JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The Bench admitting this writ petition was of the opinion that the decision in Shah Mohammad v. Niaz Mohammad S.A. No. 2456 of 1967 Dt-10-3-1969 requires reconsideration and recommended that the writ petition be heard by a Division Bench. That is how this case has been laid before this Bench. 2. One Mata Prasad had a half share in the grove plot in dispute. He died leaving two sons Har Swarup and Shri Ram. Har Swarup died in 1936, leaving a widow Smt. Suraj Kumari, Plaintiff-Respondent. At the commencement and end of the Consolidation operations the revenue records showed that Smt. Suraj Kumari was a co-tenant of this grove plot. She instituted the present suit for partition u/s 176 of the UP ZA and LR Act. The suit was contested by Sri Ram on the ground that it was barred by a family settlement and that under the personal law the Plaintiff had no share or interest in the grove plot. 3. The trial court held that the alleged compromise did not relate to the plot in dispute. It did not operate as an estoppel to bar a suit. It was also held that in view of Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act the question whether the Plaintiff had any title or share in this plot could not be re-adjudicated. The consolidation entries will be given effect to according to which the Plaintiff was a co-sharer. The family pedigree showed that she would have a 1/4th share in the plot. On this finding the suit was decreed for partition of 1/4th share. This decree was affirmed in appeal as well as in second appeal. Aggrieved, the Defendant came to this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The principal question raised on behalf of the Petitioner is that Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is inapplicable to the present case and that it is governed by Section 27(2) thereof. Let us read these provisions. Section 27 says: 27. New Revenue Records. (1) As soon as may be after the final consolidation scheme has come into force, the Distt. Dy. Let us read these provisions. Section 27 says: 27. New Revenue Records. (1) As soon as may be after the final consolidation scheme has come into force, the Distt. Dy. Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared for each village a new map, field book and record of rights in respect of the consolidation area, on the basis of the entries in the map, as corrected u/s 7, the 'Khasra-Chakbandi', the annual register prepared u/s 10 and the allotment orders as finally made and issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall subject to such modifications and alterations, as may be prescribed, be followed in the preparation of the said map and records. (2) All entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. (3) After the issue of notification u/s 52, the Collector shall, instead of the map, field book and record of rights previously maintained by him, maintain the map, field book and record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) and the provisions of Sections 28 and 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to the maintenance of such map, field-book and record of rights, as the case may be. Section 49 of the Act states: 49. Bar to Civil Court jurisdiction. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a (notification) has been issued (Under Sub-section (2) of Section 4) or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. 5. There is nothing to indicate that Section 27(2) overrides, modifies or repeals any part of Section 49. 5. There is nothing to indicate that Section 27(2) overrides, modifies or repeals any part of Section 49. Section 27(2) deals with the evidentiary value of the entries made in the record of rights prepared u/s 27(1) of the Act. Section 49 raises a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue courts for entertaining suits or proceedings of the kind mentioned in it. The two sections operate in different fields. They do not over-ride or impinge upon the other. This supports the submission that Section 27(2) of the Act does not in any manner fritter away the affect of Section 49. Section 49 by its first clause declares that adjudication of rights of tenure holders shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act while the second clause thereof debars civil or revenue court from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to rights which could or ought to have been so adjudicated. The defence in the present suit raises a question as to adjudication of right with respect to the plots in dispute. Such a defence cannot be entertained by the revenue court if "a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act" with respect to the rights now sought to be questioned. 6. When Consolidation proceedings commenced the Plaintiff was entered as a co-tenant. The Defendant did not say that they were unaware of the consolidation proceedings or the state of entries at that time. Har Swarup had died in 1936. The cause of action for adjudication of the question whether his widow inherited any share in the family properties arose on his death. After his death the Defendant could have instituted a suit for the adjudication of the Plaintiff's title. On commencement of Consolidation proceedings he could have raised a dispute about it by filing an objection u/s 9 of the Act. There is nothing upon which it could be held that the Defendant could not have taken proceedings under the Act for the adjudication of the Plaintiff's right or title. If he could, then Section 49 bars the Civil or Revenue court from entertaining such a question of title. 7. The Plaintiff's suit is of course not barred because it proceeds to enforce the entries made in Consolidation proceedings. If he could, then Section 49 bars the Civil or Revenue court from entertaining such a question of title. 7. The Plaintiff's suit is of course not barred because it proceeds to enforce the entries made in Consolidation proceedings. The cause of action for the present suit arose after the closure of the consolidation proceedings, as is apparent from the plaint. The plaint is not asking for any disturbance of the entries made during the Consolidation operations. It is the defence which raises questions the acceptance of which will mean the setting aside and cancellation or ignorance of the entries made in consolidation proceedings; and that is, under the circumstance of the case, not permissible. Section 49 was a clear bar to this plea in defence. 8. Section 27(2) provides that entries in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. A person can prove that the entries are not true. If that is done the entries will be corrected. But this provision has to be read with Section 49. Reading the two together, the position would be that a suit or proceeding for the correction of entry on the ground that it is not true or correct will be entertainable only if it is not barred by Section 49. If the Civil or Revenue Courts are debarred from entertaining such a question, obviously they cannot possibly enter into the merit of the dispute and to adjudicate the correctness of the entries. 9. In Shah Mohammad's case the facts were that the Plaintiffs filed an objection in consolidation proceedings but the Consolidation Officer rejected them on the ground that the remedy of the Plaintiff was before a competent court. Thus the final decision in consolidation proceedings itself referred the Plaintiff to a regular court. That was a clear case where it could be said that the Plaintiff could not take up any proceeding in Consolidation proceedings. As such Section 49 could not bar a regular suit. 10. That case also related to a grove plot. The learned Judge observed that in case of grove land, there is no adjudication of title by the Consolidation authorities. This observation is contrary co the decision of a Full Bench in Dalel v. Baroo 1963 AWR 230 and cannot hence be treated as laying down the correct law. 11. 10. That case also related to a grove plot. The learned Judge observed that in case of grove land, there is no adjudication of title by the Consolidation authorities. This observation is contrary co the decision of a Full Bench in Dalel v. Baroo 1963 AWR 230 and cannot hence be treated as laying down the correct law. 11. The decision of a learned Single Judge in Jagdeo v. Lauhar 1970 AWR 532 is distinguishable on facts. There it was held that the Plaintiff had no knowledge of the Consolidation proceedings and therefore, he could not make objections there. That is not the case before us. We need not express any opinion on the correctness of the view that mere lack of knowledge would be sufficient to hold that the litigant could not file objection within meaning of Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 12. In Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue 1970 AWR 123 a learned Judge held that Section 49 bars the adjudication of rights through a suit irrespective of the question as to whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant raises the question of title and that the right determined in consolidation proceedings, either after contest or without contest are final. It was also held that the cause of action for a suit for partition is not dependent on the determination of the rights of the parties. In Consolidation proceedings the rights of the parties are determined and the co-sharers have a right to claim partition even after the closure of consolidation proceedings. We find ourselves in agreement with the views expressed in this decision. 13. In our opinion the courts below were justified in taking the view that the defence was barred by Section 49 of the Act. 14. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Board of Revenue was in error in not recording a clear finding on the question if compromise was binding upon the Plaintiff. The trial court had given a clear finding that the plots in dispute or the village where the plot in dispute were situated were not even referred to in the compromise. Learned Counsel was unable to show us any error in that finding. If on facts that be so, the compromise cannot obviously be relevant in the present suit. It was rightly ignored. 15. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.