PARUTAPPA DASAPPA MACHA v. KRISHTAPPA SATAPPA YADALLI
1972-07-12
DATAR, GOVINDA BHAT
body1972
DigiLaw.ai
GOVINDA BHAT, J. ( 1 ) IN the election held to the Bagalkot Taluk Development Board in the year 1968, the petitioners, Parutappa Basappa Macha and Laxmappa gulappa Hosalli, and the respondents Krishtappa Satappa Yadalli and malakajappa Parappa Sajjan, were the four contesting candidates for the two general seat? from the Bhagavati Constituency. There was one other candidate, namely, one Venkawwa Kom Pandappa Dasappanavar, who was a candidate for the Reserved seat with which we are not concerned. Objections were raised to the nomination of the second petitioner on the ground that he was disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a Taluk Board as he holds an office of profit under the Government of India. That objection was overruled by the Returning Officer and his nomination was accepted. In the election that took place on 24-11-1968 the votes polled were as follows: Petitioner No. 1 3,316 votes Petitioner No. 2 3,316 votes Respondent No. 1 3,025 votes Respondent No. 2 2,979 votes petitioners 1 and 2 have secured the highest number of votes and they were declared as elected on 27-11-1968. Respondents 1 and 2 herein challenged their election by an Election petition before the Munsiff at Bagalkot on the grounds that the second petitioner was disqualified and the returned candidates were guilty of corrupt practices. On the pleadings the learned munsiff framed, among others, the following two issues: (i) Whether Laxmappa Gulappa Hosalli was holding an office of profit under the Central Government? and (ii) Whether the election petition presented was proper or not and whether it was maintainable? the request to hear the above issues as preliminary issues was rejected. Thereupon respondents and 2 filed a memo on 16-2-1970 stating therein that they do not urge any other grounds raised by them in their petition except the one about disqualification of petitioner No. 2 and on that account his election is void. On the basis of the said memo, the learned munsiff proceeded with the enquiry and recorded a finding to the effect that the second petitioner herein was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Taluk Board as he held an office of profit under the Government of India and on the basis of the said finding, he set aside the election of both the returned candidates. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioners preferred Misc.
Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioners preferred Misc. Appeal (Election Petition) No. 114 of 1970 before the District Judge, Bijapur, who affirmed the decison of the learned Munsiff by his order dated 8th July, 1971. The reasons for setting aside the election of the first petitioner are stated in paragraph-9 of the judgment of the learned District Judge. It would be convenient to set out relevant portions of the judgment which reads thus:"it was a double-member constituency in so far as the general seats were concerned. If the nomination paper of appellant No. 2 was rejected he being disqualified there would have been only 3 candidates in the field and it was likely that those who cast their votes to appellant no. 2 would have cast their votes to any of the other candidates of their choice and it was likely that those who exercised their franchise in favour of appellant No. 2 would have cast their votes in favour of the other candidate in the field Therefore, it cannot be said that appellant No. 1 was also a properly elected candidate. For similar reasons, even if any of the respondents had secured more votes than appellant No. 1, he could not be declared elected. Nothing can therefore be certain in such elections and the learned Munsiff has rightly come to the conclusion that the election to the general seats should be set aside" ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the learned District Judge, the petitioners have preferred the above writ petition. The writ petition was admitted only with regard to the first petitioner and it was dismissed as to the second petitioner, by order of this Court made on 2-8-1971. ( 3 ) SIRI K. R. Karanth, learned counsel for the first petitioner submitted that the learned Munsiff as well as the learned District Judge were in error in setting aside the election of the first petitioner when there was no material for them to come to the conclusion that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the first petitioner has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the second petitioner.
He argued that respondents 1 and 2 the election petitioners had adduced no evidence to prove that the result of the election of the first petitioner has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the second petitioner and that in the absence of proof and also in the absence of a finding, the learned District Judge as well as the learned munsiff have erred in the exercise of their jurisdiction in setting aside the election of the first petitioner. Sri U. L. Narayana Rao for respondents 1 and 2 contended that the election in the instant case was in respect of a double seat constituency and as such one integral whole and if the election to one seat was void, the Munsiff was justified in setting aside the election as a whole. ( 4 ) THE grounds on which election to a Taluk Board may be set aside by a Munsiff on an election petition are enumerated in sub-sec. (3) of S. 106 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act 1959 herein after called the Act. The relevant portions of the said sub-section read: sec. 106 (3 ). "subject to the provisions of sub-sec.
(3) of S. 106 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act 1959 herein after called the Act. The relevant portions of the said sub-section read: sec. 106 (3 ). "subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) (A) If the Munsiff is of opinion (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidates was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under this Act; or (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent or (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concern a returned candidate, has been materially affected (i) By the improper acceptance of any nomination; or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by a person other than that candidate or his election agent or a person acting with the consent of such candidate or his election agent; or (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void; or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act; the Munsiff shall declare the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. "the above provision is in pari materia with S. 100 of the Representation of people Act, 1951. The law makes a distinction between cases falling under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) on the one hand and cases falling under clause (d) on the other. In the former class of cases it is not necessary to show that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected but in the latter class of cases the munsiff shall declare the election of the returned candidate void if he is of opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination etc.
The section does not state that in a double seat constituency if the election of one of the returned candidates is declared void on any of the grounds falling under clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d ). the entire election as a whole should be declared void and fresh election ordered. ( 5 ) IN Vashist Nasain Sharma v. Dev Chandra, AIR. 1054 SC. 513. , a case under the representation of the People Act, 1951 the distinction between improper rejection and improper acceptance of nomination has been pointed out. It has been stated therein that in the case of improper rejection of a nomination, the presumption is that it has materially affected the result of the election and that in the case of improper acceptance of a nomination it cannot be held that the mere fact that the wasted votes are greater than the margin of votes between the returned candidate and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes must lead to the necessary inference that the result of the election has been materially affected and that it is a matter which has to be proved and the onus of proving it lies upon the election petitioner and should he fail to adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the Court to find in his favour on this point, the inevitable result would be that the Tribunal would not interfere in his favour and would allow the election to stand. ( 6 ) IN Narasimha Reddi v. Bhoomajim, 17 ELR. 207. also a case under the Representation of People Act, 1951, it was urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents therein that the election to a double seat constituency is an integral whole and that where the election of one candidate is set aside on the ground that he was disqualified, the entire election should be held void. Overruling that contention, a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court held that the Tribunal can only declare the election of the returned candidate void, if he was disqualified and that the entire election cannot be deemed to be void. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, the election of the petitioner was declared void on the ground that he was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act, which is a ground falling under clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) (A) of s. 106.
( 7 ) IN the instant case, the election of the petitioner was declared void on the ground that he was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act, which is a ground falling under clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) (A) of s. 106. The ground of challenge to the election of the 1st petitioner does not fall under clauses (a), (b) or (c ). The ground alleged against him was that the result of his election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the 2nd petitioner which is a ground falling under clause (d) (i ). There was no evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the result of the election of the 1st petitioner was materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the 2nd petitioner. The burden of proof which is clearly on respondents 1 and 2 has not been discharged. The language of clause (d) of 3. 106 (3) (A) is too clear for any speculation about possibilties if the nomination of the 2nd petitioner had not been accepted and there were only three candidates in the field. What the learned District Judge has done is to speculate about possibilities if the 3,233 votes secured by the 2nd petitioner had not been wasted. The judgment of the learned District Judge, in our opinion, is clearly erroneous and unsupportable in so far as it holds that the election of the 1st petitioner is rendered void for the sole reason that the constituency is a double member constituency and the election of one of the two returned candidates is void as he is disqulified. For the above reasons, we allow the writ petition of the 1st petitioner, reverse the order of the District Judge in so far as At concerns him, and dismiss the election petition against the 1st respondent in Election Petition no. 22 of 1968 on the file of the Munsiff, Bagalkot. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Court. --- *** --- .