JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash the order made by the Election Officer (Opposite Party No. 1) rejecting the nomination paper of the Petitioner in a contest for the chairmanship of the Panchayat Samiti of Rayagada Block in the district of Ganjam. 2. An election for the Panchayat Samiti of the Rayagada Block was notified under the provisions of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 (Orissa Act, 7 of 1960). The Petitioner and the opposite parties 2 to 4 filed their nominations. The opposite party No. 1 was appointed as the Election Officer. 29-12-1970 was appointed for scrutiny of the nomination papers. The opposite party No. 2 objected to the nomination of the Petitioner on four grounds. The Election Officer overruled objections on three counts, but upheld one of the objections by finding that the Petitioner was a member of the Rayagada Service Co-operative Society and owed a sum of Rs. 767.56 to that society and a notice of demand had been served upon the Petitioner on 12-12-1970 asking for clearing up the dues within seven days; but the Petitioner had not satisfied the demand and was a defaulter. As such he was disqualified from being elected as Chairman in terms of the provisions of Section 45(1)(m-1) of the Act. The Petitioner's nomination paper was accordingly rejected. The election was held, but by an order dated 11-1-1971, its publication has been withheld. 3. The opposite parties 1 and 2 have entered contest in this case. An affidavit in opposition has been filed by the opposite party No. 2. It is contended that the Petitioner was actually in default as found by the Election Officer. That apart the Petitioner was also disqualified on all other grounds which had been raised by the said opposite party against the Petitioner before the Election Officer. It is stated that the Petitioner has subsisting contracts made with the Government so as to incur the disqualification u/s 45(1)(h) of the Act and he was convicted of offences punishable under Sections 341/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, which attract the disqualification u/s 45(1)(h) of the Act. As such according to the opposite party the nomination of the Petitioner has been rightly rejected. 4. As such according to the opposite party the nomination of the Petitioner has been rightly rejected. 4. A preliminary point has been raised by the opposite parties that this writ application should be dismissed as the Petitioner had an alternate remedy of raising the election dispute under the Act. We shall first dispose of the preliminary objection. Chapter VI-A of the Act provides for election disputes. u/s 44-L(1)(d), the Election Commissioner is entitled to declare the election of a returned candidate void if he is of opinion that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected. Mr. Murty for the Petitioner, however, points out that in view of the provisions of Section 44-C, a person whose nomination paper has been rejected is not entitled to raise an election dispute. Section 44-C(1) of the Act provides: The petition may be presented by any candidate in whose favour votes have been recorded and who claims to be declared elected in place of the person whose election is questioned or by one-third of the voters concerned. The aforesaid provision, therefore, authorises a candidate in whose favour votes have been recorded to file an election dispute or one third of the voters may also file a similar dispute. A candidate whose nomination paper has been rejected is one in whose favour no votes can ever be recorded and, therefore, in terms of Section 44-C-(1) of the Act, such a candidate cannot file ad election dispute. Mr. Rath for the opposite parties contends that the provisions of Section 44-C-(1) and 44-L(1) of the Act must be read together and a harmonious construction must be given. If the Election Commissioner can declare a nomination of the returned candidate void on the finding of the nomination paper of any candidate has been improperly rejected, Section 44-C-(1) must be so read as to authorise a candidate whose nomination has been rejected to raise a dispute. We do not find any merit in such contention. The provisions are not incompatible. When one-third of the voters concerned raise an election dispute, the Election Commissioner can exercise jurisdiction u/s 44-L(1)(d) of the Act. But when the candidate himself raises the dispute he must be a person in whose favour some votes have been recorded. The Panchayat Samiti Act of 1959 is more or less modeled on the basis of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. But when the candidate himself raises the dispute he must be a person in whose favour some votes have been recorded. The Panchayat Samiti Act of 1959 is more or less modeled on the basis of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 44-L of the Orissa Act, many of the grounds provided u/s 100(1) of the Central Act have been adopted as grounds for challenge of an election. The scheme of the Central Act is such that a person whose nomination has been rejected is entitled to raise a dispute. Under the Representation of the People Act, the law has now been well settled that when a candidate has been improperly kept out of the arena of contest, the result of the election must be taken to have been vitiated. When a candidate's nomination paper is rejected he is obviously kept out of the contest. A right is conferred upon those who are qualified to contest the election and is a dispute is raised a bout the qualification of a candidate, a forum for its adjudication must be available. Under Chapter VI-A of the Orissa Act such forum has been prescribed and one of the grounds for setting aside the election is improper rejection of a nomination. In such circumstances, there does not seem to be any reasonable basis for the candidate himself not being in a position to raise a dispute before the Election Commissioner. We hope the authorities would look into the matter and amend the provisions of Section 44-C-(1) suitably so that this incongruity may not be there. As the law stands, the Petitioner could not have availed of the remedy under the statute and as such he does not have alternate remedy. The objection raised by Mr. Rath on such ground must, therefore, be overruled. 5. Mr. Murty for the Petitioner contends that in an application for a writ of certiorari, our jurisdiction is confined to the examination of the correctness of the order impugned to the extent it is against the Petitioner. Therefore, it is not open to us to consider the correctness of the entire order. Coming to the facts of this case, according to Mr. Therefore, it is not open to us to consider the correctness of the entire order. Coming to the facts of this case, according to Mr. Murty it is not open to the opposite parties to support the ultimate order of the Election Officer by saying that the objections which the Election Officer had overruled were open to be examined. 6. The Petitioner was the President of the Rayagada Grain Gala Co-Operative Society in 1960. Between 1960 and 1970, there bad been two other presidents. On 7-12-1970, the Administrator sent a notice demanding payment of Rs. 767.56 from the Petitioner. The Petitioner received such notice on 12-12-1970 and on 16-12-1970 repudiated any liability and intimated the Administrator. u/s 45(1)(m-1) a person shall not be eligible to stand for election if he being a member of any society registered under the Orissa Co-Operative Societies Act, 1951, Act 11 of 1952, has failed to pay any arrears of any kind accrued due by him, to such society for a continuous period of two years or more. Mr. Murty contends relying upon a decision of this Court in Gobind Chandra Panda v. Darshan Chandra Rout and Ors. 1969 C.L.T. 1108 that until there was a final adjudication of a liability, the demand raised by the Administrator cannot be said to have accrued due. In the reported decision, the provision u/s 25(1)(1) of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, which makes the following provision: has failed to pay any arrears of any kind accrued due by him, otherwise than as an agent, trustee, or an executor, to the Gram Sasan or being a member of a Co-Operative Society to such society, before filing of the nomination paper in accordance with the provisions of this act and the rules made thereunder; came up for consideration. This Court was considering a case of this type in the reported decision and dealing with the question of "accrued" came to hold:-"In terms of the requirements of Section 25(1)(1), the arrears must have accrued due in order that the disqualification may arise. The use of the word, "accrued" clearly goes to indicate that the legislature intended to provide that there must have been a due on the basis of a determination. 'Accured' means, according to the dictionary, 'to arise or spring as a natural growth or result'; 'coming as a natural accession or result'; 'arising in due course'. The use of the word, "accrued" clearly goes to indicate that the legislature intended to provide that there must have been a due on the basis of a determination. 'Accured' means, according to the dictionary, 'to arise or spring as a natural growth or result'; 'coming as a natural accession or result'; 'arising in due course'. It refers to 'the existence of a present enforceable right' or 'fixed' or 'assessed and determined'. Tax accrues when all events have occurred which fix the amount of tax and determine the tax payer's liability to pay the tax. See Town Area Committee Vs. N.L. Churaman and Others, The use of the word accrued in the aforesaid clause of the Grama Panchayat Act, therefore, clearly gives indication that the disqualification is contemplated to arise only when there has been an ascertainment of dues and the society has the right in present to recover the said amount and in spite of quantification of the liability and "consequent notice of demand to pay, the concerned person has defaulted. A mere demand raised by the Co-Operative Stores on the basis that a certain sum of money is payable by the Petitioner when he refutes his liability to pay the same cannot give rise to a position when it can be said that a certain amount has 'accrued due' to the Stores. In the present case a demand was raised and the Petitioner has already refuted his liability. There has been no adjudication or determination of liability of the Petitioner. Again, under the provisions of Clause (m-1) of Section 45(1) of the Act, the amount must have accrued due to the society by the Petitioner for a continuous period of two years or more. In the facts of the present case, even if the notice of demand is said to lead to accrual, the requisite period had not yet elapsed by the time the nomination papers came up for scrutiny. As such, the Petitioner had not incurred this disqualification. The Election Officer clearly came to an (sic) conclusion. It is an error apparent on the face of the record. 7. The next point for consideration is about the correctness of the decision of the Election Officer in regard to the other grounds of disqualification. Before we proceed to examine that aspect, it is necessary to dispose 'of the objection raised by Mr. It is an error apparent on the face of the record. 7. The next point for consideration is about the correctness of the decision of the Election Officer in regard to the other grounds of disqualification. Before we proceed to examine that aspect, it is necessary to dispose 'of the objection raised by Mr. Murty for the Petitioner that in a certiorari proceeding, we cannot go into such a matter. Learned Counsel for both sides 1 have not been able to indicate any decision one way or the other. It is conceded, however, that writ proceedings have been always treated as civil proceedings and if the principles in Order 41 of the CPC are applicable, a successful party is entitled to support the ultimate order impugned in a superior forum on other grounds than those upon which the order in his favour is passed. We do not propose to dispose of such a dispute finally here. But as the proceeding is of civil nature and we see I no justification to keep away the provisions of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we think it appropriate to examine the correctness of the other grounds. After all the entire record has come before us and it is open to consider the effect of the order in its entirety and if on an examination of the order now impugned, we find that interest of justice do not warrant interference, we shall withheld the discretionary relief which the Petitioner has claimed. 8. The alleged contracts have been placed before us as annexures to the counter affidavit of opposite party No. 2-Admitedly the Petitioner had entered into such contracts. Allegations have been made that the contracts are subsisting. The documents produced before us which, in the absence, of any materia 1 to the contrary, we assume, were also produced before the Election Officer, do flat clearly indicate whether the contracts are subsisting. They also do not indicate whether the work had been taken by the Petitioner for gain or as a leader without any personal interest. The Petitioner admittedly was the Muthahead of Rayagada. If in that capacity, he had entered into the contracts as a leader of the local area, then obviously there would be no question of disqualification under the provisions of the Act even if such contracts are subsisting. The Petitioner admittedly was the Muthahead of Rayagada. If in that capacity, he had entered into the contracts as a leader of the local area, then obviously there would be no question of disqualification under the provisions of the Act even if such contracts are subsisting. On the other hand, if it is found that the contracts are in his personal capacity and are found to be subsisting, their subsisting character at the material time may raise a ground of disqualification. 9. Mr. Rath for the opposite party No. 2 does not press the other ground referable to Section 45(1)(h) of the Act. 10. We quash the impugned order by issue of a writ of certiorari and direct the opposite party No. 1 to re-scrutinise the nomination paper of the Petitioner with reference to the only objection on the ground of his having subsisting contracts as provided for u/s 45(1)(o) of the Act. All other grounds of objection must be taken as untenable. The nomination paper of others which were not impugned shall not be open to further scrutiny. If the Petitioner's nomination paper is found liable for rejection on the aforesaid ground, the election which, we are told, has already been hold shall be sustained. If the Petitioner's nomination turns out to be valid upon further scrutiny, there shall be a fresh election as provided under the law. We direct the Election Officer to dispose of this question within six weeks from now as the matter seems to be very urgent. We make no order as to costs. B.K. Ray, J. 11. I agree.