JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - This revision is against an order dated 27-4-1971 by which the petitioners have been asked to furnish interim bonds under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code. Proceedings under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code were drawn up against the petitioners on 26-9-1970 and by the Court's order of that date notices of the order under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code were issued to the petitioners. All the delinquents appeared on 14-11-1970 and filed their written statement on that date. The Court on that date ordered for the issue of summons to the witnesses fixing 16tb, 17th, 18th and 19th December, 1970 for the enquiry under section 117, Criminal Procedure Code. Due to the different reasons, including the absence of the petitioners' witnesses, the case had to be adjourned from day to day. On 19-3 1971 the Court received a report from the Officer-in-charge, Sadar P.S. stating that friction between the parties had extended to a great extent. In the order of that date the Magistrate had mentioned numerous events and instances which happened in the meantime between the parties. Copies of some F.I.Rs. were submitted before the Court on subsequent dates, and ultimately the Court on hearing the counsel of both the parties and on a perusal of the various reports before it passed the impugned order directing the petitioners to furnish interim bonds for Rs. 500/- each with one surety of the like amount to maintain peace during the pendency of the enquiry under section 117, Criminal Procedure Code. In passing this order the Court has mentioned the various materials on which it passed the aforesaid order under section 117(3). 2. Mr. Tripahty, the learned counsel for the petitioners, challenges the legality of the impugned order on the ground that by the time the said order was passed the Court had not examined any witness and as such the Court had no evidence as defined in the Evidence Act, and accordingly the said order was bad in law. According to Mr. Tripathy, the learned Magistrate was legally not competent to pass an order under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code without examining some witnesses and/or without having some affidavits of overt acts before him. The contention of Mr. Tripathy is without any weight and substance. According to Mr. Tripathy, the learned Magistrate was legally not competent to pass an order under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code without examining some witnesses and/or without having some affidavits of overt acts before him. The contention of Mr. Tripathy is without any weight and substance. There is nothing under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code which states that the Court cannot pass an order under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code so long it does not examine some witnesses summoned for the purpose of the enquiry under section 117, Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Tripathy cites the decision in Madhu Limaye's case 1970 S.C.D. 975, to support his above contention. On a perusal of the said decision I am satisfied that there is nothing in that decision which supports his above contention. The facts of that case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. In Madhu Limaye's case 1970 S.C.D. 975, the Magistrate exercised his power under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code without any enquiry whatsoever about the truth of the information. The persons concerned were arrested first and then they were taken to the Court by the police with a view to being bound over under section 117(3). When they arrived in Court, the Magistrate drew, up the order under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code containing a summary of the police report, and the same was read over to them and they were asked to sign the same which they refused to do. It appears, the order under section 117(3) was passed at that stage without any further material or enquiry into the matter. The persons thereafter remained in detention. In the context of the facts of that case their Lordships observed : "Section 117(3) presumes that unless the person is hound over he would be able to perpetrate certain overt acts which might cause an apprehension of the breach of the peace. It is not necessary to take a bond from a person who is already in detention and is not released. The danger arises when the man is free and not when he is in custody. It is not necessary to take a bond from a person who is already in detention and is not released. The danger arises when the man is free and not when he is in custody. It is to prevent his acting that the bond is taken or he is kept in custody till he gives the bond." In the decision reported in Madhu Limaye's case 1970 S.C.D. 975 arising out of Madhu Limaye's detention as stated above, it has been held by their Lordships as follows:- "The gist of the Chapter is the prevention of crimes and disturbances of public tranquillity and breaches of the peace. There is no need to prove overt acts Although if overt acts have taken place they will have to be considered. The acting being preventive is not based on overt act but on the potential danger to be averted. These provisions are thus essentially conceived in the interest of public order in the sense defined by us. They are also in the interest of the general public. If prevention of crimes, the breaches of peace and disturbance of public tranquillity are directed to be maintenance of the even tempo of community life, there can be no doubt that they are in the interest of public order. As we have shown above 'public order' is an elastic expression which taken within it various meanings according to the contract of the law and the existence of special circumstances." Their Lordships in paragraph 43 of this judgment have said that while an order under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code is on hear-say, an enquiry under section 117, Criminal Procedure Code is to ascertain the truth of necessary information. Sub-section (1) contemplates an immediate enquiry into the truth of the information. Pending the completion of the enquiry, an interim bond can be asked for if immediate measures are necessary, and in default it is necessary to put the person in custody. Therefore, as the liberty of the person is involved and that person is being proceeded against on information and suspicion it is necessary to put a strict construction upon the powers of the Magistrate. The facts on which the Magistrate can act under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code must be of a definite character. In this connection they further observed that some enquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. The facts on which the Magistrate can act under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code must be of a definite character. In this connection they further observed that some enquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. Their Lordships have stated all this in the context of the facts and circumstances of that particular case, where there was absolutely nothing, excepting the preliminary police report, before the Magistrate at the time when he passed the order under section 117(3), Criminal Procedure Code as stated above. The above observations of their Lordships are of salutary nature. Doubtless, some enquiry should be made by the Magistrate before he exercises his power under section 117(3) and the facts requiring the Magistrate to act in this direction should be of a definite character. In the present case, before the passing of the impugned order the order under section 112 had already been served on the petitioners, and both the parties had already appeared before the Magistrate and had filed their written statements before him, and accordingly the enquiry under section 117 had started by the time the impugned order was passed. The witnesses had been summoned, but for reasons stated above they could not be examined by that date. Before the passing of the order on 27-4-1971 the Magistrate had before him several police reports and copies of the F.I.Rs. lodged by the parties against each other in the different police stations on different dates. The Court on a consideration of the various materials before it has catalogued the different facts and circumstances which impelled him to pass the aforesaid order under section 117(3). The impugned order also shows that before the passing of the same, counsel appearing for both the parties were given a hearing. On a perusal of the impugned order I am satisfied that the Court had enough of materials before it and it passed the impugned order on bestowing proper thought and consideration to these materials on record. Accordingly it cannot be said that there was no enquiry in this case. There is nothing in the above-mentioned Supreme Court decisions to support the above-mentioned contention of Mr. Tripathy, and if Mr. Tripathy's contention is accepted it will in most cases render the provisions of section 117(3) nugatory and will nullify the very purpose for which the said provision is made. 3. There is nothing in the above-mentioned Supreme Court decisions to support the above-mentioned contention of Mr. Tripathy, and if Mr. Tripathy's contention is accepted it will in most cases render the provisions of section 117(3) nugatory and will nullify the very purpose for which the said provision is made. 3. For reasons discussed above the Court was perfectly justified in passing the aforesaid order. 4. The impugned order was passed on 27-4-1971. It is for the Court below to see if at this point of time it should still insist on the compliance of the aforesaid order. It is also seen from the impugned order that overt acts were committed not only by the petitioners but also by the other party. It is of course for the Court below to examine this aspect of the matter also and pass such orders as it deems fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. There is no merit in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed