P. N. Khanna ( 1 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 in this second appeal under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, herein called the Act, is the owner of a house in Arya Pura, Subzi Mandi, Delhi. Accommodation consisting of a room, two kolkis, a latrine, a balcony, verandah and a courtyard on the first floor of this house had been given on rent to one Prem Singh. deceased, predecessor-in-title of the appellants and respondents Nos. 2 and 3, for residential purposes. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under section 15 (1) of the Act for Prem Singh s eviction on several grounds. The main grounds with which we are now concerned were, that neither the tenant nor any member of his family had been residing in the premises for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the said eviction application, that the tenant had on or after 9th June, 1952 sublet assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the whole of the premises without obtaining consent in writing of the landlord and that the premises were bona fide required by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself and for members of his family, while he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the case Prem Singh died and his aforesaid legal representatives were impleaded as respondents. The Additional Controller directed eviction of the appellant s and respondents Nos. 2 and 3. An appeal by the present appellants was dismissed with costs by the Rent Control Tribunal. This brought the appellants to this Court in second appeal. ( 3 ) MISS C. M. Kohli, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted at the outset that the eviction petition should have been dismissed in the absence of a notice terminating the tenancy. The Tribunal had stated in its order under appeal that in the absence of the plea of non-service of notice of termination, in the written statement, the appellants could not be allowed to urge the same in appeal. The written statement was first filed by Prem Singh on October 26, 1964, where it was stated that the alleged notice was not legal and was of no consequence, though it had been duly replied to. The written statement was first filed by Prem Singh on October 26, 1964, where it was stated that the alleged notice was not legal and was of no consequence, though it had been duly replied to. The plea of insufficiency of notice of termination had thus been raised at the earliest opportunity by the tenant, although in an amended written statement filed by the legal representatives of the deceased tenant, this objection had not been repeated. Exhibit A. W. 15/1 is a copy of the notice dated September 7, 1962 which was proved to to have been served on Prem Singh, the tenant. ( 4 ) THE appellant s learned counsel submitted that notice merely demanded possession without terminating the tenancy. "no words had been used indicating the intention to terminate the tenancy. This argument is not plausible. The notice in its earlier part informed the tenant that he was liable to eviction for reasons mentioned therein. It then asked the tenant in clear terms that he must vacate and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises by the end of the month of September, 1962. In case of failure to vacate the tenant was threatened with proceedings for his eviction. Landlord s intention not to allow the tenant to continue the tenancy, was thus clearly indicated, which in other words could be said to imply the termination of the tenancy on the expiry of the month. As was observed by Lord Atkinson in Harihar Banerji and others v. Ramshahi Roy and others. AIR 1998 PC 192, notices to quit. though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law ; the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all the facts and circumstances, and further that they are to be construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective, but to be construed to make them sensible and effective. The rule is to make "lame and inaccurate" notices sensible, where the recipient cannot have been misled as to the intention of the giver ; and not to indulge in a fine and far fetched subtle argument as if engaged in the process of splitting a straw. The tenant in this case cannot be said to have been misled or to have been left in any doubt. He could not have been asked to quit if the tenancy had remained in tact. The intention was made clear that the landlord was not prepared to allow him to continue to remain in possession, of course, as a tenant. He was asked to quit failing which legal proceedings were threatened. It was, therefore, a perfectly valid and effective notice, which did terminate the tenancy. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that after the expiry of this notice a fresh tenancy had been created. This argument is a clear after thought and this was never the appellant s case. The tenant in the written statement had been insisting that the tenancy had commenced somewhere in 1947 under the Custodian. The present plea of the learned counsel for the ap- pellants, therefore, cannot be entertained. ( 6 ) THE next contention raised on behalf of the appellant s was that the findings to the effect that there was a parting with possession of the premises in dispute in favour of Ram Piyari, appellant No. 2, who was a daughter of Prem Singh, was not borne out by facts proved on record. This contention is without any basis. In the first place, it is a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed in second oppeal. As was observed by Mr. Justice Hegde for the Supreme Court, in Vinod Kumar V. Ajit Singh Ahlnwalia, 1969 RCR 181, it is not competent for this Court to re-assess the evidence. Secondly, a perusal of the file shows that this finding is supported by ample evidence. Kishan Law, AW4, Ram Asra, AW 6 Rishori Lal A. W. 6, and Chhatter Singh, A. W. 7, had stated that the premises had been vacated by Prem Singh about three years earlier. The premises were then said to have been let out to another person (one teacheress) and after she had left, the premises were said to have been given over to appellant No. 2. The premises were then said to have been let out to another person (one teacheress) and after she had left, the premises were said to have been given over to appellant No. 2. It is true that appellant No. 2 is the daughter of Prem Singh deceased. But, it was never the tenant s case that she was in occupation in her capacity as a daughter of Prem Singh. The stand taken up by the appellant s was that Charan Dass, husband of Ram Piyari was a co-tenant with Prem Singh from the very beginning and as such there was neither subletting nor parting with the possession of the premises. The plea of co-tenancy was rightly rejected by the Additional Controller and by the Tribunal. Ram Piyari thus, had been claiming to be in occupation of the premises in her own right and not as a daughter or a legal representative of the deceased, Prem Singh It was also brought on record from unimpeachable evidence that Ram Piyari s children had been admitted in the Schools situaied in the neighbourhood of the Premises in dispute some where in the middle of 1964. These children were educated previously at Jalesar in Uttar Pradesh. This shows that Ram Piyari came here with the intention of permanently settling in the premises in dispute after having left Jalesar. Prem Singh who is proved to have left the house some where in March 1963, cannot be said to have entertained any intention of going back to re-occupy the premises. Prem Singh having thus divested himself not only of physical possession, but also of his right to possession of the premises in dispute, cannot be said to have retained the legal possession thereof. Ram Piyari who claims to have been in possession of the premises in her own right, therefore, had acquired possession of the premises from Prem Singh and the finding that there was a parting with possession of the premises in dispute from the tenant in favour of Ram Piayari is, therefore, not unjustified. ( 7 ) THE last contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the landlord had acquired vacant possession of one room on the ground floor in the same building and that three daughters of the landlord had been married and had ceased to be members of his family. ( 7 ) THE last contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the landlord had acquired vacant possession of one room on the ground floor in the same building and that three daughters of the landlord had been married and had ceased to be members of his family. This, it was stated, happened during the pendency of this appeal. The landlord thus having acquired sufficient accommodation for his reduced requirements, could no longer be said to be in bonafide need of the premises for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family. This contention of the learned counsel again is baseless. At the time of the filing of the eviction petition, the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife and six children, two of whom were married daughters and the remaining four, that is two daughters and two sons were unmarried. The landlord was residing in a rented accommodation consisting of one room. The appellants, on the other hand, had contended that he had two rooms with a verandah, kitchen and a bath. According to the appellant s witnesses, one room had keen converted into two rooms by the land- lord. Even if it be accepted that the landlord has acquired a living room on the ground floor during the pendency of the suit, which fact is disputed, he would be getting from the appellants only one room and a kolki, besides the kitchen, etc. This accommodation by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be excessive in view of the landlord s present needs. The finding of the Tribunal on this point cannot be assailed as unjustified.