JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application for a certificate for appeal to the supreme Court under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. 2. THE petitioner was a tenant in respect of premises No. 56, Southern avenue, Calcutta, at a monthly rent of rs. 100/ -. The said premises was purchased by the Opposite Party on the 27th of July, 1957. On the 9th of July 1958 the Opposite Party instituted a suit, being Title Suit No. 577 of 1958 in the fifth Court of the Munsiff at alipore for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of reasonable requirement. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on July 18, 1866 and the said decree was ultimately affirmed by this Court in S. A. No. 1572 of 1967 on March 7, 1969. The Tenant defendant was, however, granted time till the end of March 1970 to vacate the disputed premises. In the mean time the West Bengal premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1970, came into force on the 6th of March, 1970. By the said Amending Act a new Section, namely, section 17e was introduced in the parent Act. The relevant portion of the said section run as follows: "17e. (1) Where before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment)Act 1969, a decree for the recovery of possession of any premises was passed in a Suit which had been brought by a landlord, who had acquired his interest in. such premises by transfer, before the expiration of a period of three years, from the date of his acquisition of such interest only on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 as it was inforce before such commencement but the possession of such premises had not been recovered from the tenant by the execution of the decree, the tenant may, within a period of sixty days from the date of commencement of the West bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment)Act 1970 make an application to the court which passed the decree to set aside the decree". Before the commencement of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second amendment) Act 1969, Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the act stood as follows : "13. Before the commencement of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second amendment) Act 1969, Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the act stood as follows : "13. Protection of tenant against eviction (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely (f) Where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purpose of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial addition or alteration or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held;. ". Taking advantage of this new provision the tenant petitioner filed an application under section 17e of the act. The said application was allowed by the trial court and the ejectment decree which was obtained by the landlord-opposite party was set aside on july 8, 1970. Against the said order the landlord opposite party came up to this Court in revision and obtained civil Rule No. 2374 of 1970. The said rule came up for final hearing before us on the 29th of March, 1972, and it was made absolute and the order of the trial court was set aside on the ground that, following the Division bench decision reported in (1) Sailendra nath Ghosal v. Sm. Ena Dutta, 75 c. W. N. 331 we had already held in Civil, rule No. 1943, of 1971 (2) Amal chandra Chatterjee v. Promode Kumar banerjee (Since reported in 76 C. W. N 743) that section 17e of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act was ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution in so far as it is retrospective in operation. The petitioner has filed the present application for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court against the said Order. 3. THE learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of this Court being one of reversal and the value of the subject-matter in dispute, according to him, being over rs. 20,000|- he is entitled to a certificate as a matter of course. There is no dispute that if the valuation test is satisfied then the petitioner would be entitled to get a certificate as a matter of right. 20,000|- he is entitled to a certificate as a matter of course. There is no dispute that if the valuation test is satisfied then the petitioner would be entitled to get a certificate as a matter of right. Let us, therefore, see whether the present case fulfils the condition as to valuation for purpose of appeal to the supreme Court. The suit in connection with which this application has been filed was valued at Rs. 1,200/- only. It is submitted that this was only for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction. In paragraph 15 of the present application it has been stated that the market value of the disputed premises is over a lakh of rupees and "the capitalised value of the said tenancy at 20 years, purchase is Rs. 24,000/- inasmuch as monthly rent thereof is Rs. 100/-". It is difficult to follow what is meant by the expression "the capitalised value of the said tenancy". By capitalising the rent at a certain number of years' purchase the valuation that is derived is the valuation of the property itself and not the valuation of the tenancy. The subject-matter in dispute here is the tenancy and not the property in respect of which the tenancy is held. Relying upon the decision in (3) Luxmi Kama Jha v. Nilkanta Ghosal and another, A. I. R. 1971 Cal. 224, it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that if the basis indicated in the said decision for valuing the tenancy is applied in the present case, the subject-matter indispute will be much above Rs. 20,000/ -. In that case a suit for eviction was decreed in full by the two Courts below. The High court on appeal, changed that decree into one for partial eviction and the proportionate rent was fixed at Rs. 240/-per month in place of Rs. 362/- per month, which was the original rate of rent. The landlord thereupon filed an application for a certificate under article 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution. In determining the value of the tenancy their Lordships deducted the capitalised value of the Landlord's reversion at twenty years' purchase from rs. 1,00,000/- which was the value of the entire property, and held that by such method the valuation of the subject-matter of the dispute would be over rs. 20,000/ -. In determining the value of the tenancy their Lordships deducted the capitalised value of the Landlord's reversion at twenty years' purchase from rs. 1,00,000/- which was the value of the entire property, and held that by such method the valuation of the subject-matter of the dispute would be over rs. 20,000/ -. By capitalising the annual rent at twenty years' purchase the figure that is derived represents the value of the property itself and not merely the landlord's right of reversion only. At paragraph 5 of the Judgment their Lordships have said : "there is no question also that in the same manner the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the Court of first instance where the entire property was comprised within the disputed tenancy at a rental of Rs. 362/- per month would be above the said value". 4. BUT actually when the figures are worked out on that basis the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the Court of first instance would be Rs. 13,120/-only (Rs. 362/-X12 X20- Rs. 86,880/-substracted from Rs. 1,00,000/-Rs. 13,120/-. It therefore appears that calculated on this basis the higher the rate of rent, the lower is the value of the subject-matter in dispute i. e. the tenancy. In other words in the case of a tenant paying a higher rate of rent, the subject-matter in dispute would be less. In respect of the same premises, then in the case of a tenant paying a lower rate of rent. Even if it is conceded that it may be so when the application is by the landlord, it cannot in our opinion, be accepted, as a criterian for valuation of the subject matter in dispute when the application is by the tenant, because of the obvious anomalous result that will ensue from the application of this method of valuing the subject-matter in dispute. We are, therefore unable to accept this method of valuation in the instant case. In the next place reliance was placed by the petitioner on the decision in (4) Ramric Lal Saha v. Sachindra narayan Roy, A. I. R. 1968 Cal. 316, in support of the contention that the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the court of first instance as well as in the appeal before the Supreme Court is aver Rs. 20,000/ -. 316, in support of the contention that the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the court of first instance as well as in the appeal before the Supreme Court is aver Rs. 20,000/ -. But this contention of the petitioner does not receive any support from that decision; on the contrary the said decision goes against him inasmuch as, the petitioner in our opinion, has failed to discharge the onus which lay upon him to show that the subject-matter in dispute in the trial court as well as in the appeal before the supreme Court is over Rs. 20,000/ -. The petitioner also relied upon the decision in (5) Ram Luxman Singh v. Girindra mohan Hazra, A. I. R. 1963 Cal. 13, and (6) Central Talkies and another v. Lala dwarka Prasad, A. I R. 1956 All. 348. But as observed in paragraph 20 of the judgment in Ramric Lal Saha v. Sachindra Narayan Roy, a. I. R. 1968 Cal. 316, the said decisions are no longer good law in view of the decision of the supreme Court in (7) Chittormal v. Pannalal, A. I. R, 1965 S. C. 1940. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petitioner is not entitled to a certificate under Clause (a) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. 5. IN support of his contention that the petitioner is entitled to a certificate under Article 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution Counsel for the petitioner argued that even if the value of the tenancy, which is the subject-matter in dispute in the present case, be less than Rs. 20,000/-he is entitled to get a certificate as the property in respect of which the tenancy is held, that is the premises in dispute, is valued at over Rs. 20,000/ -. It is argued that as the ejectment decree in question will effect the petitioner's right to use the said property he is entitled to get a certificate under Clause (b. We are unable to accept this argument because it is well-established that Clause (b) of Article 133 (1) refers to property ether than the property in dispute, that is to say, it must be a claim respecting property, in addition to or ether than the subject-matter of the dispute (Vide chittarmal v. Shah Pannalal Chandulal, a I. R. 1965 S. C. 1440. (8) Udoychand pannalal v. P. E. Guzdar and Company a. I. R. 1925 Privy Council 159, and (B) Bombay Gas Company Limited v. Jagan Nath Pandurang and others, (1972) 2 S. C. C. 119. 6. IN the last place, it has been argued that the present case involves a substantial question of law and a large number of cases will be affected by the decision of this Court. It has further been urged that another Division Bench of this Court has granted a certificate under Clause (c) of Article 138 (1) of the Constitution for appeal to the supreme Court against the decision in (10) Pramila Bala Dassi v. Kalyani Dutt f. A. No. 665 of 1962 in which the question involved was whether the provisions of sub-section (3a) of Section 13 of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956, in so far as the same are retrospective in operation are ultra vires article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, and therefore, a certificate should be granted under Clause (c) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution in the present case as well. In the present case the landlord had already obtained a decree for possession of the disputed premises after evicting the tenant. The right which had accrued to the landlord under sand by virtue of the decree is sought to be taken away by Section 17e of the act retrospectively. In (11) Mahbub begum and others v. Hyderabad State through the Chief Secretary and others, a. I. R. 1951 Hyderabad I, a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court has held that a decree is property within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (f) of the constitution. It is well established that property cannot be taken away retrospectively (Vide (12) Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited v. The State of Bombay and others, A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 328 and (13) Maharanna Sri jayvant Singhji Ranmalsinghji v. The state of Gujrat and others. A. I. R. 1962 s. C. 821. The position, therefore is that although this Court has declared Section 17e of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act 1956 as amended by Act xviii of 1970 as ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution that decision has been arrived at by applying a well, settled principle of law laid down by the highest court of the country. The position, therefore is that although this Court has declared Section 17e of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act 1956 as amended by Act xviii of 1970 as ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution that decision has been arrived at by applying a well, settled principle of law laid down by the highest court of the country. It has been pointed out in the (14) State of Kerala and another v. R. E. D. Souzha (1971) I S. C. C. 533 that if a particular point has not been decided by the supreme Court, but the principle has been laid down or decided and a decision has been arrived at by applying such principle then it cannot be said that the question involved in the case is a substantial question of law requiring a decision by the Supreme Court and in such a case a certificate should not be granted under Clause (c. From what we have discussed above it follows that the petitioner is not entitled to a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under any of the Clauses of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. In the result, this application is rejected. There will be no order as to costs.