JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This appeal has been filed by a defendant against whom a decree for ejectment had been passed by the First Additional Munsif, Lucknow in Regular Suit No. 518 of 1967 and an appeal against that decree was dismissed by the Civil Judge Mohanlalganj, Lucknow. 2. The brief facts of the case so far as relevant for the decision of this second appeal were that the plaintiff Jalaluddin was the owner of a shop situate in the town Lucknow which was held by the defendant at Rs. 6.25 per month as rent. The plaintiff served a notice on the defendant demanding Rs. 162.50 as arrears of rent from 16.1.1965 to 15.3.1967 within one month of the service of the notice and also terminating his tenancy on the expiry of thirty days from such service. This notice was served on the defendant on 4.4.1967. The plaintiff then filed a suit (No. 204 of 1967) in the Court of Munsiff South Lucknow against the defendant on 6.5.1967 claiming a decree for ejectment and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 171.87 from February 1965 to 3.5.1967 and also praying for damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month from 4.5.1967 till the delivery of possession to him for which he offered to pay additional court fee subsequently. The shop in question was governed by the provisions of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The plaintiff, however, claimed a decree for ejectment on the ground that the defendant had committed a default in payment of arrears of rent due by him for more than three months in spite of service of notice of demand within the meaning of section 3(l)(a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 3. The plaintiff had also applied to the District Magistrate for permission to sue the defendant under section 3 of the Act. That application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but a revision filed against that order was allowed by the Commissioner on 6.9.1967 and the plaintiff was granted the permission to file a suit against the defendant. After that the plaintiff filed another suit (No. 518 of 1967) in the court of Munsif South, Lucknow on 16.9.1967. That application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but a revision filed against that order was allowed by the Commissioner on 6.9.1967 and the plaintiff was granted the permission to file a suit against the defendant. After that the plaintiff filed another suit (No. 518 of 1967) in the court of Munsif South, Lucknow on 16.9.1967. In this suit the plaintiff again claimed arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 171.87 from February 1965 to 1.5.1967 and damages amounting to Rs. 28.13 from 2.5.1967 to 15.9.1967. He prayed for a decree for ejectment and pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month till the date of delivery of possession. In this suit it was alleged that the defendant besides making a default in payment of arrears of rent within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) was also liable to ejectment on the basis of the permission dated 6.9.1967 granted to him by the Commissioner under section 3 (3) of the Act. 4. Both the suits were contested by the defendant on a number of grounds which it is not necessary to mention for the purposes of this second appeal. 5. Originally one of these suits was pending before the Munsif South, Lucknow and the other had been transferred to the Additional Munsif, Lucknow. Subsequently the District Judge under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure transferred the other suit also from the court of Munsif South to the court of Additional Munsif. Before the Additional Munsif an application was made on behalf of the plaintiff on 17.10.1968 in suit No. 518 of 1967 that suit should be consolidated with Suit No. 204 of 1967. This application was allowed on 13.12.1968. 6. On 11.2.1969 the plaintiff moved an application in Suit No. 204 of 1967 that he may be permitted to withdraw his claim for ejectment in that suit which may continue only with regard to recovery of arrears of rent. This application was allowed by the learned Munsif on the same date and the plaintiff's claim for ejectment was treated as withdrawn and not pressed. Thereafter the two suits were tried together by him. This application was allowed by the learned Munsif on the same date and the plaintiff's claim for ejectment was treated as withdrawn and not pressed. Thereafter the two suits were tried together by him. He found that the defendant had not committed default within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) but on the basis of the permission dated 6.9.1967 the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit during the currency of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The other pleas taken by the defendant were also over ruled and the plaintiff's claim for possession and arrears of rent was decreed. 7. An appeal filed by the defendant against that decree was also dismissed by the appellate court. The defendant has now come in second appeal before this Court. 8. I heard the learned counsel for the parties. The only point that was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant was that after the plaintiff had abandoned or withdrawn his claim about ejectment in Suit No. 204 of 1967 and the trial court permitting this withdrawal under its order dated 11.2.1969 had not given liberty to the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject -matter of such part of the claim, the plaintiff was debarred from filing a fresh suit in respect of that part of the claim by Order 23, Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is further contended that on the same principle the other suit which he had previously instituted, could not under sections 10 and 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure be maintained or continued after the order dated 11.2.1969. 9. The reply of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent was that on 11.2.1969 when the trial court permitted the plaintiff to withdraw his claim for ejectment in the prior Suit No. 204 of 1967 both the suits were before that court and it shall be presumed that the court permitted the continuance of the other suit after this withdrawal even though it was not so specifically stated in the order dated 11.2.1969. Secondly, it was contended that the second suit was not in respect of the same subject-matter or based on the same cause of action so far as the relief for ejectment is concerned and as such the institution of such a suit was not barred either by section 10 or section 12 of the Code. Even if this suit had not been filed earlier, the plaintiff could file his suit for ejectment based on the permission granted by the Commissioner under section 3 of the Act after the dated 1 1.2.1969 had been passed without any permission from the court and in any case the second suit which he had already instituted could not stand on a worse fooling than the suit which he was under law at liberty to file after the abandonment of his claim for ejectment in Suit No. 204 of 1967 on 11.2.1969. Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure would not have stood in the way of filing such a suit based on a different cause of action. We have therefore to examine whether the second Suit No. 5111 of 1967 is based on the same cause of action on which the first Suit No. 204 of 1957 was based so far as the relief for ejectment is concerned so as to attract the bar of Order 23 Rule 1(3). 10. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of Calcutta High Court in A. J. Judah v. Ramapada Gupta, AIR 1959 Calcutta 715. The material observations which are contained in head note (c) of the report are as follows : "In order that Order 23, Rule 1(3) may apply the subsequent suit must be in respect of the same subject-matter as the previous suit. If on a comparison of the plaints in the two suits it is found that the reliefs claimed and the allegations constituting the cause of action are not exactly identical, that will not be conclusive and subsequent suit may yet be hit by the mischief of Order 23, Rule 1 (3). For the determination of the question one has to look to the substance of the two suits and not to their form and language only. The subject-matter of a suit can only be ascertained from the plaint filed. For the determination of the question one has to look to the substance of the two suits and not to their form and language only. The subject-matter of a suit can only be ascertained from the plaint filed. The plaint must state the reliefs claimed and the cause of action that entitles the plaintiff to get the reliefs claimed. This indicates that the subject-matter of a suit can only be ascertained from the cause of action and relief, set out in the plaint. If the cause of action in the subsequent suit is different from the cause of action in the previous suit withdrawn, the two suits must be held to be in respect of different subject-matter. The addition of a new fact to a state of existing facts may change the character of the suit and the right to relief. For the purpose of Order 23 R. 1(3) each one of the bundle of facts jointly and severally should not be treated as giving rise to the cause of action so that the subject-matter of the suit is so extensive as to cover all claims that may arise from the proof of each single fact in such permutation and combination as can be imagined. For the purpose of cause of action all the facts pleaded have to be looked at as a 'bundle' that is in the collective capacity as giving right to a claim. Each fact cannot be looked at in isolation, or the facts cannot be looked at in a different combination. If the reliefs claimed in the subsequent suit though not expressly stated but was implicit in the previous plaint by reason of the bundle of facts pleaded as constituting the cause of action, the plaintiff would be debarred from claiming the relief in a subsequent suit based on the same bundle of facts because of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. "If the cause of action which gave rise to the reliefs claimed in the subsequent suit did not arise when the previous suit was instituted and withdrawn in the sense that one important event absolutely essential to complete the cause of action in the subsequent suit did not take place, then the subject-matter of the two suits must be different and Order 23 Rule 1(3) has no application. It may be that for successful determination of the suit alleged to be hit by the mischief of Order 23 Rule 1(3) questions and issues have to be decided which were substantially at issue in the previously instituted suit; but that does not make the subject-matter in the two suits to be same. If the previous suit was decided against the plaintiff then the decisions on those issues either expressly or constructively must have been taken to have been decided against the plaintiff and the subsequent suit would fail because of the principles of res judicata embodied in section 11 of the Code. If, however, the suit was not decided but merely withdrawn, no question of res judicata arises and in law the plaintiff' is still entitled to agitate the question in Court. The principles of section 11 and Order 23 Rule 1(3) are different and it is not permissible to apply the principles of res judicata to cases under Order 23 Rule 1(3)" I am in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by his Lordship P.C. Mallick J. regarding the application of Order 23 Rule 1(3). In the light of these principles we have now to see whether the cause of action so far as the claim for ejectment is concerned is the same in the two suits or not. The bundle of facts which furnished a cause of action to the plaintiff for claiming the relief for ejectment at the time of filing the first suit were that : 1. The plaintiff was the owner of the shop in dispute which was occupied by the defendant as a tenant, 2. The plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant by serving on him the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and 3. The defendant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and had failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand within the meaning of section 3 (1)(a) of the Act and as such the plaintiff was entitled to file this suit for ejectment even during the currency of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 11. The facts which constituted the cause of action for claiming the relief for ejectment in the second suit were as follows :- 1. 11. The facts which constituted the cause of action for claiming the relief for ejectment in the second suit were as follows :- 1. The plaintiff was the owner of the shop in dispute which was occupied by the defendant as a tenant. 2. The plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant by serving on him the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. The defendant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and had failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand within the meaning of section 3(l)(a) of the Act and as such the plaintiff was entitled to file this suit for ejectment even during the currency of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 4. The plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit for ejectment even during the currency of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act on the basis of permission granted to him on 6-9-1967 by the Commissioner before whom a revision was filed against the order of the District Magistrate rejecting the landlord's application for grant of such permission under section 3 of the Act. 12. From these propositions it would be clear that one important event, namely, the grant of permission by the Commissioner on 6-9-1967 which was absolutely essential to complete the cause of action in order to claim the relief for ejectment in the subsequent suit, did not exist when the previous suit was filed and it came in existence only subsequently. It is on the basis of this event that the bar to file such a suit during the currency of the Act was removed and the plaintiff's suit for ejectment was decreed by the courts below. I am therefore, of the opinion that the cause of action for claiming the relief for ejectment on the basis of this permission in the subsequent suit was different from that in the former suit though certain other facts constituting the cause of action were common in the two. 13. I am therefore, of the opinion that the cause of action for claiming the relief for ejectment on the basis of this permission in the subsequent suit was different from that in the former suit though certain other facts constituting the cause of action were common in the two. 13. It is a different matter that after this permission had been granted to him by the Commissioner on 6-9-1967, it was open to the plaintiff to pray for amendment of his plaint by incorporating this ground also for the removal of the bar to the filing of the; suit during the currency of the Act. It was, however, in the discretion of the court to allow or disallow this amendment, it was equally open to the plaintiff to file a second suit for ejectment on the basis of this permission. If this new ground had not been available to the plaintiff at the time of filing this second suit and the second suit had been filed by repeating only those bundle of facts constituting the cause of action as had been mentioned in the first suit, it could be said that the second suit was not maintainable either before the withdrawal of the claim for ejectment in the previous suit or after such withdrawal. But in view of this new ground a subsequent suit could be filed after withdrawing the claim for ejectment in the previous suit and such a subsequent suit would not be barred by Order 23 Rule 1(3). If a subsequent suit would not be so barred, it follows that a previously instituted suit cannot stand on a worse footing, particularly when the two suits had been consolidated by the trial court prior to the withdrawal and the court had a discretion to order such consolidation instead of staying the hearing of the second suit under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure as was held by this court in P. P. Gupta v. East Asiatic Co., AIR 1959 Calcutta 715. 14. 14. On 11-2-1969 or on any other date there was no decision by the court in the previous suit No. 204 of 1967 that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of ejectment on the ground that the defendant had not committed a default under section 3(l)(a) or that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was bad on any other ground. As such there was no question of the second suit being barred by the principle of res judicata a simply because the plaintiff had withdrawn his claim for ejectment in his first suit. I am therefore of the opinion that this plea raised on behalf of the appellant has no force. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. The stay order dated 18-3-1971 is discharged.