JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - The petitioner and the opposite party had been married in accordance with the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1872 sometime about the year 1951. On 17-7-1962, the opposite party filed in Court two applications against the petitioner, one for obtaining judicial separation and the other for divorce under sections 23 and 27 respectively of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (Act XLIII of 1954) (here in after referred to as the Act). These two applications were numbered as O.S. No. 26 of 1962 and O.S. No. 27 of 1962 respectively. In both these applications, the grounds alleged against the petitioner for judicial separation and divorce are mental and physical cruelty to the opposite party. Specific instances of cruelty were however not given in those applications. About two months thereafter, that is, on 4-9-1962, a joint petition was filed by both the parties under section 28 of the Act for obtaining divorce by mutual consent as subsequently the petitioner herein backed out of it, the application filed under section 28 of the Act was dismissed on 4-9-1964. Shortly thereafter, the opposite party herein filed two applications in Court for amendment of the two applications filed by her in 1962. By these amendments, the opposite party sought to furnish detailed particulars of the acts of cruelty alleged to have been committed on her by the petitioner. These applications on amendment were opposed by the petitioner but the learned District Judge allowed the amendment applications by his order dated 15-9-1970. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in these revision petitions. 2. One of the grounds on which judicial separation and divorce can be obtained either by the husband or the wife is that the respondent has since the solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty. Section 41 of the Act empowers the High Court to make rules consistent with the provisions contained in the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapters, V, VI and VII of the Act. In particular, it authorizes the High Court to prescribe forms and contents of petitions for nullity of marriage or for divorce. Sections 23 and 27 occur in Chapters V, VI respectively of the Act. In particular, it authorizes the High Court to prescribe forms and contents of petitions for nullity of marriage or for divorce. Sections 23 and 27 occur in Chapters V, VI respectively of the Act. In exercise of the power conferred under section 41, the High Court has made rules under the Special Marriage Act. Rule 4(f) thereof requires that the matrimonial offences charged must be set out in separate paragraphs with the time and place of the alleged commission. Rule 4(5)(vi) requires that where the ground for obtaining divorce or judicial separation is cruelty it should be stated in the petition that the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the said cruelty. Rule 25 provides that a proceeding commenced by the petitioner for divorce or judicial separation shall be deemed to be a suit for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 40 of the Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in the Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under the Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 3. Order 6, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for amendment of pleadings in a suit. It is not disputed that there is no provision either in the Act or in the rules framed by the High Court under the Act which are inconsistent with Order 6, rule 17 of the Code. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the ordinary consideration which govern the amendment of pleadings in a suit should also govern the amendment of the pleadings in a proceeding either under Chapter V or under Chapter VI of the Act. 4. The question, therefore, is whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the amendments sought for in the year 1964 in respect of the two petitions filed in 1962 should or should not be allowed. The only ground on which the applications for amendment are opposed by the petitioner herein is that the amendment has been applied for at a very late stage of the proceeding, namely more than two years after the original applications were filed. The only ground on which the applications for amendment are opposed by the petitioner herein is that the amendment has been applied for at a very late stage of the proceeding, namely more than two years after the original applications were filed. It is argued that when the opposite party filed the original applications in 1962, she must have been fully aware of the acts of cruelty which she now alleges and she must also have been aware of the requirement of the rule that detailed particulars should be furnished in the application, and if in spite of these she has deliberately omitted to furnish the particulars and thereby incurred the risk of those applications being dismissed, the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced if the opposite party is now permitted to amend the applications as prayed for by her thereby depriving the petitioner of a valuable right which he has already acquired. In support of this contention the petitioner relies on Austin v. Austin 20 W.B. 128, and Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez & ors. AIR 1969 S.C. 1201 . The first mentioned case was a suit by a wife for judicial separation on the ground of her husband's cruelty. The petition was filed on the 23rd of November, 1870. The defendant filed his written statement, issues were settled and the case was set down for hearing. It was at that stage that the wife prayed for leave to amend her petition by adding to it several charges of cruelty committed by the respondent in and between the months of February and August, 1870, on the ground that when she first filed the application, she omitted to instruct her attorney regarding instances of cruelty by reason of her memory having become at that time impaired through bad health. The Court rejected the application on the ground that cruelty is essentially a charge which must be in the knowledge of a wife at the time she commences her suit, and it should be charged then and once for all. The second case is one under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is unnecessary to state the details. It is sufficient to say that in the original application filed by the election petitioner, there was no reference to any statement alleged to have been made by the returned candidate Mr. The second case is one under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is unnecessary to state the details. It is sufficient to say that in the original application filed by the election petitioner, there was no reference to any statement alleged to have been made by the returned candidate Mr. Fernandez himself, although several allegations were made against bis agents. The election petition was later sought to be amended by adding thereto certain instances of corrupt practises alleged to have been made by George Fernandez himself. Rejecting the amendments prayed for, their Lordships observed: "If the material facts of the corrupt practise are stated, more or better particulars of the charge may be given later, but where the material facts themselves are missing it is impossible to think that the charge has been made or can be later amplified. This is tantamount to the making of a fresh petition." It has also to be remembered that there is a time limit for filing of an election petition, and consequently a petition filed beyond time is liable to be rejected in limine. It is, therefore, that their Lordships refused to allow the amendment in that case because by the time the amendment was applied for, the period of limitation for filing of an election petition had expired. Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez & others 20 W.B. 128, therefore, affords no assistance to the petitioner. 5. In the present case, it is not that opposite party had not made any allegations of cruelty against the petitioner in the original applications filed by her. She had specifically stated there that on several occasions during the years 1954 and 1955, the petitioner had treated her with legal and physical cruelty, that there had been a series of litigation's between the parties in the Civil and Criminal Courts and that the opposite party had not in any manner condoned the said cruelty. The opposite party states in her application for amendment that in the original applications she did not mention specific acts of cruelty because of feelings of delicacy. It seems her lawyers advised her that she should overcome such feelings and submit a list of acts of cruelty to be incorporated in the petition. But before she could do so, the joint petition under section 28 of the Act was filed in Court. It seems her lawyers advised her that she should overcome such feelings and submit a list of acts of cruelty to be incorporated in the petition. But before she could do so, the joint petition under section 28 of the Act was filed in Court. Hoping that this petition would be allowed, she did not consider it any more necessary to supply the details of the acts of cruelty. The petition under section 28 remained pending for about two years and was ultimately rejected and shortly therefore, the opposite party came up with these amendment applications. The learned District Judge considered these grounds to be good and sufficient for allowing the amendment and I see no reason to take a contrary view. Both the parties in these proceedings occupy high places in society, and one can appreciate the feelings of delicacy on the part of the opposite party not to wash dirty linen in Court. I am, therefore, prepared to believe her statements that it is only out of feelings of delicacy that she omitted to give particulars of the acts of cruelty in her original applications. A party cannot be refused a just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading to a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. See Jai Jai Ram Monoharlal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon AIR 1969 S.C. 1267 . The petitioner has not acquired any valuable right which he would lose by reasons of the present amendment being allowed. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge was right in allowing the amendment applications and I see no reason to interfere with the order passed by him. 6. The revision applications are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Final Result : Dismissed