JUDGMENT : tare C. J. ( 1. ) This is a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India seeking to quash the order dated 21-8-1972, passed by the first respondent rejecting the petitioners preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to hear the reference at Jabalpur. ( 2. ) The petitioner is the employer, while the second respondent was its employee. The petitioner is a registered partnership-firm, of which the Head-Office is at Delhi. However, the petitioner runs a brick factory at Katni, which is known as New Fire Bricks and Pottery Works. It is the petitioners contention that the entire control of the factory is from Delhi and nothing is managed from Katni. ( 3. ) The petitioner passed on order, dated 3-3-1970, removing the second respondent from service. Hence the second respondent approached the first respondent for adjudication of a labour dispute. The Labour Commissioner accordingly referred the dispute for adjudication under section 10 (1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and made a reference to the first respondent for adjudication. During the course of the proceedings the petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the appropriate Government as contemplated by section 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was the Delhi Government and not the Madhya Pradesh Government. That objection was overruled and hence this writ petition. ( 4. ) In such cases it is not possible to apply the analogy of the Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety. But as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P.) Ltd v. Rangavilas Motors ( AIR 1967 SC 1040 ) it has always to be ascertained as to where the dispute arises. This question may depend on several factors. Cases were cited before us showing that it is at the Head Office where the dispute would arise. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Association of Medical Representatives (MandV) v. Industrial Tribunal, M. P. Indore(1966 M P L J 769- 1966 (1) LLJ 614 ) to urge that the appropriate Government would be the Government where the Head Office is located, namely, Delhi. In the said case the Head Office of the medical firm was located at Bombay and it used to send medical representatives for canvassing and for effecting sales in different parts. In the said case the Head Office of the medical firm was located at Bombay and it used to send medical representatives for canvassing and for effecting sales in different parts. There was no sub-office or any agency in the State of M. P. but merely there were moving medical representatives going out in different towns. It was under those circumstances that a Division Bench of this Court held that the dispute would arise at Bombay and not in Madhya Pradesh and the appropriate Government would be the Maharashtra Government. That case, in our opinion, is clearly distinguishable. ( 5. ) In this connection we might observe that the tests as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranga Vilas Motors case (supra) are as follows :- "Therefore, the appeal must succeed unless the Company can satisfy us that the points decided against it should have been decided in its favour. This takes us to the other points. Mr. O. P. Melhotra strongly urges that the State Government of Mysore was not the appropriate Government to make the reference. He says that although the dispute started at Banglore, the resolution sponsoring this dispute was passed in Krishnagiri, and that the proper test to be applied in the case of individual disputes is where the dispute has been sponsored. It seems to us that on the facts of this case it is clear that there was a separate establishment at Bangalore and Mahalingam was working there. There were a number of other workmen working in this place. The order of transfer, it is true, was made in Krishnagiri at the Head- Office, but the order was to operate on a workman working in Bangalore. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the proper question to raise is : where did the dispute arise? Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Co Ltd v. Its workmen(1962 1 LLJ 409 SC) held as follows: The Act contained no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial-Relations Act, 1946, Chagla C. J., observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Vin(AIR 1955 Bom. 463 at p. 464 = 1956-1 LLJ 557, 558), "But what we are concerned with to decide is: where did the dispute substantially arise ? Now, the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction, a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction." In our opinion, those principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under section 10 of the Act." "Applying the above principles to the facts of this case it is quite clear that the subject- matter of the dispute in this case substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government." ( 6. ) Applying the said tests to the facts of the present case we find that the dispute arose at Katni in Madhya Pradesh and no part of the dispute can be said to have arisen at Delhi where the Head-Office of the petitioner-firm is located. We find that the present case is on all fours with the case of Ram Kishan v. Shambu Nath Vaid(1962-2 LLJ 294) decided by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court presided over by Khosla C. J. and A. N. Grover J. (as he then was). In that case the facts were that a workman was transferred from Amritsar to Mussoorie. He did not carry out the transfer order and, therefore, his services were dispensed with on the ground of disobedience. In that case the facts were that a workman was transferred from Amritsar to Mussoorie. He did not carry out the transfer order and, therefore, his services were dispensed with on the ground of disobedience. The industrial depute about termination of service was taken up by fellow-workmen at Amritsar and the Punjab Government referred the dispute for arbitration. It was contended on behalf of the employer that the appropriate Government was the Uttar Pradesh Government wherein Mussoorie was located to which place the employee had been transferred. A Single Bench of the Punjab High Court had 1962 1 LLJ 409 SC taken the view that the appropriate Government was the Uttar Pradesh Government. A Division Bench of the High Court, however, reversed that decision and held that the appropriate Government was the Punjab Government. In the present case, which is, as stated above, on all fours with the said Division Bench case of the Punjab High Court, it is clear that the dispute arose at Katni in Madhya Pradesh and the appropriate Government was the Madhya Pradesh Government. We would, therefore, reject the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and we are of opinion that the Labour Court at Jabalpur was right in over-ruling the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioner before it. ( 7. ) This petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed summarily without notice to the other side. Petition dismissed summarily.RAJESH