T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants are the plaintiffs who have filed Civil Suit No. 886/64 in City Civil Court Ahmedabad for obtaining possession of the suit premises which consists of a single room and which bear M. C. No 2558 of Tajpur Momnawad at Ahmedabad. The respondents claim that they are the sub-tenants in the premises ever since the year 1947 and have therefore acquired tenancy rights under sec. 15 (2) of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Bombay Act LVII of 1947) (which is hereinafter referred to as the Act) and therefore they are not liable to be evicted from the suit premises. As against this the contention of the appellants (plaintiffs) is that the respondents (defendants) have entered into suit premises for the first time in the year 1956 as family members of the original tenant one Mahemudsha Chhotusha. The appellants further prayed that this original tenant Mahemudsha Chhotusha died some where before 8th April 1960 and therefore after the date of his death the respondents are not entitled to continue the possession of the suit premises. ( 2 ) THE dispute between the parties has taken a very long course through different courts proceedings and therefore it would be necessary to state shortly the facts forming the background of the present litigation. These facts are as under:- ( 3 ) IT is an admitted fact that the suit premises were leased by the appellants to the above referred Mahemudsha in the month of August 1947 at the rent of Rs. 10/per month. A few months thereafter a regular rent note was executed by said Mahemudsha as found at ex. 37 which is dated 26th January 1948 It is an admitted position that this rent note contains a clause prohibiting the tenant from sub-letting the premises. According to sec 108 clause (j) of the Transfer of Property Act a lessee has got a right to sub-let the premises taken by him on rent subject of course to a prohibition contained in a contract of lease. Such a prohibtion however was there according in the terms of the rent note ex. 3. The Bombay Rent Act of 1948 which came into force on 19-1-1948 however created a complete bar to the sub-letting of premises. Such a prohibtion however was there according in the terms of the rent note ex. 3. The Bombay Rent Act of 1948 which came into force on 19-1-1948 however created a complete bar to the sub-letting of premises. Therefore even according to the provisions of the Rent Act the original tenant Mahemudsha had no right to create any sub-lease in the suit premises. ( 4 ) NOW the case of the respondents is that even though the contract of lease prohibited the sub-tenancy Mahemudsha had given the suit premises to them on a sub-lease and had himself taken other premises on lease in the vicinity of the suit premises. The other premises taken on lease by Mahemudsha bear MC. No. 2561/2thus according to the respondents they were inducted in the suit premises as sub-tenants by Mahemudsha soon after the tenancy rights in favour of Mahemudsha were created in the year 1947. According to the respondents they were paying regularly rent of Rs. 10/per month to Mahemudsha. ( 5 ) THE record of the case reveals that on 9th March 1956 the appellants served a notice on Mahemudsha for vacating the suit premises on the ground that he had given the suit premises for occupation to his relatives and that the plaintiffs themselves required the suit premises for their own personal occupationin reply to that notice Mahemudsha contended that the respondents were residing in the suit premises as members of his family and that he had taken other premises for him as all of his family members could not be accommodated in the suit premises. Ultimately the plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction against Mahemudsha which was registered as Civil suit No2268/56. That suit was dismissed but was remanded to the trial court by the appellate court. After the remand the suit was compromised on 7th July 1959 and a consent decree in terms of that compromise was obtained by the parties. According to this consent decree tenant Mahemudsha agreed to hand over the possession of the suit premises within three years and further agreed that in default of three months payments agreed to be paid by the parties during the course of these 3 years he would be liable to be evicted. According to this consent decree tenant Mahemudsha agreed to hand over the possession of the suit premises within three years and further agreed that in default of three months payments agreed to be paid by the parties during the course of these 3 years he would be liable to be evicted. However before this period of 3 years expired Mahemudsha died with the result that the appellant filed Darkhast No. 386/60 for recovery of the possession of the suit premises against Mahemudshas widow named Fatma. Bai Fatma appears to have raised some objection to the Darkhast and contended that all the heirs of Mahemuasha were not joined as parties. However on 28-12-62 the executing court ordered warrant for possession. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER on 2nd January 1963 the first respondent filed suit No. 8/63 in Small Causes Court for obtaining injunction restraining the plaintiff from taking possession of the suit premises. He also prayed for some interim relief but that relief was not granted by the court. ( 7 ) THEREAFTER on 3rd January 1963 the first respondent filed his objections in the above referred Darkhast No. 366/60 filed by the plaintiffs for obtaining possession of the suit premises raising a plea that all the respondents and their family members were sub-tenants in the suit premises ever since the year 1947. Thereafter on 4th January 1963 the plaintiffs applied to the executing court for removing the obstruction caused by the first respondent by filing the above referred objections. This application of the plaintiffs was registered as Misc. Application No. 1/63. But the same was dismissed by the executing court on 11-7-63 on the footing that the respondents were the sub-tenants in the suit premises. Thereafter the appellants have filed the present suit on 9-7-64. ( 8 ) THE learned trial Judge has held that the respondents are found to be the sub-tenants in the premises and since they are in possession of the suit premises as such ever since the year 1947 they have acquired tenancy rights under sec. 15 of the Act ( 9 ) FEELING aggrieved by this decision the original plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. [ After stating the facts His Lordship further proceeded :-] ( 10 ) THEN the question is the legal consequence of this position. 15 of the Act ( 9 ) FEELING aggrieved by this decision the original plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. [ After stating the facts His Lordship further proceeded :-] ( 10 ) THEN the question is the legal consequence of this position. According to the respondents if once it is found that the possession of the suit premises has been transferred or assigned to them on creation of a sub-lease or otherwise at any time before the year 1950 then they would be entitled to tenancy rights as provided by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15. Shri Vakils contention however was that the respondents would not be entitled to any tenancy rights under this section of this Act on account of the fact that the original contract of tenancy contained a prohibition against the creation of a sub-lease or transfer or assignment of tenancy rights by the tenant. In this connection Shri Vakil has contended that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 protects only those sub-tenancies which were statutorily barred under the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 and not those sub-tenancies which have been barred by a contract between the parties. In other words according to Shri Vakil if a sub-tenancy is barred by virtue of a contract between the parties at any time before the year 1959 then such sub-tenancies would not be protected by subsec. (2) of sec. 15. ( 11 ) SEC. 15 is in the following terms:- ( 12 ) (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law but subject to any contract to the contrary it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this Act for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein:-PROVIDED that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. (2) The bar against sub-letting assigning or transferring premises contained in sub-sec. (2) The bar against sub-letting assigning or transferring premises contained in sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed not to have had any effect before the commencement of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 in any area in which this Act was in operation before such Commencement; and accordingly notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in the judgment decree or order of a Court any such sub-lease assignment or transfer in favour of such persons as have entered into possession despite the bar as sub-lessess assignees or transferees and have continued in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance shall be deemed to be valid and effectual. IT is apparent that sub-sec. (1) of this section prohibits the creation of a sub-tenancy in the whole or an) part of the premises covered by the Rent Act. This is of course subject to the contract to the contrary. This sec. 15 was amended in the year 1959 by an Ordinance which was subsequently converted into Act which is Bombay Act No. 49 of 1959. Before this amendment was carried out there was a total prohibition to the creation of sub-tenancy over the premises covered by the Act. However after this amendment sub-sec. (2) was inserted in this section by the above referred Bombay Act No. 49 of 1959. That sub-sec. (2) was substituted in modified form subsequently by Gujarat Act No. 57 of 1963. The present sub-sec. (2) is the one which is so substituted. ( 13 ) NOW if we refer to this sub-sec. (2) it will be found that it consists of two parts. The first part thereof removes the bar against the sub-letting which existed before the Ordinance of 1959. The second part provides for the consequence of the removal of that bar and begins with a non-obstante clause saying that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract etc. any sub-lease assignment or transfer in favour of the persons who have entered into the possession of the premises despite the bar and have continued in possession at the commencement of the Ordinance of 1959 shall be deemed to be valid and effectual. any sub-lease assignment or transfer in favour of the persons who have entered into the possession of the premises despite the bar and have continued in possession at the commencement of the Ordinance of 1959 shall be deemed to be valid and effectual. Now the contention of Shri Vakil was that since the first part of this sub-section refers to the removal of the statutory bar which existed before the amendment of section by Ordinance of 1959 the second part of the sub-section must be construed to have reference only to the statutory bar and not to the contractual bar to the creation of the sub-tenancy. This contention is not acceptable for the simple reason that the second part of the subsection specifically refers to the contract between the parties and says that the sub-tenancy in question shall be valid and effectual notwithstanding anything contained in any contract. The first and the second parts of this sub-section are joined by the expression and accordingly. The expression accordingly means according to Webster agreably or suitably or in a manner confirmative to or consequently. In other words the expression accordingly connotes the consequence which is obtained in conformity with the prior proposition. The prior proposition in this case is contained in the first part of the sub-section which contemplates the removal of the statutory bar and therefore in conformity with that removal the consequences which are mentioned in the second part of the sub-section follow. If that be so it cannot be said that the consequences which are mentioned in the second part of the sub-section are confined in their operation on to the ambit of the contingency mentioned in the first part. Therefore after mentioning that the statutory bar which prevailed before the year 1959 was removed the Legislature has proceeded to narrate all the consequences which are not necessarily confined only to the bar created by the statute before the year 1959. It is for this reason that the second part of the sub-section says that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract between the parties a sub-lease assignment or transfer created before the year 1959 shall become valid and effectual. Thus the second part of sub-sec. (2) oblitrates-altogether the bar created by the statute as well as by the contract. It is for this reason that the second part of the sub-section says that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract between the parties a sub-lease assignment or transfer created before the year 1959 shall become valid and effectual. Thus the second part of sub-sec. (2) oblitrates-altogether the bar created by the statute as well as by the contract. In my opinion therefore Shri Vakils contention that confirment of validity and effectiveness on the subtenancy contemplated by second part of sub-sec. (2) does not operate on contractual bars is not found acceptable. ( 14 ) IN this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the plaintiffs suit. ( 15 ) THIS appeal therefore fails and the same is dismissed with costs. The decree of the trial court is confirmed. .