Judgment :- 1. This petition arises from a judgment by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Palghat, in C. C. No. 17 of 1972. The petitioner is the Inspector of Police, Palghat. The petition is filed under S.561-A to expunge a substantial portion of the judgment in the case as being unnecessary, irrelevant and capable of adversely affecting the official career of the petitioner and his means of livelihood. 2. The facts necessary for this case are: that a complaint was filed by the Inspector of Police against one Gheevarghese, the then Motor Vehicles Inspector of Palghat.for offences under S.47 read with S.51-A of the Kerala Police Act alleging that he on 18-10-1971 at about 6.00 P.M. behaved in an indecent manner towards pw.1 and members of his family at the Municipal T. B. at Palghat. One Pushkaran, who is pw.1 in the case, was staying in the T. B. on 18-10-1971 along with his wife, sisters and a child. At about 6.00 P. M the accused along with another man entered the room occupied by pw.1 and members of his family and behaved in an indecent manner. The said Pushkaran sent a complaint to the police on 18-10-1971 and the Inspector of Police filed this complaint in the Sub Magistrate's Court on 27-12-1971. The case was transferred to the Additional First Class Magistrate's Court by the District Magistrate, Palghat. 3. Four witnesses were examined in the case. pw.1 is Pushkaran. pw.2 is his wife Pw.3 is the watchman of the Municipal TB. and Pw. 4 is the Legal Adviser to the Kerala State Financial Enterprises. The Inspector of Police did not tender himself for examination in the case. The complaint is marked as Ext. P-1. 4. The learned Magistrate in an unnecessarily long judgment covering 29 pages of certified copy and 17 pages of closely-typed copy, acquitted the accused, and rightly, because the prosecution failed hopelessly to prove its case. It has come out in the case that pws. 3 and 4 did not support the prosecution case. The fact that the sisters of pw.1 were present in the T. B. was denied by pw.1 and even the room in the T. B. was registered in the name of one Gopi, who is said to be the brother-in-law of pw.1. The complaint was filed in Court nearly 57 days after it was received by the Inspector of Police. The fact that the sisters of pw.1 were present in the T. B. was denied by pw.1 and even the room in the T. B. was registered in the name of one Gopi, who is said to be the brother-in-law of pw.1. The complaint was filed in Court nearly 57 days after it was received by the Inspector of Police. The complaint disclosed only a non-cognisable offence and the Inspector acted against law in initiating proceedings except in accordance with S.155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S.155(1) lays down the procedure for a police officer to initiate proceedings when a non-cognizable offence is brought to his notice. It is contended that while acquitting the accused the learned Magistrate discussed the conduct of the Inspector, the petitioner in this case, in such a manner as to cast aspersions on his official duties and condemned him in such a manner as to affect his career and his means of livelihood. The learned Magistrate found that the case against the accused was false, frivolous and vexatious and, therefore, issued notice under S.250 Cr. P. C. to show cause why compensation should not be made payable by the complainant, pw.1. 5. It is worth mentioning that the learned Magistrate allowed the accused in the case to file a written statement after he was questioned under S.342. The written statement filed by the accused is fairly long and is an attack against the Inspector of Police with an exhortation that the accused was entitled to get compensation under S.250 Cr. P. C. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before me that some of the sentences found in the written statement filed by the accused have been bodily incorporated by the learned Magistrate as part of his judgment. The statement is argumentative and is a clear indictment of the Inspector of Police. These are matters which should find a place only in submissions at the bar to entitle the accused for an acquittal and not in a statement which is a substitute for the answers in S.342 statement. The practice of filing written statements in a criminal case is deprecated, vide: Tilkeshwar v. Bihar State (AIR. 1956 SC. 238). 6. These are matters which should find a place only in submissions at the bar to entitle the accused for an acquittal and not in a statement which is a substitute for the answers in S.342 statement. The practice of filing written statements in a criminal case is deprecated, vide: Tilkeshwar v. Bihar State (AIR. 1956 SC. 238). 6. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the various remarks against the Inspector of Police were made by the Magistrate in righteous indignation at his conduct in the case and, therefore, there is no need to expunge them. I can appreciate the indignation of the learned Magistrate against the Inspector of Police, who, according to him, had wilfully absented himself from appearing in Court. he could have expressed himself in two or three strong sentences against the Inspector of Police. He should have seen that the prosecution had submitted before him that they did not propose to examine the Inspector, although the Public Prosecutor himself expressed helplessness in that behalf. But the extent to which the learned Magistrate has gone in this case to express his indignation against the police officer, according to me, exceeds the limits of judicial restraint. A judgment which could have been written in a few paragraphs covering two or three pages has been made unnecessarily long and contains a scurrilous attack against the Inspector of Police which the case did not warrant. On a reading of the judgment it would appear that the Inspector of Police was in the dock and not the accused. 7. The first point that has to be considered in this case is whether the fact that the Inspector of Police initiated proceedings without conforming to the requirements of S.155 (1) and (2) Cr. P. C. warrants a judgment couched in such unsavoury language designedly to harm the official position of the Inspector. It is true that Ext. P1 disclosed only a non-cognizable offence. In Podan v. State of Kerala (1961 KLT. 698) this Court has laid down that "S. 155 (2) expressly prohibits the investigation by the police suo mote of non-cognizable offence. The order of a Magistrate is a condition precedent for investigation into a non-cognizable offence by a police officer. It is true that Ext. P1 disclosed only a non-cognizable offence. In Podan v. State of Kerala (1961 KLT. 698) this Court has laid down that "S. 155 (2) expressly prohibits the investigation by the police suo mote of non-cognizable offence. The order of a Magistrate is a condition precedent for investigation into a non-cognizable offence by a police officer. A deliberate disregard of the prohibition under S.155 (2) has only to be deprecated" If a police officer were to take cognizance of non-cognizable offence and do everything necessary for the investigation of cognizable offences, his action is not justifiable. This is the correct position of law. A Police officer who investigates into a non-cognizable offence except in accordance with S.155 (2) Cr.P.C, acts improperly but this by itself does not justify an attack on him, in such a way as to cast slur on his official position. 8. In State of Kerala v. Ali Meerankutty, (AIR. 1965 Kerala 59) a Division Bench of this Court held that there is a fundamental and meaningful distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The Court said: "The Criminal Procedure Code makes a fundamental and meaningful distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The role of the Police in non-cognizabla offences is very much circumscribed. They may neither arrest the offender without warrant from the Magistrate nor investigate the offence without an order from the Magistrate. If they receive information of the commission of such an offence they have to refer to Magistrate. There are no provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code permitting the police officer to send any reports to the Magistrate with regard to such offences." These cases clearly indicate that the Police Officer cannot in law enquire into a non-cognisable offence on his own and if a police officer does it, he acts against the provision of law. Judicial opinion is divided on the question whether a trial of a non-cognisable offence on a police report not in conformity with S.155 (1) and (2) Crl. P.C. will be vitiated or will only be an irregularity. In either case, the benefit of the defect has to be given to the accused and be could be acquitted with the remarks that the police officer bounded his limits imposed on him by law in filing the complaint in Court. P.C. will be vitiated or will only be an irregularity. In either case, the benefit of the defect has to be given to the accused and be could be acquitted with the remarks that the police officer bounded his limits imposed on him by law in filing the complaint in Court. Whether such an irregularity committed by a police officer deserves wholesale condemnation as is seen in the judgment in question is the point I am called upon to decide in this case. I have no hesitation in observing that the learned Magistrate went out of his way in attacking the Inspector of Police for the irregularities committed by him. 9. The learned Magistrate has commented upon the delay in filing the complaint. Ext. P1 is a statement sent by pw.1 to the Inspector of Police. pw.1 has admitted Ext. P1 and also his signature. If ultimately the evidence was not sufficient to find the accused guilty, the blame cannot be cast upon the Inspector of Police. The Inspector of Police, of course, has a duty to have moved the Court with expedition and the admitted delay of 57 days taken by him for filing the complaint in Court cannot be justified. The learned Magistrate was right in criticising this delay caused by the Inspector of Police and this attack should find a place in the judgment and I have absolutely no quarrel with the same. But the manner in which these defects have been exaggerated by the learned Magistrate is a matter for consideration. 10. To begin with I am constrained to remark that the learned Magistrate has exercised himself unduly in writing this lengthy judgment which he could have compressed within a few paragraphs. The accused had an excellent case for acquittal. The evidence of four witnesses, the conduct of the Inspector of Police and the irregularity of the procedure adopted by the police could have been effectively commented upon in a few paragraphs and while acquitting the second could have criticised the Inspector of Police. Instead of doing so, which judicial restraint warrants, the learned Magistrate allowed himself to be unnecessarily lengthy and expressed himself in a manner not warranted by the facts of the case. Hence the need to see whether the remarks mads are necessary or not. Instead of doing so, which judicial restraint warrants, the learned Magistrate allowed himself to be unnecessarily lengthy and expressed himself in a manner not warranted by the facts of the case. Hence the need to see whether the remarks mads are necessary or not. Before considering the petition on merits and the prayer to expunge portions of a judgment validly pronounced by a Court of law, it will be useful to refer to the case-law on the point. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice some of the cases which deal with this aspect of law. In Emperor v. Atta Ullah Shah (AIR. 1936 Lahore 429) it is observed as follows: "A High Court has an inherent power to expunge a portion of a judgment by an inferior Court. The power is unbounded by the law, which expressly gives the Court authority to make "such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". On the other hand, this jurisdiction has always been regarded by the High Courts as one of an extra-ordinary character to be exercised with care and caution in exceptional cases, because it is of the utmost importance to the administration of justice that Courts should be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by High Court and because, in weighing evidence and in arriving at conclusions on questions of fact, lower Courts have often to make remarks which reflect adversely on the character of witness. It is the duty of the High Court, in order to prevent abuse of the processor the Courts, and secure the ends of justice, to delete passages commenting adversely upon a person who Is not a party to the proceedings and has not had a fair opportunity of being beard and also to delete such passages when they are based upon no evidence, or evidence not properly upon the record. But the power to expunge is not limited to such cases only. But the power to expunge is not limited to such cases only. It is also desirable that a judgment once delivered should remain in the shape in which it was originally published, and although the practice should not be extended to exercise this peculiar power beyond limits there appears to be no good reason why it should not be used to delete passages which, though based on evidence, damage the character of a person, and are wholly irrelevant to any point in issue and which a Court has unnecessarily gone out of its way to include in a judgment. Further where High Court's notice has been drawn to a judgment which appears to it to be couched in language injudicious and uncalled for, High Court can and ought to express its opinion in the matter whether any passage is or is not ultimately to be expunged." (see head notes (a) and (b). In State of Bombay v. Nilkanth (AIR. 1954 Bombay 65 (FB.) a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay has laid down the law regarding jurisdiction of High Courts under S.561-A to expunge remarks from the judgment of a lower Court in these terms: "As S.561 A was enacted to emphasise the fact that the High Court has the widest jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice, S.561 A must give the power to the High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated by Criminal P. C. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be mads in an application, although the application is not contemplated by the Code, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice. There is no inherent jurisdiction in a superior Court to alter the judgment of another court. Even if the matter comes up before it in appeal or revision it would have no such inherent jurisdiction. The inherent power that the High Court possesses is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or revision may be preferred to High Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations mads by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper. The inherent power that the High Court possesses is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or revision may be preferred to High Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations mads by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper. It would not be correct to say that expunging remarks from a judgment or deleting passages from a judgment constitutes the inherent power of any superior Court and therefore the inherent power of the High Court. In entertaining an application under S.561A what the High Court should do is not to expunge remarks but judicially to correct by its judgment of the lower Court The jurisdiction under S 561 A, judicially to correct the judgment of the lower Court is a very exceptional jurisdiction which should be exercised in the most exceptional cases. A jurisdiction like this is intended to be exercised when remarks are made without any foundation whatsoever, when remarks are made against strangers which remarks may do irreparable harm to them and who have not been even heard in their defence by the Court which passes the remarks. This jurisdiction is not Intended to substitute the opinion of the High Court for the opinion of the lower Court. A judge, however humble and however junior, is entitled to his own opinion with regard to matters that come before the Court. Judicial corrections should be restricted to cases where the decision is wrong or erroneous, but if the decision is right or if no decision is arrived at, then High Court should interfere under S.561-A in the most exceptional and the rarest of cases". (See head notes (a), (b) and (c)" In this judgment, it is made clear that the jurisdiction of High Court is not to alter the judgment of another Court and this is so even if the matter comes up before it in an appeal or revision. It has also been laid down that a judge, however humble and junior, is entitled to his own opinion with regard to matters that come before him. Judicial corrections should be restricted to cases where the decision is wrong or erroneous and the jurisdiction under S.561A could be exercised only in the most exceptional and rarest of cases. It has also been laid down that a judge, however humble and junior, is entitled to his own opinion with regard to matters that come before him. Judicial corrections should be restricted to cases where the decision is wrong or erroneous and the jurisdiction under S.561A could be exercised only in the most exceptional and rarest of cases. The principle which Their Lordships wanted to emphasise was that the exercise of jurisdiction under S.561 A should be only in most exceptional cases. Every judge has his own discretion to decide a case and this discretion is sacrosanct. This . discretion should not be interfered with in any manner by the High Court. It is only when the judgment needs the extraordinary correction of clippings by the High Court that S.561-A should be invoked. 12. In S. Lal Singh v. State (AIR. 1959 Punjab 211) the Punjab High Court while discussing the scope of S.561A dissents from the observations mads - in the Full Bench decision in State of Bombay v. Nilkanth (AIR. 1954 Bombay 65 FB.) of the Bombay High Court. The following observations of the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court are apposite in this context and are therefore extracted: "If remarks made against a person without any foundation are allowed to remain in the judgment of the trial Court, his adversaries, by utilising the certified copy of the judgment, can do irreparable harm to him. The contrary observations made by the High Court exonerating him would not be available along with the judgment of the trial Court, In appropriate cases, therefore, the only way in which the High Court can effectively prevent abuse of the process of the court and further the ends of justice is by ordering the damaging remarks to be expunged and the jurisdiction to do so must necessarily be deemed to be inherent in the High Court However, as such adverse remarks are likely to injure the reputation or prejudicially affect the means of livelihood or the career. of the person concerned, this power should be exercised by the trial Court with great reserve and moderation so as to ensure that the witnesses are not restrained from coming forward to give evidence and giving their real opinion for fear of displeasing the trial Court. of the person concerned, this power should be exercised by the trial Court with great reserve and moderation so as to ensure that the witnesses are not restrained from coming forward to give evidence and giving their real opinion for fear of displeasing the trial Court. The need for this caution is still greater in case of remarks against officials whose entire career is likely to be affected by such remarks. However, if the remarks, though unjustified, form an integral part of the judgment and are not distinctly separable, the High Court would not expunge the same but content itself by recording its observations that the same are unjustified." What is laid down by the Punjab High Court is, the High Court has the power to clip down portions of judgments from lower Courts in appropriate cases. Their Lordships would say that a trial Court has perfect liberty to make remarks which may reflect adversely on the character and conduct of the witnesses and such remarks may be necessary for his judgment, and that the trial Court should be allowed to perform its functions freely and fearlessly without any undue interference by the High Court. But Their Lordships cautioned the lower Courts that this power should be exercised by the trial Court with great reserve and moderation so as to ensure that the witnesses are not restrained from coming forward to give evidence and that such remarks should not tend to injure the reputation or prejudicially affect the means of livelihood of persons concerned or their career. Their Lordships further observed that the need for this caution is still greater in the case of remarks against officials whose entire career is likely to be affected by such remarks. Their Lordships have also clearly indicated that if the remarks sought to be removed from the judgment form an integral part of the judgment and are not distinctly separable, the High Court would not expunge the same but content itself by saying that the same are unjustified. The High Court has unlimited power to expunge remarks if it is satisfied that they are neither necessary nor justified nor do they form an integral part of main fabric of the judgment. 13. The Supreme Court authoritatively laid down the position of law and the extent of jurisdiction under S.561-A in two decisions reported in Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1964 SC. 13. The Supreme Court authoritatively laid down the position of law and the extent of jurisdiction under S.561-A in two decisions reported in Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1964 SC. 1) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Naim (AIR. 1964 SC 703). Before the decision of the Supreme Court in these two cases, there was a conflict of opinion as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to expunge objectionable remarks from the judgments of inferior Courts. Till then, the view expressed by the Bombay and Patna High Courts was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgments of inferior Courts which had not been brought before it in regular appeals or revisions; the general trend of opinion in the other High Courts being that the High Court had inherent power to expunge remarks from the judgments of lower Courts which were either irrelevant or inadmissible and which obviously affect the character of the person before the Court. In Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1964 SC. 1) Their Lordships to the Supreme Court observed that the High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. The Court said: "Every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of Justice. This power extends to expunction or ordering expunction of irrelevant remarks made against a person who is neither a party nor a witness to the proceeding, from a judgment or order of a subordinate court, although the matter has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision, and would be exercised by it in appropriate cases for securing the ends of justice. Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate Court of its powers such as by passing comment upon a matter not relevant to the controversy before it and which is unwarranted or is likely to harm or prejudice another. Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate Court of its powers such as by passing comment upon a matter not relevant to the controversy before it and which is unwarranted or is likely to harm or prejudice another. There can be no doubt that the judgment of a tribunal empowered by law to adjudicate upon and decide any matter affecting the rights of parties is inviolable unless the law allows it to be questioned or interfered with. In such a case the judgment can be challenged only and interfered with only by the specified authority and to the extent permissible by the express provisions of law. Not even the inherent power of the High Court is exercisable for this purpose because what is made final or inviolable by law is beyond the purview of such power. But the inviolability which attaches to a judgment must necessarily be confined to its integral parts, that is the verdict and reasons therefor. It cannot extend to matters which though ostensibly a part of the judgment are not in reality its integral parts. Clearly the High Courts, by expunging remarks from an order or judgement of a subordinate court, would not in any event be altering it on merits or in any matter of substance but be only deleting from it matter which being alien to the matter before court ought never to have been there. As such is the only effect of what the High Court does, no prohibition to this course can be inferred from the fact that S.423 and 439 which deal with appellate and revisional powers, are silent about such matters. There do not exclude such power. No doubt, the exercise of such power will have the effect of taking out of the judgment or order something which was there before and thus in a limited way to interfere with the content of the document embodying the judgment or order. But bearing in mind the paramount importance of securing the ends of justice the High Court must be deemed to have such power." (See head-note) In the same judgment, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observe that "every judicial officer must be free to express his mind in the matter of the appreciation of evidence before him". In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn (AIR. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn (AIR. 1963 SC.703), again the Supreme Court has observed: "The High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only It is a principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, that the proper freedom and independence of judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by the Supreme Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has as opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety moderation and reserve." (See head note) Thus, the principle governing expunging of remarks by the High Court is that if the attack is made in the judgment against a person who is not a party and if such attack is unjustifiable or if it does not form the main fabric of the judgment, or that it is separable and is irrelevant or where the attack will harm the reputation of a person or affect him officially or jeopardise his means of livelihood then the High Court can interfere under S.561-A. This jurisdiction is an extraordinary jurisdiction and should be exercised very sparingly and in most exceptional cases. A Judge has to see whether the portions sought to be expunged are separable and that they do not form an integral part of the judgment. It has also to be noted that where the person disparaged in a judgment is a public servant, acting in his independent sphere, it is absolutely necessary that the judge's suspicion about his conduct be communicated to him and an opportunity given to him to show cause against the view that the judge is inclined to take of his conduct. Where a judge is satisfied that a public servant has not been doing his duty diligently certain disparaging remarks to correct him can be made, but such remarks should not exceed the bounds of propriety or judicial discretion. 14. Bearing in mind these principles, let us consider the judgment in question on its merits. The learned Additional First Class Magistrate has stated the tacts of the case in Para.1 to 8 and formulated the points for consideration in Para.9. The points formulated are: "(1) Whether the accused wilfully trespassed into the room occupied by Pw1 and behaved in a violent, riotous or indecent and disorderly way? (2) What is the offence, if any, committed, and (3) What is the proper punishment?" The first point is, as indicated above, whether the accused wilfully trespassed into the room occupied by pw.1 and behaved in a violent, riotous and indecent and disorderly way. All that was necessary for afinding in favour of the accused in this case was to discuss the evidence of pws.1 to 4 and come to the conclusion that their evidence cannot be accepted and hence the accused is acquitted, and if necessary, adding 'honourably', as the accused was a gazetted officer and as the case was proved to be false. pw. 1, who gave Ext. P1 petition, deposed against the original statement made by him. pw. 2 is the wife of pw. 1. pw. 4, an Advocate and legal adviser to the Kerala State Financial Enterprises, deposed that he did not see either pw.1 or pw. 2 Pw. 3, the watchman, denies that he had ever given information about the fact that the accused was the Motor Vehicles Inspector to pw. 1. pw. 2 is the wife of pw. 1. pw. 4, an Advocate and legal adviser to the Kerala State Financial Enterprises, deposed that he did not see either pw.1 or pw. 2 Pw. 3, the watchman, denies that he had ever given information about the fact that the accused was the Motor Vehicles Inspector to pw. 1. After discussing the evidence of these witnesses, in Para.10 to 15 in detail, the learned Magistrate observes in Para.16 as follows: "Now in the nature of the evidence, I am constrained to observe that this prosecution is ill-founded and without any bona fides." Judicial propriety should have dictated to the Magistrate that there he should have wound up the judgment. Thereafter, he starts a real tirade against the Inspector of Police. One of the attacks made by the Court below against the Inspector is that he acted illegally in initiating proceedings in a court for a non-cognizable offence without recourse to the provisions of S.155 (1) and (2) Crl. F.C. It is not rare for police officers sometimes to overlook the provisions of law and initiate proceedings or investigate into cases. On that count alone, the police officer does not deserve down right condemnation at the hands of a Court. In Para.16 of the judgment, the procedure adopted by the Inspector of Police was referred to as deserving high condemnation. In Para.17, the learned Magistrate proceeds to discuss the various mysteries unfolded in the case. In Para.18, the learned Magistrate betrays his mind by stating "even though these matters do not materially affect the facts in issue, still these are things which the prosecution could not reconcile" and proceeds to discuss the evidence of pws.1 to 3 again. Para.19 is also devoted to the discussion of the evidence again. From Para.20 we have a discussion of the various points raised by the defence counsel on the question of law and fact and those points are discussed one by one in the succeeding paragraphs. It is worthwhile to remember that the accused was permitted to file a written statement which was not a statement explaining the circumstances appearing in the evidence against the accused, but a charge against the Inspector of Police by the accused and requesting the Court to take action under S.250 Crl. P.C. 15. It is worthwhile to remember that the accused was permitted to file a written statement which was not a statement explaining the circumstances appearing in the evidence against the accused, but a charge against the Inspector of Police by the accused and requesting the Court to take action under S.250 Crl. P.C. 15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Court has bodily incorporated some of the portions of the written statement in the judgment. Para.21 discusses the scope of the S.155 (1) and (2) Crl. P.C. Para.22 discusses the inordinate delay in filing the complaint in Court and this paragraph is wound up by saying: "these are all matters which the department'has to take a deterrent view". Para.23 is devoted to the absence of the Inspector of Police in the case. In Para.23 the learned Magistrate observes: "In this case, I have gone out of the normal rule and informed him the date of posting of this case." It was not necessary at all for the Court to go out of the normal rule and inform the Inspector of Police the date of posting of the case. It is for the Police Officer to find out the date of posting of the case and make himself available in Court if his presence was necessary. If the Court felt that the police officer was deliberately avoiding attendance in Court, the Court is not powerless to get him to the Court by using coercive methods. In the course of the discussion about the absence of Inspector of Police in Para.23 of the judgment, the learned Magistrate at one stage remarks "when the case was taken up on 21-2-1972 the learned defence counsel submitted in Court that the Circle Inspector was present in the premises of the Court. Immediately I verified it through my Bench Clerk and found it to be correct and hence I sent a Police Constable of the Town Station who attended the Court for the C.I. But the C.I. did not turn to this side." This is not a proper thing for a Court to do. Immediately I verified it through my Bench Clerk and found it to be correct and hence I sent a Police Constable of the Town Station who attended the Court for the C.I. But the C.I. did not turn to this side." This is not a proper thing for a Court to do. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly remarks that this inquisitorial method of enquiry is unknown to law and to the Indian criminal jurisprudence and to verify the statements we do not have the evidence of either the Bench Clerk or the police constable who had been sent to fetch the Inspector of Police. Unnecessary anxiety shown by the Magistrate to get the Inspector to his Court is not in keeping with judicial dignity. If the Magistrate was satisfied that the Inspector paid scant respect for the Court and deliberately absented, himself, necessary remarks should have been made in the judgment. If the Inspector did not appear in Court in spite of summons, a non-bailable warrant could have been issued to him to get him arrested. Instead of resorting to these dignified methods, the learned Magistrate in this case resorted to methods not in keeping with the dignity of the Court nor as contemplated by the procedure laid down in criminal cases. The learned Magistrate observes in Para.24 thus: "It is with much regret I notice the conduct of the C.I. in this case throughout is it is not atrocious on his part to have this sort of hide and seek policy? Is there any atom of bona fides in his conduct?" These remarks are liable to create an impression in the mind of a layman that a Court of law is helpless against an Inspector of Police. Instead of expressing regret in these terms and exhibiting undue anxiety at the atrocity on the part of the police officer, and lamenting over the conduct of the police officer the learned Magistrate should have, with dignity, got him in Court by adopting coercive methods. 16. In Para.25, again the Court pursues the matter. The learned Magistrate accuses the Inspector of Police of having manipulated the petition register and committed illegalities besides having absconded in the case. 16. In Para.25, again the Court pursues the matter. The learned Magistrate accuses the Inspector of Police of having manipulated the petition register and committed illegalities besides having absconded in the case. The learned Magistrate further says "if a police officer like the present C. I. continues to exercise his powers as he has done in this case, the ordinary citizen will not get any justice from the police" and winds up the paragraph by saying "I do not want to express anything more: regarding the irresponsible activity of the complainant, C. I. of police, Palghat." 17. Para.26, 27 and 28 of the judgment are devoted for a discussion of the irregularities committed in the maintenance of records. These discussions are, in my opinion, unnecessary for the disposal of this case. I regret and state that the learned Magistrate would have been well-advised to stop the judgment at Para.16 when he remarked "I am constrained to observe that this prosecution is ill-founded and without any bona fides", and proceeded under S.250 Crl. P. C. against the complainant for filing this vexatious and frivolous complaint. 18. The prayer in the petition, Crl. R. P. No. 216 of 1972, is to delete: "to Para.10 of the judgment: "with regard to his wilful absence I shall deal with later. In Para.16 of the judgment: if anybody gives a petition or sends a petition and basing which a criminal camplaint is filed by the police officer, especially when it is against a responsible Government official like the accused in this case, it is too much of him and that procedure deserves to be highly condemned. The whole of Para.22 of the judgment. The whole of Para.23 of the judgment. The whole of Para.24 of the judgment. The whole of Para.25 of the judgment. The whole of Para.26 of the judgment. The whole of Para.26 (repeat) of the judgment. The whole of Para.27 of the judgment; and the whole of Para.28 of the. judgment." 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.1 in this petition has already obtained a certified copy of the judgment of the lower Court and has sent its copies to the higher authorities in the police department to take action against the petitioner. judgment." 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.1 in this petition has already obtained a certified copy of the judgment of the lower Court and has sent its copies to the higher authorities in the police department to take action against the petitioner. It is submitted that for reasons best known to themselves the prosecution witnesses deposed in favour of the accused and left the petitioner in the lurch. The remarks made by the Court against him in his absence cannot be justified. 20. Now the only question that remains is the nature of the order to be passed in the petition. The only apprehension expressed in the petition before me is that the observations made by the learned Magistrate will be used against the petitioner for departmental enquiry that may be initiated against him. The jurisdiction of this Court to expunge remarks in a judgment is, as stated above, very extraordinary and has to be exercised very cautiously and for compelling reasons. After giving anxious consideration to the circumstances in this case, I am of the opinion that it is sufficient to order as hereunder. 21. The observation in Para.16 "If anybody gives a petition or sends a petition and basing which a criminal complaint is filed by the Police officer, especially when it is against a responsible Government official like the accused in this case, it is too much of him and that procedure deserves to be highly condemned" is expunged. The last sentence in Para.22 "these are al I matters which the department has to take a deterrent view" is also expunged as it is not necessary for the disposal of the case. 22. Regarding the other portions of the judgment which are sought to be expunged,1 think, interests of justice will be met by a declaration that Para.22 to 28 are not necessary for the purpose of the judgment and no departmental action will lie against the petitioner on the basis of any observation made by the learned Magistrate in these paragraphs. I do so accordingly. In the result, the Crl. M. P. is allowed to the extent indicated above. Allowed.