JUDGMENT : B.D. Singh, J. This application by the 13 petitioners under Sections 435, 439 and 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') is directed against the ORDER :dated the 8th of September, 1969 passed by the Magistrate under Section 117 (3) of the Code in case no. 265M of 1969. In the said proceeding the petitioners are the members of the second party whereas the opposite party are the members of the first party. 2. In ORDER :to appreciate the point involved in this application, it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. On 15.6.1969 a report was submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Surajgarha police station for action under Sections 107 and 117 (3) of the Code against both the parties. On 18.6.1969 the Sub-divisional Magistrate drew up a proceeding under Section 107 of the Code against both the parties. Both parties showed cause on the 14th July, 1969. On the 29th August, 1969, the petitioners alleged to have assaulted the opposite party and others. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party on 5th August 1969, 16th August, 1969, and the 26th August, 1969. On the 5th September, 1969 opposite party filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for taking ad interim bond from the petitioners under Section 117 (3) of the Code. On the 8th September, 1969, the Magistrate passed the impugned ORDER :, the relevant position of which reads as: "From the perusal of the petition and hearing of the lawyers, it appears there has been an incident in which the O. Ps. are alleged to have assaulted the 1st party. This shows that there might be serious breach of peace during the course of enquiry in future, I, therefore, feel that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of breach of the peace or the commission of any offence. I, therefore, direct the members of the opposite party to execute a bond of Rs.1000/- with two sureties of like amount for keeping the peace and maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the enquiry." 3. Mr. Arun Bihari Mathur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the impugned ORDER :, and has raised the following points for consideration by this Court. Mr. Arun Bihari Mathur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the impugned ORDER :, and has raised the following points for consideration by this Court. (i) The learned Magistrate erred in directing the petitioners to execute ad interim bond without being satisfied that it was necessary in the instant case to take immediate measures, and (ii) He erred in taking into account an incident which happened on the 29th August, 1969, regarding the assault in the impugned ORDER :without giving the petitioners an opportunity to show cause for the same. 4. I will take up for consideration point no. (i) first. Learned counsel in ORDER :to find support to his contention on this point has referred to a Bench decision of this Court in (1) Jagdish Prasad Verma V. The State (A.I. R. 1957 Patna. 106) where Banerji and Kanhaiya Singh, JJ., while dealing with the provisions contained in Sections- 112 and 117 (3) of the Code observed that it is only when the person is present in Court or has been bought before the Court, that a Magistrate can take. into consideration whether circumstances do exist for taking immediate measures and, when he is fully satisfied that such circumstances do exist, then only he can direct the execution of an ad interim bond, but before taking recourse to Section 117 (3) he has to put his reason in writing. It is Manifestly dear that Section 112 and Section 117 provide two different procedures for two different ends and, therefore, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an ORDER :under Section 117 (3) along with one under Section 112. An emergency ORDER :under Section 117 (3) can only be made when the Magistrate has started enquire into the truth of the information under Section 117(1), and, in the course of that enquiry, he considers that immediate measures are necessary. An ORDER :made under Section 117(3) is certainly bad if it is not accompanied by reasons recorded in writing why the Magistrate wants to take this emergency measures. Where the Magistrate did not give any reason, whatsoever., when demanding ad-interim bonds from the petitioners and on the date fixed for execution of the ad-interim bonds, he merely expressed that the police report indicate that the members of the opposite Party were likely to create a breach of the peace. Where the Magistrate did not give any reason, whatsoever., when demanding ad-interim bonds from the petitioners and on the date fixed for execution of the ad-interim bonds, he merely expressed that the police report indicate that the members of the opposite Party were likely to create a breach of the peace. It was held that there was no sufficient reason for passing the ORDER :. 5. Learned counsel further relied on a recent JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in (2) Madhu Limaye V. Sub-divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (A.I.R 1971 Supreme Court 2486), where the JUDGMENT : of this Court, referred to above, has been approved. Their Lordships, while dealing with the provisions contained in Section 117 of the Code at page 2500 in paragraph 43 observed that Sub-section (1) contemplates an immediate inquiry- into the truth of the information. It is pending the completion of the inquiry that an interim bond can be asked fur if immediate measures are necessary, and in default it is necessary to put the person in custody. Therefore, as the liberty of a person is involved, and that person is being proceeded against on the information and suspicion, it is necessary to put a strict construction upon the powers of Magistrate. Some inquiry has to be made before the bund can be ORDER :ed. The Section even as it is drafted today is hedged in with proper safeguards and it would be moving too far away from the guarantee of freedom, if the view were allowed to prevail that without any inquiry into the truth of the information sufficient to make out a prima facic case a person is to be put in jeopardy of detention finding is required that immediate steps are necessary. The ORDER :must be one which can be made into a final ORDER :unless something to the contrary is established. 6. In my opinion, the above observations made in the two cases, referred to above, do nut lend support to the contention advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners on the facts and circumstances of this case. As mentioned earlier, in the present case three witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party. Therefore he had made some enquiry in that regard and as such the ORDER :cannot be attacked on this ground. 7. Now I will take up for consideration paint no. (ii). As mentioned earlier, in the present case three witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party. Therefore he had made some enquiry in that regard and as such the ORDER :cannot be attacked on this ground. 7. Now I will take up for consideration paint no. (ii). Learned counsel urged that from the impugned ORDER :it is clear that the Magistrate while passing the ORDER :was mainly influenced because of the assault incident and no opportunity was given to the petitioners to show cause with regard to the said incident, as required under Section 112 of the Code. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite' party has fairly conceded that in this case opportunity was not given to the petitioners to meet the point with regard to the assault. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the impugned under cannot be sustained. 8. In the result, the application is allowed, the ORDER :is set aside and the ease is sent back to the case is sent back to the Magistrate to pass fresh ORDER :under Section 117(3) of the Code in the light of the observations made above. If he is satisfied that still there exists emergency, he may pass such an ORDER :but he must record the reasons for doing so.