JUDGMENT Oza, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 167 of 1962 (decided on 30th March 1965) after leave having been granted by the learned Judge 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that in village Sandawata, Tahsil Sarangpur, there was some agricultural land bearing Khata No. 128 and consisting of survey Nos 797, 798 and 800 measuring 19 Bighas and 4 Biswas, and the appellant's father Motilal was the recorded tenant of these lands. These lands were situated in the erstwhile State of Narsinghgarh. The lands were given on Adh-Batai (sub-lease) to the deceased respondent Rama on 3rd October 1944, The appellant filed a suit on 6th May 1952 for possession of these lands on the ground that the sub-lease was terminated by a notice dated the 8th April 1950. This suit was decided on 13th December 1954 In pursuance of the decree passed in this suit, an execution was filed and on 21st May 1965 the possession of the suit lands were obtained by the appellant. The deceased respondent Rama preferred an appeal against the judgment of the trial Court, which was allowed on 7th February 1962 Against this, the appellant Surajmal preferred a second appeal in this Court which was decided by the impugned judgment dated the 30th March 1965. The learned Single Judge held that the respondent being a Shikmi was entitled to the advantage of section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959 Consequently, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. On a prayer from the appellant, the learned Judge felt that in view of the decision in Raghunathsingh v. Gangabai 1963 JLJ 998 the question involved in the case is a substantial question of law and so he certified the case as a fit one for filing an appeal under the Letters Patent. Consequently, this letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 3. At the commencement of the hearing, Shri W. Y. Pande, learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection. Consequently, this letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 3. At the commencement of the hearing, Shri W. Y. Pande, learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection. He contended that the suit was filed in the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat, and that at the time when then the suit was filed an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge was only permissible under the provisions contained in section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act (No. 8 of 1949), and in view of section 52 of the States Reorganization Act. 1956, the right of appeal available to the appellant could not be under the Letters Patent but would be under section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act. According to the learned counsel, under the rules framed for an appeal under section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act, a certificate ought to have been issued by the learned Single Judge certifying the case as a fit one for appeal, but in the present case as no such certificate has been filed along with the memorandum of appeal, the appeal cannot be entertained under section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act and it deserves to be thrown out on this short ground alone. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on Radha Krishna Das v. Rai Krishna Chand 28 IA 182 Moolji Jaitha and Co. v. K. S. W. Mills Co. AIR 1950 FC 83 and Radha Krishna v. Swaminatha AIR 1821 PC 25. He also placed reliance on the decision in Amritlal v. State of Bombay AIR 1965 Guj 87 . 4, Shri S. D. Sanghi learned counsel for the appellant, contended that section 52 of the States Reorganisation Act no doubt provides that for the territories of the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat the jurisdiction of the High Court under the provisions of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act would continue; but it does not mean that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the Letters Patent would not be available. He contended that under section 23 of M. B. High Court of Judicature Act what was contemplated was that the learned Single Judge should certify a case as a fit one for appeal. He contended that under section 23 of M. B. High Court of Judicature Act what was contemplated was that the learned Single Judge should certify a case as a fit one for appeal. According to the learned counsel, the issuance of a certificate is only provided in rule 20 of the Rules and Orders under the High Court of Judicature Act, and that being merely a rule of procedure in view of section 54 of the States Reorganization Act will not be applicable, and the leave granted by the learned Single Judge would amount to certifying the Case as a fit one for appeal. Learned counsel contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge itself amounts to a certificate and consequently (here is no substance in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. In support of his contentions, he relied on in Re-Shridhar Rao AIR 1958 AP 60 and Shakuntala v. M. B. Jaisoorya AIR 1958 AP 390. 5. To appreciate the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, it would be worthwhile to consider section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act, which is as under- 23. Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from.-- (a) a decree or an order appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law for the time being in force, passed by a District Judge in exercise of his original or appellate civil jurisdiction. (b) a decree or an appealable order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of his extraordinary or appellate civil jurisdiction : Provided that no appeal shall lie to the High Court from any decree or order passed or made by a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal from the decree or order of a subordinate Court passed or made in any appeal arising out of any suit, unless the Single Judge who passed or made the decree or order certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal. The proviso to this section provides that no appeal shall lie unless the Single Judge, who passed or made the decree or order, certifies that the case is fit one for appeal. The proviso to this section provides that no appeal shall lie unless the Single Judge, who passed or made the decree or order, certifies that the case is fit one for appeal. Rule 20 of the Rules and Orders under the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act provides as under :-- 20. (a) An application to a single Judge of the High Court for obtaining a a certificate required under proviso to section 23 of the High Court Act (No. VIII of 1949) shall be in writing and presented within fifteen days of the date of decree or judgment. The application need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree or judgment in question. The delay in making any such application may on sufficient ground being shown, be condoned by the judge to whom the application is made. (b) No memorandum of appeal in such cases shall be entertained unless it is presented before the expiration of 30 days from the date of judgment decree or order appealed from unless the admitting Bench, in its discretion for good cause shown grants further time for presentation The time spent in obtaining the certificate from the Judge (including the date of application and the date on which the Judge passed the order) shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation. (c) The memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by the certificate of the Judge against whose order, the appeal's preferred. It need be accompanied by a copy of a judgment, decree or order appealed against. Clause (c) of rule 20 provides that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by the certificate of the judge against whose order the appeal is preferred. It is, therefore clear that what is required under section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act is that the Judge certifies the case as a fit tone for appeal. Clause (c) of rule 20 provides that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by the certificate of the judge against whose order the appeal is preferred. It is, therefore clear that what is required under section 23 of the M. B. High Court of Judicature Act is that the Judge certifies the case as a fit tone for appeal. The filing of a certificate along with the memorandum of appeal has only been provided in rule 20 Section 52 of the States Reorganisation Act reads thus: The High Court for a new State shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in that new State, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction, as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by any High Court or Judicial Commissioner's Court for an existing State. Section 52 of the States Reorganisation Act therefore, states that the High Court of the new State shall, in respect of the territories included in the new State, exercise jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court under the law in force immediately before the appointed day Shri Pandey, therefore, contended that the High Court of the new State in respect of its territories could exercise only that jurisdiction which was available to the High Court under the law in force before the appointed day and no further. The argument of the learned counsel finds support from the view taken by the Gujrat High Court in Amritlal v. State of Bombay AIR 1965 Guj 87 where it was observed :- Under the circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there is a vital distiction between the jurisdiction of a Court and powers e ercisable by that Court and, when section 52 of the Reorganisation Act enacts that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay for the new State of Bombay shall in relation to the Saurashtra area be the same as the jurisdiction which the Saurashtra High Court possessed, it means that the High Court of Bombay has the same jurisdiction which the High Court of Saurashtra had. The latter question is entirel different from the question relating to the powers of the individual Judges or of the division Benches of the High Court It has further been observed in this decision that :- That being so, the jurisdiction which is referred to in section 52 cannot be and is territorial jurisdiction Section 52, in terms speaks of original and appellate jurisdiction which is quite different from territorial jurisdiction. Besides original and appellate jurisdiction the section also speaks of other jurisdictions. The latter expression comprises such other jurisdictions as civil and criminal, testamentary and intestate, matrimonial, divorce, insolvency and admirality which the High Court of Saurashtra possessed under cl. (b) of section 4 of the Ordinance 11 of 1948 Subbarao C.J. (as he then was) has observed in, in Re-Sriahar Rao and another, AIR 1958 AP 60 Section 119, States Reorganisation Act, only preserves the laws prevailing in the Telangana area till the Legislature or other competent authority provides otherwise. The laws will be applied as if there was no territorial change. But the provisions of the section cannot preserve any laws governing the jurisdiction and procedure obtaining in the Hyderabad High Court which ceased to exist from the appointed day. When the High Court itself became defunct, it is not possible to hold that the laws governing its jurisdiction and procedure continue to exist. They ceased to have any legal existence along with the Court with which they were bound up Hence after the appointed day, the proceedings transferred from the Hyderabad High Court would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and be governed by the procedure obtaining therein Learned counsel Shri Pande contended that what was observed in this case has been met by section 52 of the States Reorgansation Act. Consequently, he contended that the appellate jurisdiction for the territories of the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat could only be found in the section 23 of the High Court of Judicature Act and not in the Letters Patent. In Shakuntala v. M. B. Jaisoorya AIR 1960 AP 390 the same question was again considered and it was observed :- Straightway we must state that there is a fallacy in this argument. In Shakuntala v. M. B. Jaisoorya AIR 1960 AP 390 the same question was again considered and it was observed :- Straightway we must state that there is a fallacy in this argument. It has to be observed that Letters Patent governed the proceedings in the Madras High Court and after the formation of the Andhra State it was applied to the Andhra High Court as well and after 1st November 1956 the jurisdiction of the Andhra High Court has been extended to the Hyderabad State and the High Court in the newly formed Andhra Pradesh State was to exercise jurisdiction over all the territories in Hyderabad, the Hyderabad High Court having ceased to exist. The necessary consequence of this was that the Letters Patent which governed the proceedings in the High Court in so far as the Andhra High Court was concerned applied to the Andhra Pradesh High Court also. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a party against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court where leave is granted. A right of appeal is therefore provided in all cases decided by a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court provided he grants leave. It therefore comes to this that a party could file an appeal against any judgment reordered by a Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh irrespective of the fact that the subject matter of the appeal relates to an area in the Hyderabad State, that is to say, the Telengana area. The test is : Is it a judgment of a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ? The maintainability of the appeal would not depend upon what the Judge of the High Court decided, but whether he decided the question sitting as a Judge of the Andhra High Court. The learned counsel invited our attention to sections 119 and 120 of the States Re-organization Act. These sections, in our opinion, have no relevancy whatsoever to the question as to whether an appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The learned counsel invited our attention to sections 119 and 120 of the States Re-organization Act. These sections, in our opinion, have no relevancy whatsoever to the question as to whether an appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Sections 119 and 120 only say that by reason of territorial changes and formation of new states as amended in Part-II of the Act, there would not be any change in the law in force immediately before the appointed date. They only save the operation of the existing laws until such laws are adapted, modified or repealed by the competent Legislature 6. So far as the States Reorganization Act is concerned it provides for the High Court for the new State. It also states that the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the territories of Madhya Pradesh shall be the High Court of the New State. It further provides that the High Court of the Part B. State (Madhya Bharat High Court) is hereby abolished. It cannot therefore be doubted that the high Court of Madhya Pradesh which was known as High Court of Judicature at Nagpur became the High Court of the New State governed by the Letters Patent of that High Court. What section 52 provided was that if there was any jurisdiction available in respect of any part of the territories with the abolished High Court, that jurisdiction will still be available in spite of the fact that, that High Court has been abolished. Consequently, section 52 more or less is enacted like a saving clause Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that for the territories of the erstwhile Madhya Bharat the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court will only be limited to section 23 of the High Court of Judicature Act cannot be accepted. What it provides is the saving of the jurisdiction which was available under section 23 of that Act. Accordingly we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Gujrat High Court in AIR 1965 Guj 87 (supra). It cannot, therefore be doubted that once a case has been heard and decided by a single Judge of this Court, an appeal would be competent under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Accordingly we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Gujrat High Court in AIR 1965 Guj 87 (supra). It cannot, therefore be doubted that once a case has been heard and decided by a single Judge of this Court, an appeal would be competent under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. If there are any cases from the territories of Madhya Bharat where the appellate jurisdiction is available under section 23 of the High Court of Judicature Act, which is not available under the Letters Patent, that jurisdiction alone is saved under the provisions contained in section 52. Consequently, this appeal filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent will be competent. 7. Even under section 23 of the High Court of Judicature Act what was required was that the learned Single Judge certifies the case as a fit one for appeal The filing of the certificate has only been provided in Rule 20 of the rules framed by the Madhya Bharat High Court under Section 23. section 54 of the States Reorganization Act provides : -- 54. Subject to the provisions of this Part the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court for the corresponding State shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court for a new State, and accordingly, the High Court for the new State shall have all such powers to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure as are, immediately before the appointed day, exercisable by the High Court, for the corresponding State : Provided that any rules or orders which are in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court for the corresponding State shall, until varied or revoked by rules or orders made by the High Court for a new State apply with the necessary modifications in relation to practice and procedure in the High Court for the new State as if made by that Court. This section clearly provides that so far as the laws or rules pertaining to practice and procedure are concerned those of the new High Court will be applicable subject to such modifications if necessary Consequently, after the formation of Madhya Pradesh the rules of the new High Court alone would be applicable and in this view of the matter Rule 20 of the Madhya Bharat High Court Rules will have no application. Therefore, even under section 23 if the appeal could be filed, the filing of a certificate would not be necessary. Consequently, in our opinion the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is without any substance. 8. As regards the merits learned counsel for the appellant contended that the protection which was given to the respondent only pertained to his possession and if on the date the M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force the respondent was not in possession, then he cannot derive any advantage from the provisions contained in section 185 of that Code. 9. In the present case the sub-lease was created in 1944. In 1950 the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act came into force. Section 75 of this Act provided :-- 75. A sub-lease of the whole or any part of the holding of a Pokka tenant effected properly and legally prior to the commencement of this Act shall terminate after the expiry of the period of sub-lease or 4 years after the commencement of this Act, whichever period is less. This section clearly provides that sub-lease created before the passing of this Act shall come to an end after the expiry of the period of sublease or four years after the commencement of the Act, whichever is less. Consequently, it cannot be doubted that even if this sub-lease was subsisting on the commencement of this Act, it came to an end four years after the commencement of this Act. section 76 runs-- 76. (1) If the sub-lessee does not hand over possession of the land sub-let to him after the sub-lease ceases to be in force under section 74 and 75 to the lessor or his legal heir in case of his (lessor's) death, he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) On the dispossession of the trespasser under sub-section (1) the Pokka tenant, or if he is dead his legal heir shall under orders of the Tahsildar be placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. Thus this section further provides that after the sub-lease comss to an end as provided in section 75 and the sub-lessee does not hand over possession, then he shall be deemed to be a trespasser. Consequently, in 1954, that is, four years after the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act the sub-lease came to an end and the respondent as he had not handed over possession could only be treated as a trespasser. The respondent lost his possession in execution of the decree on 21st May, 1955. The Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955, came into force the respondent was not in possession. Consequently, this protection could afford no assistance to him as this Act only protected the possession of the sub-lessees even if their leases had come to an end. Section 3 of this Protection Act provided: 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 76 of the Madhya Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, during the continuance of this Act but subject to the provisions contained in section 4 below, no Ryotwari Sub-lessee other than a sub-lessee under section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 and a sub-lessee deemed to be a trespasser under section 78 of the said Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, shall be ejected from his land. It is in this context that section 4 of this Act provided the stay of all proceedings pertaining to eviction of sub-lessees. But as the possession had been lost by the respondent before this protection Act came into force it could not protect the respondent. 10. Section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code provides- 185 (1) Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds-- (i)......... (ii) in the Madhya Bharat region-- (a)......... But as the possession had been lost by the respondent before this protection Act came into force it could not protect the respondent. 10. Section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code provides- 185 (1) Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds-- (i)......... (ii) in the Madhya Bharat region-- (a)......... (b) any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955; or shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code." This provision therefore makes it clear that if any person is holding land on the date this Code comes into force as a Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act, then he shall be called an "occupancy tenant." The definition of "sub lessee" given in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari sub-lessee Protection Act reads-- "2(b) "Ryotwari sub-lessee" means a person to whom a Pakka tenant of any Ryotwari land has sub-let on sub-lease any part of his Ryotwari land; It cannot therefore be doubted that the respondent was a Ryotwari sub-lessee. The whole controversy in the present case turns on the word "holds" used in section 185. According to the learned counsel for the appellant Shri Sanghi 'holds' implies continuance of possession and if the respondent is not in possession of the land on the date this Act came into force, section 185 would provide no benefit to him On the other hand, Shri W. Y. Pande, learned counsel for the respondent contended that "holds" does not only indicate that the person should be in possession but it also means that he is entitled to be in possession. This question has already been considered in a number of decisions of this Court and learned counsel have attempted to interpret these decisions either-way. This question has already been considered in a number of decisions of this Court and learned counsel have attempted to interpret these decisions either-way. In Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal 1966 RN 331: 1966 JLJ 695: AIR 1966 SC 1485 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the provisions contained in section 185(1)(ii)(a) observed:-- A person who was inducted into the land as a tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary tenant who continued to hold the land at the commencement of the Act was entitled to protection, notwithstanding that under the law in force prior to the commencement of the Act, the contractual relationship was determined. The word "holds" although in a different context came up for consideration in Handique v. Board of Agricultural Income-Tax, Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1191 and it was held :-- The expression 'holds' includes a two fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title.0 The matter again was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Laxmi Kumar v. Ram Bihari Mishra, 1970 RN 113 While considering the provisions contained in sect on 185 (1) (ii) (b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, it was observed :-- The obvious intention of section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code is to give occupancy rights to those sub-tenants whose rights as sub-tenants had come to an end......but who are still holding the land on the date the Code came into force. This clearly goes to show that if on the date when the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code came into force the respondent was in possession, then alone he would get the advantage of being an occupancy tenant. A similar view was expressed in the Divisional Bench decision on this Court reported in Gajraj Singh v. Jagatsingh, 1970 RN 133. 11. The learned single Judge appears to have taken the view that as the respondent was initially a sub-lessee although the sublease was determined, still his right to continue was protected by the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act. Consequently, he was entitled to get the rights of an occupancy tenant. In view of the discussion above, in our opinion, this does not appear to be the correct view. Consequently, he was entitled to get the rights of an occupancy tenant. In view of the discussion above, in our opinion, this does not appear to be the correct view. In fact the learned Judge granted leave in view of the decision reported in Raghunath Singh v. Gangabai, 1960 JLJ 998 where Krishnan, J. has observed-- But when protective legislation of this nature is being enacted for the benefit of a particular class, it does happen that certain individual member do not get the benefit. But that does not throw any doubt on the purpose of that litigation or one for the enactment of which the protection Act is a preliminary step. I would, therefore, hold that on this ground the appellant who is a sub-tenant benefitted by the Protection Act and who, by virtue of the stay order dated 8-9-1955 (confirmed on 21-12-1955), is still holding the land, becomes under section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code, an occupancy tenant. 12. In these circumstances, therefore, the respondent who was not in possession on the date the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code came into force cannot get the advantage of this provision by claiming to have acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant. In that view of the matter the judgment passed by the learned single Judge cannot be maintained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff-appellant's suit for possession is decreed. The appellant shall be entitled to costs of this appeal as well as in Courts below. Counsel fee as per schedule if certified.