JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE applicants were convicted and sentenced to payment of fine under section 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, for breaches of Regulations 99 and 102 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, by the Magistrate First Class, chhindwara, The appeal preferred by them was dismissed by the Sessions judge, Chhindwara, except as to the reduction of the amount of fine. This revision filed by them was first heard by Golvalker, J. , who by his order dated september 10, 1963 allowed the parties to lead further evidence on certain points. The record was sent to this Court by the trial Magistrate after recording additional evidence in March 1964. Golvalker, J. on March 31, 1964 ordered that the case be put up on a fixed date after vacation. It is regrettable that the case was thereafter not listed at all for eight years and it came up before me in September 1972. ( 2. ) THE applicants H. S. Sachdeo, G. C. Singh Roy, P. K. Sen, g. N. Banerjee and Jogiram were respectively Agent, Manager, Assistant manager, Overman and Sirdar of the Eklehra Colliery at the relevant time. The colliery is owned by a company, the Amalgamated Coal-fields limited. On September 9, 1959 at 6 30 A. M. an accident occurred at the junction of two galleries, 17 south rise and 4 east level, in Pit No. 3 of the colliery. A part of the roof of the junction measuring 12x 8and varying in thickness from 21/2 to 9 fell down killing Baboolal, timber Mazdoor and Sk. Jamil, coal cutting machine helper. The Inspector of Mines G. S. Icchparani (P. W. 1) visited the place of the accident on the same day. A site plan was prepared under his direction by the Surveyor of the colliery P. B. Guin (P. W. 3 ). The site plan is Ex. P-2. The Inspector conducted an inquiry regarding the cause of the accident in which he recorded the statements of the Manager, Assistant Manager, Overman and the Sirdar. These statements are Exhibits P -3 to P -7. On the complaint of the Inspector the applicants were prosecuted for the offence under section 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, on the ground that they contravened regulations 99 and 102 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957. ( 3. These statements are Exhibits P -3 to P -7. On the complaint of the Inspector the applicants were prosecuted for the offence under section 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, on the ground that they contravened regulations 99 and 102 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957. ( 3. ) ON a consideration of the evidence, the trial Magistrate came to the conclusion that the width of the gallery at the northern end of the junction was 16 feet and 6 inches and thus the width was in excess of the maximum of 4. 8 metres (15 feet and 10 inches) prescribed by Regulation 99 (2 ). It was further held that the roof at the junction was of shale, there was a line of fault at a distance of eighty to hundred feet, and a line of slip in the roof of the western gallery. It was also held that the root of the junction was supported by three cross bars, two bars and three props which was inadequate support and the roof was not made and kept secure as required by Regulation 102. The cause of the accident was that there were two slips in the roof of the junction itself and as the roof was not adequately supported a portion of it fell down. The trial Magistrate, however, did not specifically hold that these slips in the junction were visible before the accident. In giving his findings against the accused the Magistrate admitted in evidence their statements made to the Inspector of Mines during the inquiry conducted by him. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge disregarded the statements of the accused made by them to the Inspector on the ground that these statements were not put to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and they were not given an opportunity to offer any explanation. However, on the basis of the other evidence on the record the Sessions Judge upheld all the findings of the trial Magistrate except as to the visibility of the slips in the roof of the junction. I have already said that the trial Magistrate did not specifically hold that these slips were visible before the accident. The sessions Judge held that the slips were visible even before the accident. I have already said that the trial Magistrate did not specifically hold that these slips were visible before the accident. The sessions Judge held that the slips were visible even before the accident. He agreed with the conclusion of the trial Magistrate that the width of the gallery at the junction was in excess of the prescribed maximum and the roof was not adequately supported, therefore, Regulations 99 and 102 were contravened and the accused were guilty under section 74 of the Mines Act. ( 4. ) IT is convenient first to take up the point regarding the admissibility of the statements made by the applicants to the Inspector of Mines during the inquiry conducted by him on the ground of non-compliance with section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that no questions were put to the applicants pertaining to these statements in their examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, but it is now well settled that omission of this nature is a mere irregularity and if no prejudice is caused to the accused, the omission has no repercussion on the trial; [see Muniappan v. State of Madras ( AIR 1961 SC 175 .), Keki Bejonji v. State of bombay ( AIR 1961 SC 967 .), Rama Shankar v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1962 SC 1239 .), Bibhuti v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1969 SC 381 .) and Ajit Kumar v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1972 SC 2058 .)]. As explained by the Supreme Court in Mathew v. T. C. State ( AIR 1956 SC 241 .), if the accused is not afforded the opportunity to explain a circumstance appearing in the evidence against him, "he is entitled to ask the appellate Court to place him in the same position as he would have been in had he been asked. In other words, he is entitled to ask the appellate Court, which is the ultimate Court of fact, to take the explanation that he would have given in the first Court into consideration when weighing the evidence in just the same way as it would have done if it were there all along. " Their Lordships further said in the same case : "therefore, all he is entitled to say on appeal is, i was not asked to explain this matter. " Their Lordships further said in the same case : "therefore, all he is entitled to say on appeal is, i was not asked to explain this matter. Here is my explanation, this is what I would have said ; please consider it. " In the instant case the applicants no doubt raised the question of noncompliance with the requirement of section 342 in the appellate Court bat they did not put forward the explanation which they would have given had an opportunity been given to them to explain the statements made by them to the Inspector the learned Sessions Judge without considering the question of prejudice and any possible explanation which the accused would have given, excluded the statements made by them to the Inspector from consideration on the mere non-compliance with section 342 by the trial Magistrate. In this Court on the authority of Mathews case where this course was adopted, I asked learned counsel appearing for the applicants to indicate after consulting them as to what explanation they might have given had they been afforded opportunity to explain the statements. The learned counsel stated that the accused admit their signatures on the said statements but they deny to have made the statements. The explanation offered by the accused is entirely worthless. The statements Exs. P-3 to P-7 have been proved by icchparani (P. W. 2), the Inspector, and they are admittedly signed by the accused. It is incomprehensible that officers of the status of Manager, Assistant Manager and Overman would sign certain statements without having made them. As regards the Sirdar, his statement Ex. P-3 is not only signed by him but also by the Manager with a certificate that it was properly recorded by the Inspector. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the statements exs. P-3 to P-7 were correctly recorded by the Inspector. In my opinion, no prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the non-compliance with section 342, and these statements cannot be excluded from consideration on that ground. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel then contended that an Inspector of Mines is a police officer within the meaning of that expression as used in section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made to him are inadmissible as they amount to confessions. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel then contended that an Inspector of Mines is a police officer within the meaning of that expression as used in section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made to him are inadmissible as they amount to confessions. Under section 7 of the Mines Act the Inspector has been conferred the power of examination and enquiry in order to ascertain whether the provisions of the Act and of the Regulations, rules and bye laws and of any order made thereunder are observed in the case of any mine. If he has reason to believe as a result of inspection, examination or inquiry that an offence under the Act has been or is being committed, he may search any place and take possession of any register or record appertaining to the mine and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as may be, apply to any search or seizure under the Act as they apply to any search or seizure made under the authority of a warrant issued under section 98 of the Code. It is also provided under section 75 of the Act that no prosecution shall be instituted against any owner, agent or manager for any offence under the Act, except at the instance of the chief Inspector or of the District Magistrate or of an Inspector authorised in this behalf by general or special order in writing by the Chief Inspector. The question as to when an officer can be called a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act has been considered by the Supreme court in a number of cases. All these cases were reviewed in Ramesh Chandra mehta v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1956 SC 244, para 12. 241 at p.) while dealing with a Customs Officer and the following test was laid down: "the test for determining whether an officer of Customs is to be deemed a police officer is whether he is invested with all the power of a police officer qua investigation of an offence, including the power to submit a report under section 173 of the Code of criminal Procedure. " In view of this test the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehtas case rejected the contention that a Customs Officer is a police officer although he has power to detain, to arrest, to produce the person arrested before a Magistrate and to obtain an order for remand and keep in his custody with a view to examine the person so arrested and other persons to collect evidence, because he has no power to make a report under section 173; see further Illias v. Collector of customs ( AIR 1970 SC 940 . ). Following these cases it has recently been held by a Division Bench of this Court that a Food Inspector functioning as such under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is not a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act; State v. Mohd. Abdul Rehman ( AIR 1970 SC 106s. ). Applying the test laid down in these cases it is quite clear that an Inspector of Mines who has no power to arrest any person or to submit a charge sheet under section 173, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be held to be a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act, although he has power of examination, inquiry, search and seizure and he can make a complaint if an offence is committed under the Mines Act. The Patna High Court has also taken the same view; State v. B. L. Ohri ( 1972 MPLJ 951 = 1872 MPWR 584. ). Indeed, without any power of arrest it is difficult to understand how can an Inspector of Mines be in a position to extort a confession. Assuming, therefore, that the statements of the accused that were made to the Inspector of Mines in the enquiry held by him amount to confession, they are not inadmissible for an Inspector is not a police officer. ( 6. ) COMING to the facts, the site plan Ex. P-2 which was prepared by p. P. Guin (P. W. 3), the Surveyor of the Colliery, on the instructions of icchparani (P. W. 1), the Inspector, and which is also signed by the Manager, gives an idea as to the situation at the time of the accident. ( 6. ) COMING to the facts, the site plan Ex. P-2 which was prepared by p. P. Guin (P. W. 3), the Surveyor of the Colliery, on the instructions of icchparani (P. W. 1), the Inspector, and which is also signed by the Manager, gives an idea as to the situation at the time of the accident. It shows that the roof of the junction was supported by two bars (G H and IJ.), three cross bars (K L, M N and OP) and three props (Q, R and S) and that nearly half portion of the roof towards the north (OPDC) was not supported at all. As a result of the fall of the roof one of the cross bars (OP) broke down. The plan also shows the presence of two slicken sides in the roof (V W and V1 W1), a line of slip (1-2) in the gallery 4 level east near the junction in question and a line of fault (E F) touching the galleries 15 and 16 south rise. The width of the gallery on the northern side of the junction (CD) was 166". The conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge that the roof of the junction was not adequately supported is based on the facts that the width of the gallery at the junction was in excess of the prescribed limit, the roof was of shale, two slips in the roof were visible before the accident, there was a line of fault nearby touching 15 and 16 south rise and a line of slip in 4 east level. It has also been found that the roof was supported by two bars, three cross bars and three props as shown in the site plan Ex. P-2 and having regard to the facts of the case, this support given to the roof was not sufficient to make the roof secure within the meaning of the Regulation 102. ( 7. ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants has not disputed in this court that the width of the gallery at the northern end of the junction was in excess of the prescribed limit. Regulation 99 lays down that save with the previous permission in writing of the Regional Inspector and subject to such conditions as he may specify therein no gallery in a seam or section shall exceed 3 metres in height or 4. Regulation 99 lays down that save with the previous permission in writing of the Regional Inspector and subject to such conditions as he may specify therein no gallery in a seam or section shall exceed 3 metres in height or 4. 8 metres (15 feet and 10 inches) in width at any place. It is now conceded that the width of the gallery at the northern end of the junction, as shown in the site plan, was 16 feet and b inches and thus the width at that place was 8 inches in excess of the prescribed maximum. Contravention of regulation 99 is, therefore, clearly established. It is also not disputed that the existence of the line of fault E F, touching the galleries 15 and 16 south rise, as also of the line of slip 1-2 in 4 east level was known to the applicants even prior to the accident. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants has challenged the finding that the roof was of shale. He referred to the evidence of Udal (D. W. 1), Gaffar (D. W. 2) and Sk. Farid (D W. 3) who state that the roof was of coal. The statement of Iechparani (P. W. 1) that the roof was of shale has been criticised on the ground that he inspected the roof after the accident and as the layer of coal from the roof fell down in the accident making the layer of shale visible, his statement cannot be relied upon to show that the roof was of shale even prior to the accident. The criticism of the statement of Iechparani (P. W. 1) assumes that the layer of the roof that fell down was of coal. There is no evidence to show that the fallen roof was of coal. Moreover, the entire roof of the junction had not fallen and, therefore, Icchparanis inspection of the roof that remained intact could give rise to the inference that the entire roof before the accident was of shale. Purther, the statements of the applicants Jogiram, G. N. Banerjee and G. C. Singh Roy taken by the Inspector during his enquiry, which are respectively Exhibits P-3, P-4 and P 6, contain clear admissions that the roof of the junction was of shale. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the roof of the junction was of coal and not of shale. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the roof of the junction was of coal and not of shale. ( 9. ) NEXT it was argued that the finding that the slips at places V W and VI WI were visible before the accident is erroneous. Before proceeding to discuss the evidence on this point it is necessary to understand the meaning o) these expressions fault, slip and slicken side. A fault is a crack or fissure in the strata, more or Jess vertical, accompanied with a vertical displacement of the beds either upwards or downwards from their original position. When the displacement is not more than a few feet the fault is generally known to miners by the term hitch, heave and slip. By slicken-side is meant the highly polished surface plane of a fault or slip, caused by friction through movement along the two surfaces on either side of the fault plane. A perusal of the site plan Ex. P-2 will go to show that the slicken sides v W and V1 W1 are shown within that area of the roof which fell down in the accident. The site plan does not show any slip or fault extending beyond that area of the roof which fell down, Icchparanis (P. W. 1) evidence is to the effect that, although not shown in the map, the slips extended beyond v W and V1 W1 in that portion of the roof which had not fallen and from this his conclusion is that the slips at V W and V1 W1 must have been visible before the accident. The applicants do not accept that the slips extended beyond V W and V1 W1. On this point 1 am not prepared to accept the statement of Icchparani (P. W. 1 ). The site plan Ex. P-2 contains all details and was prepared on the instructions of Icchparani. It shows even those faults and slips which are not in the junction. Having regard to the details given in Ex. P-2 it is reasonable to conclude that if the slips had extended in the roof of the junction beyond V W and V1 W1 that would have certainly been shown in Ex. P-2. The Surveyor Gain (P. W. 3) who had prepared Ex P-2 has deposed that the slips were not seen extending beyond V W and V1 W1. P-2 it is reasonable to conclude that if the slips had extended in the roof of the junction beyond V W and V1 W1 that would have certainly been shown in Ex. P-2. The Surveyor Gain (P. W. 3) who had prepared Ex P-2 has deposed that the slips were not seen extending beyond V W and V1 W1. Further, there is the evidence of Gafoor (P. W. 4), Udal (D W. 1) a,,d Gaffar (D. W. 2) that the slips in the roof of the junction were not visible prior to the accident. The learned counsel Shri Jain who appeared for the complainant in this revision did not dispute that it the fissure in the strata does not extend upto the bottom of the roof a slip may remain hidden and may become visible only after the fall of the roof. Icchparani (P. W. 1) also in his evidence admitted that undetected slips may lead to accidents. Having regard to the entire evidence on this point, my conclusion is that the slicken sides v W and V1 W1 became visible after the fall of the roof and that the slips existing there were not visible prior to the accident. On mis point I do not agree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge. ( 10. ) ON the question of support of the roof the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the roof was supported by four cross bars and the finding that it was supported only by three cross bars is not correct. The site plan Ex. P-2 shows that prior to the accident the roof was supported by two bars (C H and IJ), three props (Q, R and S) and three cross bars (K L, M N and OP ). The cross bar OP broke down as a result of the fall of the roof. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is that there was a fourth cross bar beyond OP towards the north which fell down on the ground after the accident, and is, therefore, not shown in Ex. P-2. It is true that Gafoor (P. W. 4), Udal (D W 1), Gaffar (D. W. 2) and Sk. Farid (D. W. 3) have all deposed that four cross bars were fixed on September 8. P-2. It is true that Gafoor (P. W. 4), Udal (D W 1), Gaffar (D. W. 2) and Sk. Farid (D. W. 3) have all deposed that four cross bars were fixed on September 8. It is also true that Gain (P. W. 3), the Surveyor, also states in cross-examination that on 8th he saw four cross bars. But, in my opinion, the statements of these witnesses on this point have rightly been rejected, for if there had been a fourth cross bar lying on the ground that would have certainly been shown in the site plan Ex. P-2 which was prepared by Gain himself. The applicant jogiram in his statement Ex. P-3, taken by the Inspector, clearly admitted that there were only three cross bars supporting the roof. Therefore, the evidence of Iechparani (P W. 1) has rightly been accepted that he did not find any fourth cross bar at the time of his inspection and that the roof was supported by three cross bars as shown in the site plan Ex, P-2 and not by four cross bars. ( 11. ) BEFORE proceeding further to consider the provisions of the Mines act and the Goal Mines Regulations it is convenient now to restate the facts found on which the liability of the applicants has to be ascertained. These facts are that the roof of the junction was of shale there was a fault plane touching the galleries 15 and 16 south rise at a distance of 80 to 100 feet from the junction, and a slip plane in the roof of 4 level gallery towards west of the junction. There were two hidden slips in the roof of the junction which became visible after the accident. The width of the gallery at the northern extremity of the junction was 6 inches in excess of the prescribed maximum. The roof of the junction was supported by two bars, three props and three cross bars as shown in Ex. P-2, There was no support for nearly half of the roof which is shown as Q P D G. A portion of the roof fell down killing two workmen. ( 12. ) THE Goal Mines Regulations, 1937, were made under section 57 of the Mines Act, 1952. They repealed and replaced the Goal Mines Regulations, 1926 which were made under section 29 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923. ( 12. ) THE Goal Mines Regulations, 1937, were made under section 57 of the Mines Act, 1952. They repealed and replaced the Goal Mines Regulations, 1926 which were made under section 29 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923. Regulation 99 (2) of the 1957 Regulations prescribes the maximum height and width of a gallery which is not to be exceeded save with the previous permission in writing of the Regional Inspector; the maximum width prescribed is 4. 8 metres. Regulation 102 (1) which is the important regulation to be considered in this case reads: "the roof and sides of all working places and travelling roadways, including airways and travelling roadways to second outlets, shall be made and kept secure. " The Regulations also specify the duties and responsibilities of the officials. Regulation 44 (3) (a) provides that the Sirdar "shall see that the roof and sides of all travelling roadways to, and working places in, his district are made and kept secure". Duties and responsibilities of the Overman are contained in Regulation 43. It is his duty to enforce in his district to the best of his power the provisions of the Act and the Regulations and he can give such directions as may be necessary to enforce compliance with those provisions, and to secure the safety of the district and the safety and proper discipline of the persons employed therein. The Assistant Managers duties and responsibilities are laid down in Regulation 42. Clause (1) of this regulation provides that the Assistant Manager shall see that in the part of the mine assigned to him by the Manager, all work is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act and of the regulations and orders made thereunder. The duties and responsibilities of the owner, agent and Manager are contained in section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952, which reads as follows: "18. Duties and responsibilities of owners, agents and managers.- (1) The owner, agent and manager of every mine shall be responsible that all operations carried on in connection therewith are conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations, rules and bye-laws and of any orders made thereunder. Duties and responsibilities of owners, agents and managers.- (1) The owner, agent and manager of every mine shall be responsible that all operations carried on in connection therewith are conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations, rules and bye-laws and of any orders made thereunder. (2) In the event of any contravention of any such provisions by any person whosoever, the owner, agent and manager of the mine shall each be deemed also to be guilty of such contravention unless he proves that he had taken all reasonable means, by publishing and to the best of his power enforcing those provisions, to prevent such contravention: provided that the owner or agent shall not be so deemed if he proves- (a) that he was not in the habit of taking, and did not in respect of the matter in question take, any part in the management of the mine; and (b) that he had made all the financial and other provisions necessary to enable the manager to carry out his duties; and (c) that the offence was committed without his knowledge, consent or connivance. (3) Save as hereinbefore provided, it shall not be a defence in any proceedings brought against an owner or agent of a mine under this section that a manager of the mine has been appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. " (N. B. The section is quoted as it stood at the relevant time)Contravention of any provision of the Act, or of any regulation, rule or bye-law or of any order made thereunder is made punishable under sections 73 and 74 of the Act which read as under : 73. Disobedience of orders.-Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any regulation, rule or bye-law or of any order made thereunder for the contravention of which no penalty is hereinbefore provided shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both, and, if the contravention is continued after conviction, with a further fine which may extend to one hundred rupees for each day on which the contravention is so continued. 74. 74. Contravention of law with dangerous results.- (1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any regulation, rule or bye-law or of any order made thereunder, shall be punishable,- (a) if such contravention results in loss of life, with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both; or (b) if such contravention results in serious bodily injury, with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both; or (c) if such contravention otherwise causes injury or danger to persons employed in the mine or other persons in or about the mine, with imprisonment which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. " (N. B. The sections are quoted as they stood at the relevant time)Section 77 provides for exemption of the owner, agent or manager from liability in certain cases. As defence under this section has not been taken, it is not necessary to quote it. Section 87 which gives protection to actions taken in good faith reads : "87. Protection of action taken in good faith.-No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding whatever shall lie against any person for any thing which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act. " ( 13. ) IT has not been disputed before me that the junction where the accident took place was a "working place" and the point for consideration is whether the roof of the junction was made and kept secure as required by regulation 102. This raises the question as to the meaning of the words "shall be made and kept secure" in Regulation 102. This regulation is almost identical with Regulation No. 67 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. Thus the regulation in this form has stood in this country for about 46 years, but it is surprising that there is no reported decision on its construction. Assistance is, however, available from English cases which have construed similar language in section 49 of the Goal Mines Act, 1911 (1 and 2 Geo. 5 c. 50 ). This section provided that "the roof and sides of every travelling road and working place shall be made secure". Assistance is, however, available from English cases which have construed similar language in section 49 of the Goal Mines Act, 1911 (1 and 2 Geo. 5 c. 50 ). This section provided that "the roof and sides of every travelling road and working place shall be made secure". A contravention of the section was made a punishable offence under section 75 and in the event of any contravention by any person whomsoever, the owner, agent and manager of the mine were each guilty of the offence unless he proved that he had taken all reasonable means by publishing and to the best of his power enforcing the provisions of the Act to prevent their contravention or non-compliance. The offence was normally punishable with fine but in case it was committed wilfully by the personal act, personal default, or personal negligence of the person accused, the Court could pass a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months (section 101 ). The owner, agent, or manager could escape criminal liability if he proved that the contravention or non-compliance was due to causes over which he had no control and against the happening of which it was impracticable for him to make provision [section 102 (3)]. The owner could also escape civil liability for damages as for a breach of statutory duty if he showed that it was not reasonably practicable to avoid or prevent the breach [section 102 (8)]. The Coal Mines Act, 1911, was repealed and replaced by the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954. The language of section 48 of the 1954 Act which has taken the place of section 49 of the 1911 Act is materially different and the cases construing it are only of assistance in so far as they state the meaning of section 49 of the 1911 Act. ( 14. ) THE English Courts have generally held that subject to escape clauses in section 102 the duty to make the roof and side of every travelling road and working place secure imposed by section 49 of the 1911 Act was an absolute duty and was of a higher degree than the common law duty to take reasonable care; see Edwards v. National Coal Board ( (1949) 1 All E B 743 (C A.) ). In Gough v. National Coal Board ( (1959) 2 All E R 164 (H L ).) it was said by Lord Reid that it was well established that the duty under section 49 was an absolute duty (p. 168)and he further said that the word "secure" in that section meant "in such a state that there will be no danger from accidental falls" (p. 170 ). In the same case Lord Tucker dealing with the meaning of the word secure observed: "security from what ? I would say security from accident or unintentional collapse or falls, as distinct from security from the natural consequences of the deliberate assaults inherent in the operation of mining to which both the face and the roof are subjected from time to time. In Marshall v. Gotham Co. Ltd. , ( (1954) 1 Aller 937.), I had occasion to refer to the word "secure" in a regulation identical with section 49 and said (ibid. , at p. 943): "i agree that the word secure does not involve security from the effects of earthquake or an atom bomb, but I think it must include security from all the known geological hazards inherent in mining operations. " "i do not desire to qualify in any way what I said in that case, but would only observe that deliberate assault on the mine face was not within my contemplation as a geological hazard. " (pp. 171, 172)Then in Brown v. National Coal Board ( (1962) 1 Aller 81 (H L ).) while construing section 48 of the 1954 Act, the House of Lords again adverted to section 49 of the 1911 Act. Lord Redeliffe, with whom Viscount Simonds and Lord Reid agreed, emphasised the absolute character of the obligation imposed by section 49 in his speech as follows: "no doubt, when such matters as public health or the safety and protection of workmen are in question, the legislature has again and again imposed absolute obligations in the contemplation that offences against them may be committed without the presence of mens rea or even though the offender could by no means have complied with the obligation imposed. He has not so much a duty to perform as a responsibility for circumstances. He has not so much a duty to perform as a responsibility for circumstances. Such obligations are typically created by requiring that a certain state or condition of things is at all times to persist or that a person is to do some specified thing without qualification. I accept that an obligation of this nature was created by section 49 of the coal Mines Act, 1911. " And referring to the meaning of the word "secure" he observed : "when dealing with the same word in the earlier Act of 1911 and the duty thereby imposed to make a roof secure, the court3 have not accepted impregnability as a test. It has generally been recognised that an offence would not occur if a fall was due to certain causes which can be regarded as lying outside ordinary skilled engineering provision, e g. an earthquake, an atom bomb detonation, an explosion [see, for instance, Marshall v. Gotham, Co. Ltd , Jackson v. National Coal Board ( (1955) 1 Aller 145.) and or deliberate operations designed to bring the roof down see Gough v. National Coal Boand. I think, therefore, that the meaning of "secure" was correctly stated by Mo Nair, J. , in the Cough case, when in the court of appeal he said: "secure" means a physical condition of stability which will ordinarily result in safety. . . . . . " Lord Denning, however, in the same case was of opinion that although the obligation imposed by section 49 was higher than the one under common law, it was not absolute and the element of foresee ability entered into it. He explained his point of view as follows : "my Lords, I do not think that the Act of 1911 ever imposed an absolute duty in that sense. It imposed a high duty but not an absolute one. These were its constituents; First, if the roof was not secure, then it had to be made secure. What did "secure" mean in this context ? Foresee ability certainly came into it. The mine owner was not liable to make the roof secure unless he ought reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of a fall. Thus the mine owner was not bound to provide security from the effects of earthquake or atom bomb see Marshall v. Gotham Co. Ltd. by Lord Tucker. Foresee ability certainly came into it. The mine owner was not liable to make the roof secure unless he ought reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of a fall. Thus the mine owner was not bound to provide security from the effects of earthquake or atom bomb see Marshall v. Gotham Co. Ltd. by Lord Tucker. And he was not bound to provide security from an explosion caused by a miner himself see Jackson v National Coal Board. But if the possibility - I streets the word "possibility" - of a fall was a reasonably foreseeable, the mine owner was bound to provide security against it. Thus he was bound to provide against the danger from a "glassy slant" even though it was rare and not discoverable by examination beforehand [see Edwards v. National Coal Board] for the simple reason that it was a known geological hazard inherent in mining operations [see Marshall v. Gotham Co. Ltd. ] by Lord Tucker. In short, a roof was not "secure" within the meaning of the Act of 1911 if it was "a possible cause of injury to anybody acting in a way in which a human being may be reasonably expected to act in circumstances which may be reasonably expected to occur. " My lords, I have taken those words from the well-known judgment of DU PARCO J. , in walker v. Bletchley Elettons, Lid. ( (1937) 1 ALLER at p. 175.) for they seem to me to express just the right shade of meaning of the word "secure" under the Coal Mines Act, 1911, as they do of the words "securely fenced" under the Factories Act, 1937 (see Burns v. Joseph Terry and Sons, Ltd. ( (1950) 2 Aller at pp. 989 to 991.)) by somerwell, L. J. approved in John Summers and sons, Ltd. v. Frost ( (1955) 1 Aller at p. 885.) by Lord Reid They impose a higher duty than is imposed by the common law; for the common law does not require a man provide to security against a possible cause of injury, even though it is foreseeable [see Baltone v. Stone ( (1951) ALER 1078.)] secondly, if the roof was not secure, then there was a continuing obligation to remedy it. It did not cease for any length of time at all. It did not cease for any length of time at all. Wherever a portion of the roof became insecure it had immediately to be made secure, see Gough v. National Coal Board. So the obligation was not only to make but also to keep secure. But what had the mine owner to do to satisfy this obligation ? He had to do whatever was necessary for the purpose. Not merely what was reasonable or desirable but what was necessary. He had to take any measures that might be necessary to eliminate the risk, such as lining the sides of every travelling road so as to provide security against a "glassy slant", [see Edwards v. National Coal Board, (supra)] This too, was a higher duty than the common law; for the common law only requires an employer to take all reasonable precautions for the workmens safety, see Smith v. Baker and sons ( (1891) AC at p. 353.), by Lord Waston". ( 15. ) HAVING considered the English cases on the construction of section 49 of the Coal Mines Act, 19ll, I prefer to adopt the views of Lord denning in Browns case for construing Regulation 102. I have already said that according to Lord Denniss opinion the duty imposed by section 49 of the English Act was a high duty but not an absolute one and the element of foresee ability to some extent oxtered into it. This view must be adopted for construing Regulation 102 for the additional reasons that the Indian Act makes the contravention of the regulation punishable with imprisonment or fine even though the default may not be wilful or due to negligence (under the English act sentence of imprisonment could he imposed only if the default was wilful) and it has no escape clauses similar to those contained in section 102 of the english Act. In my opinion, Regulation 102 means that the roof and sides of working places and roads shall be maintained in a physical condition of stability to prevent possibility of accidents arising from reasonably foreseeable hazards in mining operations. In my opinion, Regulation 102 means that the roof and sides of working places and roads shall be maintained in a physical condition of stability to prevent possibility of accidents arising from reasonably foreseeable hazards in mining operations. I am also of opinion that if there is a fall it is presumptive evidence of breach of Regulation 102 that the roof or side, as the case may be, was not made or kept secure and it would be for the accused to show that its possibility could not be reasonably foreseen or guarded against; on this point I also rely upon the opinion of Lord Denning in Browns case (see p. 91 of the report ). ( 16. ) COMING to the facts of the instant case, the fall of roof on the principles stated above itself establishes that the supports provided by the management were not adequate to maintain the roof in a physical condition of stability and that the roof was not made or kept secure as required by the regulation. The question then is whether the possibility of fall of roof could not be reasonably foreseen or guarded against. It was argued on behalf of the applicants that it was not possible to detect the existence of the slips in the roof of the junction and as the fall of roof was essentially because of the hidden slips, it could not have been reasonably foreseen that the supports provided were not sufficient to maintain the roof in a stable condition. I have already held that the slips in the roof of the junction were not visible before the accident, but there is no evidence to show that the usual method of testing the roof by sounding it with a hammer was followed and the fault was not detected. Even assuming that the slips could not have been detected, yet the possibility of fall of roof because of a hidden or undetected slips is a well-known hazard in mining operations (see Coal Mining by Robert Peel, 20th edition p. 368), which is referred to in the cross-examination of Ichhaparani (P. W. 1) and hence the possibility of such an accident is reasonably foreseeable and the regulation casts an obligation to prevent it. In Edwards v. National coal Board (supra) there was a fall from the side of a travelling roadway because of a latent defect known as a glassy slant the presence of which could not have been detected, but it was held that there was a breach of the duty to keep the side of road secure. This case was cited with approval by Lord denning in the passage earlier extracted from his speech in Browns case to emphasize that even the possibility of an accident is to be guarded against. Moreover, the facts that the roof was of shale, a fault plane was discovered touching the galleries 14 and 15 south rise, a slip plane was detected nearby in 4 east level and the width of the gallery at the northern end of the junction was in excess of the maximum width prescribed, were sufficient to indicate that the roof of the junction may possibly be weak requiring support. Indeed, the applicant Sen (the Assistant Manager) admitted in his statement made to the Inspector (Ex. P-7) that he had instructed Banerjee (the Overman)to support the roof of the junction in the same manner as 16 south and 3 east heading junction had been supported. He also admitted that the 16 south and 3 east heading junction had been supported with cross bars at the interval of about 3 feet and props were set under the cross bars to support the span of the cross bars. He further admitted that he inspected the junction after the accident and he found that it was not supported according to his instructions. Banerjee in his statement (Ex. P-5) also admitted that instructions were given to the Sirdar to support the junction but after the accident it was found that it was not supported according to the instructions and there should have been one more cross bar and three more props to support the roof. The Manager Singh Roy also admitted in his statement (Ex. P-6) that there should have been a few more vertical props to make the support adequate. These statements clearly show that the weakness of the roof was anticipated and it was, therefore, decided to properly support it but the support actually given as found after the accident was not in accordance with the instructions and was inadequate to support the roof. These statements clearly show that the weakness of the roof was anticipated and it was, therefore, decided to properly support it but the support actually given as found after the accident was not in accordance with the instructions and was inadequate to support the roof. It is thus clear that the necessity of a higher degree of support than what was found was actually foreseen. Learned counsel for the applicants referred to me the statement of Prof. B. S. Verma (D. W. 8) to show that the fall of roof could not have been avoided even by giving more support. In cross-examination Shri Verma, however, admitted in answer to question No.51 that the fall could have been prevented if the timbering had been skin to skin. I am, therefore, of opinion that the roof of the junction was not made or kept secure as required by Regulation 102. 16-A. The next question is whether the applicants can be made liable for contravention of Regulation 102. I have earlier referred to the duties imposed by the regulations on the Sirdar, Overman and Assistant Manager. It is the duty of the Sirdar as provided in Regulation 44 (3) to see that the roof and sides in his district are made and kept secure. The Overman and the Assistant Manager have also the responsibility to see that the regulations are complied with within their jurisdictional area (see Regulations 42 and 43.) Having regard to these provisions the Sirdar, Overman and the assistant Manager are liable for the contravention of Regulation 102. Further, having regard to section 18 of the Act, the agent and Manager must also be deemed to be guilty, for they have not proved that they had taken all reasonable means, by publishing and to the best of their power enforcing the regulations so prevent its contravention; (see Mohanlal v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1961 SC 1543 , p. 1547. ). The defence open under the proviso to section 18 (2) has also not been taken. As the contravention of the regulation has resulted in loss of life, all the applicants must be held to have committed the offence under section 74 of the Act. ). The defence open under the proviso to section 18 (2) has also not been taken. As the contravention of the regulation has resulted in loss of life, all the applicants must be held to have committed the offence under section 74 of the Act. It was argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that section 74 must be construed to enforce only such contraventions which are wilful or which are caused by negligence and not those which result from mere error of judgment. The object of the Act and the Regulations is the protection of workmen and to ensure their health and safety in mining operations. When such is the object and the section does not expressly provide that men rea. shall be an essential ingredient of the offence, it is difficult to read that requirement by implication ; (see the speech of Lord Redeliffe in Browns case which i have earlier extracted.) Indeed, the point raised is concluded against the applicants by two decisions of this Court; State of M. P Jamilkhan ( (1957) MPLJ Note No. 196.) and State of M. P. v. P. V. Chaturbnuj ( (1962) MPLJ Note No. 476.)]. Moreover, the instant case is not one of error of judgment. I have already referred to the statements of the Overman and the Assistant Manager made to the Inspector. These statements clearly show that they had judged correctly that the roof should be given a higher degree of support than it was actually given and it was sheer negligence and lack of supervision that the roof was not adequately supported. ( 17. ) IT was lastly argued that the applicants are entitled to the protection conferred by section 87 which I have already quoted. The section bars suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act. Assuming that the section protects not only acts but omissions, the act to come under the protection must have been done or intended to be done "under the Act" i. e. in compliance with the provisions of the Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder. Act or omissions which amount to contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules or regulations made under it do not qualify for protection under section 87. Act or omissions which amount to contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules or regulations made under it do not qualify for protection under section 87. This section is identical with section 117 of the factories Act, 1948, which was construed by the Supreme Court in State of gujarat v. Kansara Manila ( AIR 1964 SC 1893 . ). In that case their Lordships said : "there must be a compliance or an intended compliance with a provision of the Act, before the protection can be claimed. The section cannot cover a case of a breach or an intended breach of the Act however honest the conduct otherwise. " (p. 1897.)The above passage must also govern the construction of section 87 of the Mines Act. Applying it, it is clear that the applicants who omitted to make the roof secure in contravention of Regulation 102 are not entitled to any protection under section 87. ( 18. ) THE revision fails and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.