Judgment J.NARAIN, J. 1. In a proceeding under Sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the wife Humaira Khatoon, Opposite party No. 1. was awarded a sum of Rs. 75/- per month and the daughter Shamima Parvin a sum of Rs. 100.00 per month by way of maintenance with effect from 1st of July, 1969. Criminal revision filed by the husband petitioner was dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition on 20th April, 1970 in the Court of Shri S. M. Ahmad. Magistrate first class Patna intimating that he had divorced opposite party No. 1 on the 19th April, 1970. He filed another petition on the 18th September, 1970 saying that opposite party No. 2 had attained puberty according to the Mahomedan Law. On the basis of these two petitions he prayed that he was no longer liable to pay maintenance allowance to any of the two opposite parties. By his order dated the 29th November, 1971 Shri S. M. Ahmad, Magistrate first class Patna has rejected these two petitions. The present revision application is directed against this order. 2. Sec.279 of Mullas Principles of Mahomedan Law 16th Edition deals with the subject of maintenance on divorce. It says that after divorce the wife is entitled to maintenance during the period of iddat. If the divorce is not communicated to her until after the expiry of that period she is entitled to maintenance until she is informed of the divorce. 3. There is no controversy between the parties regarding the proposition of law as set out above. The only question that was canvassed by them was as to the date when the wife opposite party No. 1 will be deemed to have been informed of the divorce. The order sheet dated the 15th June, 1970 of the Court of the Magistrate speaks about the petition dated the 20th April, 1970 filed by the petitioner. It appears that with regard to that petition an order was passed to issue summons to opposite party and to put up the matter on the 3rd July, 1970. On the 3rd July, 1970 both parties were present but the case was adjourned to a future date. It appears that with regard to that petition an order was passed to issue summons to opposite party and to put up the matter on the 3rd July, 1970. On the 3rd July, 1970 both parties were present but the case was adjourned to a future date. In view of the fact that both parties were present on the 3rd July, 1970 the parties agreed before me that this should be the date upto which the petitioner was liable to pay maintenance to his wife opposite party No. 1. In view of the agreement between the parties on the point, I decide accordingly. 4. Now as to the maintenance of the daughter opposite party No. 2. The relevant words of Sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are "refuses to maintain his legitimate child unable to maintain itself." 5. In order to decide the question it would be pertinent to ascertain the age of opposite party No. 2 on the 18th September, 1970 when the petitioner filed a petition before the learned Magistrate saying that he was no longer liable to pay maintenance to her. In her deposition opposite party No. 2 Shamima Parvin gave out that her Matriculation certificate disclosed the date of her birth as the 14th September, 1953. Thus she was 17 years 4 days on the 18th September, 1970. The point for consideration is whether this being her age she was entitled to maintenance on that date or not. 5A. Besides age maintenance is claimed on the ground that she is unable to maintain herself. From the materials on record it appears that she has passed her Matriculation examination and has read upto the Pre-University class. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that she has been working as a teacher in the Patna Junior School. This is not admitted by opposite party No. 2 who has stated that she had worked as an honorary teacher in the Patna Junior School for about six months without any remuneration. She states that she got some honorarium and not any fixed sum and that she had accepted this job to gain experience. She says that she is financially hard up as her father does not pay the allowance fixed by the Court regularly. Thus there is nothing to show that she has been earning and is able to maintain herself. She states that she got some honorarium and not any fixed sum and that she had accepted this job to gain experience. She says that she is financially hard up as her father does not pay the allowance fixed by the Court regularly. Thus there is nothing to show that she has been earning and is able to maintain herself. The fact that she was only a matriculate and a girl and that also in her teens on the relevant date, is also a circumstance to show that she was not able to maintain herself. 6. The word "Child" has not been defined in the Code. There has been divergence of judicial opinion as to the meaning that is to be attached to the word "Child". Some High Courts have taken the view that it means a person below 18 years. Other High Courts including our own High Court have taken a contrary view. In Hemanta Kumar Banerjee V/s. Monorama Debi AIR 1935 Cal 488 : (36 Cri LJ 1114) it was held that "Child" was a person who was incompetent to enter into any contract or to enforce any claim under the law and as such he was held to be below 18 years of age. Relying on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ranchhoddas Narottamdas V/s. Emperior. AIR 1949 Bom 36 : (49 Cri LJ 630) the Madras High Court in the case of Jambapuram Subbama V/s. Jambapuram Venkata Reddi. ( AIR 1950 Mad 394 ) : (51 Cri LJ 931) has held that a "child" under Sec. 488 means a minor whether under the Majority Act or the Court of Wards Act or the Guardians and Wards Act and not simply progeny. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Purnasashi Devi V/s. Nagendra Nath ( AIR 1950 Cal 465 ) has however, taken a view contrary to what was taken by a Single Judge of that Court in its earlier decision in the case of Hemanta Kumar Banerjee AIR 1935 Cal 488 : (36 Cri LJ 1114) (Supra). The case of Smt. Purnasashi Devi lays down that the word "child" has been deliberately used to leave the Courts free to order maintenance for such sons and daughters as are unable to earn livelihood for themselves having due regard to the class of society to which they belong and other surrounding circumstances. The case of Smt. Purnasashi Devi lays down that the word "child" has been deliberately used to leave the Courts free to order maintenance for such sons and daughters as are unable to earn livelihood for themselves having due regard to the class of society to which they belong and other surrounding circumstances. The fact therefore that the son was 17, 18 or 19 was held no ground for refusing maintenance. Allahabad High Court in the case of Abdul Hai Qadir Bux V/s. Km. Azra Sikandar, ( AIR 1965 All 125 ) : ((1965) 1 Cri LJ 269) has also held that the word "Child" in Sec. 488 does not mean a minor. Our own High Court in the case of Mt. Khedani Rajwarin V/s. Lagan Singh. (AIR 1921 Pat 379) : (22 Cri LJ 336) held that there was no limit of age placed by Sec. 488 for the maintenance allowance to be awarded to a child. In my opinion also the word "child" occurring in Sec. 488 of the Code cannot be held to mean a child below 18 years of age. It seems to me that the legislature has purposely omitted to define the word "child" in the Code or to limit the age placed upon it. The object behind Sec. 488 of the Code is to prevent vagrancy and that being the dominant object, the words used are "child unable to maintain itself." To take an illustration : If owing to some mental or corporeal defect the person is unable to maintain himself even if he is beyond 18 years of age the section intends to bestow on him all the benefit of maintenance. 7. In the present case, as I have shown above opposite party No. 2 had not even attained 18 years of age on the date the petitioner filed the application before the learned Magistrate. She was also not able to maintain herself on that date. Therefore, the order impugned in respect of opposite party No. 2 cannot be disturbed. 8. Some reference was made to the Mahomedan Law on the point and the petitioner sought to escape the liability of paying maintenance allowance to the daughter on the ground that she had attained puberty and as such he was entitled to her custody and that he was prepared to maintain her if she came and stayed with him. 8. Some reference was made to the Mahomedan Law on the point and the petitioner sought to escape the liability of paying maintenance allowance to the daughter on the ground that she had attained puberty and as such he was entitled to her custody and that he was prepared to maintain her if she came and stayed with him. Judging the matter in the light of the Mahomedan Law also, the order of the learned Magistrate does not call for interference. 9. The following propositions are well-settled. Amongst Hanafis and the Shias Puberty is presumed on the completion of the 15th year. The mother is entitled to the custody of her female child until she has attained puberty (Vide Sec.352 of the Mullas Mahomedan Law). A father is bound to maintain his daughters until they are married (Vide Sec.370 of Mahomedan Law). 10. It is contended that now that opposite party No. 2 has completed her 15th year and has thus attained puberty the father is entitled to her custody. The daughter opposite party No. 2, however, is not prepared to go back to her father on the ground that he has already taken a wife and that relationship between her and her father has become bitter inasmuch as in the proceeding before the Magistrate she had deposed against the father and was cross-examined on behalf of the father. Now in such a circumstance while remaining away from the father is the daughter entitled to maintenance? In Dinsab Kasimsab V/s. Mahammad Hussen Dinsab. 47 Bom LR 345 : (AIR 1945 Bom 390) reference was made to the case of Sardar Muhammad V/s. Nur Muhammad (1917) 18 Cri LJ 811 (Lah) where it was held that the father was entitled to decline to maintain his children if they refused to live with him without reasonable cause when he had a right to their custody as their guardian. Mulla at page 339 in his treatise on Mohomedan Law (Sixteenth Edition) says that where the father is entitled to the custody of the daughter and offers to keep her in the house and maintain her, the daughter has no right to separate maintenance unless there are circumstances which justify the daughter in staying away from her fathers house. Mulla at page 339 in his treatise on Mohomedan Law (Sixteenth Edition) says that where the father is entitled to the custody of the daughter and offers to keep her in the house and maintain her, the daughter has no right to separate maintenance unless there are circumstances which justify the daughter in staying away from her fathers house. As I have stated above, in the present case there are two reasons for the daughter to stay away from her father and thus even while remaining separate from her father she is entitled to maintenance. 11. Now the question is as to the date till when the petitioner will be liable to maintain opposite party No. 2. This will naturally depend on the date when she is able to maintain herself or is married whichever is earlier. 12. With the above observation the application is dismissed.