JUDGMENT : K.B.N. Singh, J. In this revision application, the petitioners challenge an ORDER :passed by Shree U. Mehta, Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad declaring the possession of the members of the second party over the lands in dispute in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code".) 2. The petitioners were the members of the first party whereas the opposite party were the members of the second party. A number of plots appertaining to khata nos. 10, 24, 43, 44, 90 and 153 of village Pabai were in dispute. It may be stated here that portions of majority of the plots are in dispute, besides some plots in w hole are in dispute. 3. The case of the first party petitioners was that the disputed plots were recorded in the survey record-of-rights in the names of two brothers, Dalip Singh and Hari Singh. The members of the first party belong to the branch of Hari Singh, petitioner no.1 being his son, Dalip Singh had two sons, Dargahi Singh and Bhajan Singh. Bhajan Singh's daughter is Uttim Devi (O. P. no.2), and her husband, Bijoy Kumar Singh, is opposite party no. 1. According to the members of the first party, Dargahi Singh and Bhajan Singh died in a state of joint ness with Hari Singh, and the petitioners succeeded to their properties by survivorship. According to the petitioners, 3.09 acres of khata no. 43 and 9.83 acres of khata no. 44 were sold at a public auction in Certificate Case No.8 of 1942-43 on the 10th December, 1943 and were purchased by one Chandrakali Devi, wife of Raghu Singh of village Lalai. Their case is that they have taken these lands from the said Chandrakali Devi and are in possession thereof. 4. The case of the members of the second party-opposite party, on the other hand, is that, although Dalip Singh and Had Singh were jointly recorded in the survey record• of-rights in respect of the lands in dispute, their residential houses were separately recorded in their possession. After the survey, however, both the brothers partitioned their lands half and half and thereafter they sold and purchased lands separately. After the survey, however, both the brothers partitioned their lands half and half and thereafter they sold and purchased lands separately. According to the members of the second party, after the death of Dalip Singh, his two sons, Dargahi Singh and Bhajan Singh, came in possession of the lands left by Dalip Singh and they got rent receipts separately from the members of the first party. Dargahi Singh and Bhajan Singh got their lands commuted into naqdi under Section 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act separately in Mutation Case No. 2779 of 1957, decided by the Rent Commutation Officer on the 8th January, 1958, and the rent roll was prepared accordingly. According to the members of the second party, on the 4th October, 1966, Dargahi Singh and Bhajan Singh gifted the lands in dispute to Uttim Devi, daughter of Bhajan Singh, under a registered deed of gift and thereafter she is coming in possession of the disputed lands. After the death of Bhajan Singh in 1969, Uttim Devi has been mutated in respect of the disputed lands by the Anchal Adhikari by his ORDER :dated the 16th September 1969 passed in Mutation Case No. 87 of 1969-70 and the said ORDER :has been affirmed in appeal by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector on the 11th February, 1970, and rent receipts arc being issued in the name of Uttim Devi. 5. Both the parties filed affidavits and documents in support of their respective cases. The members of the first party filed affidavits of three witnesses, while the members of the second party filed affidavits of six witnesses. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties and considering the materials on record, declared the members of the second party to be in possession of the disputed lands. Hence, this revision by the members of the first party. 6. Mr. Gorakhnath Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that the ORDER :of the learned Magistrate is bad in law and should be set aside inasmuch as he has rejected the affidavits filed by both the parties and has decided the proceeding on the basis of the documents alone. 6. Mr. Gorakhnath Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that the ORDER :of the learned Magistrate is bad in law and should be set aside inasmuch as he has rejected the affidavits filed by both the parties and has decided the proceeding on the basis of the documents alone. He submitted that the affidavits are the main basis for decision in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code, and, in support of his contention, he relied on the case of (1) Arjun Singh V. Singeshwar Chaudhary (A.I.R. 1960 Patna 513: 1960 B.L.J.R. 419), which was referred to in a Bench decision of this Court in (2) Naina Sah V. Ramrup Sah (A.I.R. 1965 Patna 104). Relying on these decisions, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the impugned ORDER :should be set aside and the case remanded to the court below f or afresh decision. 7. The main question for consideration in the instant case, therefore, is, whether in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code if the Magistrate rejects the affidavits of both sides is he entitled to declare the possession of either party on the basis of the documents alone? The relevant portion of Section 145(1) of the Code may usefully be reproduced : "145(1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the First Class is satisfied. ...that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the• peace exists concerning any land ... .he shall make an ORDER :in writing…..and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims." (The underlining is mine). The relevant portion of Sub section (4) of Section 145 may also be quoted: "( 4). The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements, documents and affidavits, if any, so put in, hear the parties and conclude the inquiry.. . . The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements, documents and affidavits, if any, so put in, hear the parties and conclude the inquiry.. . . ." A question then arises whether the filing of affidavits in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code is a must. From the above quoted provisions, it appears that it is open to a party either to put in documents or affidavits or both under Sub-section (1) of Section 145. Similarly, the Magistrate, under Sub-section (4) of Section 145, has to decide the question of possession on perusal of the statements, documents and affidavits, if any. Therefore, if affidavits are not filed by the parties or the affidavits filed by them are rejected by the Magistrate, on a fuller consideration, then from the aforesaid provisions, to my mind, it does not appear that the Magistrate Ceases to have jurisdiction to decide the proceeding. He can very well, on a consideration of the documents, if be can so decide, declare the possession of the party, who, according to him, was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the proceeding or two months earlier thereto. The case of Arjun Singh (A. I. R. 1960 Patna 513), therefore, does not support the extreme contention of the learned counsel, inasmuch as in that case the learned Magistrate had refused to consider the affidavits which, according to him, were oath against oath. It was in that context that Kanhaiya Singh, J. observed : "If the affidavits are ignored, it is difficult to understand en what evidE11ce the question of possession will be decided. Both the parties have no doubt, filed documents and there may be some circumstances, but by themselves they are inadequate to establish possession. It may be that in some cases documents by themselves may not be sufficient for the Magistrate to come to a decision on the question of possession. For that the appropriate procedure laid down in the Code is reference to the Civil Court under Section 146 of the Code. 8. So far as the next case (2) (A. I. R. 1965 Patna 104) is concerned, that case related to the manner in which the affidavits are to be considered. For that the appropriate procedure laid down in the Code is reference to the Civil Court under Section 146 of the Code. 8. So far as the next case (2) (A. I. R. 1965 Patna 104) is concerned, that case related to the manner in which the affidavits are to be considered. Paragraph 5 of the report, on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners, reads as follows: “(5) The manner in which affidavits, filed by the parties in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code, are dealt with by the Magistrates, is, by no means, uniform and presents some difficulty. Ordinarily, we come across three kinds of cases. In one class of cases, it is generally found that the Magistrates pass ORDER :s on the basis of the documents and other materials on the record without any reference to the affidavits filed by the parties concerned. In the other class of cases, we find that the usual observation of the Magistrates with regard to the affidavits is to the effect that there is oath against oath and as such much importance cannot be attached to them on the question of possession. The third category of cases are those in which the Magistrates concerned usually mention about the merits and demerits of the affidavits filed by the parties and determine their evidentiary value in the light of the other evidence and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, no inflexible rule can be laid down as to the manner in which a court should peruse the affidavits as required by Section 145 (4) and determine their evidentiary value along with the other evidence on the record. The manner of the examination of the affidavits by a Magistrate will vary in each case according to the nature of the dispute between the parties and the contents of the affidavits. In vast majority of the cases the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties to the proceedings are of stereotyped nature and therefore difficulties are often experienced in judging properly the truth or otherwise of the assertions contained therein for want of the cross-examination of the deponents. Naturally, therefore, the courts have to consider the affidavits in the light of the other evidence, if any, on the record. Naturally, therefore, the courts have to consider the affidavits in the light of the other evidence, if any, on the record. It is imperative, however, that the Magistrate should peruse the affidavits filed by the parties and also other statements and documents, if any, as required by Section 145 (4) of the Code. That being so, the ORDER :of the Magistrate must show that he has considered the affidavits, that is, he has applied his judicial mind to the assertions contained therein. Evidently, therefore, ORDER :s passed in the first two classes of cases will show that there has been no compliance with the statutory provisions contained in Section 145 (4) and as such the ORDER :s passed in those classes of cases may successfully be impugned on the ground of non-consideration of the affidavits...." This case also, therefore, is of no assistance to the learned counsel. 9. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate, in paragraph 5 of his ORDER :, referred to the documents filed by the parties. The first party filed copy of the sale certificate in the certificate case in favour of Chandrakali Kuer, who is not a party to the proceeding, in respect of portions of lands of khata nos. 43 and 44, as mentioned above. They also filed a copy of the report of the Sarpanch in Mutation Case no. 87 of 1969-70 showing that the members of the second party were not in possession of the disputed lands. The report of the Sarpanch is dated the 23rd July, 1969, from which it appears that Bhajan died in the year 1969. Then the learned Magistrate referred to the ORDER :of the Anchal Adhikari in the said mutation case who, on spot inquiry, found the members of the second party to be in possession of the lands and disbelieved the report of the Sarpanch that the members of the first party were in possession of the lands. As already stated, the ORDER :of the Anchal Adhikari was affirmed in appeal by the Land Reforms Duputy Collector. The learned Magistrate then referred to five chaukidari receipts in the name of Dargahi Singh and two in the name of Uttim Devi, dated the 20th November, 1969 and 22nd April, 1971. He also took into consideration four rent receipts with respect to the lands of disputed khata nos. 10,24,43, 44 and 90, dated the 31st March. The learned Magistrate then referred to five chaukidari receipts in the name of Dargahi Singh and two in the name of Uttim Devi, dated the 20th November, 1969 and 22nd April, 1971. He also took into consideration four rent receipts with respect to the lands of disputed khata nos. 10,24,43, 44 and 90, dated the 31st March. 1970 for the period 1967-68 to 1969-70. He also referred to certain other documents, namely, the deed of gift in favour of Uttim Devi and certain earlier proceedings, showing that the branch of Hari Singh was separate from the branch of Dalip Singh, and, on a consideration of these documents, he came to the conclusion that the members of the second party were in possession Of the disputed lands. The findings of the learned Magistrate in the instant case being based on the mutation ORDER :of the Anchal Adhikari, as affirmed on appeal by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, and also on the rent receipts for the relevant period, it is not one of those cases where the question of possession could not be decided on the basis of documents. The possession of the members of the second party having been declared on the basis of documents which have a direct bearing on the question of possession, I do not think that, on this ground, an interference with the impugned ORDER :of the learned Magistrate, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this court, is called for. 10. Mr. Singh, for the petitioners, then, submitted that the learned Magistrate has illegally excluded the Pleader Commissioner's report which was submitted when the proceeding was at the stage of Section 144 of the Code. This report is with respect to only five plots, namely, 1672, 1673, 1678, 1038 and 698. The Pleader-Commissioner had reported about the physical feature of the land and had also said that the members of the first party were living in the house and the Goshala on plot no.1678 was in their possession. The report does contain not only matters of scientific measurement or visual observation, but matters relating to possession as well. In such a situation, the learned Magistrate cannot be said to have committed any illegality by excluding the report of the Pleader-Commissioner from consideration, in absence of any affidavit filed by the Pleader-Commissioner, in support of possession of the first party. 11. Mr. In such a situation, the learned Magistrate cannot be said to have committed any illegality by excluding the report of the Pleader-Commissioner from consideration, in absence of any affidavit filed by the Pleader-Commissioner, in support of possession of the first party. 11. Mr. Singh has lastly urged that the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code having been converted after two months from the date of the initiation of the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code, the entire proceeding is vitiated. Learned counsel has submitted that the proceeding under Section 144 was started on the 3rd April, 1970 and the same was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code on the 29th June, 1970, which was clearly beyond two months. It appears from the ORDER :of the learned Magistrate, dated the 1st June, 1970, that the report of the Pleader-Commissioner was missing from the file, and •as the apprehension of• a breach• of the peace continued till then and he could not finally decide the proceeding, he issued fresh notices under Section 144 of the Code. Thereafter, on the 29th June, 1970, he converted the proceeding into one under Section 145 of the Code and recorded the following ORDER :: "In view of the above circumstances, whereas it appears that there is a bona fide land dispute involving an apprehension of a breach of the peace, this proceeding is converted into a proceeding u/s 145 Cr.P.C.” Therefore, from the aforesaid ORDER :of the learned Magistrate, it appears: that he was. satisfied about a bona fide land dispute and apprehension of a breach of the peace on the date he converted the proceeding under Section 144 into one under Section 145; and, although he had used the word "converted"; he had recorded reasons sufficient for starting a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. Whatever irregularity or illegality there may be in the ORDER :of learned Magistrate dated the 1st June, 1970 in extending the period of the proceeding by issuing fresh notices; the fact remains that, on the 29th June, 1970, there were materials before the Magistrate on which he could be satisfied for initiating a proceeding under Section 145, as he has done. 12. Mr. Singh has also urged that the lands of khata nos. 12. Mr. Singh has also urged that the lands of khata nos. 43 and 44 having been sold in the certificate case and the petitioners having claimed possession through Chandrakali Devi, the possession of the petitioners with respect to those lands should have been maintained in preference to the claim of the members of the second party. As already stated, Chandrakali Devi is not a party to this proceeding I nor has she filed any affidavit supporting the case of the petitioners that they had been cultivating these lands under some arrangement with her. It is rather surprising that no • step in the proceeding has been taken at her instance, though the land were attached during the course of the proceeding. The mutation ORDER :as also the rent receipts of the members of the • second party are with respect to the lands of these two khatas also. No ground has, therefore, been made out for treating the lands of those two khatas separately from the lands of the other khatas. 13. It is thus apparent that the ORDER :of the learned Magistrate in the instant case does not require any interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this court on any of the grounds urged by learned counsel for the petitioners. In my opinion, it is a fit case to be fought in the Civil Court, rather to be allowed to linger any further before the Criminal Court. 14. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.