VENKATASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff in RCS. No. 284 of 1955, on the file of the Court of the Third Joint Civil Judge, Jr. Dvn. , Belgaum, and is directed against the judgment and decree of the Second Addl. District Judge, belgaum, made in CA. No. 245 of 1957, on 22-2-1963. This apppeal has been brought up before us for final disposal by virtue of a reference made by Gopivallabha Iyengar, J. , on 10-12-1970. The undisputed facts, briefly stated, are as follows: the suit was one for ejectment based on two rent notes executed by the defendants on 2-5-1951. The suit lands in question are situated within the limits of the Belgaum Municipal Borough. The rent notes were executed in favour of one Laxman Narayan Ananthabat, who was the owner at the relevant time. Although the term of the lease stipulated under the said deeds was one year, the defendants held over the said lands even after the expiry of the said period and continued as tenants on the same terms and conditions. Therefore, under the Bom. Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1948), the defendants became 'protected tenants' entitled to the benefit conferred by the several provisions of that) Act. ( 2 ) BY the Amending Act XXXIII of 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952), which came into force with effect from 12-1-1953, the agricultural lands situated within the Municinal boroughs, constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925, were exempted from the operation of the Act of 1948. The Belgaum municipal Borough was one such. Presumably, taking advantage of this situation the said Laxman Naravan Ananthabhati sold the suit lands to the appellant ("plaintiff) on 30-4-1953 for a consideration of Rs. 49,000. Thp appellant thereupon issued a notice to quit to the defendants on 2-3-1954 and filed the present suit on 29-7-1955. ( 3 ) THEN camp the Amending Art XIII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Art of 1956 ). which was givn effect to from 1-8-1956 Bv this Act, a new S. 43c was introduced, among others. The said section runs thus:"43c Nothing in Ss. 32 to 32b (both inclusive) and 43 shall apply to lands in the areas within the limits of (a) Greater Bombay. which was givn effect to from 1-8-1956 Bv this Act, a new S. 43c was introduced, among others. The said section runs thus:"43c Nothing in Ss. 32 to 32b (both inclusive) and 43 shall apply to lands in the areas within the limits of (a) Greater Bombay. (b) a Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporation Act. 1949. (c) a Municipal Borough constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. (d) a Municipal District constituted under the Bombay District municipal Act, 1901. (e) a cantonment, or (f) anv area included in a Town Planning Scheme under the bombay Town Planning Act, 1954: provided that if any person has acquired any right as a tenant this Act on or after the 28th December 1948, the said right shall not be deemed to have been affected bv the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act. 1952. or (save as expressly provided in Sec. 43d), by the Amending Act, 1955, notwithstanding the fact that either of the said Act has been made applicable to the in which such land is situate. " the reliefs claimed in the suit were: (1) For possession of the suit lands; (2) for payment of Rs. ,1,100, being the arrears of rent for the year 1954-55; and (3) for an enquiry into future mesne profits. The defendants in their defence, mainly depending on the legal effect of the proviso to s. 43c as introduced by the Act of 1956, contended inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable and, in any event, the sale of the suit lands in favour of the appellant-plaintiff was invalid by virtue of the fact that if was one effected in clear contravention of the provisions of S. 64 of the act of 1948. Before the trial Court, no evidence was adduced on behalf of any of the parties, and the case has been fought out on the basis of the admitted facts as set out in the pleadings. For our present purpose, it would he sufficient to set out only two of the issues concerned therein. They are: " Issue (1) Whether the defendant proves that the sale of the suit lands to the plaintiff by Ananthabhat is null and void as contended by them in para 4 of their written statement ? For our present purpose, it would he sufficient to set out only two of the issues concerned therein. They are: " Issue (1) Whether the defendant proves that the sale of the suit lands to the plaintiff by Ananthabhat is null and void as contended by them in para 4 of their written statement ? issue (8) Whether the sale of the suit land to plaintiff is null and void as per the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands Amending Act, 1955. as contended in para 1 of the Additional written Statement Ex. 427. " ( 4 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit of the appellant as praved for. In appeal, the said judgment and decree were reversed and the suit was dismissed. In the course of the appeal the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the sale of the suit lands to the appellant did not operate to confer a valid title. In view of the limited scope and nature of the arguments addressed at the Bar, it is unnecessary to refer to the other findings of the first appellate Court. The contentions urged on behalf of the appellant, briefly outlined, are: (1) the lower appellate Court was in error in not decreeing the suit for possession, notwithstanding the provisions of S 43c of the Act of 1948; (2) the finding that the sale in favour of the appellant was invalid was erroneous: (3) if the sale in favour of the appellant were found to be valid, there ought to be a decree for Rs. 1. 100 being the arrears of rent for the year 1954-55; and (4) if the suit is decreed for possession, a decree for enquiry into future mesne profits should necessarily follow. On behalf of the respondents, the common argument was that the proviso to S. 43c had provided for a retrospective operation whereby the rights of tenants were left unaffected bv the Acts of 1952 and 1956, except as regards matters specifically saved therein, and, therefore, the sale in favour of the appellant would be invalid as it would be a transaction entered into in clear contravention of S. 64 of the Act of 1948. The suit, therefore, has been properly dismissed. The suit, therefore, has been properly dismissed. It may be mentioned here that no specific argument was addressed in support of the reasons given by the lower appellate Court for holding the sale in question as invalid. We shall now proceed to deal with the contentions in the order in which they have been set out earlier. ( 5 ) ON the first contention, the argument on behalf of the appellant was that the suit having been instituted at a time when the Act of 1948 was inapplicable to the area comprised in the Municipal Borough of Belgaum, and the suit lands admittedly being situated within the limits of such municipal Borough, the appellant has a legal or vested right to continue the same as per the law in force at the relevant time, notwithstanding the enactment of the proviso to S. 43c pf the Act of 1948. In answer to this argument, on behalf of the respondents, our attention was invited to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ishverlal v. Motibhai, AIR 1966 SC. 459 . " in the said case, the Supreme Court was actually called upon to decide a similar question arising under the same Act, in circumstances more or less similar to those obtaining in the case before us. The contentions urged on behalf of the appellant in the said case were " (1) that the rights of the respondent in the land conferred or recognised by virtue of the Bombay act 67 of 1948 (i. e. , the Act of 1948), were extinguished on the enactment of the Bombay Act 33 of 1952 (i. e. the Act of 1952), and by the amendments made by the Act 13 of 1956 (which was brought into force during the pendency of the suit) these rights were not restored to the respondent so as to prejudice the appellant's claim to evict him and (2) that the Civil Court was competent in the suit filed by the appellant to grant a decree for possession of the land held by the respondent. " the Court in disposing of these contentions, and holding against the appellant therein, referred to with approval a Full Bench decision of the high Court of Bombay in 60 Bom. L. R. 1383 (FB. ). " the Court in disposing of these contentions, and holding against the appellant therein, referred to with approval a Full Bench decision of the high Court of Bombay in 60 Bom. L. R. 1383 (FB. ). The relevant observations occur at para 13, at page 466 of the said report, and run thus:" In Maganbhai Jethabhai's case (60 Bom. L. R. 1383 (FB)), the bombay High Court held that the proviso to S. 43c affords protection to the tenant if the tenant had the protection of the Act of 1948 as originally enacted notwithstanding that the protection was taken away bv the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) act, 1952. The Bombay High Court also held that the protection of the proviso to S. 43c must be given to the tenant even in cases where it is claimed in a suit filed before the amendment was enacted, if the suit is not finally disposed of We agree with the Bombay High Court on both the questions decided in Maganbhai Jethabhai's case. "it is clear from the above enunciation, that the benefit of the protection afforded to a tenant under the proviso to S. 43c could be claimed by a tenant in any suit before the same is finally disposed of. It follows, therefore, that the appellant would not be entitled to a decree for possession, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This contention, therefore, has to fail and is accordingly rejected. ( 6 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the appellant, relates to the invalidity of the sale effected in favour of the appellant by Laxman Ananthabhalt on 30-4-1953. The argument is that at the time when the sale came to be effected the Act of 1948 was not in force in the area where the lands were situate, by virtue of the Act of 1952. Hence all such transactions were governed by the general law of the land, and the tenant had no rights whatever to be claimed and enforced pursuant to the Act of 1948. In other words, the landlord was not required to comply with any of the provisions of the Act of 1948 before the conveyance of title to an agricultural land to a third party like the appellant before us. In other words, the landlord was not required to comply with any of the provisions of the Act of 1948 before the conveyance of title to an agricultural land to a third party like the appellant before us. To put it in yet another way, since S. 64 was not at all in force at the time of the relevant transaction, no question of complying with its terms would arise. It follows, therefore, that any contravention of the provisions thereof would not attract the penal provisions of sub-sec. (8) of S. 64, under the terms of which any sale made in contravention of this section shall be invalid. It was also contended that the sale in favour of the appellant was concluded and completed in accordance with the law in operation at the relevant time and the proviso to S. 43c did not expressly or by necessary implication provide for a nullification of such tansaction. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the respondents, by way of answer to the above argument, reliance was placed on an enunciation by the Supreme Court in the afore-mentioned case of Iswarlal (1), occurring at para 12 of the report referred to earlier. The passage in question runs thus:" The respondent became on the enactment of Act 67 of 1948 entitled as a tenant to the diverse rights conferred by that Act. The right to claim that every contractual tenancy is statutorily extended for a period of ten years, the right to claim that the tenancy may not be determined otherwise than in circumstances mentioned in S. 14, and in case of protected tenants subject to restrictions imposed by S. 34 the right not to be deprived of possession otherwise than by an order under S. 29 (2), were some of those rights vested in the respondent before act 33/52 was enacted. These and other rights were restored to the tenants retrospectively from the date on which Act 33 of 1952 was enacted by virtue of the express provision contained in the proviso to S. 43c. These and other rights were restored to the tenants retrospectively from the date on which Act 33 of 1952 was enacted by virtue of the express provision contained in the proviso to S. 43c. The Legislature having restored the rights originally granted under Act 67 of 1948 with restropective operation from the date on which Act 33 of 1952 was enacted, a person sued, before Act 13 of 1956 was brought into force, could in a pending suit set up the defence that he is entitled to the rights of a tenant or a protected tenant. "on giving our careful and anxious consideration to the matter, we are clearly of opinion that the contention urged on behalf of the appellant must be accepted as correct, and the finding of the lower appellate Court that the sale in favour of the appellant was invalid, cannot, therefore, be sustained. S. 64 of the Act of 1948 provides, inter alia, for the procedure to be followed by a landlord and a tenant whenever a landlord desires to sell agricultural land coming within the purview of that Act, to any person. It is further provided under sub-sec. (8) of that section that " any sale made in contravention of this section shall be invalid". Any declaration as to invalidity of a sale can therefore, only be made pursuant to the provisions of that sub-section. It seems to us to be plain that any 'contravention' contemplated under the said sub-section is one which would be relatable to the point of time when the offending sale actually took place. It is true that such a sale would become invalid pursuant to sub-sec. (8) of s. 64, even when a transgression of any of the requirements of that section, whether procedural or otherwise, occurs. We have, therefore, to see whether any such transgression of any of the provisions of the said section has in fact occurred or was at all possible at the time the sale in question took place, ( 8 ) WE have earlier referred to the fact that the provisions of the Act of 1948 were inapplicable to the area in which the suit lands were situated during the period between 12-1-1953, when the Act of 1952 was actually brought into force, and 1-8-1956, the date on which the Act' of 1956 came into force. The sale in favour of the appellant was effected on 30-4-1953. In these circumstances it is clear that S. 64 was not in operation at all when the transaction of sale took place. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings assigned to the word 'contravene' is "to tansgress (a law etc. . .)". Any idea of a 'contravention therefore, presupposes the existence of a law or rule having the force of law, in operation at the relevant time. We have earlier noticed that S. 64 was not in force in the territory in which the suit lands are situate at the time the sale in question took place. In such circumstances, we fail to appreciate as to how a 'contravention in the context of the provisions of S. 64 of the Act of 1948, could have occurred by the act of sale in favour of the appellant. It follows from this discussion, that 'the penal consequences envisaged under sub-sec. (8) of S. 64 would also not ensue. Consequently, the sale of the suit lands in favour of the appellant would not be hit by the provisions of sub-sec. (8) of S. 64 of the Act of 1948. ( 10 ) IN our view, this question can also be approached from another angle. It is undoubted that the sale in favur of the appellant was complete and effective in accordnce with the law governing the matter, and was unaffected by the provisions of the tenancy law as the same was not at all in force in the area in which the lands are situated. In other words, it was a valid and concluded transaction at the time it was entered into. A question then would arise whether such a transaction had been actully undone by express words or necessary implication in giving restrospective effect as in the proviso to S. 43c of the Act of 1948. It seems to us that such a transaction remains unaffected by the proviso to S. 43c. On this aspect of the case, it may be relevant to refer to certain observations of the Supreme court in the case of Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W. B. , AIR. 1960 SC. 936. It seems to us that such a transaction remains unaffected by the proviso to S. 43c. On this aspect of the case, it may be relevant to refer to certain observations of the Supreme court in the case of Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W. B. , AIR. 1960 SC. 936. In para 8 of the above report, it is observed thus:" The principles that have to be applied for interpretation of statutory provisions of this nature are well established. The first of these is that statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they are retrospective only if by express words or by necessasy implication the Legislature has made them retrospective; and the retrospective operation will be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made by express words, or necessary implication. . . . . . '" ( 11 ) OUR attention was also invited to a Full Bench decision of the Bombay high Court in support of such a contention. The case is Dhundirajjayaram v. Dhondu Anaji Pilankar, 60 Bom. L. R. 1393, FB. That was also a case arising under the bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the two Amending acts as we are concerned in the present case. The facts in that "case were that the landlord had obtained a decree for ejectment against the tenant on 22nd April, 1955 and obtained possession of the lands in e cation of such decree. Thereafter, the Amendment Act XIII of 1956 force. The tenant applied for redelivery of possession pursuant to S 84 of the act of 1948, on the strength of the retrospective effect conferred by the proviso to Sec. 43c of that Act. A Full Bench of the Court observed, at para 1395 of the aforesaid report, thus:" Now what the tenant is seeking to do is to set aside a decree passed by a competent Court. When the decree was passed on April 22, 1955, that decree was in conformity with the law. The legal fiction introduced by the proviso was not available to the tenant and in as much as the Tenancy Act did not apply to him the landlord was entitled to the decree. When the decree was passed on April 22, 1955, that decree was in conformity with the law. The legal fiction introduced by the proviso was not available to the tenant and in as much as the Tenancy Act did not apply to him the landlord was entitled to the decree. Not only the decree has become final, in as much as no appeal or revision has been preferred against it, but the decree has been executed and possession has been taken by the landlord under that decree. The legal fiction at the highest can be availed of by the tenant in pending proceedings. The tenant can ask a Court either of first instance or of appeal or even of revision to pass a decree in conformity with the law which obtains at present. But the legal fiction does not permit the tenant to tell us that although the Courts passed judgment in accordance with the law, although that judgment has been executed, in view of the legal fiction introduced thereafter he is claiming certain rights which rights he did not have at the date when the litigation finally ended. In our opinion, no Court has ever taken the view that unless the Legislature expressly provides that a particular legal fiction should affect not only pending litigation but decrees passed by a competent Court, that retrospective effect of any legislation can be such as to affect) or prejudice decrees passed by competent courts. " (Underlining (italics) is ours ). It seems to us that the principle underlying the above enunciation would be equally applicable to the facts of the present case. We have here a conveyance by way of sale which was legal and valid at the time it was executed. Title passed to and vested thereunder on the appellant. The proviso to S. 43c merely restored the rights of a tenant or a protected tenant. It has not and cannot render invalid a conveyance by way of sale where title has validly passed from the landlord to the buyer. In the absence of express words in the statute we cannot by implication hold that the proviso to S. 43c has such effect. Disagreeing with the lower appellate court, we hold that the sale in favour of the appellant is valid and that he has acquired a valid title to the suit land. In the absence of express words in the statute we cannot by implication hold that the proviso to S. 43c has such effect. Disagreeing with the lower appellate court, we hold that the sale in favour of the appellant is valid and that he has acquired a valid title to the suit land. The next contention relates to the claim for rent for the vear 1954-55. Tn view of our finding that the appellant has acquired a valid title to the suit lands and was, therefore, in the position of a landlord, the claim in this behalf has to succeed. We hold accordingly. ( 12 ) THE last contention relates to future mesne profits. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that this claim could be upheld only if he were to succeed on the first contention regarding decree for possession. We have earlier held that the appellant would not be entitled to a decree for possession. Hence this contention has to fail. ( 13 ) AS a result, this appeal partly succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated above. The decree under appeal is set aside in so far as it concerns the claim for rent due for the year 1954-55 and the interest due thereon, and the decree of the trial Court to that extent stands restored. The decree of the lower appellate C9urt in so far as it concerns the reliefs of possession and future mesne profits, however, will remain undisuturbed. The appellant will get his costs proportionate to his success both here and in the trial Court, and bear his own in the lower appellate Court. The respondents, however, will bear their own costs throughout. --- *** --- .