JUDGMENT P. Unnikrishna Kurup, J. 1. The same question of law arises for consideration in both these second appeals and they have been placed before a Division Bench by a learned Judge of this Court as he was of the view that there were conflicting decisions of different High Courts on the question at issue. 2. The question of law that arises for consideration is whether in execution of a decree for specific performance arising on a contract for sale, delivery of property can be ordered by the execution court. In the two appeals before us, the decree for specific performance merely directed the defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, failing which the court ' was to execute the deed. There is no specific direction in the decree that delivery of the property be given to the plaintiff. The question is whether in execution of such a decree, it is open to the court to order delivery of the property. The first appellate court in both the cases ordered delivery holding that the executing court is entitled to give possession of the property as the relief of possession is inherent in a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale. The matter came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this court in Second Appeal No. 1354 of 1963, and following the decision in Atal Behary Acharya v Baroda Prasad Banerji (AIR 1931 Patna 179), it was held that incidental to the relief to which a plaintiff was entitled in a decree for specific performance arising on a contract for sale, the court had a right to grant possession of the property. The Patna decision has specifically held that a contract for sale includes not only the execution of the necessary document but also putting the vendee in possession of the property; and, therefore, even if there is an omission in the plaint or in the decree about granting possession, the executing court is not debarred from granting the plaintiff the relief of recovery of the property. 3. On behalf of the appellant in Second Appeal No. 1236 of 1968, his learned counsel Mr. 3. On behalf of the appellant in Second Appeal No. 1236 of 1968, his learned counsel Mr. T. L. Viswanatha Iyer brought to our notice certain decisions to which we shall presently refer; where it has been held that a second suit for possession will not be barred by O.2 R.2 or S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code where a decree for specific performance arising out of a contract for sale has already been passed. His contention is that the implication of these decisions is that the decree for specific performance did not necessarily take within its ambit the relief of possession and therefore it has to be taken that unless there is a specific prayer for possession and a decree for that relief, such a relief cannot be granted by the court. In Krishnammal v Soundararaja Aiyar (ILR 38 Mad. 698) a plaintiff had obtained in a previous suit a decree against the defendants for specific performance of an agreement to sell certain immovable property and, in execution of that decree, he had got a sale deed in his favour. He filed another suit for recovery of possession of the property and was resisted by the defendants with the plea that the second suit was barred under O.2 R.2 of the Civil Procedure Code. This plea was overruled by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. In that decision, an earlier Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Narayana Kavirayan v Kandaswami Goundan (ILR 22 Mad. 24) was referred to, where a different view appears to have been taken. The learned Judges refused to follow that decision, and, relying on S.55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, came to the conclusion that on the execution of the sale deed a right to possession accrued in favour of the vendee and a suit for possession was maintainable on the strength of the sale deed. 4. The next decision brought to our notice is that reported in Ramanujam Naidu v Sivalingam Pillai (AIR 1924 Mad. 360). This decision has followed, with approval, the decision in ILR 38 Mad. 698. We have also been referred to Krishnaji Babaji Haval v. Sangappa Muriganppa Wangi (AIR 1925 Bom. 4. The next decision brought to our notice is that reported in Ramanujam Naidu v Sivalingam Pillai (AIR 1924 Mad. 360). This decision has followed, with approval, the decision in ILR 38 Mad. 698. We have also been referred to Krishnaji Babaji Haval v. Sangappa Muriganppa Wangi (AIR 1925 Bom. 181) where the view taken is that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, though a claim for possession might be made, it is not obligatory upon the plaintiff to make such a claim. According to this decision, under S.54 of the Transfer of Property Act a contract for sale of immovable property by itself creates no interest or charge upon the immovable property, and until the claim for specific performance is decreed in favour of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that he is entitled to possession, though for the sake of convenience and to avoid multiplicity of suits, it might be open to the plaintiff to make a claim for possession in the same suit. With respect, we are unable to follow the reasoning in this judgment. To say, that in an agreement for sale of the property the parties have merely undertaken to execute a sale deed, but that there was no intention to hand over possession of the property would, in our opinion, be ignoring the realities and taking an artificial and restricted view of the situation. The parties, merely for the sake of obtaining a sale deed, would not enter into a contract. The obvious intention is that a sale deed should be executed and the property covered by the sale deed should be put in the possession of the vendee. To divorce the two reliefs would be to create an artificiality not warranted by law. The Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider this question in the decision reported in Arjun Singh v Sahu Maharaj Narain ( AIR 1950 All. 415 ). That court has agreed with the Patna High Court in the view that the court executing the decree is competent to deliver possession, as an order directing delivery of possession is merely incidental to the execution of the deed of sale. 5. The argument advanced by Mr. 415 ). That court has agreed with the Patna High Court in the view that the court executing the decree is competent to deliver possession, as an order directing delivery of possession is merely incidental to the execution of the deed of sale. 5. The argument advanced by Mr. Viswantha Iyer is this:-- If the decree for specific performance by implication includes the relief of possession also, then a second suit for possession cannot obviously lie as it will be barred by O.2 R.2 and also S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The contention is that the decision referred to earlier of the Madras High Court, inasmuch as it holds that a second suit for possession will lie, is opposed to the principle laid down in the Patna decision as the latter has specifically laid down that a decree for specific performance includes the relief of possession also. The Madras decision, in our opinion, clearly indicates that it is possible to reconcile the two views referred to earlier. In ILR 38 Mad. 698, Tyabji J. has clearly pointed out the fundamental difference between a right to possession arising out of a contract to sell and the right to possession based upon the conveyance, a distinction which has also been noticed by Venkatasubba Rao J. in AIR 1924 Mad. 360. 6. In a decree for specific performance arising from a contract for sale, specific performance is not confined to merely the execution of the sale deed. The right is not merely to obtain a sale deed, but the right is to specific performance of a contract to sell, thereby implying that besides the execution of the sale deed, there is also a further duty to put the vendee in possession of the property. In every contract for sale, unless the contrary appears, the vendor must be deemed impliedly to agree to give possession of the property to the vendee and in a suit for specific performance, the vendee seeks to enforce the terms of that contract. The vendor as much agrees to put the vendee in ' possession, as he agrees to execute a conveyance in his favour. It would therefore follow that when the relief claimed is one of enforcement of the specific performance, it also includes the relief of obtaining possession of the property. The vendor as much agrees to put the vendee in ' possession, as he agrees to execute a conveyance in his favour. It would therefore follow that when the relief claimed is one of enforcement of the specific performance, it also includes the relief of obtaining possession of the property. Therefore the relief is a composite one and, as observed by the Patna High Court, the relief of possession is incidental to the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. This does not however preclude a second cause of action arising in favour of the plaintiff to obtain possession. This right for the second time to obtain possession arises not from the agreement for sale, but from the subsequent sale deed executed. The claim to possession in the second suit is based upon the conveyance obtained in pursuance of the decree in the first suit and the cause of action in the second suit is entirely different and the first suit cannot therefore operate as a bar. We do not think that there is any inconsistency in the two sets of decisions as the right to possession claimed in the second suit is based upon the conveyance and does not arise out of the contract to sell. In other words, the right to possession in the first suit arises out of the contract to sell and the right to possession in the second suit arises by reason of the provision of the Transfer of Property Act under which a vendor is, in law, bound to put the vendee in possession on the execution of the deed of sale. In this view, both the sets of decisions can be reconciled and we consider this to be the correct position of law. The result is that the decision of the court below in both the second appeals is correct and has to be upheld. 7. The second appeals are, as a result, dismissed, but in the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs.