JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, A.C.J. - This revision is by the defendant and arises out of a suit for a declaration that the defendant is not the adopted son of the plaintiff's husband or, in the alternative, for a declaration that the alleged adoption, if any, is null and void. 2. The cause of action for the suit arose when the defendant's name was jointly recorded with the plaintiff in respect of all the properties left by her late husband. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 800/-, and paid a Court-fee of Rs. 22.50 paise, obviously under Article 3-A, of schedule 1 of the Court-fees Act. 3. The defendant in his written statement expressly raised an issue with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. According to him, the properties left by the husband of the plaintiff would be valued at more than rupees twenty thousand, the extent of such properties being four acres and odd paddy lands and a residential house. Since the declaration involved these properties, valued at more than rupees twenty thousand, the valuation of the suit, for the purposes of jurisdiction, could not be less. 4. Of the issues framed in the suit issue no. 1 was : "Is the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court ?" and this issue was taken up for decision before other issues. The order passed in regard to this issue is under revision. 5. The learned Munsif proceeded to dispose of this issue first, on the footing that valuation of the suit, which was merely for a declaration regarding adoption, shall be determined with reference to the properties involved in the suit, and on that basis, be allowed the parties to lead evidence and on a consideration of the same, came to the conclusion that the value of the properties involved was Rs. 7,055/-, but as the plaintiff had the moiety interest in the property, the proper valuation of the suit, for purposes of Jurisdiction, would not exceed half the total value, that is, Rs. 3527 of 50 paise. Since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif was Rs. Four thousand, and since he found that the value of the suit was Rs. 3527.50 that is, below Rs. Four thousand, he held that the suit was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. 6. 3527 of 50 paise. Since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif was Rs. Four thousand, and since he found that the value of the suit was Rs. 3527.50 that is, below Rs. Four thousand, he held that the suit was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced the contention that in suits for pure declaration like the present, that is, for a declaration that an adoption is valid or invalid, the valuation of the suit, for purposes of jurisdiction, will be the real market price of the land and properties involved in such declaration, and not the notional value imputed by the plaintiff; and that the conclusion, as to the market-value of the property involved, of the learned Munsif, is wrong. In reply, the counter-contention is that the plaintiff is to put his own valuation on the relief of pure declaration which he claims and that the consideration of the extent of properties, which the plaintiff may be entitled to in future, on the footing of such declaration, should not be imported. In the alternative, it is further argued that the finding of the market-price of the Court below is correct. 7. I would take up the second part of the contention first, because, the learned Munsif has proceeded on the assumption that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court will be the market-value of the properties involved. On perusing the order of the Munsif, I am not satisfied that his conclusion is the result of a grievous error in exercise of his jurisdiction ; but even if I was of the mind to hold that such conclusion is factually erroneous, nevertheless, that finding, having been arrived at on a proper appraisement of the evidence on record, an exercise of jurisdiction, legally vested in him, it will not be permissible for me to interfere with the same in exercise of my powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, if the finding as to the valuation cannot be revised, the other question as to how to value a suit, to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid or valid or never in fact took place, becomes academic in the present case. Since, however, this question has been canvassed somewhat at length, I would like to give my opinion with regard to that. 8. Since, however, this question has been canvassed somewhat at length, I would like to give my opinion with regard to that. 8. There is no controversy that the Court-fee payable is under Article 3-A, of schedule 1 of the Court-fees Act. That provide a graduated slab system of Court-fees related to the valuation stated in the plaint for the purpose of Jurisdiction. The question for consideration is as to how a plaint in the nature of suits enumerated in Article 3-A, of schedule 1 is to be valued for the purpose of jurisdiction. The relevant provisions to be noticed in this connection are contained in the Court-fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act. Section 6 of the Court-fees Act provides that except as therein mentioned, no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the first or second schedule to that Act, shall be filed, exhibited, or recorded in any Court of Justice, unless in respect of them there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document. Section 7 deals with computation of fees payable in respect of certain suite. There is a guideline provided for valuing the relief sought in such suits. The valuation so put is not only for the purposes of computation of Court-fees, but is also the value for purposes of jurisdiction. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act makes this position dear by providing that where in suits other than those referred to in section 7, paragraphs v, vi, and ix and clause (d) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, Court-fees are payable, ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees, and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There are two schedules in the Court-fees' Act, 1870., Schedule I enumerates a category of suits where Court-fees are payable ad valorem, and schedule II enumerates another category of suits where fixed Court-fees are payable. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act obviously refers to the category of suits in schedule I only. The present suit, it may be re-called, is one covered by Article 3-A of schedule I of the Court-fees Act. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act obviously refers to the category of suits in schedule I only. The present suit, it may be re-called, is one covered by Article 3-A of schedule I of the Court-fees Act. Thus, the valuation of the relief claimed in the present suit would be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction, but section 7 of the Court-fees Act being not applicable as this suit is a declaratory one, without any consequential relief, there is no express statutory mandate for the plaintiff to put his own valuation. Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that when the subject matter of suits of any class, governed by section 8, is such that in the opinion of the High Court, it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court-fees Act, 1870, and the Suits Valuation Act, be treated as if their subject-matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf. The present suit may be one such suit as is envisaged by this section, but there are no directions issued by the High Court under this section, at least nothing has been brought to my notice. Section 8-A of the Court-fees Act provides that the plaintiff shall file a statement of the particulars of the subject-matter of the suit with the plaint, giving his own valuation. It, thus, empowers the plaintiff to put his own valuation in a suit of the present nature, which is not covered under section 7 of the Court-fees Act, and such valuation for the purpose of Court-fee will be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. Order 7, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code provides that every plaint shall contain a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court-fee, so far as the case admits. This supports the view that in the absence of any guideline, the plaintiff is to put his own valuation according to the dictates of his own conscience. Section 12 of the Court-fees Act invests the Court with a power to determine every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable with finality. This supports the view that in the absence of any guideline, the plaintiff is to put his own valuation according to the dictates of his own conscience. Section 12 of the Court-fees Act invests the Court with a power to determine every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable with finality. Since under Article 3-A, schedule I of the Court-fees Act, the determination of the Court-fee payable is dependent on the jurisdictional value put on the plaint, it necessarily gives power to the Court to determine the question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. In doing so, he will doubtless be governed by the allegations in the plaint without being influenced by the pleas in the written statement : Sathapos Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1953 S.C. 248 . It follows, therefore, that where the plaintiff put an arbitrarily low valuation, the same can be interfered with by the Court under this section of the Court-fees Act, and if the plaint has correlated the relief to any property, the valuation must bear a reasonable nexus to the market-value of the property, and no national value of the relief can displace the real value of the property ; but that is not the case here. 9. My conclusion from a review of the aforesaid provisions in the absence of any restriction, imposed upon the plaintiff, in the matter of valuing his relief in a suit of a purely declaratory nature, as contemplated in Article 3-A of schedule I, he is entitled to put his own valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction, which will be the basis for computation of Court-fee payable. There is no warranty for holding as has been held in some cases, Veeremma v. Buthia AIR 1972 Mad 538 and M. Nagamma v. M. Narasimham and another AIR 1935 Mad. 279 , that the valuation must be corrected to the property indirectly involved in the, declaration claimed in the suit. The principles put forth in the aforesaid two Madras decisions are based more on considerations of convenience and revenue rather than of any fundamental principle. The Privy Council has said in the case of Rachappa Subrao Jadav v. Shidappa V. Jadhav 46 Ind. The principles put forth in the aforesaid two Madras decisions are based more on considerations of convenience and revenue rather than of any fundamental principle. The Privy Council has said in the case of Rachappa Subrao Jadav v. Shidappa V. Jadhav 46 Ind. App 24 that the Court-fees Act has been passed, not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality against his opponent, but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. In other words, the indication is that the matter of valuation for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction is to be decided strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions touching it, and not by importing other extraneous considerations. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sheo Deni Ram v. Tulshi Ram I.L.R. 15 All. 378, where it has been said : "The value for the purpose of jurisdiction of a suit to set aside an adoption is not the value of the property which may possibly change hands if the adoption be set aside, but the value put upon his plaint by the plaintiff." 10. The other cases relied upon, to the same effect, are the cast of Prahlad Chandra Das v. Dwarka Nath Ghose, and the case of Bai Machbai v. Bai Hirabai I.L.R. 35 Bom. 264. 11. Thus, viewed from this angle, the suit is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. The ultimate conclusion of the trial Court on issue no. 1 is correct. 12. In result, the Civil Revision fails, and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed