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1972 DIGILAW 186 (KER)

KRISHNAN DAMODARAN v. PADMANABHAN PARVATHY

1972-08-11

N.D.P.NAMBOODIRIPAD, T.C.RAGHAVAN

body1972
Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition is concerned with the interpretation of sub-section (1) of S.40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, Act 10 of 1960 (shortly called the Act). 2. The plaintiffs who are the petitioners before us sued to set aside a deed of cancellation executed by the defendant on 4 21970 revoking an earlier gift deed executed by her and for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title and possession over the suit property. The plaintiffs also prayed for the issue of a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from entering into possession of the disputed item. The suit property consists of 12 cents of garden land with a building situated thereon. The document impugned valued the property at Rs. 100/-while in the plaint the value was determined at Rs. 200/- for the purpose of payment of court-tee. The Court-Fee Examiner raised the objection that separate court-fee is payable on the B relief relating to the permanent injunction. The defendant in her turn raised the contention in her written statement that the market value of the suit property is not less than Rs. 4,000/-and that court-fee has to be paid on that basis. An issue was raised regarding the proper court-fee payable and it was heard preliminarily. The lower court ordered that for the B relief separate court-fee is payable under S.27 (c) of the Act and that for the main prayer court-fee has to be paid on the market value of the property. Consequently it directed the plaintiffs to take out a commission to value the property at their cost within one month. 3. The finding of the lower court with regard to the payment of court-fee on the B relief was not challenged before us. The only question that falls for decision is whether for the main relief proper court-fee has been paid. It is common case that court-fee is payable in accordance with the provisions contained in S.40 (1) of the Act; and the contention of the petitioners is that in view of the wording of the relevant clause in S.40 (1) the basis of valuation for the purpose of payment of court-fee is the amount recited in the document sought to be cancelled and not the market value of the property as found by the court below. Sub-section (1) of S.40 of the Act is in the following terms: "(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other documents is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed; if a part of the decree or other amount is sought so be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property." 4. For the purpose of convenience the three paragraphs of S.40 (1) are being referred to here-under as Clause.1,2 and 3 respectively. It is not disputed that the case on hand falls under Clause.2. Clause.1 provides for computation of fee in suits for the cancellation of (a) a decree for money, (b) a decree for other property having a money value, and (c) other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property. Since a litigant may seek the cancellation of a decree or a document either in part in its entirety it was necessary to make separate provisions with respect to each category; and Clause.2 and 3 have been added only to meet that requirement. The contention of the petitioners is that the words "value of the property for which other document was executed" found in Clause.2 are to be read as laying down that it is the value of the property recited in the document sought to be cancelled that is the exclusive basis for computation of court-fee under Clause.1. An analysis of sub-section (1) of S.40 would show that such a construction is not warranted by the express words used in the three clauses. Clause (1) enjoins that "fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. An analysis of sub-section (1) of S.40 would show that such a construction is not warranted by the express words used in the three clauses. Clause (1) enjoins that "fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. In a suit for cancellation of a document dealing with any property the subject matter of the suit is that property, and consequently, in such a case the words "value of the subject matter of the Suit" found in Clause.1 are to be read as "value of the property in the suit". Clause.3 dealing with suits for partial cancellation of a document also contains the expression value of the property". There is nothing in Clause.1 or Clause.3 to indicate that "the value of the property" referred to thereunder is the value recited in the document sought to be cancelled. That being so, the same expression namely, "value of the property" occurring in Clause.2 is not capable of a different construction simply because that clause contains the additional words "for which the document was executed". Even if Clause.2 has to be interpreted in isolation the words used in the relevant provision do not support the position canvassed by the petitioners. The word "for" occurring in Clause.2 carries also the meaning "with respect to" and "in respect of". A document is executed with respect to or in respect of a property and not with respect to or in respect of the "value" of the property. Consequently, the expressions "the value of the subject matter of the suit" found in clause (1) and "value of the property" in Clause.2 and 3 shall not be construed differently. Since none of the three clauses prescribes any particular method for the determination of the value of the property dealt with by the document sought to be cancelled, the value to be taken for computing the fee is the market value of the concerned property on the date of the suit. 5. Our conclusion in the above respect ands support in Meeraseayu v. Meeran Pillai (1964 KLT. 895). That was a suit for a declaration that a decree was not binding on the plaintiff and for the further relief of setting aside the decree. The reliefs were separately valued, and for setting aside the decree the valuation shown was Rs. 300/-, being the amount for which the impugned decree was passed. 895). That was a suit for a declaration that a decree was not binding on the plaintiff and for the further relief of setting aside the decree. The reliefs were separately valued, and for setting aside the decree the valuation shown was Rs. 300/-, being the amount for which the impugned decree was passed. The question raised was, whether in view of S.40(1) of the Act, court-fee had to be paid on the market value of the property and not simply on the amount for which the decree was passed. Following the decision of the Madras High Court in Narasamma v. Satyanarayana (AIR. 1951 Madras 793) it was held that the value or amount must certainly be the market value as on the date of the filing of the suit. The cancellation of a document itself came up for consideration in Uma Anther jenam v. Gorindaru Namboodiripad (1966 KLJ.1109). The court observed as follows: "When the decree or other documents is for property as distinguished from money it is the value (which in the absence of any indication to the contrary can mean only market value) of the property that counts, not the value as shown in the decree or other document. The second clause makes this clear it is impossible to misread this clause as the petitioner would have so misread the first clause and say that the value referred to is not the actual value of the property but the value shown in the document. Likewise sub-section (2) of the section." 6. The decisions of the Madras High Court are not strictly uniform. In Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma (AIR. 1939 Madras 462) a Full Bench of that court had to consider whether in a suit for cancellation of a deed of conveyance the valuation should be under S.7(iv-A) or S.7(v) of the relevant Court-Fees Act. The court held that the court-fee has to be calculated on the amount or the value of the property, and to give the wording of para (iv-A) its plain meaning the valuation must be the valuation based on the market value of the property at the date of the plaint. S.40(1) of the Madras Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act 14 of 1955 is in pari materia with S.40(1) of the Act; and S.40(1) of the Madras Act came up for consideration in Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami (AIR-1971 Madras 380). S.40(1) of the Madras Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act 14 of 1955 is in pari materia with S.40(1) of the Act; and S.40(1) of the Madras Act came up for consideration in Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami (AIR-1971 Madras 380). Following the earlier Full Bench decision in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma (AIR. 1939 Madras 462), the court held as follows: "The amount mentioned in the decree or the document is relevant only when the question is with regard to the decree for money or document securing money. But in the case of decrees or documents dealing with property of money value, the value of the subject matter of the suit should be computed on the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the document was executed. I need not repeat that the valuation in respect of the property dealt with by the decree or document should be market value and such market value should be as on the date of suit." Our attention was invited to a later decision reported in Andalammal v. B. Kanniah (1971-2 MLJ. 205). That was a suit for cancellation of a settlement deed executed by the plaintiff. It was held that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff on the basis of the value of the property as given in the settlement deed is correct. There is no reference to the earlier decisions on the subject. With respect, we are inclined to agree with the view expressed in the earlier decisions. 7. A similar position came up for the consideration of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Tharamma v. Ramachandra Reddy (AIR. 1968 AP 333.) There, the suit related to the cancellation of a decree and for possession of the property involved therein. The relevant provision relating to court-fee is contained in S.37 of the Andhra Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Following the decision of the Madras High Court in Kothandarama v. Chokkammal (AIR 1950 Madras 458) the court held that court-fee has to be paid on the market value of the property. 8. The preponderance of authorities is thus in favour of the view that in a suit for cancellation of a document court-fee is payable on the market value of the property covered by the document and not on the basis of the valuation given in the document. The finding of the court below is, therefore, correct. 8. The preponderance of authorities is thus in favour of the view that in a suit for cancellation of a document court-fee is payable on the market value of the property covered by the document and not on the basis of the valuation given in the document. The finding of the court below is, therefore, correct. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs.