Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1972 DIGILAW 195 (KER)

Kunhahammedkutty v. State of Kerala

1972-08-17

K.SADASIVAN, P.GOVINDAN NAIR

body1972
JUDGMENT K. Sadasivan, J. 1. These original petitions and C.R.P. 124 of 1971 challenge the constitutional validity of S.20 of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970 Act XI of 1970 (for brevity the Act), in that it is violative of Art.14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Act is claimed by the State to be an ameliorative measure, intended to render relief to agriculturist debtors whose properties have been sold in court sales in execution of decrees obtained against them. S.20 provides for setting aside such sales held after 14-7-58. and restoration of property in cases where the sale has resulted in delivery of possession. S.20 of the Act reads: "(1) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been sold in execution of any decree for recovery of a debt or sold under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force for the recovery of a debt due to a banking company in liquidation -- (a) on or after the 1st day of November, 1956; or (b) before the 1st day of November, 1956, but the possession of the said property has not actually passed before the 20th day of November, 1957, from the judgment debtor to the purchaser and the decree holder is the purchaser, then, notwithstanding anything in the Limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force, and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed such judgment debtor or the legal representative of such judgment-debtor may deposit one half of the purchase money together with the costs of execution where such costs were not included in the purchase money, and apply to the court within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the property and the court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside, and the court shall further order that the balance of the purchase money shall be paid in ten equal half yearly instalments together with the interest accrued due on such balance outstanding till the date of payment of each instalment, at six per cent per annum, the first instalment being payable within a period of six months from the date of the order of the court. x x x x (3) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been sold in execution of any decree for the recovery of a debt or sold under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force for the recovery of a debt due to a banking company in liquidation, on or after the 14th day of July, 1958 and the decree holder is not the purchaser, then, notwithstanding anything in the Limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force, and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed, such judgment debtor or the legal representative of such judgment debtor may, deposit the purchase money and apply to the court within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the property, and the court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside, (4) No order under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) or sub-s.(3) shall be passed without notice to the decree holder, the transferee of the decree, if any, the auction purchaser and any other person, who in the opinion of the court would be affected by such order and without affording them an opportunity to be heard. (5) Where improvements have been effected on the property sold after the date of the sale and before the notice under sub-s.(4), the value of such improvements as determined by the court shall be deposited by the applicant for payment to the auction purchaser. (6) An order under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2), or sub-s.(3) shall not be deemed to affect the rights of bona fide alienees of the auction purchaser deriving rights before the date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Bill, 1968, in the Gazette. (7) Where a sale is set aside under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) or sub-s.(3), in case the applicant is out of possession of the property, the court shall order redelivery of the property to him. (7) Where a sale is set aside under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) or sub-s.(3), in case the applicant is out of possession of the property, the court shall order redelivery of the property to him. (8) In respect of any sale of immovable property which has not been confirmed, the judgment debtor if he is an agriculturist shall be entitled to pay the decree debt in accordance with the provisions of S.4 and 5 and on the deposit of the first instalment thereof, the sale shall be set aside. (9) Where the judgment debtor fails to deposit any of the subsequent instalments the decree holder shall be entitled to execute the decree and recover the defaulted instalment or instalments in accordance with the provisions of this Act. x x x x 2. The brunt of the attack is directed against sub-s.(1) and (3), more particularly the latter. The effect of these provisions, according to the petitioners, would be to deprive them of the ownership of the properties that has become vested in them by virtue of the sales, which is a violation of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution. There is no intelligible reason, according to the petitioners, to discriminate between a bona fide purchaser at court sale on the one hand, and bona fide purchaser from a court auction purchaser at court sale on the other. This is a clear violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. According to them no circumstances existed warranting the introduction of such a sweeping measure in utter disregard of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The sales having been confirmed, and the execution having been complete the relationship of debtor and creditor no longer subsists, and. therefore, the Act would fall outside the ambit of Entry 30 of List II of the 7th Schedule. 3. The State as well as some of the judgment debtors have filed objections. According to the State, the Act is intended to provide relief to indebted agriculturists. As the purchase money is made available for payment to the purchaser, there is no violation of Art.19(1)(f). The Act is a measure of agrarian reform and it is in implementation of such a reform that the rights of the auction purchasers over the property are sought to be extinguished by the section. Such a provision is protected by Art.31A(1) of the Constitution. The Act is a measure of agrarian reform and it is in implementation of such a reform that the rights of the auction purchasers over the property are sought to be extinguished by the section. Such a provision is protected by Art.31A(1) of the Constitution. In any event the impugned provision imposes only a reasonable restriction on the right of the auction purchaser to acquire and hold properties. 4. The first point argued before us was in respect of the legislative competency of the State in enacting the provision impugned. On a consideration of the question in its relevant aspects, we see no difficulty in holding that the provision in question is within the competency of the State Legislature. The substance of the matter with which the section deals is agricultural indebtedness and what it provides for is the relief of such indebtedness. The pith and substance of the Act would therefore, fall within the ambit of Entry 30 of the State (List II) of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution and its validity is, therefore, beyond doubt. Entry 30 is "money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness." Learned counsel, Sri. Govinda Wariyar, would argue that by the confirmation of the sale, the execution is complete and that has put an end to the debtor creditor relationship that subsisted between the parties and therefore, the Entry relating to money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness cannot apply. In other words, the argument is that there is no indebtedness in cases where the sale had been confirmed. We are unable to agree. The vesting of the property sold in auction, does not put an end to the need for granting relief to the agricultural judgment debtor. If the sale had taken place because of his indebtedness, setting aside of that sale will be relief of agricultural indebtedness. To read the entry as enabling relief only when the debt existed as such would be to limit the scope of legislation under the Entry. Such construction we do not feel, is justified by the wording of the Entry. In any case, a constitutional entry should not be read in that manner. It is the principle of the decision in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 58 ) that should apply. Such construction we do not feel, is justified by the wording of the Entry. In any case, a constitutional entry should not be read in that manner. It is the principle of the decision in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 58 ) that should apply. A passage may be extracted from that judgment: "The cardinal rule of interpretation is that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. "When a law is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it, what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation." ( AIR 1957 SC 297 ). The present Act was preceded by Act 31 of 1958, which contained identical provisions. S.22 of that Act was directed against setting aside court sales of immovable property over which an agriculturist had any interest. Sub-s.(1) of S.22 like Sub-s.(1) of S.20 of the present Act provided for setting aside sales on deposit of the purchase money (where the purchaser is the decree holder one half of the purchase money together with costs of execution to be deposited within six months of the date of the Act and the balance to be paid in ten equal half yearly instalments); and sub-s.(2) provided for redelivery of property in case the judgment debtor was dispossessed in consequence of the sale. The period of six months for making the initial deposit of one half was, by the amended Act 2/61, raised subsequently to one year. By the time Act 2 of 1961 came into effect (January, 1961), the period of one year prescribed therein had expired and the amendment had practically become infructuous. Only court sales that had taken place on or prior to 14-7-58 were taken in under Act 31 of 1958 and it was to provide relief to agriculturist debtors whose properties had been sold subsequent to 14-7-58 that the present Act was enacted. In the interval between the two dates (14-7-58 and 14-7-70) a good number of sales in execution involving the properties of agriculturist debtors had taken place. In the interval between the two dates (14-7-58 and 14-7-70) a good number of sales in execution involving the properties of agriculturist debtors had taken place. The evolution of debt relief has been the avowed policy of the State governments from very early times. The Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1114, The Travancore Debt Relief Act, 1116, The Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, Bengal Agriculturist Debtors' Act, 1935 etc., are some of the enactments falling in this category. In all these Acts there were Provision to set aside the court sales on payment of purchase money and value of improvements (vide S.28 of the Cochin Act, S.13 of the Travancore Act, S.22 and 23 of the Madras Act and S.37A of the Bengal Act). In all these Acts there were provisions also for restoration of possession in cases where sales had been confirmed and property had been delivered over to the purchaser. It will thus be seen that there have been successive legislations for setting aside sales that had taken place during different periods. The legislature apparently found that the other provisions in the enactments granting relief to the agriculturists such as instalment payments of their debts and setting aside of sales that had taken place during specific periods to which sales alone the Acts applied were not sufficient to relieve the burden of their debts and it was necessary, periodically, to set at naught the consequences of such burden. There is nothing wrong in proceeding on the basis that such forced sales took place because the reliefs granted had not afforded sufficient ameliorative measures. This is a consequence which so vitally affects an agriculturist; in most, if not all, cases taking away his means of sustenance. Restoration of the wherewithal to exist would be relief of agricultural indebtedness. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt regarding the legislative competency of the Act, and we think it will fall within Entry 30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 5. In appreciating the contention regarding infringement of Art.19(1)(f), the points urged in these petitions have clearly to be borne in mind. 6. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt regarding the legislative competency of the Act, and we think it will fall within Entry 30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 5. In appreciating the contention regarding infringement of Art.19(1)(f), the points urged in these petitions have clearly to be borne in mind. 6. The petitioner in O. P. 5576/70 alleges that in execution of the decree obtained by one Pathumma Umma against respondents 2, 8 and 9 and deceased Abdulla, eight items of immovable properties were sold on 30-1-1961 in E. P. 336/59 in O.S. 233/52 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Perinthalmanna. One other item was subsequently sold on 25-7-1966 in E. P. 635/65 in the same suit. The decree in the suit was passed on the strength of a registered deed of mortgage executed by the 2nd respondent and others in 1931, The amount due under the decree was scaled down in the suit and the decree was only for the principal amount covered by the mortgage together with interest at 5 1/2%. The decree was passed on 26-6-1953. The judgment debtors failed to pay the instalments prescribed by the Act and it was in such a situation that the sales were conducted. The properties were purchased by the petitioner benami for his son. Some of the items were taken delivery of from the judgment debtors on 16-5-61 and some other items on 19-9-64 and the remaining few items on 15-3-67. On 18-4-69 the petitioner's son executed a surrender deed in favour of the petitioner surrendering possession to him. In one of the items thus taken delivery of, the petitioner has constructed a residential building spending over Rs. 10,000/- and is residing there. He has also effected valuable improvements over all the items of properties by planting various types of fruit bearing trees. While so, the Act was passed providing for cancellation of the sale on deposit of the purchase money within 6 months of the date of the commencement of the Act; and in pursuance of this, O.P. 11/70 was filed in the Munsiff Court for setting aside the sale and redelivery of the properties, as provided in S.20(7) of the Act. According to the petitioner, the properties having vested in him by virtue of the sale, any disturbance of his possession or ownership would be violative of Art.14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. According to the petitioner, the properties having vested in him by virtue of the sale, any disturbance of his possession or ownership would be violative of Art.14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. S.20(3) of the Act is not entitled to the protection of Art.19(5) of the Constitution, since it is not a reasonable restriction on the right to acquire, bold and dispose of property. Seasons have been favourable for the past several years and yield from agricultural land has been good. The prices of agricultural produces have been high, and cultivators of land and agriculturists have been making enormous profit. Therefore, there was, no justification for the introduction of such a sweeping measure in total disregard of the fundamental rights guaranteed. The Act had been enacted not out of genuine need in the State for such an ameliorative measure, but more as a measure of political expediency. The market value of the land has gone up by more than 100 per cent since the date of the sale. Under the provisions of the CPC. the judgment debtor, in such circumstances, has to deposit not only the decree debt; but also a sum equal to 5% of the purchase money for payment to the auction purchaser. This salutory rule has been violated. Under S.20(3), the judgment debtor need deposit only the purchase money. The first sale was for Rs. 751 and the second one for Rs. 2001/-. The property, if sold in open market, would now fetch Rs. 50,000/-. The petitioner is now being deprived of the property on payment of the sale price and the value of improvements, which would only be about half the present market value of the land. 7. The petitioner in O. P. 6466/70 "would aver that in execution of a decree obtained by one U. Ramankutty against respondents 3 to 5 in O. S.286/55 on the file of the Munsiff of Ottapalam basing on an hypothecation deed of the year 1949 part of the amount was realised. As it was a debt coming under Act 31 of 1958, the respondents were entitled to discharge the debt in instalments as provided in that Act; but they committed default of six consecutive instalments, and the right to pay in installments was thus forfeited. Most of the items were outstanding on verumpattom with one Ayyappan. As it was a debt coming under Act 31 of 1958, the respondents were entitled to discharge the debt in instalments as provided in that Act; but they committed default of six consecutive instalments, and the right to pay in installments was thus forfeited. Most of the items were outstanding on verumpattom with one Ayyappan. The petitioner became a tenant by virtue of an assignment deed executed in his favour by one Abdul Hakim, who himself was a transferee of the rights of Ayyappan. The remaining items were in the possession of the petitioner by virtue of an oral lease. The petitioner also has purchased the rights of Ramankutty under the decree in O. S.286/55. He thereafter filed E.P. 191/64 and brought the property to sale on 18 10 64 and himself purchased 10 items for a sum of Rs. 4000/-. The sale was duly confirmed and delivery was taken. It was then that the present Act came and taking advantage of the provisions of the Act, E. A. 584/70 was filed praying for setting aside the sale and redelivery. The grounds urged for striking down the impugned provisions are identical as those in O.P. 5576/70. 8. In C.R.P. 124/71, the facts are that in 'execution of the decree in O.S. 277/60, 12 and odd acres belonging to the judgment debtor was sold on 3-6-68 and purchased by the decree holder. The sale was confirmed on 5-7-68 and delivery was effected on 19-8-68. The petitioner has since been in possession and enjoyment of the property by making substantial improvements like levelling up the property, sinking wells etc. Rs. 5000/-has been invested by him on the improvements. Prior encumbrances have been discharged by him, and on that account he has had to spend Rs. 3,900/-. E.A. 362/70 was filed by the 1st respondent in pursuance of the provisions in the impugned Act, on deposit of the requisite amount. The petitioner raised objections; but the court finally allowed the petition and set aside the sale. The court also held that S, 20 of the Act does not provide for value of improvements being ascertained before an order for delivery is passed. The petitioner appealed to the District Judge of Palghat against the order. The learned District Judge held that the Act provides for valuation of the improvements and payment thereof, before an order for redelivery is made. The petitioner appealed to the District Judge of Palghat against the order. The learned District Judge held that the Act provides for valuation of the improvements and payment thereof, before an order for redelivery is made. He has accordingly remanded the case to the lower court. The learned District Judge has not entered any decision on the other points. The petitioner challenges the provision as being violative of Art.14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. He is particularly aggrieved on account of the fact that the Act does not provide for recoupment in respect of the amount spent for discharging prior encumbrances and also on account of the fact that there is no clear provision for payment of value of improvements before delivery is ordered. 9. The respondents seek to justify the measure on the ground that the Act is intended to provide reliefs to indebted agriculturists in the State and alleviate their distress. The learned Advocate General invited our attention to the various measures taken by the Government to salvage agriculturist debtors from the sad plight in which they were placed. Benefits conferred by Act 31/58 were available only in respect of the debts incurred by the agriculturists before 14th July, 1958. Some relief, of course, could be rendered by Act 31 of 1958; but that was inadequate and after 14-7-58 the situation deteriorated and indebtedness among the agriculturists continued to assume large proportions due to various factors. Suits happened to be filed in the various courts for recovery of debts incurred after 14 7 58 from poor agriculturists and the number of such suits as seen from statistics was appalling. It is seen that 102867 such suits were filed in the various courts of the State, after 14 7 1958. In execution of the decrees obtained in these suits properties of poor agriculturists happened to be sold. Protective measures to alleviate their distress had hence to be provided in the Act such as scaling down of debts and providing for payment in instalments and setting aside of sales in execution. S.20 had to be enacted as it was found that by mere scaling down the problem was not solved. Learned Advocate General took us also to the average indebtedness of the agriculturists in Kerala vis a vis the plight of the agriculturists in other States. S.20 had to be enacted as it was found that by mere scaling down the problem was not solved. Learned Advocate General took us also to the average indebtedness of the agriculturists in Kerala vis a vis the plight of the agriculturists in other States. The All India Rural Credit Committee's Report, 1954 shows that 51.7% of the Rural families are indebted. Of this, the proportion between cultivators and non cultivators is 58.6 and 38.6 respectively. The All India average borrowing per rural family was Rs. 160/-. The corresponding average for the cultivator and non cultivator was R.210/-and Rs. 66/- respectively. Of the average borrowing per family of Rs. 309/- for rural households, that of the cultivators was Rs. 358/- per family as against Rs. 171/- for non cultivators. Family expenditure accounted for 49.8% of the borrowing in the case of small cultivators, 49.5% in the case of medium cultivators, 49.2% for large cultivators and 37.2 for big cultivators. The rural credit survey of 1961-62 shows that 64% of the cultivators in Kerala are indebted. This is the second biggest in India. The average cash loan borrowed by the cultivators in Kerala is Rs. 318/- per household as against Rs. 127/- for the non cultivator house hold. The most important purpose of borrowing is household expenditure. In the lowest asset group, i. e., of less than Rs. 500/- as much as 72% of the borrowings are accounted for household expenditure. In this connection it has also to be remembered that capital expenditure in cultivation is the lowest in Kerala, being only 8.6%. The aggregate of the borrowings of the agriculturist households in India have increased from Rs. 750 crores in 1951-52 to 1034 crores in 1961-62, i.e., an increase of38%. Financial stringency has not relaxed in subsequent years. The level of debt per household, it has to be remembered, is comparatively low in Kerala and the cost of cultivation is also less; still the cultivator here is unable to make both ends meet. Consumer's needs and distressed circumstances assume an important role in adding to total debt. Debt for improvement purposes is almost everywhere of an insignificant proportion. When we come to the sources of borrowing, we see that it is still the professional money lender that provides the source in the villages. As observed by Dr. C. B. Mamoria, in his book on Agricultural Problems of India, 6th Edn. Debt for improvement purposes is almost everywhere of an insignificant proportion. When we come to the sources of borrowing, we see that it is still the professional money lender that provides the source in the villages. As observed by Dr. C. B. Mamoria, in his book on Agricultural Problems of India, 6th Edn. pages 487 & 488:-- "Without doubt the village money lender is still the most important source of borrowing, and even though sometimes he has proved to be a dangerous necessity he has been and still is, an inescapable necessity. According to the findings of the Rural Credit Survey Committee, the amount of debt owned to the agriculturist and professional money lenders formed 24.9 and 44.8 percent respectively of total debts. Relatives, landlords, traders and commission agents accounted for 11.2 percent, 1.5 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. Debt owned to the government and cooperatives formed hardly 3.3 and 3.1 per cent respectively." In these circumstances, one cannot criticise the government in launching on such a measure to lighten the burden of indebtedness of agriculturists. On behalf of the State it was submitted that the relief of agriculturists"' indebtedness is a policy to which the State has committed itself and it is in furtherance of the State policy that the present Act was resorted to. As observed in Narayanan Nair v. State (1970 KLT. 669 F. B.): "There is a presumption that the legislature understands the needs of the people, and that the provisions of a legislation are designed to meet their needs. It is only in very extraordinary circumstances that a court will pronounce a legislation regulating the rights of property as unreasonable." The U. S. Supreme Court in William Ferguson v. Skrupa (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 10 Lawyers' Edn. 2d, p. 93 at p. 97) observed,:- "We are not concerned with the wisdom, need or appropriateness of the legislation Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this court does not sit to "subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government." Patanjali Sastri, C. J: has held in State of Madras v. Row (1952 SCR. 607) that: "the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned; and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness, can be laid down as applicable to all cases. 607) that: "the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned; and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness, can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict." Analysing the above passage, Seervai in his commentary on "the Position of the Judiciary under the Constitution of India", page 64, would observe: "Reasonableness is not an abstract concept but requires the evaluation of a large number of elusive factors, in which the Judge's philosophy or scale of values will play a large part. But this does not mean that he can give free play to his philosophy or scale of values; first because the constitution is meant for people of varying philosophies and scales of values and not merely for people like himself, and secondly because the elected representatives of the people, who are charged with the duty of making laws have considered the law reasonable." 10. On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that once it is established that there has been restriction introduced by a statute it is for the State to discharge the burden to show that it is reasonable and in the interests of the general public. A few decisions were also cited in support of this position. It is true, when an enactment is found to infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.19(1), it must be held to be invalid unless those who support it can bring it under the protective provisions of clauses (2) to (6) of that Article. To do so, the burden is on those who seek that protection and not on the citizen to show that the restrictive enactment is invalid: (vide AIR 1954 SC 728 , AIR 1964 SC 925 and AIR 1970 SC 129 ). In the last mentioned case AIR. 1970 SC 129 question of reasonable restriction arose in respect of Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 29 of 1964, which created a State monopoly in the trade of tendu leaves and under S.5(1) thereof prohibited anyone, excepting those mentioned therein either to purchase or transport tendu leaves. In the last mentioned case AIR. 1970 SC 129 question of reasonable restriction arose in respect of Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 29 of 1964, which created a State monopoly in the trade of tendu leaves and under S.5(1) thereof prohibited anyone, excepting those mentioned therein either to purchase or transport tendu leaves. R.9 of the Rules framed thereunder provided for an application for a transport permit in form M and the issuance of such permit in form N. The appellant, in the case, applied for and obtained permits authorising them to transport tendu leaves purchased by them from the various forest units to their godowns situate outside those units. On June 4, 1965 the Divisional Forest Officer issued an order which forbade altogether movement of old tendu leaves and as regards new leaves, provided that their movement from one village to another had to be covered by a permit. It also provided that permits would be necessary for bulk transport from warehouses to branches and from there to sattedars, and that such permits would be issued by range assistants and range officers on receipt of applications therefor. The appellants made a representation to the D.F O. mentioning the several difficulties which would result from the said order and the said officer in partial modification of his order permitted branch managers of bidi manufacturing firms themselves to issue transport permits to sattedars. Finding, however, that instead of distributing the said leaves to the sattedars, the branch managers were issuing permits for bulk transport, the said officer on October 12, 1965 rescinded his order of June, 8, 1965. The result was that the appellants were required to obtain permits for moving the tendu leaves from their branch offices to the sattedars. Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition claiming that under S.5 of the said Rules they were required to obtain permit only when moving the leaves purchased by them from units where they were grown to their warehouses and that once they were so moved to the warehouses there could be no restriction in their further movement from the warehouses to their branches and from there to their sattedars and the mazdoors. The Court held: "In our view reading S.5(2) along with R.9 of the said rules, what they are intended to require is that a manufacturer must have a permit to move the leaves purchased by him from the unit or units where he has purchased them to his warehouse out side and from there to his branches and also when he transports them to his sattedars. But, no such permit was intended to be necessary when the leaves are distributed for the manufacture of bidis by these sattedars to the mazdoors whom he employs. A construction so limited in its sweep is commendable as it is consistent with the object of the Act and it is also in harmony with Clause. (5) and (6) of Art.19 and Clause. (b) of Art.304." It was further held: "The object of the Act clearly was to regulate trade in tendu leaves in the public interest and for that end to create a state monopoly so that the purchasers of these leaves may not exploit the need and the poverty of small growers and pay the least possible price. The legislature thought that it was in the public interest to entrust the entire trade to the State who would fix reasonable prices in consultation with an advisory committee and make at the same time compulsory for the State to purchase the entire stock which the growers would offer for sale at those prices." 11. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the burden cast on the State to show that the restrictive enactment is valid has not been discharged and that the State has not applied its mind at all to the question whether the restriction is competent. We do not think that this contention is correct. S.20 of the Act is enacted in the interests of the indebted mass of agriculturists among the general public in the State. The provision imposes only reasonable restriction on the right of the auction purchaser to acquire and hold property. For the deprivation of his rights he is compensated by the deposit of the purchase money in court and also the value of improvement effected after the purchase. S.22(1) of Act 31 of 1958 provided for setting aside of sale on application being brought within six months of the commencement of the Act, viz., 14-7-58. For the deprivation of his rights he is compensated by the deposit of the purchase money in court and also the value of improvement effected after the purchase. S.22(1) of Act 31 of 1958 provided for setting aside of sale on application being brought within six months of the commencement of the Act, viz., 14-7-58. Subsequently, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General, Government received several representations stating that many of the affected debtors could not take advantage of the benefits conferred by S.22(1) within the short period of six months provided therein. Government had, therefore, to pass an amendment in January, 1961 and by that time the extended period of one year provided in the amended Act had also elapsed. The amendment thus became infructuous. Statistics, as already indicated show that suits against indebted agriculturists were in the increase after 14 7 58 and it was in these circumstances that the impugned Act was passed. From this it was argued that there was no application of the mind to the question as to what was . the existing law and what was the evil that was sought to be remedied. We do not think the criticism is justified. When it is remembered that the purpose of the enactment is to benefit the indebted agriculturists, and facts and figures show that a large body of them stood in need of immediate relief, the protection afforded cannot be said to be unreasonable restriction on the right of the auction purchaser to own and possess property. We do not see much force in the petitioners' contention that under S 65 of the CPC., the title to the property having vested in the purchaser he has become the absolute owner thereof and the legislature has no power to divest him of that right by enacting such a measure. His ownership is being disturbed for implementing the agrarian reform, providing protection to agriculturist debtors and for disturbing his rights he is being compensated by payment of the purchase money. This is only in the nature of reasonable restriction on his right to hold the property, falling under clause (5) of Art.19. A Full Bench of this court in Krishnan Nair v. Abdu ( 1964 KLT 94 ) had to consider this aspect of the question in relation to S.11A of Act 31/58. This is only in the nature of reasonable restriction on his right to hold the property, falling under clause (5) of Art.19. A Full Bench of this court in Krishnan Nair v. Abdu ( 1964 KLT 94 ) had to consider this aspect of the question in relation to S.11A of Act 31/58. S.11A provided for termination of melpattom granted for specific period before the expiry of the term, on depositing into court one third of the advance outstanding. On deposit of the one third the section provided for termination of the melpattom and the right of the melpattomdar to collect the usufructs from the property covered by the melpattom. It was contended in the case that the said provision was violative of Art.13 of the Constitution. The Full Bench observed: "In testing a law against Art.13 of the Constitution, the court must see what the law deals rather than to the form the matter assumes. The substance of the matter with which the impugned section deals is agricultural indebtedness and what it provides for is the relief of such indebtedness. If that be so, the section cannot be regarded as infringing either Art.14 or Art.19. If the melpattomdar is deprived of his melpattom rights provision is made for the repayment of his money with interest as a charge on the property, and the restriction placed on his right to hold property namely his melpattom right, is but a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. And there would be no substance in the charge that melpattomdars are being discriminated against in that, while other agricultural lessees are being given fixity of tenure, the impugned law provides for premature termination of melpattoms. The position of a melpattomdar is more that of a usufructuary mortgagee than of an agricultural lessee, and the impugned section is but a counterpart of S.11 which provides for the premature redemption of usufructuary mortgages. In enacting the impugned section, the legislature thought that an agricultural who has parted with the trees on his land on a melpattom is in a like case with one who has parted with land on a usufructuary mortgage." It was contended for the petitioners that it is for this court to decide whether the restriction imposed in the impugned measure is reasonable and would fall within the ambit of clause (5) of Art.19. Of course, this court can point out the unreasonableness involved in the measure if to our satisfaction it is so. The Supreme Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nayar v. State of Madras & Kerala (1960 KLJ 1077) observed: "It is reasonable to think that the makers of the constitution considered the word "restriction" to be sufficiently wide to save laws "inconsistent" with Art.19(1). or "taking away the rights" conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word "restriction" to include cases of "prohibition" also. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however that when the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken be the court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the court. The State can establish that a law. though it purports to deprive a citizen of his fundamental right, under certain circumstances amounts to a reasonable restriction within the meaning of clause (5) of Art.19 of the Constitution." 12. The restriction is only in the interests of the general public. The following observations appearing in the same decision (1960 KLJ 1077) are pertinent. in this connection: "The phrase "in the interests of the general public" means I think nothing more than "in the public interest", and it may well be that legislation affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area might well be legislation in the public interest though the public of other parts of India might not be directly affected by such legislation. If they are indirectly affected such would be quite sufficient to make such legislation in the public interest. Legislation affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants of that particular area ............ It is not in the interests of the general public or in the public interest to allow any class of persons to labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. Legislation affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants of that particular area ............ It is not in the interests of the general public or in the public interest to allow any class of persons to labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. It is in the interests of the general public or in the public interest that all classes of the citizens of India are content and that their grievances should be removed, ..... Grievances or discontent in some particular area or in some State or in some class of persons may eventually affect the whole Republic of India, though originally the effects might be. limited. The removal of any grievance, abuse or discontent is a matter not only where the discontent or grievance is genuine it may well be in the public interest to remove such, though the public in other parts of India may not be directly affected." An ameliorative measure like the one before us is thus a genuine attempt on the part of the State to redress the grievance of a section of the public and as such it is a public measure. The Allahabad High Court in Nand Ram Chhotey Lal v. Raman Singh ( AIR 1962 All. 521 ) dealing with the constitutionality of certain provisions of the U. P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act observed:- "The Zamindar Debt Reduction Act is merely in the nature of regulatory law regulating the relationship of the creditors and the exzamindars. It cannot be called a piece of legislation authorising the acquisition or expropriation of a private property or affecting such rights of property as are guaranteed under the Constitution. The provisions of the said four sections do not amount to deprivation as contemplated by Art.31. The Act was passed within the legislative competency of the State Legislature. The impugned provisions of the Act are covered either by entry 30 of List II or entry 13 of List III. The Act was also made law after receiving the assent of the President." The position is the same here also. 13. The Act was passed within the legislative competency of the State Legislature. The impugned provisions of the Act are covered either by entry 30 of List II or entry 13 of List III. The Act was also made law after receiving the assent of the President." The position is the same here also. 13. There was a general contention based on the amendment introduced by Act 2/61 which provided that if six consecutive instalments were defaulted the debtor would lose his benefit under the Act, and it must be taken that the debtors are not entitled to any relief. In support of this position it was further contended that the defaults were purposely made in the payment of instalments leading thereby to the court sales and such recalcitrant debtors are not entitled to any protection. Without materials before us we are not in a position to pronounce on the propriety or otherwise of this contention. So also the argument that agricultural produce has been fetching good market in these days and thus the financial capacity of the debtors has been boosted. As already stated, the presumption is that the legislature. understands the needs of the people and that the provisions of a legislation are designed to meet their needs. We do not, therefore, purpose to probe further into the matter to see if the test applied by the State is reasonable or not. The learned Advocate General did not seek the help of Art.31A, for the constitutional validity of the impugned measure. 14. Learned counsel also contended that S.20 is hit by Art.14, in that it discriminates, without reason between a bona fide purchaser at a court sale and an assignee from an auction purchaser, and also between a decree holder auction-purchaser, and a stranger purchaser. In the case of the purchaser who is the decree holder himself, only one half of the purchase money need be deposited initially, and the rest be paid in 10 equal half yearly instalments together with the interest due. But in the case where the purchaser is not the decree holder, the sale shall be set aside on the debtor depositing the whole of the purchase money and applying to the court within six months from the date of the commencement of the Act. But in the case where the purchaser is not the decree holder, the sale shall be set aside on the debtor depositing the whole of the purchase money and applying to the court within six months from the date of the commencement of the Act. Under Sub-s.(6) it is provided that an order under Sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) or sub-s.(3) shall not be deemed to affect the rights of bona fide alienees of the auction purchaser deriving rights before the date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Bill, 1968, in the gazette. Third proviso to S.22 in Act 31/58, which is similar to sub-s (6) of S.20 of the Act was challenged on the ground that it is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution before this court in Nibisa Umma v. Cherian Koshi ( 1965 KLT 1120 ), and this court repelling the contention observed: 'There is no compelling reason why an agricultural judgment debtor should be benefitted at the expense of or be preferred to a bona fide alienee of the category mentioned. It may be, that in the case of some of them they might have paid much more for the transfer to them, than what their transferor had paid at the court sale. The classification has also a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by Act 31 of 1958, for, while agricultural judgment debtors should be granted relief, such relief should not injure bona fide alienees of a certain category atleast; this is not discrimination." So also the discrimination sought to be made between decree holder purchaser and stranger purchaser. In the case of the former, the judgment debtor need deposit only one half in the first instance and the rest in instalments; but in the case of the latter, as already stated, the entire purchase money has to be deposited for getting the sale vacated. Here also it is not difficult to find a rational basis for differentiation. The decree holder could possibly have invested his money in the transaction, only in dribblets and finally he happens to make the purchase in his name, due to dearth of bidders, for a low price. So he cannot have any grievance when he is paid back also in dribblets. The decree holder could possibly have invested his money in the transaction, only in dribblets and finally he happens to make the purchase in his name, due to dearth of bidders, for a low price. So he cannot have any grievance when he is paid back also in dribblets. In the case of the stranger purchaser, on the other hand, the investment is made in a lump and the purchase also is effected mostly after competition. The discrimination, in the circumstances cannot be said to be irrational or unreasonable. 15. There is, of course, provision for payment of value of improvements effected after the purchase; but there is no provision to compensate the purchaser who has discharged prior encumbrances charged on the property. This aspect was particularly pointed out by Sri. Ravindranathan Nair, who appeared for the petitioner in C.R.P. 124/71. The trial court, we are told, took the view that in the absence of a definite provision to the effect that redelivery will be ordered only after deposit of the value of improvements it is not proper on the part of the court to delay redelivery till the value of improvements is deposited. This, we do not think, is correct. Deposit of value of improvements is provided in sub-s.(5) and redelivery in sub-s.(7). From this circumstance, viz., the provision for redelivery is preceded by the provisions for deposit of value of improvements, it can legitimately be inferred that the intention of the legislature was that the value of improvements should be secured before redelivery is ordered. It is therefore, proper that value of improvements, as determined by the court, is directed to be deposited by the petitioner before redelivery is ordered. But in cases where the auction purchaser paying prior encumbrances, there is difficulty since there is no provision in the Act for reimbursement in respect of the amounts so paid. The only course open for the auction purchaser in such cases will be to recover the amount in other appropriate proceedings. No other point was pressed before us. 16. The impugned provisions of the Act, according to us, are intra vires of the Constitution and have to be upheld. We do so and dismiss these petitions, in the circumstances, without costs. This decision will govern the other connected O. Ps. also.