any, had been done at Patna. As such, his complaint regarding the offence should have been presented before the appropriate court at Patna and not at Saharsa. 19. Learned counsel for the opposite party (complainant) has contended that as averred in the complaint petition the initial deception which was in the shape of inducement to him to purchase a new Fiat car had been practised at Saharsa and it was only in consequence thereof that he had parted with his money at Patna which he would not have done but for that inducement. In these circumstances, according to him, it was always open to him to file this case either at Saharsa or at Patna as permissible under Sec.179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is difficult to accept this contention. As I have already observed, the alleged representation of the accused persons to him at Saharsa did not involve any ingredient of cheating. Even if they are accepted to have done so that was to be treated as their normal act as businessmen to advance the cause of their business by removing the prejudices which had been created in his mind against the quality of a new Fiat car. In the complaint petition he had alleged that the car after being given to him at Patna was in the process of delivery at Saharsa when it stopped functioning on the way to which fact reference has also been made on his behalf to bring this case within the jurisdiction of Saharsa court. In the complaint petition he had alleged that the car after being given to him at Patna was in the process of delivery at Saharsa when it stopped functioning on the way to which fact reference has also been made on his behalf to bring this case within the jurisdiction of Saharsa court. On his admitted case that he paid the price at Patna for which the dealers granted him receipt and then made over to him the car at Patna the significance of his averment regarding the car being in process of delivery at Patna, in the context, is not understandable. The moment he paid the price and got its physical delivery and took its charge at Patna the matter in this respect must be deemed to have been complete because unless this was so how could he get the car registered in his name at Bhagalpur after having taken it from Patna and then driven to Saharsa. On all these facts it has to be irresistibly concluded that everything relevant regarding this transaction was initiated and completed at Patna and if there was any element of cheating in the transaction that must also be deemed to have taken place at Patna. That being so, the appropriate forum for institution of this case was at Patna and not at Saharsa. For these reasons, the entertainment of the complaint by the Saharsa court was not competent under law. It will thus appear that the impugned orders have to be treated as being illegal on this score as well. 20. On the above findings, it is manifest that the impugned orders deserve to be struck down. This application is, accordingly, allowed, and the orders dated 2-7-1969 of the Subdivisional Magistrate taking cognizance in the case and the subsequent proceedings in the court of the transferee court are hereby quashed.