JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an application under Article 226 of the constitution by a resident of Bhubaneswar town. It is alleged by him that by end of 1959, he was allotted a plot of land in Unit No. 3 of the New Capital area by the Administrator. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the Government of Orissa through the Estate Officer and raised thatched house for his residential purpose by 1960 and lives there and carries on his occupation. On 1-9-1969, a notice was issued to him by the opposite party who happens to be the Executive Officer of the Notified Area Council of Bhubaneswar, purporting to be under section 273-A of the Orissa Municipal Act requiring demolition of the house as being an unauthorised construction. On 11-9-1969, similar notices were issued to others living in the area. The petitioner showed cause in response to the notice and took the stand that he had raised the construction under specific directions of the Administrator, the residential house has been raised about 10 years before and asking for demolition of such a construction was unfair, improper, oppressive and illegal. No orders were communicated on the representation, but a fresh notice was issued in April, 1970, wherein it was stated that the petitioner had been twice noticed for removal of unauthorised construction and as he had not yet complied with the direction, the Notified Area Council would remove the structure on 30th of April, 1970. The petitioner came before this Court on the 29th of April, 1970, and obtained an interim order of stay of demolition of the construction. 2. In the counter affidavit filed by the Executive Officer of the Notified Area Council, it is asserted that the construction made by the petitioner was not in terms of the licence in his favour given by the Estate Officer. 2. In the counter affidavit filed by the Executive Officer of the Notified Area Council, it is asserted that the construction made by the petitioner was not in terms of the licence in his favour given by the Estate Officer. A letter of the Estate officer addressed to the opposite party dated 3rd of June, 1970 has been produced as an annexure to the counter affidavit, the material portion whereof reads as follows :- "Some plots were carved in Unit-III (Malisahi) in the year 1958-59 and some Malies, Mulias, Rickshaw pullers were given licence of the said plots for their purposes on the following terms and conditions : (1) The licensee is to build a residential house within 3 years from the date of execution of the licence deed in accordance with the design and plan approved by the licenser free of any premium on the plot of land given on license and to remain there with his family till he carried on his profession. (2) The licensee shall pay to the licenser for such permission every year Rs. 1/- on the 28th day of April. (3) In case of default in payment of any instalment of the sum of Rs. 1/- the licenser may revoke the licence and the licensee shall thereupon forfeit all the rights in respect of the allotted plot of land and shall remain liable for any sum that is due from him and also for any loss which may be caused to the licenser by reason of such default. (4) The licensee shall not use the site permitted for any purpose other than the purpose for which it is given. He shall surrender the site if he ceases to carry on his profession. (5) x x x x Shri Penteya, the writ petitioner was permitted to to carry (occupy) Plot no. 163 measuring 27' x 27' in Unit-III (Malisahi) free of premium for residential purposes and he was granted a licence on the above terms and conditions only. Shri Penteya entered into agreement with the licenser to occupy plot No. 163 in Unit III on the above terms and conditions and registered the licence deed. He has neither renewed the licence every year nor paid the sum of Rs. 1/- as provided in the licence deed. He constructed his residential house without any designed plan approved by the licenser. He has neither renewed the licence every year nor paid the sum of Rs. 1/- as provided in the licence deed. He constructed his residential house without any designed plan approved by the licenser. x x x x" In Paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit it is further stated that the construction raised by the petitioner is contrary to the provisions of section 264 of the Orissa Municipal Act. His construction was without permission and when the unauthorised construction came to be detected, notice under section 273-A of the Act was issued. As the construction is unauthorised and the the petitioner has forfeited his right to be on the land, he is not entitled to maintain the writ petition. 3. Mr. Palit, learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that the construction is without permission as required under section 264 of the Orissa Municipal Act. That section provides : "(1) If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building, he shall send to the Executive Officer-- (a) An application in writing for the transfer of the site together with a site plan of the land ; and (b) an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with a ground plan, elevations and sections of the building and specification of the work: Provided that the Executive Officer may on application in writing by the person concerned and on payment of a prescribed fee get such plan prepared within a reasonable period. Explanation- 'Building' in this sub-section shall include a hut, a wall, foundation, plinth or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public road." Sections 265 to 270 deal with various contingencies in relation to permission for building. Explanation- 'Building' in this sub-section shall include a hut, a wall, foundation, plinth or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public road." Sections 265 to 270 deal with various contingencies in relation to permission for building. Section 273-A of the Act provides thus :- "(1) If the executive officer is satisfied- (i) that the construction or reconstruction of any building or well (a) has been commenced without obtaining the permission of the Executive Officer or where an appeal has been preferred to the council in contravention of any order passed by the council in appeal ; or (b) is being carried on, or has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the plans or particulars on which such permission or order was based ; or (c) is being carried on, or has been completed in breach of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule or by-law made under this Act or of any direction or requisition lawfully given or made under this Act or such rules or by-laws ; or (ii) x x x x (iii) ............be may make a provisional order requiring the owner or the builder to demolish the work done, or so much of it as, in the opinion of the Executive officer, has been unlawfully executed or to make such alterations as may in the opinion of the Executive Officer be necessary to bring the work into conformity with the Act, by-laws, rules direction or requisition as aforesaid, or with the plans and particulars on which such permission or order was based ; and may also direct that until the said order is complied with the owner or builder shall refrain from proceeding with the building or well. (2) The Executive Officer shall serve a copy of the provisional order made, under sub-section (1) on the owner of the building or well together with a notice requiring him to show cause within a reasonable time to be mentioned in such notice why the order shall not be confirmed. (3) If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, the Executive Officer may confirm the order with any modification he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner." Section 274 provides for an appeal from the order of the Executive Officer to the council. (3) If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, the Executive Officer may confirm the order with any modification he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner." Section 274 provides for an appeal from the order of the Executive Officer to the council. Section 385-A provides for penalty for unlawful building and in terms of clauses (a) and (o) thereof, the petitioner is certainly liable to be penalised in a criminal case upon his conviction. In fact there is even provisions for imposition of a daily fine. In the case of Rajaballav Misra v. Executive Officer, Notified Area Committee, Bhubaneswar 22 C.L.T. 202, it was held that the Executive Officer has jurisdiction to direct demolition of a structure held to be a building if the constructions or reconstructions have been commenced without obtaining permission. To the same effect has been the decision in the case of Municipal Council, Cuttack v. Ghanashyam Das 34 C.L.T. 1067. 4. Mr. Palit does not dispute the petitioner's liability for being proceeded against under section 385-A of the Act and concedes that there can be conviction if the petitioner is found to have committed such offence. But according to him the Notified Area council has no authority to demolish the structure all by itself. During the hearing of this application Mr. Mohanty contended that such power is vested in the Council under the provisions of sections 343 and 344 of the Act. According to him, Chapter 23 of the Act deals with licenses and permissions. As such the provisions of this Chapter have to be read along with the provisions of Chapter 17 dealing with building regulations. Permission referred to in Chapter 23 is not different from 'Permission' provided for in Chapter 17. In cases where permission has not been obtained under Chapter 17, the procedure indicated in Chapter 23 is applicable. As such the provisions of this Chapter have to be read along with the provisions of Chapter 17 dealing with building regulations. Permission referred to in Chapter 23 is not different from 'Permission' provided for in Chapter 17. In cases where permission has not been obtained under Chapter 17, the procedure indicated in Chapter 23 is applicable. Section 343 of the Act provides : "If under this Act or any rule, regulation or by-law made under it, the licence or permission of a municipal council or its Chairman or the Executive Officer, as the case may be, is necessary for the doing of any act and if such act is done without such licence or permission, or in a manner inconsistent with the terms of any such licence or permission, than- (a) the Chairman or the Executive Officer may by notice require the person so doing such act to alter, remove, or as far practicable, restore to its original state the whole or any part of any property, movable or immovable, public or private, affected thereby, within a time to be specified in the notice; and further ; (b) If no penalty has been specially provided in this Act for so doing such act, the person so doing it shall be liable on conviction by a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every such offence." Section 344 provides- "(1) Whenever by any notice, requisition or order under this Act, or under any rule or regulation or by law made under it any person is required to execute any work or to take any measures or do anything, a reasonable time shall be named in such notice, requisition or order within which the work shall be executed, the measures taken or the thing done. (2) if such notice, requisition or order is not complied with within the time so named, the Chairman of the municipal council concerned may cause such work to be executed or may take any measures or do anything which may, in his opinion, be necessary for giving due effect to the notice, requisition or order aforesaid ; (3) If no penalty has been specially provided in this Act for failure to comply with such notice, the said person shall be liable on conviction by a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every such offence." Thus the contention of Mr. Mohanty appearing for the Notified Area Council is that the provisions of section 273-A in Chapter 17 and all the provisions contained in sections 343 and 344 in Chapter 23, must be read as supplemental to each other. The statute authorises the making of a provisional order requiting demolition under section 273-A(1). An opportunity of being heard is provided under sub-section (2) and finality is given to the order matte after compliance with the provisions of sub-section (2) in terms of sub-section (3) of that section, the ultimate order in terms of the statute being "shall then be binding on the owner". An appeal is provided to the council and under the scheme of the Act that appellate order is intended to be final. The delinquent owner to builder can be proceeded under section 385-A even without a prior proceeding under section 273-A of the Act. That is why in section 385-A, the contingencies are alternately provided for and one of the five indicated there is failure of the person to whom direction is given by the Executive Officer under section 273-A and he has failed to obey such direction. 5. After a final order has been made under section 273-A (3) of the Act it is open to the Executive Officer to take action under section 343 of the Act and when there is failure to comply with the direction of the notice, it is open to the Municipal Council to take action to give due effect to the order. Under section 345 of the Act, the expenses incurred for giving effect to the order can be collected by the same machinery as is provided under the Act for recovery of taxes. The scheme of the statute, therefore, shows that the Notified Area Council has power to direct demolition and in the event of failure to comply on the part of the owner or builder, it can itself undertake the demolition at the expenses of the owner or builder and reimburse itself in respect of the expenses in terms of the provisions of section 345 of the Act. 6. Mr. Pal contends that the provisions of section 344 of the Act are ultra vires the Constitution, inasmuch as remedy too summary enough has been provided under this section in addition to the general common law remedy of obtaining a decree from the civil Court. 6. Mr. Pal contends that the provisions of section 344 of the Act are ultra vires the Constitution, inasmuch as remedy too summary enough has been provided under this section in addition to the general common law remedy of obtaining a decree from the civil Court. In support of this contention of his, he places reliance on the decision of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. & another v. State of Punjab and another AIR 1967 S.C. 1581 and a series of decisions of different High Courts including some of this Court dealing with the provisions of eviction from public premises. We are not in a position to extend that principle to the present statute. Admittedly the powers conferred on the Council under the Orissa Municipal Act are to give effect to public duties for the purposes of sanitation, good living and ensuring convenience for those who reside within the local jurisdiction of the council. Such powers have been conferred under the statute and powers to enforce orders made by the council have been given to the council with a view to ensuring proper discharge of such public duties. Under Chapter 17, a duty has been cast on those who went to raise buildings, within the local jurisdiction of a council to obtain permission as condition precedent to raising of the building. If there is a default, power is vested in the council to order demolition of such unauthorised structure raised in breach of the duty imposed by the statute and if the delinquency continues even after the direction is given further power is provided to set the matter right by actual demolition. 7. There are really no two alternative remedies open to the council. The test laid by Willes, J, in the famous case of Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Nawkesford (1859) 6. C.B. (N.S.) 336, has been thus stated:- "There are three classes of cases in which a liability be established founded upon statute. 7. There are really no two alternative remedies open to the council. The test laid by Willes, J, in the famous case of Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Nawkesford (1859) 6. C.B. (N.S.) 336, has been thus stated:- "There are three classes of cases in which a liability be established founded upon statute. One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law ; there unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication excludes the common law remedy; the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases, is where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy ; there the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz:, where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class." It has been indicated by Lord Tenterden, C.J., in Doe D. Bishop of Bochester v. Bridges 109 E.R. 1001,:- "When an act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. If an obligation is created but no mode of enforcing its performance is ordained, the common law may, in general, find a mode suited to the particular nature of the case." Lord Halsbury in Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle U.D.C. (1895-99) All. E.R. 191 (H. L.), at page 193 has said:- "The principle that where a specific remedy is given, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar, and which runs through the law." Under general law the owner is entitled to build upon his own property as he likes. The Municipal Act interferes with such right and creates a liability for every owner or builder to obtain permission in the manner provided as a condition precedent to raising of a building. Thus a liability is created under the statute and a mode is prescribed for enforcing the breach of such liability. It appears to us that is the only way the council is entitled to enforce breach of duty and not by approaching the common law Court. 8. In Cutler v. Wandwarth Stadium Ltd. (1949) 1 All E.R. 544 (H.L.), it has been clearly indicated that in case of a breach of statutory duty, the penalty provided in the statute creating the duty may be regarded as the only manner of enforcing the duty. In our view there is no scope for the contention on the basis of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Public Premises Eviction Act case that the provision in section 344 of the Municipal Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. We would hold that by necessary implication the remedy in civil Court is not provided under the Act for enforcing orders arising out of defaults by owners or builders in raising constructions and the remedy is as provided under section 344 (2) of the Act. That is the machinery created by the statute for discharge of the public duty cast upon the council. 9. Coming back to the facts of this case, we find a notice under section 273-A (1) of the Act had been given to the petitioner and he failed to comply with it. Therefore, there has already been a compliance with the requirement of section 344(1) of the Act. It is now open to the Chairman of the council to take action under sub-section (2) of section 344 of the Act. As such the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. We are prepared, however, to extend the time for compliance with the notice by three months from today, failing which it shall be open to the Chairman of the council in terms of section 344(2) of the Act to take such measures as may be necessary for giving due effect to the order made under section 273-A(3) of the Act. Subject to that direction the petition is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs. Subject to that direction the petition is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs. K.B. Panda, J. - I agree Final Result : Dismissed