ORDER S.R. Vyas, J. The petitioner, Kanhaiyalal Vaidya, an Ex-Member of the Parliament and presently a non-official visitor for the Central Jail, Bherogarh, Ujjain, has made the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for an order in the nature of habeas corpus claiming the release of eight convicts undergoing life sentences in the said jail at Ujjain on the ground that their imprisonment beyond the dates specified in paragraph 8 of this petition was illegal. The material facts are these: The convicts Nanda, Ramprasad, Shaligram, Champalal, Modsingh, Udaliya, Shivpal and Peerawa were sentenced to imprisonment for life by different Courts in different cases and on different dates in the State of Madhya Pradesh as shown in Annexure 'A'. The petitioner claims that as an official visitor, he has visited the Central Jail at Bherogarh and found that the aforesaid prisoners had become due for release from prison since the dates mentioned against their names in column No. 8 of the said Annexure, but were not so released by the Jail Superintendent; that the enquiries made by him did not reveal that an order forbidding the release of the said prisoners was passed by the State Government under the Rules framed under the Prisons Act, 1894; that the petitioner made several efforts to bring this fact of wrongful imprisonment to the notice of the State Government but without any result and that in these circumstances a direction be issued to the State Government and the Superintendent, Jail, Bherogarh to produce the prisoners before the Court and direct their release from imprisonment. In the returns filed on behalf of the State Government and the Superintendent, Jail, it is admitted that the said prisoners were sentenced to imprisonment for life by different Courts on the dates mentioned in Annexure A. It was, however, contended that neither under the provisions of law nor under the provisions of the Prisons Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the said convicts were entitled to be released; that according to the nature of the sentences awarded to the prisoners they are required to be imprisoned for the remaining parts of their lives and that unless the State Government was to pass a positive order for the remission of the remaining part of their sentences, the prisoners could not be released as prayed for in the petition. In support of the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the provisions of section 59 of the Prisons Act and the rules 2 (h), 717 and 718 of the Rules framed under section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894 and contended that under the aforesaid Rules a sentence of life imprisonment was to be treated as a sentence for imprisonment for 20 years; that the said prisoners had earned remission from the dates they were sentenced to imprisonment; that taking into consideration the remission earned by them, they had become due for being released from prison on specified dates and that the Superintendent, Central Jail had no authority to keep them under prison any longer without any positive order to the contrary from the State Government. Learned Government Advocate also relied upon the said provisions of the Prisons Act and the Rules framed thereunder and contended that in all cases where the accused are sentenced to life imprisonment, they are ordinarily required to be imprisoned for the remaining parts of their lives; that it is upto the State Government to consider individual cases and pass suitable orders for remission of any part of the remaining sentence; that so far as the prisoners in this case are concerned, the Government have taken an appropriate decision according to which recommendations for remission have either been rejected or postponed or allowed. The last contention was that it was not correct to contend that a prisoner undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life was entitled to be treated as undergoing sentence of 20 years imprisonment and entitled to be released on the date when, after taking into consideration the remission earned by him, the sentence of 20 years imprisonment is completed. We have examined the respective contentions of both the parties. In our opinion, this petition must be rejected for the following reasons. The first question that arises for consideration is as to whether in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Penal Code under which the prisoners were sentenced to life imprisonment there is no authority for the view that a sentence of life imprisonment is to be reckoned as a sentence for a period of 20 years. This question, in our opinion, is concluded by the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Nathu v. State Misc. This question, in our opinion, is concluded by the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Nathu v. State Misc. Petition No. 27 of 1972 dated 10-3-1972 and Rama v. State Misc. Criminal Case No. 47 of 1972 dated 10-3-1972 and the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra and others AIR 1961 SC 600 . Even the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to refer to any other provision of the Indian Penal Code which could justify the view that a sentence of life imprisonment is to be reckoned as a sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relies on the provisions of the Prisons Act and the Rules referred to above for the contention that a sentence of life imprisonment has to be treated as a sentence of imprisonment, for 20 years and if the remissions earned by the prisoner are taken into consideration, then he must be released no sooner the total period undergone by the prisoner comes to 20 years. We, therefore, propose to consider those provisions on which reliance has been placed. Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894 (No. IX of 1894) empowered the State Government to make Rules consistent with the Act on various matters. Relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules on which reliance has been placed are these: Section 59. The State Government may make rules consistent with this Act-- (1) ... ... (2) ... ... (3) ... ... (4) ... ... (5) for the award of marks and the shortening of sentences. * * * * Rule 2 (h). In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,-- 'Sentence of imprisonment for life' shall be deemed to mean imprisonment for twenty years. Rule 717. When a life convict who is either: (a) a Class I prisoner, or (b) a Class II or prisoner with more than one sentence, or (c) a prisoner in whose case the State Government has passed an order for bidding his release without reference to it; has earned such remission as would entitle him to release but for the provisions of this role, the Superintendent shall report accordingly to the State Government in order that his case may be considered with reference to section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Rule 718. Rule 718. Save as provided by rule 717 when a prisoner has earned such remission as entitles him to release, the Superintendent shall release him. It was contended that according to sub-section (5) of section 59 of the Prisons Act, the State Government is competent to make rules for the award of marks to a prisoner and for shortening of sentences. Further according to rule 2 (h) of the Rules, it was contended that for the purposes of the imprisonment of a convict a sentence of imprisonment for life must be deemed to mean imprisonment for 20 years. It was lastly contended that so far as the prisoners in this case are concerned, since the date they were committed to prison, they shall be deemed to have been sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and as they have earned remission since the date of their confinement to prison, they became due for release on the dates mentioned in the annexure 'A'. There is no doubt that if there had been no other provisions to the contrary the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner could have prevailed but, in our opinion, there are specific provisions which do not justify the view put forth on behalf of the petitioner. Ordinarily any prisoner sentenced to any punishment of imprisonment becomes entitled to be released no sooner he completes the term of imprisonment after taking into consideration the remission earned by him under the Rules in force. However, so far as the life convicts, that is persons sentenced to imprisonment for life, are concerned, the position is quite different. According to rule 698 of the Rules a life convict means a person sentenced to imprisonment for life. Under section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code the Government is competent to grant remission of unexpired sentences. Rule 358 of the Rules provides that a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life shall be considered for release as soon as the term already undergone, together with any remission earned under the rules, and such other special remission as may have been granted by the Government in celebration of any public event, amounts to 14 years. The case of such a person, according to this Rules, has to be reported to the Government through the Inspector-General of Prisons and it is then for the State Government to decide whether he should be released or not. The case of such a person, according to this Rules, has to be reported to the Government through the Inspector-General of Prisons and it is then for the State Government to decide whether he should be released or not. If the State Government decides that he should not be released, then the case be reported again for further consideration after two years of the State Government's order. This provision, therefore, makes it clear that no sooner a prisoner undergoes a sentence of 14 years, together with the remission earned by him, his case is to be considered for release by the State Government. This rule, however, does not provide that he is automatically entitled to be released on the completion of 14 years sentence. Rule 359 of the Rules makes a provisions for the Advisory Board and the Board can recommend premature release of a prisoner to the State Government and it is then upto the State Government either to accept or not the recommendations of the Advisory Board. This rule, therefore, also makes a provision for a recommendation of the Advisory Board and does not lay down that a life convict after serving a particular substantive sentence become automatically entitled to be released. Again rule 698 (2) of the Rules provides that in case a life convict undergoes 14 years imprisonment together with the remission earned under the Rules the case is submitted for orders of the State Government by the Jail Authorities. This provision also, therefore, does not confer any right on the prisoner to be released from prison no sooner he completes 14 years of prison. The case, according to this provision, has to be submitted for the orders of the State Government by the Jail Authorities. Rule 717 of the Rules then provides that in case of a life convict, who has earned such remission as would entitle him to release but for the provisions of this rule, has to be reported by the Superintendent, Jail to the State Government in order that it may be considered with reference to section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The note appended to rule 718, which we have already reproduced above, further makes the position quite clear. The note appended to rule 718, which we have already reproduced above, further makes the position quite clear. It is as under: Note.--The intention of rules 717 and 718 is-- (a) That the cases of Class I life convicts, or Class II life convicts, who have more than one sentence for offence committed either before their admission to jail or while in jail, and of any other life convicts in whose cases the State Government may have deemed it desirable, should be submitted for the special orders of the State Government as to whether release should be granted, and if so, on what conditions (such conditions must, it would be noted, be prescribed by order under section 401, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898); and (b) that all other convicts should, on the expiry of their sentence less the periods for remission earned, be released unconditionally without any special orders from the State Government. This provision also makes it quite clear that the case of a life convict, who has undergone a particular sentence of imprisonment has to be submitted to the State Government for orders for consideration under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code and it is only when the State Government remits the remaining part of the sentence that a life convict can be prematurely released. Otherwise under the sentence awarded to him he has to remain as a prisoner for the remaining part of his life. Rule 2 (h), on which too much reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, only says that for the purposes of the Rules framed under the Act a sentence of imprisonment for life has to be calculated as an imprisonment for 20 years and it is precisely on the basis of this calculation that for the purposes of rules 358, 359, 698, 717 and 718 of the Rules that an officer in charge of the jail in which the prisoner is confined, has to determine as to whether the prisoner has or has not undergone a sentence of 14 years inclusive of the remission earned by him. No other interpretation can be put to the provisions of rule 2 (h) of the Rules framed under the Act. No other interpretation can be put to the provisions of rule 2 (h) of the Rules framed under the Act. So far as the return of the State Government in this case is concerned, it is clear that the cases of the prisoners Nanda, Saligram, Champalal, Modsingh, Udaliya and Shivpal were submitted by the Jail Authorities to the State Government for orders and the Government did not think it proper to release them prematurely. The case of Ramprasad was reported to be still under consideration and so far as the case of Peerawa was concerned, he was released. It is clear from the copies of letters addressed by the Jail Authorities to the Inspector-General of Prisons, by the Inspector-General of Prisons to the State Government and by the State Government to the Inspector-General of Prisons that the cases of all prisoners in this case were submitted in time for consideration of the State Government under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. The case of one was reported to be under consideration and the cases of the rest were rejected. Only one convict was permitted to be released prematurely. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that the imprisonment of the remaining prisoners is in any way illegal. No instance was brought to our notice where it could be said that the Government had either omitted to consider the cases submitted to them by the Jail Authorities or that the Jail Authorities had omitted to release the prisoners even after the Government had decided for their release. Accordingly, in our opinion, the petitioner is not entitled to the prayer made by him in this petition as the detention of all the prisoners undergoing imprisonment is proper and valid. This petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we direct both the parties to bear their own costs of this petition. Petition dismissed