JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff whose suit, under Order 21, Rule 63, CPC was dismissed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur. Late Balakrushna Rath, the father of the Plaintiff had taken on loan of Rs. 9.150/- on two hand notes dated 27.6.1951 from late V. Venkataratnam Raju, husband of Defendant No. 2 and father of Defendant No. 1. The hand-notes were kept alive by payments made from time to time by late Balkrushna Rath. The Defendants instituted a suit on the hand-notes against late Balkrushna Rath (M.S. 14/63) and obtained a decree for about Rs. 17, 000/0. In execution of that decree (E.P. No. 35 of 1963) against Balkrushna Rath, the house mentioned in the schedule to the plaint in the present suit was attached. The Plaintiff thereupon filed a petition under Order 21, Rule 68, CPC claiming that in a prior partition between himself and his father, the plaint schedule property had fallen to his share and that be was Is possession thereof in his own right and that It was consequently not attachable in execution of the decree which the Defendants had obtained against his father. That application having been rejected on 10-3-1965, the Plaintiff filed a revision petition in this Court (Civil Revision No. 102 of 1965) which was dismissed on 22.7.1968. The Plaintiff thereafter on 30.8.1968 instituted the Suit giving rise to the appeal. 2. It was contended in the plaint that due to misunderstanding between the Plaintiff and his wife on one side and his parents on the other, an amicable partition of the entire family properties came to be made between the years 1944 and 1952. To avoid further ill-feelings, the Plaintiff's father relinquished all his properties including the suit house in favour of the Plaintiff by a registered deed of relinquishment dated 9.11.1953 and put the Plaintiff in possession of all the properties. The Plaintiff has thus been enjoying the suit house as his absolute and separate property and had got his name mutated in municipal records in respect thereof. In the year 1961, Balkrushna Bath was declared a pauper. The Plaintiff has thus been enjoying the suit house as his absolute and separate property and had got his name mutated in municipal records in respect thereof. In the year 1961, Balkrushna Bath was declared a pauper. The Defendants being aware of this fact and knowing fully well that Balakrushna Rath was not possessed of any properties executed the money decree which they had obtained against him and attached the disputed house, being fully aware that the disputed house did not belong any more to him. It was further contended that the suit debt in M.S. 14 of 1960 was not incurred by Plaintiff's father for the benefit of the family or for any legal or binding necessities and the debt was an Avyavaharika debt which the Plaintiff is not liable to discharge. In the circumstances stated above, the Plaintiff prayed for declaration of his title to the disputed house and for a further declaration that it is not liable to be attached or sold in execution of the decree which the Defendants had obtained against the Plaintiff's father in M.S. 14 of 1960 and to set aside the order passed by the Court below in the claim petition (M.J.C. No. 162 of 1963). 3. The Defendants in a joint written statement denied the plaint allegation that there was ever any partition between the Plaintiff and his father and that in such partition the disputed house had fallen to the share of the Plaintiff. According to them, late Balkrushna Rath till his death in the year 1966 was living jointly with his son the Plaintiff and continued to be the owner of the disputed house which was himself acquired property. The plaint allegation that the loans to recover which M.S. 14 of 1960 was filed, was an Avyavaharika debt, was denied and it was contended that the loan was incurred for the benefit of the family of which late Balakrushna Rath was the Karta. Regarding the registered deed of relinquishment referred to in the plaint, it was stated that the document was created by late Balakrushna Rath in order to defraud his creditors and to save his properties from being sold to recover the loans which he had incurred. The allegation that late Balakrushna Rath was a pauper was also denied. Regarding the registered deed of relinquishment referred to in the plaint, it was stated that the document was created by late Balakrushna Rath in order to defraud his creditors and to save his properties from being sold to recover the loans which he had incurred. The allegation that late Balakrushna Rath was a pauper was also denied. It was finally contended that the suit is barred by limitation as it had been filed more than a year after the rejection of the claim petition. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge framed as many as 13 issues in the suit covering the various aspects of the pleadings and after considering the evidence on record held that the disputed house was the self-acquired property of late Balakrushna Rath. He disbelieved the story of partition set up by the Plaintiff and held that the deed or relinquishment Ext. 5 evidenced a sham transaction and was created by late Rath solely with the purpose of defeating the claims of his creditors. He disbelieved the Plaintiff's case that the debt contracted by his father was an Avyavaharika debt and consequently held that the Plaintiff although not a party to the suit in which the decree under execution was obtained against his father, Is still liable to discharge the debt. On the question of limitation, he held that the suit is not barred by limitation. In view of his other findings, however, he dismissed the suit with costs. Hence this appeal. 5. Ext. J. is the copy of registered sale deed dated 9.2-1940 by which late Balakrushna Rath had purchased the disputed house. P.w. 2 who is the brother-in-law of the Plaintiff has deposed that late Balakrushna Rath was a renowned lawyer and was Government pleader for some time, that he was a rich man and had acquired vast properties. Admittedly, therefore, he was in a position to purchase the disputed house from his own earnings. There is not an iota of evidence on record that Balakrushna Rath was possessed of any ancestral properties and much less that the ancestral nucleus was such that with the income there from the disputed house could have been purchased. It is true that if a coparcener having separate property, voluntarily, throws it into the joint stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it, then it becomes joint family property with an its usual incidents. It is true that if a coparcener having separate property, voluntarily, throws it into the joint stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it, then it becomes joint family property with an its usual incidents. But an intention to throw such property into the common stock and to waive an separate rights in respect thereof must be clearly established and cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the owner allowed joint use of the property by the other coparceners which may as well be due to kindness and affection. No attempt has been made in the suit to establish that the disputed house which admittedly had been purchased by late Balakrishna Rath had ever been thrown by him into the common stock. In the circumstances, there is no evidence to come to the conclusion that the disputed house was joint family property in which the Plaintiff could, as of right, claim a share in any partition which might have taken place between him and his father. 6. Turning now to the evidence regarding partition, the Plaintiff had stated in the plaint that an amicable partition of the entire family properties was made between the years 1944 and 1952. Whether by the statement he meant that there was disruption of the joint status in 1944 and that the question of actual division of the properties continued for a period of eight years thereafter or whether discussions regarding partition took place between the years 1944 and 1952 and that the disruption in the joint status and partition by metes and bounds took place in 1952, is not olea, from the plaint. When the Plaintiff was examined-under Order 10, Code of Civil Procedure, he stated that it was only since January, 1953 that he separated from his father which, if true, rules out any partition between the father and the son prior to 1953. When the Plaintiff, however, was examined as a witness in this case (p.w. 3) he stated that he had not only, separated from his father in the year 1944 but that properties were also divided at that time and in the said partition, the disputed house and two other houses belonging to the family situated at Berhampur had fallen to his share. P.w. 1 is the Plaintiff's father-in-law. P.w. 1 is the Plaintiff's father-in-law. He claims to be one of the persons who brought about the partition between the Plaintiff and his father and according to him the partition took place in the year 1944 and in the said partition the house at Berhampur and some lands in village Dhanija and at some other places had fallen to the Plaintiff's share. According to him, the family at that time possessed only one house at Berhampur and that it was the disputed house. He stated that when the partition took place, partition lists had been prepared to indicate the properties which fell to the share of each coparcener. But strangely-enough, p.w. 1 who is one of the Bhadralogs who brought about the partition and is closely related to the family has not signed in the partition deed & even if such partition lists were prepared at that time, they have not seen the light of day as they have not been produced in Court. P.w. 2, the brother-in-law of the Plaintiff deposed that the partition between the Plaintiff and his father took place in the year 1944, but according to him along with other properties the family possessed at that time to other houses at Berhampur besides the disputed house and that all the three houses bad fallen to the share of the Plaintiff. According to this witnesses the partition was effected under a written agreement but no partition deed was drawn. A list indicating the respective shares had, however; been prepared and signed by the Plaintiff and his father only and that no outsiders had signed in the list. Strangely enough, the Plaintiff who also depose that the partition took place in 1944 and that the disputed house had fallen to his share, does not say that any partition lists had been prepared. The question of his offering an explanation for non-production of the partition lists about which his two other witnesses p.ws. 1 and 2 have deposed did not therefore arise. There is also not a single scrap of paper on record from which it is possible to infer that there was a partition in the family in the year 1944 and much less that in the said partition, the disputed house had fallen to the share of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's case regarding partition in the year 1944 must therefore be rejected. 7. The Plaintiff's case regarding partition in the year 1944 must therefore be rejected. 7. Reliance is placed by the Appellant on Ext. 19 which is a petition dated 25-1-1950 filed by Balakrushna Rath and the Plaintiff before the Tahasildar, Aska praying for mutation of the name of the Plaintiff in respect of certain lands which by then stood recorded in the name of Balakrushna Rath. It is mentioned in the said petition that these lands have fallen to the share of the Plaintiff. It is wen established that an unequivocal and unmistakable manifestation by a member or members of a joint family by his or their words or conduct of an Intention to become separate is sufficient to effect the separation of his or their title and the severance of his or their interest, although division of possession, or partition by metes and bounds, cases not take place or even if there is no separation in food and dwelling. Once there is a definite and unmistakable indication of a member to separate; his right to obtain and possess his share is unimpeachable, and neither the co-sharers can question it nor can the Court examine his conscience to find out whether his reasons for separation are wen founded or sufficient. Equally & division of right or severance of the joint status may result not only from an agreement between the parties but also from any act or transaction which has the effect of defining their shares in the estate though it may not physically partition the estate. Judged in the light of these principles, Ext. 19 which was signed by both the Plaintiff and his father who are the only coparceners of the joint family can justly lead to the inference that sometime before 25-1-1950, there was disruption of the joint status between the father and the son followed by a partition of either the entire joint family properties or a partial partition. It is also clear from Ext. 19 that the lands mentioned therein had fallen to the share of the Plaintiff in the said partition. Although, therefore, Ext. 19 may indicate that by that time there was a partition between the father and the son, it by no means proves the Plaintiff's contention that the disputed house was treated as a joint family property or that in the family partition it had fallen to his share. 8. Although, therefore, Ext. 19 may indicate that by that time there was a partition between the father and the son, it by no means proves the Plaintiff's contention that the disputed house was treated as a joint family property or that in the family partition it had fallen to his share. 8. The only document in which specific reference is made to the disputed house is Ext. 16 which is an application dated 5-3.1959 submitted by the Plaintiff to the Secretary to the Berhampur Cooperative Urban Bank, Limited to advance to him a loan of Rs. 2000/- on the security of the disputed house to which he claimed title on the basis of a partition deed dated 23.2.1954. Referring to this document, the Plaintiff as p.w. 3 had stated that what he intended to state in Ext. 16 is that he got the suit house on the strength of Ext. 5 the deed of relinquishment which, however, he wrongly described as a deed of partition. On his own admission, therefore, the Plaintiff's case when be offered the disputed house as security in the year 1959, was that he had acquired the to the disputed house not as a result of the emicable partition between the father and the son said to have taken place in 1944, but on the strength of the registered deed of relinquishment Ext. 5. dated 23.2.1954. Ext. 5 Is the deed of relinquishment executed by Balakrushna Rath in which the Plaintiff and his mother were named as claimaint. The material portions thereof run thus: 1. That whereas there have been different agreements since the family partition between the Executant and the other members on different dates like 10.10.1944, 9.10.1949, 20.6.1950, 4.11.1950, 27.9.1951 etc. leading towards final settlement. 2. Whereas by a registered deed dated 10.7.1953 the Executant and the claimant entered into a definite family arrangement which could not be final. 3. The Executant hereby relinquishes an the right title and interest he has over properties like coparcenary separate, joint family or any other character. 4. That this act shall extend absolutely to all properties whether moveable all immoveable. 5. That the Stridhan properties are not effected (affected) by this deed. 6. That this deed is executed out of free will and good wishes. 7. Executed, signed, sealed and delivered the 5th day of November, 1953. Sd. B.K. Bath 23-2.1954. 9. 4. That this act shall extend absolutely to all properties whether moveable all immoveable. 5. That the Stridhan properties are not effected (affected) by this deed. 6. That this deed is executed out of free will and good wishes. 7. Executed, signed, sealed and delivered the 5th day of November, 1953. Sd. B.K. Bath 23-2.1954. 9. It is argued on behalf of the Appellant that even assuming that in the partition which took place between the father and the son prior to Ext. 5 the disputed house had not been allotted to the Plaintiffs share and still remained undivided, the release under Ext. 5 by Balakrushna Rath of all the interest which he had by then in any of the properties, which must necessarily include this disputed house, would completely obliterate his interest therein with the result that the entire interest which Balakrushna Rath had by then in the family properties would vest in the Plaintiff who was the only other coparcener. Such an argument is plausible only on the assumption that the disputed house was joint family property in respect of which, after the severance of the joint Status, between the father and the son, they would stand in the position of co-owners. That is so because, there could be no release by one person in favour of another who is not already entitled to the property as co-owner. In this connection, a reference may be made to a. Fun Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Board of Revenue and Another Vs. V.M. Murugesa Mudaliar of Gudiyatham, which arose out of a reference u/s 57 of the Stamp Act made by the Board of Revenue. The document in question in that case proceeded on the footing that the five persons, namely the three executants and the two persons in whose favour the instrument was executed, who were carrying on business of that firm owned the property as co-owners, the executants being entitled to a three fifths share and the other two being entitled to the remaining two-fifths share. The document recited that in consideration of certain amount the executants released, extinguished, abandoned, cancelled and relinquished their rights, claims etc. In respect of the property, interest, etc. There was not a division of the property by metes and bounds in accordance with the said shares. The document recited that in consideration of certain amount the executants released, extinguished, abandoned, cancelled and relinquished their rights, claims etc. In respect of the property, interest, etc. There was not a division of the property by metes and bounds in accordance with the said shares. The Court held that it was a release deed falling under Article 44(b) of Schedule IA of the Stamp Act. Their Lordships observed that each co-owner in theory was entitled to enjoy the entire property in part and in whole. It was therefore not necessary for one of the co-owners to convey his interest to the other co-owner. It was sufficient if he released his interest. The result of such release would be the enlargement of the share of the other co-owner. But there could be no release in favour of another person who was not already entitled to the property as a co-owner. In view, however, of our finding that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the disputed house formed a part of joint family properties and as admittedly it is his father Balakrushna Rath who had purchased the same, the Plaintiff was not a co-owner of the property when Ext. 5 was executed and consequently as a result of Ext. 5, he could not have acquired any title under Ext. 5 to the disputed house. Ext. 5, therefore, cannot be relied upon by the Plaintiff as a document' under which he acquired title to the disputed house. 10. Whatever might have been the intention of Balakrushna Rath in executing Ext. 5 whether be genuinely desired to relinquish all his rights and interest in the disputed house making his Bon the absolute owner thereof or whether such a document was executed with the sole object of defeating the claims of his creditors who by then included the predecessor in interest of Defendants it was natural for the Plaintiff thereafter to show to the world at large that he was the owner of the house. If, therefore, in the year 1959, he offered this house as security for a loan to the Co-operative Bank or if he got his name mutated in Municipal records, of which there is no evidence, they would not in any way help him in establishing his title to the house. If, therefore, in the year 1959, he offered this house as security for a loan to the Co-operative Bank or if he got his name mutated in Municipal records, of which there is no evidence, they would not in any way help him in establishing his title to the house. He has put in certain house tax receipts to show that the disputed house was recorded in his name in Municipal records and that he was paying the house tax for the same. But the holding numbers as mentioned in those receipts Ext. 15 series do not tally with the holding number as mentioned in Ext. 5. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that these receipts relate to the disputed house. Even assuming that they do, they do not in any way improve the Plaintiff's case. 11. The Appellant next attacked the correctness of the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that Ext. 5 is a sham and nominal deed which was not intended to pass title and that the sole object of executing it was to defeat the claims of the creditors of Balakrushna Rath. Admittedly, by the time this document was executed, Balakrushna Rath owed to the predecessor of the Defendants more than ten thousand rupees due on the band-notes which formed the subject matter of the suit which resulted in the decree in execution of which the disputed house was subsequently attached and which has given rise to the suit which is now under appeal. In the written statement filed in that suit (M.S. 14/60), Balakrushna Rath as the sole Defendant bad admitted the execution of the band-notes. He was, therefore, fully aware by the time Ext. 5 was executed whereby be relinquished all his rights in all the properties which he bad by that time that the dues on the band-notes were outstanding against him. If without making any arrangement to repay those dues, he relinquished all his rights in his properties, the inference is irresistible that he did so with the sole object of defeating the claims of his creditors. Otherwise, there appears to be no plausible reason at least none is brought out in evidence-as to why be should have relinquished all his rights to the properties. It is not that he bad renounced the world thereafter. Otherwise, there appears to be no plausible reason at least none is brought out in evidence-as to why be should have relinquished all his rights to the properties. It is not that he bad renounced the world thereafter. In fact, there is evidence to show that be continued to practise as a lawyer because p.w. 4 had stated that he worked as Pleader's clerk under Balakrushna Rath from 1948 till the latter's death. That apart we find from Ext. K, the Incumbrance Certificate that subsequent to the date of execution of Ext. B, Balakrushna Rath and his son the Plaintiff alone on one occasion, and on several occasions along with others bad executed several sale deeds. Ext. K cuts at the root of the Plaintiff's case that under Ext. 5 Balakrushna Rath bad divested himself of all his rights in all the properties possessed by him. In the circumstances and having regard to the evidence discussed above, the learned Subordinate Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that Ext. 5 was a nominal document never intended to be acted upon arid that it was executed by Balakrushna Rath to defraud his creditors. It is well settled that in order to avoid such transfers which come within the mischief of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is not necessary that the person who intends to avoid the transaction should file a suit for the purpose. He may as well manifest his intention to avoid the transaction, otherwise than by filing a suit, as for example, by attaching the property transferred. His very act of attaching the property would be sufficient evidence of his intention to avoid it. C. Abdul Shukoor Saheb Vs. Arji Papa Rao and Others, . 12. In view of what has been stated above, the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his title to the disputed house cannot be assailed. So far as possession of the house is concerned, there is evidence even on the Plaintiff's side to show that till his death in 1966, Balakrushna Rath was also residing in the disputed house and that it is there that he died. 13. The Plaintiff had alleged in the plaint that the debt contracted by his father from the Defendants' predecessor was an Avyavaharika debt. 13. The Plaintiff had alleged in the plaint that the debt contracted by his father from the Defendants' predecessor was an Avyavaharika debt. No evidence, however, was let in the suit to substantiate this contention, the onus to establish which admittedly lay on the Plaintiff. 14. In view of the findings recorded above, the resultant position is this. The disputed house was the self-acquired property of late Balakrushna, Rath. In between him and his Bon the Plaintiff there was a partition sometime before 25-1-1950, but there is no evidence that the disputed house was allotted to the Plaintiff in such partition. The Plaintiff never acquired any title to the disputed house so long as his father was alive and the house continued to be the property of the father. It is after his father's death in 1966 that the Plaintiff inherited it. Under Law, & Hindu son is not personally liable for the debt of his father even if the debt was not incurred for an immoral purpose. The obligation to pay the debt is limited only to the assets received by him in his share of the joint family property or to his interest is such property and it does not attach to his self-acquisitions. This pious liability of the son to pay the debts of his father exists whether the father is alive or dead. As regards debts contracted by the father after partition, the sons are not liable for such debts. The share which the father receives on partition and which after his death comes to his sons would certainly at the hands of the latter be available to the creditors of the father. This would also be the case in respect of the self-acquired property of the father which on the latter's death is inherited by the son. But-the share allotted on partition to the son can never be made liable for the post-partition debts of his father Pannalal and Anr. v. Mt. Naralni and Ors. AIR 19152 S.C. 170. This would also be the case in respect of the self-acquired property of the father which on the latter's death is inherited by the son. But-the share allotted on partition to the son can never be made liable for the post-partition debts of his father Pannalal and Anr. v. Mt. Naralni and Ors. AIR 19152 S.C. 170. Our finding being that the disputed house was the self-acquired property of Balakrishna Rath and he continued to be the owner thereof till his death, it follows that after his death that property is liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree which his creditors had obtained against him, notwithstanding the fact that the property after his death has been inherited by his son the Plaintiff. 15. We find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. S.K. Ray, Actg. C.J. 16. I agree.