Judgment.- These two petitions are against the conviction of the same accused in two different cases one against a conviction under section 70 B of the City Police Act and another against a conviction under section 71 of the said Act by the First class Magistrate Bench Court at Hyderabad in C.C. Nos. 2254 and 2807 of 1969 respectively. 2. The only point urged in these revisions by Mr. Hasan and Mr. Dixit the learned Counsel is that the offences under above provisions, for which the accused were convicted are non-cognizable offences that under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, no police officer should investigate a non-cognizable offence without the order of a Magistrate of the 1st or second class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial and as no such order had been obtained in these two cases, the. filing of the charge-sheets by the police is bad and the entire trial is vitiated. 3. Section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “‘Cognizable offence’ means an offence for and ‘cognizable case’ means a case in which a police-officer, within or without the presidency-towns may in accordance with the second schedule or under any law for the time being in force arrest without warrant”. It is now contended that at the bottom of Schedule II in the Criminal Procedure Code, it is shown that with regard to offences under other laws, if the offence is one punishable with imprisonment for less than one year, the accused concerned shall not be arrested without a warrant and as the offences with which the accused had been charged in this case being those under sections 70 and 71 of the City Police Act punishable only with a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 8 days or fine in the case of section 70 and only with a fine in the case of section 71, are not cognizable offences and as such the provisions of section 155(2) have to be strictly complied with and as there has been no such compliance in so far as the sanction of the Magistrate has not been obtained the trial is vitiated. 4. The above contention is untenable. What is contained at the bottom of Schedule II of Criminal Procedure Code, is a general provision. 4. The above contention is untenable. What is contained at the bottom of Schedule II of Criminal Procedure Code, is a general provision. Section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, defining a ‘cognisable offence’ itself says that it will be a cognizable offence if the police officer may in accordance with the second schedule or under any law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. In these cases the offences may not be cognizable offences, as per the second schedule but they are cognizable under the Hyderabad City Police Act. The accused have been prosecuted for the offences under sections 70 and 71 of the Hyderabad City Police Act. Section 30(b) of the said Act stipulates that any police officer may without an order from the Magistrate and without a warrant may arrest any person who is liable to be punished for offences under sections 70 and 71 committed before him. Therefore to that extent they become cognizable offences. In both the cases we are concerned with, the accused were arrested without warrants as the offences were committed before the police officers and charge-sheets were filed. In Delhi Administration v. Prakash Chand1, it was held that the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act (IX of 1955), were cognisable offences, as section 5 of the Act gave the Superintendent of Police power to arrest without a warrant. In State v. Shantilal2, it was held that offence under section 26 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act (XLVI of 1955), is cognizable, as section 305 of the Act empowers a police-officer to arrest without a warrant and to take such steps as are necessary for preventing the contravention of the provisions. In Maroti v. Emperor3, it was further held that even if the power to arrest without a warrant is limited to any particular class of police officer, that does not prevent the offence under section 34 of the Police Act being regarded as a cognizable one. In Maroti v. Emperor3, it was further held that even if the power to arrest without a warrant is limited to any particular class of police officer, that does not prevent the offence under section 34 of the Police Act being regarded as a cognizable one. There also the phrase used was “it shall be lawful for any police officer to take into custody, without a warrant, any person who in his view commits any of such offences” and it was held that they should not be construed as a conditional power, that it should rather be taken as limiting the power to certain police-officers, not by any category or class, but by the conditions existing at the time of the commission of the offence, i.e., those who witnessed the offence. This answers the contention of the learned Counsel that as the police-officer could arrest without a warrant only if the offences are committed in their presence, it is a conditional power and it is not an unfettered and unconditional power and as such it would not make the offence a cognizable one. In the present case, as section 30 of the Hyderabad City Police Act itself empowers any police-officer to arrest without warrant persons committing the offences risted therein including offences under sections 70 and 71 of the Act in their presence, the offences for which the accused were prosecuted in both the Cases are cognizable offences, for which the sanction under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, is not necessary and the police themselves can file the charge sheets therefor. There is therefore no force in the contention of the learned Counsel that the trials in these cases are vitiated. 5. These two petitions are therefore dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Petitions dismissed.