Judgment :- 1. The simple question that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 applies only to arrears of rent due from a tenant to a landlord and whether the relationship of landlord and tenant should be subsisting on the date on which the application for stay was filed under S.4. The facts of this case show that the suit was filed for an amount alleged to be due under an oral karar but that it was subsequently held that the amount due under the karar represented arrears of rent due by a tenant to the landlord in respect of his holding. The contention raised by the plaintiff petitioner before the lower Court was that the arrears of rent had subsequently been assigned by the landlord to a stranger and the tenant's right has also been assigned to a stranger and, therefore, the relationship of landlord and tenant no longer subsists and S.4 has no application to such a case. This contention was negative by the Court below and it is the correctness of this decision that is now challenged before me. 2. A reading of S.4 clearly shows that the legislature did not contemplate the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant on the date of the application as the word "tenant" or "landlord" has not been used in S.4 at all. All that S.4 contemplates is that proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of a holding or part of a holding accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1968 should not be proceeded with and should be stayed. It is nowhere mentioned, nor can be read into the provisions such an indication that the relationship of landlord and tenant should be subsisting on the date on which the application under S.4 is filed. It is sufficient if the proceedings are for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of a holding. The contention raised by the petitioner is that because the word "holding" has been used, there should be the existence of a holding on the date of the application under S 4 and, therefore, the order of the lower Court staying the proceedings is illegal. I find no force in this contention. 3. The contention raised by the petitioner is that because the word "holding" has been used, there should be the existence of a holding on the date of the application under S 4 and, therefore, the order of the lower Court staying the proceedings is illegal. I find no force in this contention. 3. S.4 (a), on a fair reading, can be interpreted as to mean only that the arrears of rent should have accrued in respect of a holding on the date the rent accrued due. It does not mean that the holding should subsist and the relationship of landlord and tenant should also subsist on the date the application for stay has been filed. It is conceded by both sides that the arrears of rent in respect of which the claim is now filed accrued due in respect of a holding as between a tenant and landlord and that is sufficient so far as S.4 is concerned. 4. Light is thrown on this question by a decision of this Court in Neelacantan v. Madhavan Pillai (1966 KLT. 679). There, the same question arose in respect of the interpretation of S.73 of Act 1 of 1964. There was the additional factor in that case that under S.73 the word "tenant" had been used and the Subordinate Judge relied on the definition of the word "tenant" to come to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant must be subsisting at the time the relief is claimed. When this matter came up in revision before this Court, it was argued that since the definition is used in the present tense, the relationship of landlord and tenant should have continued as on the date of the proceedings which was the reasoning which had been adopted by the Subordinate Judge also. When this matter came up in revision before this Court, it was argued that since the definition is used in the present tense, the relationship of landlord and tenant should have continued as on the date of the proceedings which was the reasoning which had been adopted by the Subordinate Judge also. This Court, however, repelled that contention and held that: "The definition can only be in the present tense, whether it related to a tenancy which subsisted at a past date or a tenancy which is to come into existence on a future date-Prom this fact alone it is wrong to conclude that the legislature did not intend to confer benefit, especially under S.73, on a person who is not a tenant at the moment." The Court finally held that S.73 would apply to all arrears of rent accrued due from a tenant although the relationship of landlord and tenant is not subsisting on the date of the action. 5. Now, it has to be remembered that S.4 of Act 20 of 1970 was enacted with the specific purpose of remedying the evils that were brought about by the striking down of S.73 of Act 1 of 1964 by this Court and, therefore, on the principle laid down in Heydon's case it has to be held that S.4 takes within its ambit all those cases which S.73 governed. In that view, it has to be held that the continued relationship of landlord and tenant is not a condition precedent for the application of S.4 and that it is sufficient if the proceedings related to the recovery of arrears of rent which accrued at a time when there was a subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant. 6. The decision of the Court below is therefore correct and the revision petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order regarding costs. M.C.. Dismissed.