Judgment 1. This application under Sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, by the petitioners is for quashing the order dated 16th August 1972 passed by Shri B. N. Sahay, Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance against the petitioners under Sections 143, 144, 379 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in this application, it will be necessary to state briefly some relevant facts. An F. I. R. dated 12th April, 1972 (Annexure 1) was lodged by the Sub-Inspector of Riga Police Station against the petitioners, who submitted also the charge sheet against them under various sections, but, however, cognizance against the petitioners was taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate only under Secs. 143, 144, 379 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence under Sec.188 was attracted because it was alleged that the petitioners had disobeyed the order passed under Sec.144 of the Code of the Magistrate on 24th March, 1972 prohibiting the petitioner not to go near the disputed land. 3. Mr. Kedar Nath Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that since the provisions contained under Sec.195 (1) (a) of the Code was not complied the cognizance taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under various sections has got to be quashed. He drew my attention to the said provision of the Section which reads as: "(1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate." Learned Counsel urged that in this case the Magistrate, who had passed the prohibitory order, ought to have filed the complaint and according to the provisions contained under the relevant portion of the section mentioned above, it was the Magistrate whose order was disobeyed had right to file the complaint. Learned Counsel further urged that on the facts and circumstances of the case by reference to annexure 1 it is clear that the alleged offences under Sections 143, 144 and 378 are allied to the offence under Sec.188 of I. P. Code in other words no distinct offence under S.379 or 143 or 144 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out by the informant. In order to substantiate his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Mahendra Prasad Singh V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 Pat 102 : (1970 Cri LJ 484). In that case a prohibitory order was passed by a Magistrate in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code in respect of the land in dispute restraining both the parties from going upon it. One party, against the order, entered upon the land and harvested the crop. The other party filed a complaint of theft. The Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint. M. P. Verma, J. held that there was not much distinction between the language of the provisions of Sections 144 and 145 of the Code in the matter of prohibitory order. Learned counsel relying on the above observations contended that in that case the cognizance under Sec.379 of the Indian Penal Code was also quashed. 4. In my opinion, the above observation of his Lordship is not available on the facts and circumstances of the instant case. I have gone through the first information report contained in annexure 1 to the application. The allegations made in the first information report clearly show that a distinct offence under Sections 379, 143 and 144 is made out in the present case. In that view of the matter, even if the taking of the cognizance under Sec.188 of the Indian Penal Code is quashed, the petitioners can be tried under Sections 143, 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Reference may be made by Basir-ul-Huq V/s. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 : (1953 Cri LJ 1232) where their Lordships in Paragraph 9 of their judgment, while dealing with the provisions contained under Sec.195 of the Code, clearly laid down that if in course of the commission of an offence under Sec.182 other distinct offences were committed the Magistrate was not debarred from taking cognizance in respect of this offence as well. Their Lordships reiterated in paragraph 14: ".........Sec.195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts, and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. Their Lordships reiterated in paragraph 14: ".........Sec.195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts, and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required ..........." The whole question in my opinion, in such cases to be decided is whether there are some distinct offences apart from the offences arising out of the prohibitory order. I have already mentioned earlier that in the present case, on reading the first information report contained under Section 1 clear impression is created that there was distinct offence apart from Sec.188 of the Indian Penal Code. In that view of the matter, I quash the taking of cognizance under Sec.188, of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, whereas the cognizance taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Secs. 143, 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code shall be affirmed. In the circumstances, the application is dismissed with the above modification.