Judgment :- 1. This is a revision petition by the plaintiff in a small cause suit, which was dismissed by the Munsiff, Kozhikode holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The revision petition came before a learned judge of this Court, who thought that the question involved was an important one to be considered by a Division Bench. Hence the revision petition has been referred to us. 2. The first question to be considered is whether the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner. The only evidence available regarding the nature of the transaction between the parties is Ex. Al, a compromise entered into by them in O.S. No. 802 of 1967. The compromise recites that there was an arrangement between the parties previously (of October 17,1949) allowing the respondent to put up sheds for the purpose of conducting a school on a plot of land belonging to the petitioner, the respondent agreeing to pay Rs. 30/- a month. Though the amount agreed to was Rs. 30/-per month, the respondent was paying only Rs. 25/- per month. In addition to that plot, another area was also added under Ex. Al; and on the aggregate the respondent had to pay Rs. 40/- per month. The total extent of the land under Ex. Al was 111 ft. by 111 ft. The respondent bad no right to construct anymore sheds on the plot excepting those allowed and had also no right to plant any trees thereon. It is also recited in Ex. Al that the petitioner continued in possession of the trees on the plot. And the plaint also proceeds on the basis that the arrangement between the parties was not a lease, but only something in the nature of a licence, under which the respondent had the right to put up sheds on the plot for conducting the school. It may also be mentioned that the only witness (Dw.1) examined on the side of the respondent was not the respondent himself; and the witness said that the respondent alone knew about the nature of the arrangement of 1949 that the witness did not know about it. 3. Ex.A1 was in January 1968; and the respondent paid Rs. 40/- per month until the end of 1969. 3. Ex.A1 was in January 1968; and the respondent paid Rs. 40/- per month until the end of 1969. From 1st January 1970, on which date Act 35 of 1969 came into force, the respondent refused to pay; and the suit was for the arrears for seven months. The claim of the respondent was that he was a tenant coming within Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 and that the plot mentioned in Ex. Al vested in the State under S.72 of the Act, i.e., the petitioner was no more the owner of the land. 4. The provisions of Ex. Al do not indicate unequivocally that arrangement between the parties amounted to a lease. In this connection, S.74 of the Land Reforms Act might be noted. Sub-s. (1) of the section provides that, , after the commencement of the Act, no tenancy shall be created in respect of any land; and sub-s. (2) provides that any tenancy created in contravention of sub-s. (1) shall be invalid. This section was there at the time of Ex. Al; and it is not to be presumed that the parties entered into an arrangement directly in contravention of S.74. Nor are the provisions of Ex. Al, as we have already indicated clear to hold that the arrangement was a lease. The arrangement is not called lease: the payment is not called rent: the term used is cooly Iqen The provisions do not also clearly indicate that possession of the plot was transferred to the respondent. For all these reasons, we are of opinion that Ex. Al is not a lease: on the other hand, it is only a licence coming under S.52 of the Indian Easements Act, which provides that, where one person grants to another a right to do or continue to do in or upon the immovable property of the grantor something which would be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence. 5. There is yet another aspect to the question. Even if Ex. Al has created a lease, still, the land covered by the lease will not come within the ambit of scope of Act 1 of 1964. 6. 5. There is yet another aspect to the question. Even if Ex. Al has created a lease, still, the land covered by the lease will not come within the ambit of scope of Act 1 of 1964. 6. The constitutionality of Act 1 of 1954 came up before a Full Bench of this Court in V. N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT. 659). The sole defence of the State in that case was that the provisions of the Act were protected by Art.31A of the Constitution. In particular, the argument was that the Act dealt with only land coming within Art.31A(2)(a)(iii), viz., "any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans". This clause of Art.31 A(2)(a) has to be read as "any land including waste land, forest land and land for pasture held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans" (vide State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anand Brahma Shah: AIR. 1967 SC. 661). It cannot be disputed that the protection contemplated by Art.31A is to further agrarian reform; and unless the land covered by the legislation comes within the aforesaid clause, there is no protection for the statute, that is "so far as land reforms are concerned, the protection of the article extends only to land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto including sites of buildings occupied by cultivators, agricultural labourers and village artisans, namely, by persons having an intimate connection with agriculture. In other words, only to what we shall hereafter refer to as agricultural lands." (vide Para.13 of the aforesaid Full Bench decision). 7. The said decision was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court (vide Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala) 1972 KLT. 353); and the Supreme Court accepted the decision of our Full Bench. There is yet another decision of the Supreme Court, viz., Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT. 411), where also the Supreme Court referred to our Full Bench decision in Narayanan Nair's case. 353); and the Supreme Court accepted the decision of our Full Bench. There is yet another decision of the Supreme Court, viz., Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT. 411), where also the Supreme Court referred to our Full Bench decision in Narayanan Nair's case. The Supreme Court has stated in summarising our conclusions "The Act as a whole was a measure of agrarian reform. It had to be read as appli-ceble to agricultural land alone by the doctrine of severable application. It got protection of Art.31A though portions failed for want of that protection and could be challenged under Art.14,19 and 31 of the Constitution." Thus, it is clear that Act 1 of 1964, being a measure of agrarian reform, could apply only to agricultural land in the sense of Art.31A (2) (a) (iii) of the Constitution. And the land involved in the case before us will not obviously come within the ambit of this clause: it is not also claimed by the counsel of the respondent that the land will fall under this clause: his argument is different, to which we shall come presently. The land is land within the Calicut City and is to be used only for putting up sheds for a school: the land has nothing to do with agriculture or agrarian reform: the purpose for which the land is let does not also further any agrarian reform. 8. Now we come to the argument of the counsel of the respondent: the argument is that, now that Act 1 of 1964 has been put in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, the provisions of the Act must apply to all land irrespective of the land being agricultural land or the legislation being a measure of agrarian reform. This contention cannot be accepted, because Act 1 of 1964 was not claimed to apply to any land other than that which would come within Art.31A (2) (a) (iii); and this Court held that the Act was intended to cover only such lands. And the Supreme Court also accepted it. Thereafter, after the Act was put in the Ninth Schedule, the scope of the Act could not have widened. The language of Art.31B may also be noted in this connection. The Article starts with the non obstante clause "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Art.31 A". And the Supreme Court also accepted it. Thereafter, after the Act was put in the Ninth Schedule, the scope of the Act could not have widened. The language of Art.31B may also be noted in this connection. The Article starts with the non obstante clause "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Art.31 A". Therefore, the result of the inclusion of a statute in the Ninth Schedule is only that the provisions thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision in the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution: the inclusion has no effect of widening the scope of the provisions of the Act. The position may probably be different if the case is covered by a particular provision which was found to be unconstitutional and, in spite of that, was included in the Ninth Schedule. Thus, Act 1 of 1964 cannot apply to the land involved in the case before us. 9. In the result, we allow the civil revision petition, set aside the dismissal of the suit and decree the suit as prayed for with costs in both the courts.