JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - These two revisions were taken up together for hearing as the questions for decision in both these revisions are the same and the counsel appearing for the parties advanced only one set of argument in both the revisions, and the revisions arise out of similar orders passed by the Court below. 2. Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1972 relates to Sessions Case Nos. 34/70, 22/71 and 60/71 pending before Sessions Judge, Koraput. These Sessions Oases have been ordered to be clubbed together and tried jointly in one trial. Criminal Revision No. 181 of 1972 relates to Sessions Case Nos. 36/70 and 50/71 pending before the Sessions Judge, Koraput and these oases have also been ordered to be clubbed together and tried jointly in one trial. 3. A Mr. Mohanty, an advocate of this Bar, was allowed to appear in both these revisions without filing his power of appearance for the time being, as he expressed his desire to appear for the opposite parties stating that he would file the power of appearance as Boon as be would receive the same. As the questions for consideration in both these Criminal Revisions are purely questions, of law, I & allowed Mr. Mohanty to Appear and throw light on the same. Mr. Mohanty, however, very Boon after the conclusion of the hearing of the revisions on the last date filed his power of appearance in both these cases. 4. Both these revision petitions, in effect, Are against the orders passed of the Court below rejecting the prayer of the Public Prosecutor, conducting the above-mentioned sessions Cases, to stay the trial of all those cases enabling the prosecution to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings in all the Sessions cases and also the respective committal proceedings and orders, as one T. Jagannatham has been granted pardon by the District Magistrate on 4-4-1972 under the provisions of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure and so as per the mandator provisions of Section 337(2), Code of Criminal Procedure he has to be examined In the committing Court In fresh committal proceedings to be started In connection with all these above cases. The Sessions Judge, on rejecting the Above-mentioned payer of the Public Prosecutor, proceeded with the trial of the cases stating in his orders that the prosecution could straight away examine the Bald approver In the Sessions Trial Itself without examining him in the committing Court. .5. From the affidavit filed In this Court by the Inspector of Police, C.I.D., Crime Branch, on 4.8.1972, and from the date of chart submitted by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State the correctness of both of which has not been questioned, It appears that the accused persons concerned with Criminal Revision No. 180 of 1972 were committed for trial on 2-6-1970. On 20-3-1972 the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Sessions Judge for stay of the trial of the connected Sessions cases, on the ground that one T. Jagannatham, who had been arrested in connection with the offences in question, was likely to be examined as an approve. In this case. The Sessions Judge on 21-3-1972 rejected the above-mentioned prayer of the Public Prosecutor, and the trial of the Sessions cases commenced on that date. The above-named T. Jagannatham made confessional statement on 27-3-1972 implicating himself and the other accused persons to the same extent in the commission of the alleged offences for which the accused persons were being tried and he was tendered pardon by the District Magistrate, Koraput on 4-4-1972. On 6-4-1972 the Public Prosecutor again filed a petition before the Sessions Judge to stay the trial of the Sessions cases, as the prosecution intended to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings in the Sessions Cases and the connected committal proceedings and orders, as it was necessary under the law to examine the approver In the committing Court In freshly instituted commitment proceedings. The Sessions Judge rejected the prayer as stated above, and continued with the trial. In the Sessions Cases relating to Criminal Revision No. 181 of 1972 the accused persons were committed to the Court of Sessions on 5-6-1970, as seen from the affidavit of the aforesaid C.I.D. Inspector of Police and the date chart submitted by the learned Standing Counsel In this case. Therefore it is seen that the trial of the Sessions Cases relating to Criminal Revision No. 181 of 1972 began on 2-4-1972. Therefore it is seen that the trial of the Sessions Cases relating to Criminal Revision No. 181 of 1972 began on 2-4-1972. As accused T. Jagannatham had been granted pardon by the District Magistrate On 4-4-1972, as stated earlier, the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Sessions Judge on 6-4-1972 to stay the trial of the sessions oases on the same grounds stated above. The Sessions Judge rejected the prayer, as stated above, and proceeded with the trial of the cases. 6. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, the State, in both these two revisions, has urged before me that in view of the fact that T. Jagannatham has been tendered pardon by the District Magistrate on 4-4-1972, he has to be examined as an approver in all the above-mentioned oases against the accused persons, and before the approver is examined in the trial Court it is necessary under the law to examine him as a witness in the committing Court as otherwise the evidence of the approver will not be admissible in evidence and the trial of all these cases will be vitiated as being contrary to law and the judgments to be passed therein would be rendered null and void as has been held by a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State v. Bauri Bissoi and Ors. 23 1969 C.L.T. 248. Accordingly, Mr. Patnaik prays that the proceedings so far in all the above mentioned Sessions Cases and the respective committal proceedings and the orders should be quashed, enabling the prosecution to start fresh commitment proceedings in respect of all these cases. 7. In the aforesaid Division Bench decision, it has been held that because of non-examination of the approver in the committing Court, the commitment order becomes illegal and the Sessions trial arising there from is contrary to law and the judgment passed therein is a nullity. In the aforesaid decision reference with approval has been made to the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Kalu Khoda and Others Vs. The State and the Division Bench decisions of the Orissa High Court reported in P. Appa Rao v. The State and Rama Rao and Ors. v. The State 1967 C.L.T. 188, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in The Public Prosecutor v. K.S. Rajanna alias Kesarlarajanna and Ors. 1966 (1) AWR 390. 8. The State and the Division Bench decisions of the Orissa High Court reported in P. Appa Rao v. The State and Rama Rao and Ors. v. The State 1967 C.L.T. 188, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in The Public Prosecutor v. K.S. Rajanna alias Kesarlarajanna and Ors. 1966 (1) AWR 390. 8. In the above-mentioned Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court, their Lordships have held that once a person has been tendered pardon u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure "the failure to examine him before the committing Magistrate would not only be in breach of the express provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 337 but would also be inconsistent with and in violation of the duty to make a full disclosure at all stages. The breach of Sub-section (2) of Section 337, therefore, is of a mandatory rather than a mere directory provision and such a breach would render the proceedings and the order illegal. Their Lordships observe that the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 337 are for the benefit of an accused and are inserted in the interest of justice. It is also observed therein: The Intended benefit for an accused for which Sub-section (2) of Section 337 appears to have been enacted would seem to consist in. (1) that the approver would have to disclose his evidence at the preliminary stage before the committal order is passed, and (2) that an accused thus not only knows what the evidence is against him but gets an opportunity to rely upon the deposition of an approver before the committing Court for the purpose of proving the approver's evidence at the trial untrustworthy; if there are contradictions or improvements. There can be thus no question that if the approver is not examined at both the stages, as required by Sub-section (2) the accused in the trial would lose this benefit and it cannot be gainsaid that be would be prejudiced if he were to lose the opportunity of showing the approver's evidence unreliable. It would be deprivation of an important' and in some cases a vital right which would cause him prejudice resulting in failure of justice. Later on their Lordships have held: ...the failure on the part of the prosecution to examine the approver before the committing Court rendered the proceedings before the former and the committal order illegal and void. 9. Mr. Later on their Lordships have held: ...the failure on the part of the prosecution to examine the approver before the committing Court rendered the proceedings before the former and the committal order illegal and void. 9. Mr. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, has contended that the decision on this matter in the above-mentioned oases of the Orissa, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh High Courts do not apply squarely to the present cases, as in all these reported oases the approver was tendered pardon before the cases were committed to the Court of Session, and accordingly the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure squarely apply to them, whereas the said provisions do not apply to the present cases as pardon has been granted to the approver when the trial of these cases had already, commenced in the Sessions Court. According to Mr. Mohanty at the stage when pardon was granted in the present cases the District Magistrate acting independently was not competent to exercise his power u/s 337, Code of Criminal Procedure as after commitment and more so during the trial the power to grant pardon come within the provisions of Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure, and only the Sessions Judge who was in seisin over the matter could tender pardon or direct tender of pardon to the approver. He also contends that as the trial of an the cases in the Sessions Court has already begun it is not necessary to quash the proceedings in the Sessions Court and also the conducted committal proceedings and the orders, as the approver can be examined in course of the trial of the Sessions cases. 10. The first above-mentioned contention of Mr. Mohanty is directly covered by the Supreme Court decision in A.J. Peiris Vs. State of Madras wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows: By Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure, power is no doubt given after the commitment to the Court to which the commitment is made to tender pardon, before judgment is passed, to any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned with any offence or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon during the trial of the case but it does not take away the power conferred under the proviso to Section 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their Lordships have also held that the proviso to Section 337(1) contains an additional power which empowers the District Magistrate to tender pardon when the offences are under enquiry or trial. In the case before the Supreme Court the accused was tendered pardon at a time when the case had already been committed to the Court of Session. Their Lordships held as above on the specific contention raised before them that as the commitment had already been made, the only Court which could direct tender of pardon was the Court of Session and not the District Magistrate, who actually tendered the pardon. Their Lordships have expressly negatived the aforesaid contention stating that there is no impotence in the same in the present oases before me the approver has been tendered pardon after the commitment of the case to the Court of Session. 11. Mr. Mohanty wanted to distinguish the above decision of the Supreme Court by stating that the point in question as decided therein would apply only to a case in which pardon has been granted after the commitment of the case and before commencement of its trial in the Court to which the commitment is made, as in the case before their Lordships, but would not apply to a case where trial of the case has already started in the Court to which commitment is made. I do not find any substance in this contention. There is nothing in Section 337 or 338, Code of Criminal Procedure which states that the District Magistrate cannot exercise his power u/s 337(1), Code of Criminal Procedure once trial of the case has commenced in the Court to which commitment is made. On the contrary, the proviso to Section 337(1), Code of Criminal Procedure in effect provides that the District Magistrate can exercise his powers in this direction even when the offence is under enquiry or trial. There is also nothing in Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure which states that once trial of the case begins in the Court to which commitment has been made, it is only that Court which can exercise the power to grant pardon. There is also nothing in Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure which states that once trial of the case begins in the Court to which commitment has been made, it is only that Court which can exercise the power to grant pardon. Section 338, Code of Criminal Procedure only empowers the Court to which commitment is made to tender pardon or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender such pardon any time after commitment and before the passing of the judgment in the case, but there is nothing in it which takes away the power conferred under the proviso to Section 337(1) of the Code. As the District Magistrate's power under the proviso to Section 337(1), Code of Criminal Procedure is an additional provision which empowers him to tender pardon even at the stage where the offences are under trial, he can justifiably exercise that power at that stage also. 12. Mr. Mohanty drew my attention to the following sentences in paragraph 9 of the decision of the Supreme. Court reported in Kanta 'Prasad v. Delhi Administration AIR 15158 S.C. 350: According to the provision of Section 338 of the Code even after commitment but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may tender a pardon or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender a pardon. It would seem, therefore, that the District Magistrate is empowered to tender pardon even after a commitment, if the Court so directs. On the above observations Mr. Mohanty submits that their Lordships intended to say that after commitment only the Court to which the commitment is made can tender a pardon or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon, and these Magistrates, at this stage, cannot tender a pardon of their own accord. The sentences quoted above do not say all that is contended by Mr. Mohanty and they have been stated in the context of the question which was specifically under discussion in that paragraph, and the same is somewhat different from the point in question before me. The sentences just preceding the above quoted Sentences is as follows: The proviso to Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates concurrent jurisdiction in the District Magistrate and the Magistrate making an enquiry or holding the trial to tender a pardon. The sentences just preceding the above quoted Sentences is as follows: The proviso to Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates concurrent jurisdiction in the District Magistrate and the Magistrate making an enquiry or holding the trial to tender a pardon. Later-on in the same paragraph their Lordships have also observed that the conferment of this power on the special Judge in no way deprives the District Magistrate of his power to grant a pardon u/s 337 of the Code. This observation and the above-quoted sentence just proceeding the sentences referred to by Mr. Mohanty clarify the position and nullify the submissions And contentions made by him. 13. On all the above considerations, the District Magistrate, in this case who has exercised his power to ten del pardon to the approver during the trial of the Sessions Cases, acted within his jurisdiction And power to tender pardon to the approver, And the pardon so tendered is perfectly legal and justified. There is, therefore, no weight or substance in the above-mentioned contentions of Mr. Mohanty. 14. The pardon granted by the District Magistrate in the present case, without doubt, is under the provisions of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure, for he has acted in that direction on his own motion and has certainly not granted the said pardon on being ordered by the Sessions Judge to the effect, as provided u/s 838, Code of Criminal Procedure. That being so, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure immediately come into effect and the approver who has been granted pardon by the District Magistrate has to be examined in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 337, Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been held by the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Kalu Khoda and Others Vs. The State that the failure to examine the approver before the committing Magistrate would not only be in the breach of the express provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 337, bat would also be inconsistent with and in violation of the duty to make a full disclosure at all stages. The breach of Sub-section (2) of Section 337 therefore, is of a mandatory rather than a mere directory provision and such a breach would render the proceedings and the order illegal. The breach of Sub-section (2) of Section 337 therefore, is of a mandatory rather than a mere directory provision and such a breach would render the proceedings and the order illegal. In the case reported in The Public Prosecutor v. K.S. Rajanna alias Kesarlarajanna and Ors. 1966 (1) Andhra Weekly Reporter, 390, it has been held that non-compliance with the procedure laid down u/s 337(2), Code of Criminal Procedure not only renders the committal illegal, but also results In serious prejudice to the accused and hence should be set aside. The views on this question expressed in the above-mentioned decisions have been accepted with approval by the above-mentioned Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State v. Bauri Bissoi and Ors. 33 1969 C.L.T. 248. That being so, the proceedings so far recorded in the Sessions Court in the above-mentioned Sessions Cases and the connected committal orders have to be quashed If and set aside, in order to enable the prosecution to examine the approver in freshly instituted commitment proceedings. 15. On the above considerations there Is no merit in the above-mentioned contentions of Mr. Mohanty. 16. On the above findings, the proceedings in the Sessions Court and the connected committal orders are hereby quashed, and it is ordered that the matter be sent back to the committing Court for fresh inquiry in accordance with law, wherein he has to examine the approver, if produced by the prosecution in due time. Both the revisions accordingly are allowed. The Lower Court records be sent back immediately. 17. It has come to my notice that the cases have been pendings since long. The committing Magistrate should take prompt steps to expedite disposal of the proceedings in his Court within as short a time as possible. Any laches or hindrances in the expeditious disposal of the committal proceedings by anybody should be handled with a firm hand in accordance with law.