JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is by the plaintiff. ( 2. ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are that the plaintiffs father who possessed lands in villages Nawapara and Dongripali died in the year 1948. The plaintiff was then a minor. On 17-4-1953, Smt. Phoolkunwar (defendant No. 3), the mother of the plaintiff, executed a sale-deed of the immovable property in suit, viz. , Plots Nos. 32/8 and 32/9 of village Nawapara in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and possession was also delivered to the vendees. The sale-deed was executed by Smt. Phoolkunwar for herself and as guardian of the minor plaintiff. Though the plaintiff attained majority in the year 1956, the present suit was filed in the year 1963 challenging the sale in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The sale was challenged on the grounds that it was without consideration and that it was not for legal necessity. It was, therefore, urged that the sale was void, that the defendants 1 and 2 were trespassers and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the lands. ( 3. ) THE allegation of the defendants was that Smt. Phoolkunwar found it difficult to manage the lands from both the villages. She, therefore, transferred the lands from village Nawapara and purchased some lands in the other village. Even Manohar (Smt. Phoolkunwars husband) himself had disposed of some lands from Nawapara and had settled down in the other village. The sale was for good consideration and it being for legal necessity was binding on the plaintiff. It was also urged that the suit was barred by limitation, not having been filed within three years of the plaintiff attaining majority. ( 4. ) THE suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court and the said decree was confirmed by the lower appellate Court also. The plaintiff has, therefore, filed this second appeal. ( 5. ) SHRI Jakatdar, learned counsel for the appellant, urged before me that the Courts below erred in law in holding that the sale was for good consideration, that it was for legal necessity and that the suit was barred by limitation. ( 6. ) ON the question as to whether there was payment of adequate consideration for the sale or not, I do not find any justification for taking a different view. ( 6. ) ON the question as to whether there was payment of adequate consideration for the sale or not, I do not find any justification for taking a different view. But I find that the finding on the question of legal necessity is not sustainable. The finding of legal necessity is based on two factors, viz. , that it was difficult for the guardian of the minor to manage the property at both the villages and that out of the sale consideration new properties were purchased at the other village. The two villages are not at very great distance; and though there is a vague allegation that some property was purchased at the other village, no details as to the property purchased or whether it was equivalent to the property sold from village Nawapara were given. I, therefore, find it difficult to sustain that finding. In my opinion, the burden is on the purchaser to show that there was, in fact, pressure on the property or that the transfer was for legal necessity. The standard of proof required in such cases is not satisfied in this case. That finding of the Courts below is, therefore, set aside. ( 7. ) THIS brings me to the question of limitation. The suit was filed on 11-2-1963 when the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 was in operation. Article 44 of the Act was to the following effect:- The question that arises for my consideration in this case is as to whether the defendant No 3 Smt. Phoolkunwar was a guardian of the plaintiff, as the expression "guardian" is understood and interpreted by the Courts in this country. Shri Jakatdar, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the expression "guardian" refers to only the lawful guardian, viz. , a natural guardian of the ward or a guardian appointed by the Court. A de facto guardian or a manager is outside the scope of the expression "guardian" used in this article. Shri Verma, learned counsel for the respondents, has conceded this position in law which is also well settled. Hence I am not required to dilate on that question. Shri Jakatdar further urged that the defendant No. 3 being a mother was a natural and hence a legal guardian of the plaintiff. But she could be a legal guardian of the person of the plaintiff and his separate property only. Hence I am not required to dilate on that question. Shri Jakatdar further urged that the defendant No. 3 being a mother was a natural and hence a legal guardian of the plaintiff. But she could be a legal guardian of the person of the plaintiff and his separate property only. Inasmuch as the property in question was not separate property of the plaintiff, the third defendant could not be treated as a legal guardian of the plaintiff, vis a vis that property and hence the transfer effected by her of the said property would be only in her capacity as a de facto guardian or a manager of the property. Shri Jakatdar conceded that in case of a sole coparcener the mother can become a legal guardian of the property of the minor because in that case it becomes his separate property ; but in those cases where others have interest in the coparcenary property, the mother cannot become a legal guardian of the minor. Shri Jakatdar relied on the statement of law in Principles of Hindu Law by D. F. Mulla, 13th Edn. , at pages 523 and 525, to the effect :- "the father is the natural guardian of the person and of the sep arate property of his minor children, and next to him the mother, unless the father has by his will appointed another person as the guardian of the person of his children. If the minor is a member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law, the father as karta (manager) is entitled to the management of the whole coparcenary property including the minors interest. After the fathers death, the management of the property, including the minors interest therein, passes to the eldest son as karta. The mother is not entitled to the custody of the undivided interest of her minor son in the joint property, because such property is not separate property, though she is entitled to the custody of his person and of his separate property, if any. If all the sons are minors, the Court may appoint a guardian of the whole of the joint property until one of them attains majority. . . If all the sons are minors, the Court may appoint a guardian of the whole of the joint property until one of them attains majority. . . On any one of the sons attaining majority, the guardianship of the property constituted by the Court ceases, and the court is bound to handover the joint family property to the adult son, notwithstanding the fact that the other sons are minors. " ( 8. ) THE contention of Shri Jakatdar is that after the death of the plaintiffs father no doubt the plaintiff became the sole surviving coparcener and but for the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, he would have become the sole surviving coparcener of the property and, as such, the property would have become his separate property and his mother would become the legal guardian of the plaintiffs property as well; but the aforesaid Act brought about considerable changes in the old law as a result of which the widow of a coparcener was inducted in the joint family representing the interest of her husband and in such a case though there was only one male coparcener in the family along with the widow of the deceased coparcener, it could not be any longer said that it becomes the separate property of the minor. It was also pointed out that though the widow was inducted in the coparcenary by the above said Act, she does not become a coparcener and, as such, cannot act as a karta of the joint family, though other incidents of the coparcenary, viz. , that her share in the coparcenary property is not defined and is subject to fluctuations till she demands a partition, are present. In support reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Satrughan v. Sabujpari ( AIR 1967 SC 272 .) and lakshmi Perumallu v. krishnavenamma ( AIR 1965 SC 825 .) It was, therefore, urged that the result of the 1937 Act was that the plaintiff did not become the sole owner of the property and, as such, it did not become his separate property and his mother as a natural guardian could not act as a legal guardian so far as his interest in the coparcenary property was concerned. In this view it was urged that the transfer effected by the plaintiffs mother was in her capacity as a de facto guardian and hence the case was not governed by Article 44 of the limitation Act, 1908, and that the case would be governed by the residuary Article, viz. , Article 144 of the Act. ( 9. ) I find it difficult to accept the extreme proposition, viz. , that in no case a mother of a coparcener, having interest in the coparcenary property, can act as his legal guardian. In a coparcenary the right of management of whole of the coparcenary property rests with the father and in his absence with the eldest member of the family as a karta. In those cases where there is a karta having the right of management over whole of the coparcenary property the mother cannot act as a manager of the share of the minor in the property because in that case it would result in curtailment of the powers of the karta and hence in Mullas statement of law on the point the emphasis is on the separate property of the coparcener. In this connection, I may refer to the statement of law in Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law by N. R. Raghavachariar, 6th Edn. , at page 205, which is to the following effect :-"after the death of the father, the management of the joint family property comprising also the interest of a minor member vests in the eldest male member of the family, and the mother of the minor is entitled only to the guardianship of the minors person and his separate property. Where a Court appoints a guardian in respect of a joint family on the ground that all its members are minors, the guardianship ceases on the attainment of majority by any of the members, and the guardian appointed by the Court must then hand over the properties to him. A mother though not a coparcener in a joint family is, in the absence of an adult male member, competent to act as manager of the family, and any act done by her in that capacity for legal necessity or benefit of the family would be binding on the family estate. A mother though not a coparcener in a joint family is, in the absence of an adult male member, competent to act as manager of the family, and any act done by her in that capacity for legal necessity or benefit of the family would be binding on the family estate. " The latter part of the statement in Raghavachariars treatise which is based on the decision in Balkrishna v. Canesa (AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 209.)may be open to doubt if the expression "manager" is equated with "karta of the coparcenary because that is in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above. But if that expression refers to the mother as a natural guardian, in my opinion, the statement can be accepted as a correct statement of law. ( 10. ) IN Neelakantan v. Kumaraswami ( AIR 1964 Mad. 353 .) the Chief Justice of the Madras high Court observed :- "in a joint Hindu family, the right of management of property inheres in the manager, if the family consists of a minor member, his guardian will not be entitled to separate possession of the minors share or even to interfere with the exclusive right of the karta to manage. The position however will be different where the minor is the sole surviving member of the joint Hindu family. In such a case there being no manager his guardian can have custody of his property. This rule has been, if we may say so, succinctly set out in Ramchandra vasudeo v. Krishnarao (ILR 32 Bom. 259.) It was held in that case that where all the coparceners of a Hindu joint family happened to be minors the court would have jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of property of that group of coparceners as a whole but when subsequently one of that group reached the age of majority, the guardianship of the persons appointed by the court would cease and the court would be bound to hand over the joint family property to the adult coparcener notwithstanding the fact that the other coparceners were minors. " (page 354 ). " (page 354 ). It would appear from this decision that in the absence of an adult coparcener the mother could be appointed as a guardian of the minors property and there is nothing in law to prevent her from acting as a legal guardian of the minor coparceners so long as one of them does not attain majority and becomes the karta of the family. In Koya Ankamma v. Kameshwaramma (air 1936 Mad. 346.) the facts were that there were two undivided cousins and at a time when both of them were minors, their mothers acting as guardians alienated certain properties belonging to them. One of the minors died later on and a suit was brought by the surviving minor to recover the property from the alienee on the ground that the alienation was beyond the power of the guardians to make. The suit was instituted within 12 years of the alienation but more than 3 years after the plaintiff had attained majority. The point for determination was whether article 44 of the Limitation Act applied to the case. The Chief Justice delivering the main Judgment, observed :- "the important facts in the case are that at the time of the alienations there were no adult co-parceners and, in spite of the contention in the lower appellate Court which was not accepted there that it is not correct to speak of the mothers who alienated the property as guardians in any legal sense, in my view, they were the de jure guardians of the minors. There is no authority for saying that when the senior member of a coparcenary, a father, dies leaving only minor co-parceners, the mother or mothers of the latter are not their de jure guardians; and I agree with Varadachariar, J. , that the cases relied upon to show that a minors interest in an undivided Hindu family is not such an interest or property that a guardian can be appointed or predicated in respect of it can be distinguished on the ground that in those cases there were other adult co-parceners and the legal guardianship of the minor co-parceners therefore vested in the adult co-parceners. That cannot be the case here; and this distinction was pointed out by Sir Lawrence jenkins, C. J. , in Bindaji v Mathurabai (ILR 30 Bom. That cannot be the case here; and this distinction was pointed out by Sir Lawrence jenkins, C. J. , in Bindaji v Mathurabai (ILR 30 Bom. 152.) The position is therefore, that these were alienations made by the de jure guardians of the minors and the present plaintiff was entitled to avoid the transaction and in such cases it has been held that Article 44 is the correct article. " From this decision it is clear that in the absence of adult coparceners the natural guardians of the minor coparceners being de jure guardians can transfer the property of the minor coparceners and to such a case only Article 44 of the limitation Act applies. This decision also makes it clear that though the interest of the minor coparceners is undefined, at a given time if guardians of such coparceners join in effecting an alienation, such an alienation cannot be said to be without any authority. In my opinion, when in the case of more than one coparcener, if all the coparceners are minors, the transfer can be effected by their natural guardians. I do not see what difference does it make when in a given family there is only one minor coparcener and a widow is inducted in the coparcenary not having full rights of a coparcener but all the same representing the interest of a deceased coparcener and also happens to be the natural guardian of the minor coparcener. In the presence of an adult coparcener the right of the widow as a guardian of the minor coparcener may remain in abeyance, as that right may come in conflict with the rights of the adult coparcener to manage whole of the property including that of the minor; but I do not see any reason why, in the absence of such a manager, the widow should not be in a position to act as a de jure guardian of the minor coparcener. ( 11. ) FOR the above said reasons, I am of the opinion that the transfer in question was by a de jure guardian and, as such, Article 44 of the Limitation act, 1908, was squarely attracted in this case. It follows that the Courts below were right in holding that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation. ( 12. ) THE appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.