Judgment :- 1. Defendants in O. S. No. 271 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff of Pattambi (originally filed as O. S. No. 113 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff of Ponnani) are the revision petitioners. The respondents are the plaintiffs in the suit. 2. The sole point for consideration in this revision petition is whether the suit is liable to be stayed under S, 4 of the Kerala Cultivators and Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1970 (Act 2 of 1970) S.4 of the said Act reads as follows: "4. Stay of suits, applications, etc., for arrears of rent. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, or in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or Land Tribunal, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act, (a) no suit or application or other proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of a holding or part of a holding accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1968; or (b) no application for, or proceedings in, execution or a decree or order for the recovery of such arrears of rent or other application or proceedings incidental or ancillary thereto, shall lie in any court or Land Tribunal; and all suits, applications and other proceedings for recovery of such arrears of rent and all proceedings in execution of decrees or orders for recovery of such arrears of rent and other proceedings incidental or ancillary thereto, pending in courts or Land Tribunals at the commencement of this Act, shall stand stayed. (2) All appeals against decrees or orders relating to arrears of rent in respect of a holding or part of a holding accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1968 and all revisions against decrees or orders relating to such arrears of rent, pending in any court or appellate authority at the commencement of this Act, shall stand stayed, and no court or appellate authority shall proceed with any such appeal or revision filed after such commencement." The suit is based on the mortgage deed dated 30 111956 executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs. The contention of the revision petitioners is that the suit, though based on the mortgage deed, is really one for arrears of rent in as much as the mortgage deed was executed by way of security for the arrears of rent that accrued due up to and for 1131 M. E. It is argued that in substance the claim is for arrears of rent, and, therefore, S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 is attracted to the case. 3. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the parties, it is necessary to look into the following extract from the suit mortgage deed on which reliance is being placed: It is fairly clear that the mortgage deed happened to be executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs because they were not in a position to discharge the arrears of rent up to and for the year 1131. Then the question is whether a suit based on such a mortgage deed is liable to be stayed under S.4 of Act 20 of 1970. 4. Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners places reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Thomas Varghese v. Joseph Thomas (1967 KLT.10 FB.) The question that cams up for decision in that case was whether in execution of a decree based on a promissory note for which the consideration was the price of goods purchased for trade, the judgment-debtor could plead that he is entitled to the benefits under the relevant provisions of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (Act 31 of 1958). Raman Nayar J., as he was then, who delivered the judgment for the Bench, held "If the promissory note was executed for the price of the goods purchased for the purpose of trade and the decree was passed on the foot of that promissory note, it would be quite right to say that the promissory note, and in turn the decree, represent the price of goods purchased for the purpose of trade." Evidently the counsel has failed to note the distinction between the provisions contained in Act 31 of 1958. which came up for consideration in the said Full Bench. decision, and the provisions of S.4 of Act 20 of 1970, which is sought to be applied to the facts of the case on hand. which came up for consideration in the said Full Bench. decision, and the provisions of S.4 of Act 20 of 1970, which is sought to be applied to the facts of the case on hand. In S.2 (c) (vi) of Act 31 of 1958 certain categories of liabilities were excluded from the term "debt", and one such exclusion, as seen in S.2 (c) (vi), related to "any debt which represents the price of goods purchased for purpose of trade". This is corresponding to the provision contained in S.2 (4) (f) of Act 11 of 1970. It is very important to note that the words used in the relevant provisions contained both in Act 31 of 1958 and Act 11 of 1970 for the purpose of exclusion from the term "debt" is "any debt which represents the price of goods purchased for the purpose of trade". In Act 20 of 1970 the bar under S.4 is against suits, applications or other proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of a holding or part of a holding accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1968. In clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.4 incidental proceedings for the recovery of such arrears of rent is made liable to be stayed. There is, therefore, no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the decision reported in Thomas Varghese v. Joseph Thomas (1967 KLT.10 F.B.) has no application to the facts of this case for the purpose of interpreting the scope of S.4 of Act 20 of 1970. The ruling given by the Full Bench could have been made applicable to the case on hand if the provision in S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 was that all suits for recovery of arrears of rent or debts representing arrears of rent are liable to be stayed. The legislature has made a distinction between the two categories of debts and there is no reason to believe that this distinction has arisen unconsciously or accidentally. 5. Another decision that has been cited by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners is a Division Bench ruling in Beevi v. Pareed (1965 KLT,104). The legislature has made a distinction between the two categories of debts and there is no reason to believe that this distinction has arisen unconsciously or accidentally. 5. Another decision that has been cited by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners is a Division Bench ruling in Beevi v. Pareed (1965 KLT,104). What came up for consideration before the Division Bench in that case was whether the exemption provisions contained in S.2 (c) (vii) of Act 31 of 1958 would be attracted to a case where a third party to a sale deed sued for the recovery of the unpaid purchase money for which a charge was created in favour of such third party. Raghavan J., (as he was then) who delivered the judgment, while agreeing with the proposition that for the purpose of S.2 (c) (vii) it is the category of the debt that matters, distinguished the facts of the cases of the two decisions cited, namely Amarnatha Menon v. Malathi Amma (1960 KLT. 10) and M. Varadaraja Perumal v. Paljnimuthu Gounder (AIR. 1941 Madras 118), from the facts of the case which was being considered by the Division Bench, and held that inasmuch as the balance money had ceased to have the character of unpaid purchase money, it would not fall within the exemption provisions contained in S.2 (c) (vii) of Act 31 of 1958. This decision, in may opinion, does not in any way advance the position of the revision petitioners. 6. Yet another decision has been cited by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and that is the one by Raghavan J. (as he was then), in Govindan Neelacantan v. Velayudhan Pillai Madhavan Pillai (1966 KLT. 679), wherein it has been held as follows: "The expression "all arrears of rent accrued due from a tenant during the period and outstanding on the date specified in column (2)" in S.73 indicates that the relevant time during which the relationship has to be taken into account is the period when the arrears accrued. It does not matter whether the landlord and tenant relationship continued thereafter or was terminated." The facts of the case were like this: The landlord obtained a decree for eviction with arrears of rent against the tenant. In execution of the decree, the property was recovered by the decree-holder (landlord). It does not matter whether the landlord and tenant relationship continued thereafter or was terminated." The facts of the case were like this: The landlord obtained a decree for eviction with arrears of rent against the tenant. In execution of the decree, the property was recovered by the decree-holder (landlord). Thereafter, when execution for recovery of arrears of rent was taken, the tenant contended that he was entitled to the relief under S.34 of Act 4 of 1961 (which has subsequently been replaced by S.73 of Act 1 of 1964). The substance of this decision is that where there is a decree for arrears of rent, even though at the time of the execution the judgment-debtor had ceased to be a tenant under the landlord as he had already been evicted from the property, still, the tenant would be entitled to plead for the scaling down as provided under S.34 of Act 4 of 1961 or S.73 of Act 1 of 1964, as the case may be. This decision also has no application to this case. 7. The one case which has direct bearing to the facts of this case and the provisions contained in S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 is the decision cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, and that is the one in K. Muhammadkutty Haji v. Narayanan Nambudiri (1962 KLT. 3), in which Madhavan Nair J. held as follows: "S.34 does not affect a decree on a promissory note, even if the note was taken in satisfaction of arrears of rent. Subsequent to the execution of the promissory note no liability for the arrears of rent as covered thereby subsisted. It is only to liabilities for arrears of rent as such, whether decreed or not, that S.34 applies. To arrears of rent already discharged it has no application. Only a liability for rent or michavaram as such has been excluded from the definition of a debt, and not a liability under a promissory note taken in discharge of arrears of rent." From the relevant provision of the mortgage deed dated 30-11-1956 extracted in this judgment, it is clear that arrears of rent up to 1131 has been settled between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and that there was no arrears of rent as such to be discharged by the defendants for that period. Therefore, there cannot also be a suit for arrears of rent as such. The landlord also cannot have a charge over the holding for the amount claimed in the suit, as would otherwise be available under S.42 of Act 1 of 1964. 8. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court also had occasion to consider the change of character of the liability where a pronote was executed in lieu of rent in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. (Raja) Inugenti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim Bahadur Varu (AIR. 1932 Madras 436). What came up for consideration before the Full Bench was whether the zamindar was liable to be assessed to income-tax on the income derived by him by way of interest on the promissory note executed by the raiyat in lieu of arrears of rent. It was held by the Full Bench that "But where the raiyat, in lieu of arrears of rent plus interest thereon, executes a promissory note in favour of the zamindar, those sections have no application and the income by way of interest earned by the zamindar is not agricultural income and is therefore taxable under the Income tax Act." This decision is based on the principle that when a fresh contract between the zamindar and the raiyat has been entered into, the actual character of the liability has been changed into a loan; it had ceased to be rent and had become merely a loan. 9. S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 is attracted only to suits, applications and other proceedings which are for the recovery of arrears of rent or to proceedings incidental thereto, and there is no scope for taking a wider view about its applicability so as to include debts representing arrears of rent. When the mortgage deed had been executed, the liability for the arrears of rent covered by the mortgage deed ceased to subsist and a new liability for money under the mortgage deed arose. In this view the lower court was correct in holding that the suit is not liable to be stayed under S.4 of Act 20 of 1970. There is, therefore, no merit in this revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed, but I make no order as to costs.