JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - On 29th December, 1952, the shop in dispute was allotted to the Appellant, Mangal Sen. He was, however, unable to obtain possession. Subsequently, the Rent Control Officer passed another order of allotment in favour of Kanhaiya Lal and Co., Respondent No. 2, on December 26, 1956. Respondent No. 2 appears to have instituted a suit for an injunction restraining the Appellant Mangal Sen from taking possession. The validity of the allotment order in his favour was also challenged. The civil court, however, dismissed the suit. It found that the allotment order in favour of the Appellant was valid. This decree was upheld by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 1037 of 1958 (decided on 19-2-1959). Thereafter, Mangal Sen made an application before the Rent Control Officer for the cancellation of the allotment order passed in favour of Respondent No. 2. The said Respondent contested the proceedings and assailed the validity of the allotment order passed in favour of Mangal Sen. 2. By a reasoned order dated 25th March, 1960, the Rent Control Officer held that in view of the decision of the Civil Court and the High Court, the allotment order dated 29th December, 1952, was valid in all respects. He also held that the allotment order passed in favour of Respondent No. 2 on December 26, 1956, was procured by fraud and misrepresentation of facts. He therefore cancelled that order. He then held that in view of the decision of this Court in Kali Prasad Basu v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1959 ALJ 167, even though he had cancelled the allotment order pass d in favour of Respondent No. 2, he had no power to eject him and thereafter, to give possession to Mangal Sen and in this view, the question whether the benefit of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 7-A of the Rent Control Act ought to be given to Kanhaiya Lal and Co. does not arise for consideration. On these findings, he directed the papers to be filed. In substance, he took no action u/s 7-A to put Mangal Sen in possession after ejectment of Kanhaiya Lal and Co. Aggrieved by this order, Mangal Sen came to this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. does not arise for consideration. On these findings, he directed the papers to be filed. In substance, he took no action u/s 7-A to put Mangal Sen in possession after ejectment of Kanhaiya Lal and Co. Aggrieved by this order, Mangal Sen came to this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge, however, dismissed the writ petition, on the finding that the Rent Control Officer did not commit my manifest error of law in following a decision of this Court. The learned judge was referred to another Single judge decision in Syed Kasim Hussain. Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1960 AWR 406 , but he held that this decision could not be deemed to have overruled he earlier Single Judge decision and since this decision was not brought to the notice of the Rent Control Officer, his order cannot be said to be manifestly erroneous in law. On this ground, the writ petition failed. Hence the present appeal. Section 7-A provides: 7-A. District Magistrate's power to take action against unauthorised occupants. (1) Where in pursuance of an order of the DM Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7, the vacancy of any accommodation is required to be reported and is not reported, or where an order requiring any accommodation to be let out or not to be let has been duly passed Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 and he DM believes or has reason to believe hat any person has, in contravention of he said order, occupied the said accommodation or any part thereof, he may sail upon the person in occupation to how cause, within a time to be fixed by him, why he should not be evicted therefrom: Provided that no order under this section shall be passed if the DM is satisfied that there has been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to do so. (2) If such person fails to appear in reply to the notice served Under Sub-section (1) or, f he appears but fails to satisfy the DM that the order Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 vas not duly passed and that he is entitled to remain in occupation of the accommodation, the DM may without prejudice to any other law of the time being n force, direct him to vacate the premises within a period to be specified. (3) Upon the making of the order Under Sub-section (2) the person against whom the order is made and every person claiming under him shall vacate the accommodation. If the accommodation is not vacated within the time allowed or such extended period as the DM may grant, the DM may evict or cause to be evicted the person or persons and use such force is may be necessary for carrying out the order and also put the person, entitled Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7, in occupation of the accommodation. (4)... ... ... It will be seen that Section 7-A(1) read with Sub-sections (2) and (3) confers power upon the DM to eject by force a person who has in contravention of the 'said order' occupied an accommodation. The 'said order' refers, inter alia, to an order of allotment that may be passed u/s 7(2) of the Act. 3. If an order of allotment is parsed in favour of a person u/s 7(2) the effect of that order is that the landlord is directed to let out that accommodation to the allottee and deliver possession of the accommodation to him. If some other person is in possession of the accommodation, the landlord is deprived of his responsibility of delivering possession to the allottee after entering into a contract of tenancy with him. The continued possession of a stranger thus has the effect of nullifying the order of allotment. In this way, the possession of the stranger would be in contravention of the order of allotment. 4. In the present case, an order of allotment was passed in favour of the Appellant on 29th December, 1952. Obviously, possession of any other person thereafter would, prima facie, be in contravention of that allotment order. 5. Respondent No. 2 came in possession under an allotment order passed on 26th December, 1956. In view of that order, he could claim to be legitimately in possession. But when that order was cancelled on the ground that it was procured by fraud and misrepresentation, the effect of the cancellation would, in the eye of law, be as if that order had never been passed or that it never existed. The position would be the same as if no order of allotment had been passed in favour of Respondent No. 2. The position would be the same as if no order of allotment had been passed in favour of Respondent No. 2. In that event, as explained above, his possession would be in contravention of the order of allotment in favour of the Appellant. In this situation, Section 7-A(1) would clearly be attracted and on the language of the provision, the DM had power to eject such a person. 6. In Basu's case 1959 ALJ 167, a learned Single Judge held that if a person occupied an accommodation under an allotment order, it cannot be said that he is occupying the accommodation in contravention of any provisions of the Act. The proposition, in so far as it goes, is correct. But the learned Judge then went on to hold that a fresh order of allotment, after cancelling the previous order, is not an order which is enforceable by the Rent Control authority either under the CPC or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor is it an order which could be enforced under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. This observation is, in our opinion, not quite correct. It is not necessary to go to the CPC or the Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to find such an authority in the Rent Control Officer. As seen above, Section 7-A of the Rent Control Act itself confers authority to eject, if necessary, by force, a person in possession in contravention of an allotment order. When an allotment order is cancelled and there is another order of allotment in favour of another person, the possession of the person in whose favour the allotment order was passed but cancelled, is clearly in contravention of the other order and would attract Section 7-A, whereunder such a person can be ejected. 7. In Kasim Hussain's case 1960 AWR 406 another learned Single Judge held that if a person who should not have been in possession has been put in possession by the Rent Control Officer u/s 7 of the Act and that order is set aside, then apart from Section 7-A, there would be an inherent jurisdiction in the Rent Control Officer to place the parties in their proper positions. In this case, the Rent Control Officer passed an allotment order, but the same was set aside by the State Government and the house was released in favour of the owner. In this case, the Rent Control Officer passed an allotment order, but the same was set aside by the State Government and the house was released in favour of the owner. It was held that the Rent Control Officer could put back the owner in possession. The case is slightly different on facts from the fact of the present case. Here the order of allotment in favour of the Appellant was passed by the DM u/s 7(2) and not by State Govt. u/s 7F. This case, though it takes a different view from the one taken in Basu's case, is not directly applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. In R.K. Khandelwal v. M.L. Chawala 1964 AWR 36 , a Bench held that if a person occupies an accommodation before an allotment order is passed and continues to be in occupation after it is passed, he can be said to occupy it in contravention of the allotment order, if it is not passed in his favour. It was observed that continuing in occupation is occupation and such occupation may become an occupation in contravention of the allotment order after it is, made. This would show that a person in occupation in pursuance of an allotment ond which has been cancelled, would be possession in contravention of an order allotment provided there is another order of allotment in existence. If another order of allotment is there, his possession would attract Section 7-A of the Act. 9. Similarly, in Babu Lal v. Sheo Nath 1967 All. 236, the Supreme Court held that granting of tenancy by the landlord and delivering possession, after the passing of an allotment order in favour of another person, did not mea that the possession of the tenant was valid. Such letting and the continuance of possession by the tenant were in direct breach of the allotment order. Such tenant can well be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention do the order of allotment and the Rent Control Officer has, therefore, jurisdiction to initiate proceedings Under Sub-section (1) of Section 7-A and pass orders Under Sub-sections (1) and (3) thereof. This is, in our opinion a direct authority of the proposition contended for by the Appellant. 10. This is, in our opinion a direct authority of the proposition contended for by the Appellant. 10. It has been held more than one by this Court that an allotment order exhausts itself after the allottee enter into possession; but, even so, the Rent Control Officer has jurisdiction to cannot the allotment order after such an even in case it is found to have been procure by fraud or misrepresentation See Siraj uddin v. State of U.P. 1972 ALJ 364. 11. On behalf of the Respondent reliance was placed upon K.C. Sharma v. The State of U.P. 1962 AWR 30 which was followed in the case of Siraj uddin. These cases are distinguishable There an order of allotment was passed by the Rent Control Officer u/s 7(2). That order was, however, set aside be the State Government. It appears that there was no other order of allotment passed by the Rent Control Officer u/s 7(2) in favour of any other person. I this situation, it was held that since u/s 7-A(1) contemplates action in respect to the contravention of an order passed u/s 7(2), it would not include an order passed by the State Government u/s 7-1 The case is clearly distinguishable because, in the present case, the order allotment in favour of the Respondent was cancelled by the Rent Control Officer himself and the order in favour of the Appellant was also passed by the Rent Control Officer u/s 7(2). 12. In our opinion, K.P. Basu case was not correctly decided. 13, The Rent Control Officer did lot, however, go into the question whether Respondent No. 2 was entitled to he benefit of the proviso to Section 7-A(1). The applicability of the proviso depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. They not having been found, we are in no position to adjudicate upon to applicability. It is hence necessary to end the case back. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Jingle Judge is set aside. The order of he Rent Control Officer in so far as it refuses to take action u/s 7-A(1) is also set aside. It is hence necessary to end the case back. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Jingle Judge is set aside. The order of he Rent Control Officer in so far as it refuses to take action u/s 7-A(1) is also set aside. The matter is sent back to him for consideration of the question whether on the facts and circumstances if the case, the Respondent was entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 7-A(1) and thereafter to pass suitable orders in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The Appellant would be entitled to costs here and n the court of the learned Single Judge.