Judgment :- 1. This revision arises from an order in M. C. No. 30 of 1971 passed under S.145 Crl. P; C. by the Executive First Class Magistrate, Trivandrum. The A Party is the petitioner before me. His case is that be is in possession of the property. B party denied this. The learned Magistrate passed final orders declaring the property to be in the actual physical possession of the B Party. 2. The only question to be decided in this case is the scope of S.29A of Act I of 1964, as amended by Act 35 of 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and its effect on the order passed by the Magistrate. The petitioner had applied for purchase of the right, title and interest of the landlord under S.54 of the Act as per O. A. No. 75 of 1971 on the file of the Land Tribunal, Trivandrum. While the O. A. was pending, his possession was threatened and therefore he moved the police to take appropriate action against the B Party. The police enquired into the matter and submitted a report on which the Magistrate initiated proceedings under S.145 Crl. P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that he did not request for initiation of proceedings under S.145 Crl. P.C. All that he wanted was protection of his possession. The learned Magistrate went into the question of possession in this case. Under S.29A of the Act, when a person claiming to be a tenant moves for purchase of the landlord's rights, the Magistrate cannot proceed under S.145 Crl. P.C. S.29A reads as follows; "29 A. Bar of proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure in certain cases. Under S.29A of the Act, when a person claiming to be a tenant moves for purchase of the landlord's rights, the Magistrate cannot proceed under S.145 Crl. P.C. S.29A reads as follows; "29 A. Bar of proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure in certain cases. (1) Where a person claiming to be a tenant applies for the preparation of a record of rights or for the determination of the fair rent or for the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of the land cultivated by him, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Magistrate shall have jurisdiction under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in respect of a dispute between that person and any other person claiming to be in possession of that land relating to that land, pending disposal of the application." Unfortunately for the A Party, S.29A was declared ultra vires by a Full Bench of this Court in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala, (1970 KLT. 659 (FB.) Therefore he was prevented from putting forth this plea. The learned Magistrate therefore proceeded to bear the case. The Magistrate was largely influen-ced by the fact that in a suit between the B Party and the landlord, the B Party got a decree and in execution of that decree B Party took delivery of the property. The petitioner contended that the said decree and delivery could not bind him as he was not a party to the suit. 3. It is now contended before me that with the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, the section has revived, with its operation effective from the date of the Act, and hence the order passed by the Magistrate which is sought to be revised is wholly without jurisdiction. In support of this contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to a decision reported in L. Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, L. R. Maduari (AIR. 1972 SC. 425). In this case, the inclusion of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 53 of 1961) in the Ninth Schedule was the subject-matter of attack. The Act was originally struck down by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, it was included in the Ninth Schedule. 1972 SC. 425). In this case, the inclusion of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 53 of 1961) in the Ninth Schedule was the subject-matter of attack. The Act was originally struck down by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, it was included in the Ninth Schedule. It was contended that by the striking down of the Act by the Supreme Court, the measure was non est or still-born and any validating measure could not instil life therein. It was argued in that case that the effect of striking down the Act was that it had been effaced from the statute book and to give it life, not only should it get protection against violation of fundamental rights as was sought to be done by Art.31-B but to get the State of Madras to re-enact the provisions thereof. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and Their Lordships observed: "23. Apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the amendatory process of Art.368 it must dow be held that Art.31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect, if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said Schedule as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Art.31 B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statute book. These Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Art.13 (2) of the Constitution, assumed full, force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Art.31 B of the Constitution. The States could not at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore the objection that the Madras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be accepted. " The same is the case here also. The States could not at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore the objection that the Madras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be accepted. " The same is the case here also. Although S.29A and other sections of the Act were struck down by the Supreme Court, the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule cures all those defects and assumes full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactments after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Art.31-B of the Constitution. Therefore, S.29A should be deemed to have been in existence at the time the Magistrate passed the order sought to be revised. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the bar of S.29A cannot be invoked in this case because it was the A Party himself who moved the Magistrate for action under S.145 Crl. P. C. It is true that the proceedings were started on his initiative. The police on getting his complaint enquired into the matter and submitted a report stating that there was dispute about possession. The mere fact that it was the A Party who was responsible for moving the Magistrate cannot deny him the protection under S.29A of Act I of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, which enables him to purchase the right, title and interest of the landlord. All that S.29A says is that a person claiming to be a tenant is entitled to the protection of that section. 5. It is submitted that O. S. No. 81 of 1967 of the Sub Court, Trivandrum, was filed by the B Party for specific performance of contract of sale between him and the original landlord and that the suit was decreed in his favour and in execution of the decree he had taken delivery of the property from the original landlord. But what is material in this case is to see that the petitioner before me was not a party to that suit and it cannot be said that the decree or the delivery is binding on him especially in the context of the protection that Act I of 1964 gives. But what is material in this case is to see that the petitioner before me was not a party to that suit and it cannot be said that the decree or the delivery is binding on him especially in the context of the protection that Act I of 1964 gives. It is also contended that the A Party has filed O. S. No. 744 of 1970 before the Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum, for an injunction. In this suit, an application for a temporary injunction was moved by the A Party petitioner before me against B Party, who is the respondent here. The application was dismissed by the Munsiff. An appeal was taken against the order of dismissal which also was dismissed. Although this does not form part of the records in this case, the learned counsel for the petitioner made available to me a typed copy of the judgment in the CMA. The operative portion of the judgment runs as follows: "At the time when the C. M. A. was taken up the learned counsel appearing for both sides fairly conceded that neither the court below nor this Court has jurisdiction to try or hear the matters involved as already the matter is seized of by the Land Tribunal, and therefore, with this observation the appeal is dismissed." Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent now to contend that the dismissal of the injunction petition is evidence against petitioner's possession. The matter has now revived before the Land Tribunal and the respondent also is a party. The matter can be adjudicated by the Tribunal, 6. In view of what is stated above and in view of the clear observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in L. Jagannath v. Authorised Officer L. R. Madurai (AIR. 1972 S C. 425) I hold that the order sought to be revised should be deemed to have been passed by the Magistrate without jurisdiction. In the result, the revision petition is allowed.