Judgment B.D.Singh, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the Managing Committee of the Mungraura Middle School, Jamalpur, district Monghyr. filed through its Secretary, Nawal Kishere (sic) Lal, is directed against the order dated the 18th September, 1971, (Annexure 19) passed by the District Education Officer, respondent No. 1, withdrawing the approval of recognition of the Managing Committee of the said school and constituting an ad hoc committee in place of regular managing committee. 2. In order to appreciate the point for consideration in this case it wilt be necessary to state briefly the facts. The said school is within the municipal area but it is not managed by the municipality. The school is, however, aided school. The aid came from the consolidated fund of the State Government. On the 23rd March, 1971, respondent No. 1 addressed a letter to all the schools for absorbing retrenched teachers, a true copy of which is enclosed with Annexure 6. On the 12th April, 1971, the petitioner had enquired from respondent No. 1 for suggesting some names of the teachers who are on his panel for filling up the vacancy of matric trained teacher with additional qualification in Sanskrit, like Madhyama, Sashtri or others, which had existed in the said school, vide Annexure 2. On the 5th June, 1971, however, the petitioner sought for approval of the Sub-divisional Officer of the Education Department for appointing one Amresh Jha to the aforesaid vacancy (see Annexure 3). It will be relevant to mention at this stage that the Sub-divisional Officer had not approved the appointment of Amresh Jha so far as it appears from Annexure 26 to the supplementary affidavit filed on the 24th July, 1972, on behalf of the petitioner. On the 12th June, 1971, respondent No. 1 wrote a letter (Annexure 4) to the petitioner enquiring from him as to why he had made appointment against his instruction contained under the aforesaid letter dated the 23rd March, 1971. On the 18th June, 1971, the petitioner sent a letter (Annexure 5) to respondent No. 1 mentioning therein that he had not received his letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, on the 26th June, 1971, respondent No. 1 wrote another letter (Annexure 6) to the petitioner mentioning therein, that the appointment of Amresh Jha was illegal and in his place Rameshwar Mishra ought to have been appointed. He directed the petitioner to appoint Kameshwar Mishra and to forward to him the resolution of the managing committee resolving the appointment of Kameshwar Mishra soon. He also enclosed his letter dated the 73rd March, 1971, as mentioned earlier. On the 19th July, 1971, respondent No. 1 sent another letter (Annexure 7) to the petitioner reminding him to furward to him the resolution of the managing committee regarding the appointment of Shri Mishra. On the 2nd August, 1971, the petitioner wrote a letter (Annexure 8) to respondent No. 1 stating therein that according to circular. No. 4771 dated 28th December, 1970 (Annexare 20) too manners committee was quite competent to make the appointment of Amresh Jha and the Sub-divisional Officer was the competent authority to approve the same for which the petitionor had approached. The petitioner again reiterated that, the letter of respondent No. 1 dated the 23rd March, 1971, was not received by the petitioner in time. If it would have so reached the petitioner would have certainly approached him for suggesting some qualified Sanskrit teacher for making appointment. It was also mentioned in the said letter that as the committee did not know about the academic and training attainment and other particulars of Rameshwar Mishra regarding his age, conduct, etc. it was not in a position to consider Mishras case for appointment, as directed, after removing Amresh Jha from service. In a letter dated the 5th August, 1971, (Annexure 9) respondent No. 1 reiterated that under the circumstances the appointment of Amresh Jha was irregular and Shri Mishra ought to have been appointed as directed. In his letter respondent No. 1 further asked the petitioner to show cause as to why it had disobeyed the direction of the Department and on that ground alone why the committee of the school should not be dissolved and in its place a new managing committee be constituted. In reply to the said letter the petitioner sent a letter dated the 16th August, 1971, (Annexure 10) the relevant portion of which reads as: "The Committee is fully prepared to submit replies to the show cause, no sooner it finally decides about Shri Mishra, on receipt of your reply on this point. In reply to the said letter the petitioner sent a letter dated the 16th August, 1971, (Annexure 10) the relevant portion of which reads as: "The Committee is fully prepared to submit replies to the show cause, no sooner it finally decides about Shri Mishra, on receipt of your reply on this point. It is a matter of great concern that you have been pleased to issue show cause notice for disbanding the school committee before giving an opportunity to the committee to honour your orders or otherwise disagree to it" The petitioner sent a copy of the said letter to various persons, including the Minister of Education and the Minister of Revenue. This was followed by the reply from the respondent No. 1 under his letter dated the 20th August, 1971 (Annexure 11) stating therein that if the petitioner wanted to comply with the orders, he could have easily done so after obtaining the particulars of Shri Mishra, but the petitioner did not do so. If the order of respondent No. 1 is not complied with within the prescribed period, further steps shall be taken by him. The petitioner then submitted his show cause under his letter dated the 21st August, 1971 (Annexure 12) wherein inter alia the petitioner justified the appointment of Amrcsh Jha. In reply to this letter respondent No. 1 sent his letter dated the 30th August, 1971, (Annexure 13) commenting upon the alleged appointment of Shri Jha. He pointed out that his appointment was contrary to the direction contained under a letter of the State Government dated the 18th December, 1970, a true copy of which is enclosed with Annexure 15. According to the said direction a teacher is eligible for appointment in the home district. Besides a teacher should be on the panel prepared by the Planning Committee. Shri Jha was the resident of Darbhanga District. Therefore, he could not have been appointed in the district of Monghyr where the institution was located. Besides he was not on the panel. The petitioner then sent another letter dated the 3rd September, 1971, (Annexure 14) mentioning therein that he was not aware of the Government direction contained in letter dated the 18th December, 1970. and requested the respondent for forwarding a copy of the same. Thereafter respondent No. 1 by letter dated the 6th September, 1971. The petitioner then sent another letter dated the 3rd September, 1971, (Annexure 14) mentioning therein that he was not aware of the Government direction contained in letter dated the 18th December, 1970. and requested the respondent for forwarding a copy of the same. Thereafter respondent No. 1 by letter dated the 6th September, 1971. (Annexure 15) sent a copy of the required letter and reminded the petitioner that if the show cause was not received from the petitioner within the prescribed time further steps would be taken. On the 9th September, 1971, the petitioner wrote another letter (Annexure 16) to respondent No. 1 for providing him copies of certain letters in order to give detailed reply. On the 15th September, 1971, the petitioner submitted second show cause (Annexure 17) to respondent No. 1 under a registered cover. On the 18th September, 1971, the impugned order was passed by respondent No. 1. 3. J.N.P. Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has assailed the order chiefly on two grounds, namely, (i) respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to withdraw the approval of the recognition of the managing committee of the said school and also to constitute an ad hoc committee in its place and (ii) there was complete absence of material for taking such a drastic step by respondent No. 1 whose action was motivated and was completely vitiated on the ground of mala fide. I will take into consideration ground No. (1) first. 4. Mr. Verma drew my attention to the impugned order wherein respondent No. 1 has referred to Articles 69, 205 and 206 of the Education Code, 8th Edition, for deriving such power. He submitted that it has already been held by a Bench decision of this Court that the Education Code compiled under the 8th Edition has not got the statutory force. Only the Education Code of the 7th Edition has been recognised, having statuary force. This submission of Mr. Verma is well founded. Therefore, he urged that Article 69 of the 8th Edition corresponds to Article 34 of the 7th Edition, which lays down Inspectors duty at aided schools. Only the Education Code of the 7th Edition has been recognised, having statuary force. This submission of Mr. Verma is well founded. Therefore, he urged that Article 69 of the 8th Edition corresponds to Article 34 of the 7th Edition, which lays down Inspectors duty at aided schools. It provides inter alia that if the Inspector finds any infringement of the conditions of the grant, or if there is any unwillingness or unwarrantable delay on the part of the school authorities in giving effect to his recommendations; he is empowered to suspend the payment of the grant. He contended that this Article does not empower respondent No. 1 to pass the order under consideration. Article 205 of the 8th Edition corresponds to Article 182 of the 7th Edition, which provides only five grounds for withdrawal or withholding recognition. None of the grounds mentioned therein justifies the action taken by respondent No, 1. He then referred to Article 206 of the 8th Edition the corresponding Article of which is not to be found in the 7th Edition. Therefore, this Article is also of no avail to respondent No. 1. 5. Mr. Nagendra Prasad Singh, learned Government Pleader No. III appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, in order to justify the step taken by the latter in question, referred to Clause (2) of Section 8 of the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960, which, inter alia, lays down that the provisions of the Bihar Education Code, 7th Edition, as amended from time to time, and all the resolutions and orders of the State Government or the Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, a collection of which was published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Bihar Gazette of the 23rd March, 1959, and which were in force on the date of commencement of the Act would be deemed to be the Rules made under the Act for the purpose of the Act In view of the above provisions Mr. Singh contended that we should also look to the notification published in the Extraordinary Gazette dated the 23rd March, 1959, in order to ascertain whether respondent No. 1 had such a power or not since the said notifications and the resolutions contained therein acquired statutory force. Singh contended that we should also look to the notification published in the Extraordinary Gazette dated the 23rd March, 1959, in order to ascertain whether respondent No. 1 had such a power or not since the said notifications and the resolutions contained therein acquired statutory force. He referred to the resolution dated the 24th July, 1958, which finds place in the said Gazette notification the relevant portion of which is to be found under clause 1 (e), which is to this effect: "Withdrawal or withholding of recognition-- Recognition shall only be withdrawn or withheld for reasons to be recorded in writing and on one of the following grounds:- - xxxxx(e) that the Managing Committee of the school not functioning in a way conducive to the smooth administration of the school affairs or proper maintenance of discipline among the teachers or pupils, is not carrying out the directions of the Board of Secondary Education or any competent authority or is not administering the finances of the school properly....." Another sub-clause on which reliance has been placed is 1-B, which is quoted in ex-tenso below: "Withdrawal of approval to the constitution of the Managing Committee-- For reasons specified in Clausa (e) of the aforesaid rule, the President Board of Secondary Education in respect of Secondary Schools and District Education Officer in respect of Elementary Schools instead of withdrawing or withholding recognition, may withdraw the approval to the constitution of the Managing Committee and make such arrangements for the management of the school, as he considers suitable pending proper reconstitution of the Managing Committee. For the purpose of this rule, Elementary Schools win mean, "Primary and Middle Schools." 6. Learned counsel submitted that the above provisions give ample power to respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order. In my opinion, the submission of Mr. Singh is well founded. The provisions referred to above certainly clothed the respondent No. 1 the jurisdiction to pass the order in dispute, Mr. Verma cannot take advantage of ths Articles of the Education Code referred to by respondent No. 1 in his order. It is true that those Articles are not relevant but that by themselves would not vitiate the order. It is well established that due to wrong labelling an order cannot be set aside. One should look to the substance. The form is of little importance. It is true that those Articles are not relevant but that by themselves would not vitiate the order. It is well established that due to wrong labelling an order cannot be set aside. One should look to the substance. The form is of little importance. Thus the ground of attack under Item No. (i) fails. 7. Now I advert to consider ground No. (ii) urged by Mr. Verma on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Verma submitted that there was no ground at all available to respondent No. 1 for passing the impugned order. The directions contained in the letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, enclosure to Annexure 6, and Annexure 15 were not applicable to the petitioners institution as it was a non-municipal school within municipal area. According to learned counsel those directions were applicable only to the schools managed by the District Planning Committee under the District Board and were applicable only to the schools in the rural area. Those directions are based on the Bihar Primary and Middle School Rules, 1961. The preamble of the said Rule clearly lays down that they were framed under the various sections of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self Government Act, 1885. Under Sec.1 of this Act under the heading extent municipal area has been excluded. Therefore, learned counsel urged that Rule 72 of the Bihar Primary and Middle School Rules, 1961, on which reliance has been placed, was not available at all to respondent No. 1. The said Rule 72, it may be recalled, provides that a list of suitable candidates for the post of teacher should be prepared by the Planning Committee at least once a year. The insistence of respondent No. 1 that Shri Amresh Jha was not on the panel of suitable candidates prepared by the Planning Committee ceased to have-any importance as the Ruh is not applicable to the instant case. That apart, Mr. Verma pointed out that even Shri Mishra was not on the panel of suitable candidates prepared by the Planning Committee, and that fact has been conceded by Shri Nagendra Pra-sad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. Mr. Singh has, however, pointed out that Shri Mishra was one of the retrenched teachers. Therefore, the directions contained in letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, was applicable in the case of Shri Mishra. Mr. Singh has, however, pointed out that Shri Mishra was one of the retrenched teachers. Therefore, the directions contained in letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, was applicable in the case of Shri Mishra. He referred to paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit wherein it is mentioned that Shri Mishra was a retrenched teacher of N. C. Ghose Girls Middle School, Jamalpur, in the district of Monghyr. Mr. Verma however, justifying the appointment of Shri Jha referred to the letter dated the 5th January, 1972, (Annexure 24) issued by the Director (Administration) and Deputy Secretary to the Additional Director of Public Instruction, on the subject of appointment of teacher in the home district. In paragraph 3 of the said letter it is clearly mentioned that a teacher, who has passed matriculation examination or equivalent to it in the district where the institution is located, would be eligible for appointment as a teacher in that institution. Amresh Jha had passed such examination in the district of Monghyr and, therefore, obviously he was eligible for the appointment. Therefore. Mr. Verma argued that the direction contained under the letter of the State Government dated the 18th December, 1970, which is enclosed under Annexure 15, did not adversely affect the appointment of Amresh Jha. 8. In my opinion, this submission of Mr. Verma is not acceptable. It may be noticed that in the instant case the direction contained in the letter dated the 18th December, 1970 was relevant and not the direction, which was contained in Annexure 24, which came into force much after Amresh Jha was appointed. On the date of his appointment the direction contained in the Government letter dated the 18th December. 1970. was in force. Mr. Verma then submitted that the committee was following all the procedure necessary for obtaining the approval for appointment of Amresb Jha by the competent authority. He drew my attention to the letter dated the 28th December, 1970 (Annexure 20) issued by the Deputy Secretary-cum-Director of Public Instruction to the District Education Officers wherein it is mentioned that the Sub-divisional Education Officer has been authorised to give approval for the appointment of teachers in the case of non-municipal schools. According to the aforesaid direction the Managing Committee has moved the Sub-divisional Education Officer for approving the appointment of Amresh Jha. According to the aforesaid direction the Managing Committee has moved the Sub-divisional Education Officer for approving the appointment of Amresh Jha. According to learned counsel, the District Education Officer had no hand in the matter and, therefore, he was not a competent person to say that Amresh Jha wns not suitable person and in his place Shri Mishra should be appointed. In my view, the petitioner cannot take recourse to Annexure 20 in flouting the directions issued by the District Education Officer. Annexure 20 does not indicate that the Sub-divisional Education Officer has got final say in the matter. The power of the District Education Officer vis-a-vis the power of the Sub-divisional Education Officer is an internal arrangement made by the State Government which cannot be investigated in the present writ application. Reference may be made to paragraph 19 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 wherein it is stated that the District Education Officer has all the powers vested in his subordinates besides his own duties, specially vested op conferred upon him by law. 9. Mr. Verma then referred to paragraph 18 of the petition wherein inter alia it is mentioned that Rameshwar Mishra had produced a forged certificate of training qualification while serving in N.C. Ghose Girls Middle School at Jamalpur and his conduct as a teacher was very much doubtful. In this connection he drew my attention to the letter of the District Tnspectress of Schools dated the 15th July, 1971, (Annexure 21). In my opinion, much reliance cannot be placed on the said letter in view of the statement made by respondent No. 1 in paragraph 20 of the counter-affidavit wherein it is stated that on the 25th September, 1970. (Annexure F) the District Inspectress of Schools had informed the District Education Officer, Monghyr, to make an early arrangement for Rameshwar Mishra, the retrenched teacher. That clearly shows that Shri Mishra was a retrenched teacher and the direction of the District Education Officer was to absorb him in view of the Government letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, referred to above, which the petitioner was not carrying out and on the contrary was justifying the appointment of Shri Amresh Jha. 10. Mr. That clearly shows that Shri Mishra was a retrenched teacher and the direction of the District Education Officer was to absorb him in view of the Government letter dated the 23rd March, 1971, referred to above, which the petitioner was not carrying out and on the contrary was justifying the appointment of Shri Amresh Jha. 10. Mr. Verma submitted that since the petitioner did not appoint Shri Mishra, the favourite of respondent No. 1, the latter was annoyed and on that score he withdrew the approval of the recognition of the managing committee and constituted an ad hoc committee and that was clearly a mala fide act of respondent No. 1. On this ground alone the impugned order is vitiated. He referred to paragraph 10 of the petition wherein it is stated that respondent No. 1 was so much based and prejudiced against the petitioner and was so much engrossed in his vested interest that he made it a prestige issue to get his favourite pushed in the school even at the cost of the institution in question. He stopped payment of all grants of the school forthwith and also cancelled the cheque issued in the name of the school towards teachers salary and thus put them on the verge of starvation. He referred to Annexure 9 and submitted that the said letter itself shows mala fide and hasty action of respondent No. 1. In my view, the said letter does not indicate mala fide action of respondent No. 1. It is a sort of reminder to the petitioner to carry out the directions and the reply to his various letters in which the petitioner had justified the appointment of Amresh Jha. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in order to find support to his contention regarding mala fide relied on Ram Chandra V/s. Secy. to Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1964 Cal 265 , wherein Durgadas Basu, J., while dealing with the provisions contained in Articles 311 (2) and 320 (b) of the Constituion of India, observed that mala fide did not necessarily involve a malicious intention. to Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1964 Cal 265 , wherein Durgadas Basu, J., while dealing with the provisions contained in Articles 311 (2) and 320 (b) of the Constituion of India, observed that mala fide did not necessarily involve a malicious intention. It was enough if the aggrieved party established: (1) that the authority making the impugned order did not apply its mind at all to the matter in question or (2) that the impugne order was made for a purpose or upon a ground other than what was mentioned on the face of the order. He also relied on Partun Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 . In that case the legality of the orders passed by the Government were challenged by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner had contented that every one of the impugned orders of June. 1961 was illegal for the reason that such action on the part of the Government was contrary to and not permitted by the relevant Service Rules applicable to him. The second ground of challenge was that those orders were passed mala fide by or at the instance of the Chief Minister, Punjab, who was personally hostile to him by reason of certain incidents and circumstances which he set out and that the impugned orders were prompted by the desire on the part of the Chief Minister to wreak personally his vengeance on the petitioner. In my opinion, in those cases their Lordships have not laid down a general principle of law as obviously mala fide is a question of fact, which depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. Reference may be made to C.S. Rowjee V/s. State of Andhra Pradcsh, AIR 1964 SC 962 where it was observed that the allegations of mala fide and of improper motives on the part of those in power were frequently made and their frequency had increased. Their Lordships observed that it has become the duty of the court to scrutinise those allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them, in cases where they have no foundation of fact. Their Lordships observed that it has become the duty of the court to scrutinise those allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them, in cases where they have no foundation of fact. In this task, which is thus cast on the courts, it would conduce to a more satisfactory disposal and consideration of them, if those against whom allegations are made came forward to place before the court either their denials or then) version of the matter, so that the Court may be in a position to judge as to whether the onus that lies upon those who make allegations of mala fides on the part of authorities have discharged their burden of proving it. In the absence of such affidavits or of materials placed before the court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. In the present case counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 by one Deo Narain Prasad, assistant in the office of respondent No. 1. Subsequently, respondent No. 1 himself swore an affidavit on the 1st September, 1972, affirming the affidavit and the statements made by Deo Narain Prasad an assistant of his department. In the counter-affidavit respondent No. 1 has given his version justifying the direction and the action taken by him on the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. It will be relevant also to refer to a Full Bench decision of this Court in N.P. Mathur V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 Pat 93 (FB). In that case it was observed at page 124 as follows:- - ".....On mere suspicion that the order has been made mala fide, it cannot be struck down. To interfere with it on the ground of such an attack, very cogent reasons and crystal grounds are necessary. The facts must be proved by a person who wants to attack an executive order on the ground of mala fides to show that the irresistible conclusion is that the sole motive or purpose or in any event the dominant one was such as was neither legal nor honest. It is only then that an order can be held to have been made mala fide and can be struck down as such. It is only then that an order can be held to have been made mala fide and can be struck down as such. It is to be noticed that of late a practice has grown to attack all sorts of executive orders on vague grounds of mala fides. But it is to be pointed out that such attacks are made without appreciation of the true, legal position in this regard." In that view of the matter I do not find any substance in the contention of mala fide as well in the present case. 13 After careful consideration I find that respondent No. 1 had ample jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under the notification, which was published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary on March 23, 1959, which J have referred in detail while dealing with point No. (i). Under clause (e) of the resolution dated the 24th July, 1958, respondent No. 1 had power to see that the managing committee was carrying out the direction of the Board of Secondary Education or any competent authority. It had also power to examine whether the managing committee was functioning in way conducive to the smooth administration of the school affairs. Various dialogues between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 in various Annexures, which I have referred in the earlier part of the judgment, whereby the petitioner has exhibited defiance attitude was also indicative of the fact that it was not conducive to the smooth administration of school affairs. 14. Mr. Verma then submitted that the various resolutions contained in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary, March 23, 1959, have been struck down in Dwarka Nath Tevvari V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1959 SC 249 wherein it was observed that Article 182 of the Bihar Education Code, which, inter alia, provides for withdrawal or withholding of recognition in case the mannping committee of a school docs not carry out the directions of the Board of Secondary Education, has no greater sanction than an administrative order or rule, and is not based on any statutory authority or other authority which could give it the force of law. Article 182 cannot therefore deprive the managing committee of its rights in the properties of the school which is under its management. In my opinion, there is hardly any merit in this contention. This submission is entirely on misconception. Article 182 cannot therefore deprive the managing committee of its rights in the properties of the school which is under its management. In my opinion, there is hardly any merit in this contention. This submission is entirely on misconception. It may be noticed that after the aforesaid judgment the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 was passed Clause (2) of Section 8 of the said Act, the provisions of which I have already mentioned in the earlier part of my judgment, specifically confers statutory force on the Bihar Education Code, 7th Edition, as well as on the resolutions and notifications of the State Government published in the said extraordinary Gazette dated the 23rd March, 1959. Therefore, whatever is contained in that Gazette has statutory force which cannot be doubted. 15. After close scrutiny from different points of view I affirm the impugned order and dismiss the application with cost of Rs. 100.00 payable by the petitioner to respondent No. 1.