JUDGMENT - The original complainant has moved this Court for accused Janardhan was acquitted in an appeal by the Second Extra Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, reversing the conviction recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, holding the accused guilty under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code and further punishing him with a fine of Rs. 75. 2. The facts in this case are really in a narrow compass. It is properly proved by the complainant that on April 22, 1968, the accused entered the premises where he used to tether his cow and took that cow to cattle-pound and this amounted to trespass within the meaning of section 441, Indian Penal Code. To support his case, the complainant examined himself as C. W. 1. He states that his house is facing north and in front of his shop there is a space where he tethers his cow. He claims that property to be in his possession exclusively and as ancestral property. On April 22, 1968, he was sitting in the shop. The accused and his cousin Yeshwant came to the site where the cow was tethered, untied the cow and began to take it to the cattle-pound. He protested and tried to prevent them whereupon the accused said that as the witness had deposed against him and on behalf of one Narayan Samarth, he was taking the cow to cattle-pound. The cow consequently was confined in the cattle-pound and the complainant got it released by paying Rs. 2.75 after about one day. He had reported the matter to the police and as police directed him to file a complaint he was moving the Court. In the cross-examination, main attack is upon his title to the property. The other facts do not appear robe at all doubted. Some suggestions are made relating to some dispute between Samarth and the accused with respect to some site which may include the present site also. He has continued to assert even in cross-examination that on the site where he was tethering his cow always belonged to him. He states that because of the incident, his relations" with the accused are now strained. C. W. 2 Gopala is a neighbour. He runs a flourmill. He has continued to assert even in cross-examination that on the site where he was tethering his cow always belonged to him. He states that because of the incident, his relations" with the accused are now strained. C. W. 2 Gopala is a neighbour. He runs a flourmill. He states that the cow of the complainant was tethered beyond the road on the open site and it was the accused who untied, the rope from the peg and took the cow to the cattle-pound. He also states that he is seeing such tethering and using of the site for the last over ten years. He also sap that it is the complainant who unyokes his bullock-carts on that site and tethers the bullocks there. He is seeing the wahiwat over this site for a long time. In cross-examination of this witness nothing much is taken out except asking him that there is a dispute between him and one Narayan Samarth and the accused. But the witness says that it relates to some different site C.W. 3 Padmakar proved and corroborated the complainant to the effect that on April 22, 1968, at about 10-15 hours, oral report was made by Krishna. That report is Exh. 14 and properly states that his cow was taken away by the accused. 3. This evidence is clear enough to establish that the premises were in the occupation of the complainant himself on the day of the incident. He was using it for tethering his cattle like bullocks as well as cow. These facts cannot be disputed and in fact are admitted in the written statement filed by the accused. In para 9 of the written statement the accused states that both the complainant and the father of the accused were on good terms previous to the incident that occurred on April 22, 1968 and as such the father of the accused had permitted the complainant to tie his cow on the land; but having learnt· about the conspiracy of the complainant with Narayan Samarth, he objected to the tying of the cow on his own land and after requests not to tether the cow which proved futile he asked his son (i.e. the accused) to take the cow to the cattle-pound and lodge it there. Defence evidence has been led. Defence evidence has been led. D. W. 1 Ganpatsao states that it was accused who took away the cow of the complainant to the cattle· pound from the site of Ganpatsao, the grand-father of the accused. The complainant was tethering the cow in the open space beyond the road. He says that the accused did not abuse nor gave threats and asserts that the site belonged to the accused. Upon that site, according to this witness, some construction, is aim done, the accused being the owner. In the cross-examination he Slates that his knowledge is hearsay and he does not know about the dispute between Narayan Samarth and the father of the accused. He was also fined in a gambling case. D.W. 2 Kondba states that the cow was tethered on the plot of Hiraman, i.e. the father of the accused. Yeshwant and the accused said to the complainant that he should untie the cow, otherwise he would take it to the cattle· pound. In examination-in-chief itself the witness says that complainant tethers his cow on the plot of the accused which belongs to the accused since about 15-16 years. In his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this fact that the complainant was tethering the cow on the site for the last 10 to 12 years is denied by the accused, Similarly, the evidence relating to the wahiwat spoken of by the prosecution witnesses is denied. The accused says that he did not remove the cow forcibly for he had already asked the complainant not to tether his cow there. To the general question he says he will file a written statement. I have already noticed the written statement which does form part of the examination of the accused. 4. Thus the plea is that the accused was the owner of the site and the occupation of the complainant was merely permissive, in that there being good relations between the parties, he was allowed to tether the cow. To put differently, the accused states that complainant was a licensee and that he had no intention either to insult, annoy or intimidate or in any manner commit any offence while he took away the cow untying its peg on the same said day. 5. Such a plea is really not available to the accused. To put differently, the accused states that complainant was a licensee and that he had no intention either to insult, annoy or intimidate or in any manner commit any offence while he took away the cow untying its peg on the same said day. 5. Such a plea is really not available to the accused. There appears to be some dispute with respect to the area; but the evidence clearly indicates that it was the complainant who was using that site for pretty long years. The complainant states-and there is no cross-examination on that point-that on the concerned day the accused was telling him that as he has given evidence against him and in favour of one Narayan Samarth, he should not tether his cow at that place. It is clear, therefore, that the accused was bent upon to evict the complainant, for he had been a witness against him. Nothing more is needed to prove the intention or the accused in such a matter. His further conduct in taking away the cow subjecting it to the cattle-pound which resulted in annoyance to the complainant is obvious. About intention, therefore, there cannot be any doubt that it was only with a view to annoy the complainant that this precipitate step was taken by the accused, in that he untied the cow and removed it to the cattle-pound which removal by itself is not permitted and clearly, therefore, the accused was taking law in his own hand. 6. The evidence given above by the defence witnesses as well as by the complainant clearly show that for a period of ten years, or over the plot where the accused entered upon and untied the cow was in the occupation of the complainant. The only plea is that it was a permissive occupation. Nonetheless, he was still in possession. The complainant says that he is the owner thereof and the accused states that he is the owner. In other words, the accused was trying to assert a title upon the title claimed by the complainant as far as the area or the portion of the land where the cow was tethered. It is, therefore, clear from the evidence in this case that the land where the cow was being tethered was in the possession and occupation of the complainant and the accused was trying to assert a title. It is, therefore, clear from the evidence in this case that the land where the cow was being tethered was in the possession and occupation of the complainant and the accused was trying to assert a title. Not only that, with an intention to annoy the complainant the accused entered upon that land but also took away the cow to the cattle· pound for no reason. That is enough to establish the ingredients of section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The learned counsel has cited certain decisions, being, Prahlad Singh v. State of J. and K.1, Ghulatan v. Kamalapati Sukla2, Mathri v. State of punjab3. Marotrao v. The State4 and S. Vullapa v. S. Bheema Row5. None of these cases will point out any universal proposition applicable to all facts. In criminal law the cases are to be understood on the facts which were being considered by the Courts. Here as I have found the accused took law in his own hand and entered upon the premises which were being used for quite a number of years by the complainant. He appears to be enraged because the complainant was a witness against him. That is enough to indicate that his entry was with an intention to annoy the complainant and the annoyance is very much available in the record of this case in that the cow was untied and taken to the cattle-pound. There is ample evidence, therefore, that all the ingredients of the section are answered. 8. However, the learned counsel argued that the application itself was barred by time. It was filed by the complainant under section 417 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He states that sub-section (4) of section 417 of the Code lays down the minimum period prescribed by the Code for entertaining such an application. 9. It may be noticed that this application under sub-section (3) of section 417 has been properly found to be within limitation by the office of this Court in the following manner: Time "Copy applied for on 22-7-1970 July 3-4 Aug.31-31 Sept.22-30 Oct. 31 Nov. -10 56-106 Copy ready on Told and delivered on 22-9-1970 -56 Days 50 Within time." That shows that taking the copying days which were 56, the application was well within time having been filed on 50th day. 31 Nov. -10 56-106 Copy ready on Told and delivered on 22-9-1970 -56 Days 50 Within time." That shows that taking the copying days which were 56, the application was well within time having been filed on 50th day. However, argues the learned counsel that the time prescribed by sub-section (4) of section 417, Criminal Procedure Code is 60 days and if the copying days are not available, then the application was barred and this Court had no jurisdiction to grant leave. He also relies on the principle that there is no power to exceed time by referring to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao.6 There the Court had held that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the provisions under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. The question of application of section, 5 of the Limitation Act would arise only if the appeal itself is beyond limitation. The Full Bench was concerned with the provisions of section 5 and considered the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was applicable when the decision was made. The provisions of Limitation Act of 1953 which came on statute book have made certain changes and subsection (2) of section 29 is in the following terms: "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the prescribed by the Schedule the provisions of section S shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." Now the contention of Mr. Ahmad the learned counsel appearing for the accused is that the matters still should be governed by the Full Bench decision of this Court (Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao) as the provisions of section 417 (3) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code are the special law and there is a special prescription for limitation. Ahmad the learned counsel appearing for the accused is that the matters still should be governed by the Full Bench decision of this Court (Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao) as the provisions of section 417 (3) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code are the special law and there is a special prescription for limitation. Not only that there is no power to exceed the time, but there is no jurisdiction to entertain an application beyond the period of sixty days, that being a special provision made by the Code. 11. Both these submissions are not at all warranted. Sub-section (2) of section 29 itself makes provisions of sections 4 to 24 both inclusive of the Limitation Act applicable wherever any appeal or application has to be filed and a limitation is differently prescribed by the special law. All the conditions of that sub-section are fully answered by section 417 (4) of the Code. That is a special provision prescribing a different limitation and by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, the provisions of sections 4 to, 24 would be applicable to such an application. One of the provisions which would be attracted is section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. That section prescribes that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. It is thus plain that sub-section (2) excludes not only the day on which the judgment was delivered but also the time taken for Copying. If that is excluded, then the present application was rightly filed and the office has rightly taken it to mean that it is filed within time. There is, therefore, no force in the submission of the learned counsel that the Court had no power to entertain such an application the same having been filed after the lapse of sixty days. 12. There is yet another angle to look at the same problem. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure power to frame rules has been conferred upon the High Court. 12. There is yet another angle to look at the same problem. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure power to frame rules has been conferred upon the High Court. Sub-section (2), of section 534 of the Code permits framing of the rules by the High Court for regulating its own practice and proceedings and the practice and proceedings of all criminal Courts subordinate to it. Such rules are not to be inconsistent with the Code or any other law in force for the time being and are subjected to further condition that they should be properly published in the Official Gazette. Now, the rules relating to criminal business of this Court are the part of Chapter XXVI of the Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960 and by rule 13 it is prescribed that every appeal and application shall be accompanied by the certified copy of the judgment or order appealed against including, wherein application is against the appellate or revisional order of the Sessions Judge, by the certified copy of the judgment of the trial Court. Thus under this rule, it is incumbent upon every litigant trying to invoke the powers of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure to present his application along with a certified copy of the judgment or order. When this is the requirement of the rule which is properly made under the power given by the Code itself, it is ample to say that that is also the requirement of section 417 of the Code. If that be so, it is further clear that without such a certified copy no application could at all been pertained. That being the position, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy will always stand excluded. 13. In the result, therefore, the present appeal will have to be allowed. The accused Janardhan will be, held guilty of an offence under section 447, Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 75 or, in default, to undergo imprisonment for fifteen days. I think looking to the nature of the controversy, that sentence is just and proper. The accused, therefore, is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 75 or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. The fine to be paid within three weeks. Appeal allowed.